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'Why do you demand explanations? If they are given to you, you will
be once more facing a terminus. They can not get you any further than you are
at present.
... the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right
place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond
it.
The difficulty here is: to stop. '
Ludwig Wittgenstein
'Zettel' (58, 8315, 8314)
Abstract.
This thesis has four main objectives; a) to provide an understanding of
Legal Aid Appeals Tribunals, from a description of individual cases and the
activities that occur therein, focusing in the main on those at which an appellant
and/or their representative is present; b) to explore the use of documentation in
the tribunal practices of tribunal panel members, legal aid clerks, appellants and
their representatives; c) to explore the possibilities that post-analytic
etbnomethodology as the adopted research methodology allows, and to clarify
what this radical research 'programme' entails; and d) taking legal positivism
as an epistopic to explore its possible ethnomethodological respecification in
light of the descriptions of practice in legal aid tribunals.
Although this thesis explores the possibility of post-analytic descriptions
it is not a theoretical investigation into post-analytic ethnomethodology, but an
empirical investigation of phenomena of legal aid tribunals which allows an
exploration of the practical application of post-analytic ethnomethodology.
Nevertheless, some clarification is attempted of just what a post-analytic
ethnomethodology may entail. Used in conjunction with the description of the
use of texts in legal tribunals, the investigation of epistopics, though not a
common research practice does here help develop our understanding of the
situated nature of legal practical, legal decision making, and legal objectivity.
In a wider sense this approach highlights an argument made throughout this
research, that texts are both significant and researchable as they are utilised in
everyday practices, and do not have to be research solely with reference to an
isolated reader and an isolated content.
Acknowledgements.
This research is a culmination of a number of years as student of
sociology, in which I have never regretted my choice of subject. I have been
fortunate to receive two ESRC awards whilst a student, and this study is the
direct result of one of these and the indirect result of the other. So to the ESRC
I take my hat off. For direct academic encouragement I am indebted to Prof.
Robert Dingwall and Dr. David Greatbatch, my doctoral supervisors whose
support included involved the encouragement to explore many ideas without any
compulsion to study only their own specialisms. For this, and much more I am
grateful.
I have been fortunate enough to be a student at the University of
Nottingham at a time when the School of Social Studies brought together an
number of people whose interests revolved around ethnomethodology and
conversation analysis. This brought me back together with previous colleagues
and introduced me to new, this was both productive and enjoyable - to all, past
and present at WIT, cheers! I am also indebted to those persons, some of whom
encouraged and some of whom inspired me, whom I met both inside and
outside the boundaries of the University of Nottingham. I have indeed been
shown much kindness.
This research could not have been undertaken without the cooperation
of members of the Legal Aid Board, and I am especially grateful to those
members who acted as clerks at the tribunals and whose welcome made my
fieldwork so enjoyable. Iam also grateful to the other tribunal members and
appellants whose cooperation and tolerance was so forthcoming.
Finally, gratitude must be acknowledged to my family and friends, for
just being there has been support enough. Though I am especially grateful to
my friends Martyn Hudson for there is no doubt that he has been a good one,
and Jon Hindmarsh with whom I have conferenced with, studied with, and








Chapter One - Introduction. 1
1.1 Description of Research. 1
1.2 Access. 2
1.3 Research Sites. 4
1.4 Outline of thesis. 5
Chapter Two - Ethnomethodology and Socio-Iegal Studies. 10
2.1 Legal Aid. 10
2.1a Legal Aid - An Outline of Process. 12
2.2 Disputes and Resolutions. 14
2.3 Tribunals. 20
2.4 Legal Aid Tribunals. 27
III
2.5 Language and Law. 32
2.6 Ethnomethodological Socio-Legal Studies. 37
2.7 Summary. 42
Chapter Three - Towards a Post-Analytic Ethnomethodology. 44
3. 1 Ethnomethodology. 45
3.2 Garfinkel's Original Studies in Ethnomethodology 47
3.2a Documentary Method 53
3.2b Summary 58
3.3 Developments in Ethnomethodology. 60
3.3a Conversation Analysis. 63
3.3b Ethnomethodological Studies of Work 65
3.3c Ethnomethodology Contra Variable Analysis. 68
3.3d Ethnomethodological methods. 73








Chapter Four - Four Phases of Legal Aid Tribunals (and Critique). 94
4.1 The Presentation of the Data Descriptions.
4.2 Two 'Perspicuous' Cases of Legal Aid Tribunals.
4.2a Case One - A Non-Attended Tribunal Hearing.
4.2b Summary.
4.2c Case Two - An Attended Tribunal Hearing.
4.2d Summary.
4.2f Discussion.
4.3 Other Activities in the Four Phases.
4.4 Foreshortened Case Hearings.
4.4a Critique of Four Phases.
4.5 Descriptive Categories in Description
4.5a Zimmerman on Rule Following.
















Chapter Five - A Critique of Legal Positivism. 167
5.1 Legal Positivism. 168
5.1a Rule Following. 172
5.1 b Section Summary. 186
5.2 Section Two - Decision-making. 187
5.2a Sociological positions. 187
5.2b Positivism and Legal Decision Making. 191
5.2c Rule, Objectivity and Decision making. 192
5.2d Ethnomethodology and Decision Making. 196
5.3 Section Three - Legal Positivism and the Sociology of Science. 198
5.3a The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. 198
5.3b Proof Accounts in Mathematics and Physics. 202
5.3c Decision Proof Accounts in Legal a Aid Tribunal. 208
5.4 Chapter Discussion. 211
Chapter Six - The Use of Texts in Tribunals. 213
vi
6.1 Documents Research. 214
6.1 a Dorothy. E. Smith. 222
6.1b A. W. McHoul. 232
6.1c E. Livingston. 239
6.1d Further Ethnomethodological Studies. 243
6.1£ Lynch and Bogen. 247
6.2 Texts in Tribunals. 249
6.2b The Legal Representative and the Focus on Textual Representation.
255
6.3 Chapter Discussion. 264
Chapter Seven - Concluding Comments. 268
7. 1 On the Description of Legal Aid Tribunals. 269
7.2 Document Usage in Lega Aid Tribunals. 271
7.3 Post-Analytic Etnomethodology. 272
7.3a An Understanding of Post-Analytic Ethnomethodology. 273
7.4 Legal Positivism as an Epistopic. 281
vii
7.5 Policy Implications. 282
Appendix One - Tribunal Venues 284
Appendix Two - Transcription Method and Abbreviations. 286




The concerns that initially drove me to start this study originated when
an undergraduate reading Sociology and Social Research at Newcastle
Polytechnic where, for my research dissertation, I attempted to look at textual
interaction. Taking academic disputes in sociology periodicals as its data the
analysis culminated in the modelling of rhetorical reference structures across
the texts. This concern with rhetorical structures also informed the dissertation
of my first Master's degree when reading Sociology of Contemporary Culture
at the University of York. The focus here moved to temporal aspects of the
textual interaction across articles, the main finding being the limitation of such
an approach to texts. My second Master's dissertation, written while reading
Research Methods at the University of Surrey, involved the evaluation of a
quantitative computational text analysis programme on newspaper articles. The
results of this study indicated that such programmes could not by themselves
tell us much about texts, and nothing about textual interaction if not
supplemented by some form of qualitative textual analysis.
It was during a year back at what was now the University of
Northumbria teaching Methods of Social Investigation, and considering how to
apply the continental analysis of Barthes, Derrida, Foucault and others that the
current research project took form. The inspiration for this came not from the
above authors, but from a television programme about inmates of mental
institutions who, after having been committed up to fifty years previously, were
found never to have been mentally ill. The question was asked of these ex-
inmates why they had never said anything at their Mental Health Review
Tribunals. Their replies indicated that they had been on the whole intimidated
by, among other things, the usage of written documentation by the various
professionals at the tribunal. These, often poorly educated people, reported
being intimidated by processes which they had little insight into and no way of
greatly influencing. This exclusion was expressed most obviously in relation to
access to the various texts.
IX
The result of reflection on this situation led to the realisation that the
importance of the texts was not only in their content, but also their deployment
in specific situations. Consequently, it became apparent that to understand
textual interaction, investigation should be of texts interpreted by members of
society in naturally occurring situated activities rather than by researchers or
computer programmes. The development of this conception led to a research
proposal obtaining funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, I
and the production of this thesis under the supervision of Prof. R. Dingwall and
Doctor D. Greatbatch.
The proposed research was very exploratory in its conception, and this
has remained a feature throughout. The research methodology was anticipated
as being ethnomethodologically informed though the final adoption and adaption
of a post-analytic approach has been very reflexive process.
1 ESRC grant award R00429334169.
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Chapter One - Introduction.
The aim of this research is to provide a description of the phenomenon
known collectively as 'legal aid tribunals'. Phenomena, by definition, are
plural, yet, as is taken as the fundamental base-line of this research, each
occasion of a phenomenon is unique. An underlying aim of this thesis has been
not loose sight of the implications that this fundamental observation has on such
a research project as this, i.e. a 'sociologically' based description of a number
of phenomena collectively, and common-sensically, understood as representing
a single type of phenomenon.
At its most basic level this thesis aims to present to the reader, who it
is presumed is unlikely to be familiar with Legal Aid Tribunals, with a series
of descriptions of individual cases, i.e. phenomena. But, and crucially so,
without having distorted through abstraction the individual and unique
occurrences of the phenomenon. Although due to the necessary analytic
requirements imposed on a doctoral thesis the main body of data descriptions
are located in an appendix rather than the main body of the text.
1.1 Description of Research.
The research, sanctioned by the Legal Aid Board, is an inquiry into the
decision making processes of legal aid appeal tribunals by Area Committees in
their processing of claims against the decision by the Legal Aid Board Area
Office to grant, or allow the continuance of, Civil Legal Aid.
The research consisted of the observation, recording and collection of
the textual materials from a number of legal aid appeal tribunals. The tribunals
are from three locations within one of the twelve area offices covering England
and Wales. It was initially thought that ten tribunal sittings! would provide
enough material for the research to move to the description stage. However,
! Each sitting would hear anything from ten to thirty individual cases,
although the number of attended cases would tend not to exceed ten.
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due to some access problems related to consent forms (discussed below), the
actual number of tribunal sittings attended was fifteen. The data collection
consisted of non-participatory observation (to the extent that one can be a non-
participant in situated action) and audio recordings of the tribunals themselves,
the collection of the relevant texts pertaining to the individual cases, and some
ethnographic work necessarily involved in orchestrating the research activity
itself. This coordination was principally with the clerks, qualified solicitors who
the Legal Aid Board area office supply to the local legal aid tribunals, who
oversee the administrative smooth running of the tribunals and return with the
panel's decisions on individual cases to the area office. The research is
therefore informed by informal discussion and interaction central to the
successful completion of inquiries of this type. The data thus provided allows
an ethnomethodological description of verbal and textual contributions in
processing of legal aid tribunals.'
1.2 Access.
Access to these tribunals was negotiated with the central office of the
Legal Aid Board in London and a Legal Aid Board area office during the period
October 1995 to October 1996. The length of this period was due largely to the
sensitive nature of the subject matter of the research and the need by the Legal
Aid Board to protect, as it is required by law, the privacy of its clients.
Negotiations resulted in a contract between the Legal Aid Board, myself, and
the University of Nottingham outlining the parameters of the research project
and the dissemination of the research data and findings.' The consent - although
2 It should be noted that although the research methods have been described
individually, each method will necessarily impact upon the others at the data
collection stage, and also at the 'description' stage.
3 Consent by the Legal Aid Board central office involved: Firstly, the
drawing up and signing of a contract in which the confidentiality and anonymity
of all the parties to the research was to be guaranteed. Secondly, that, due to the
sensitive nature of the research topic and the issues involved, only members of
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this was informal and not on a signed consent form - and assistance of the Legal
Aid Board area office also had to be obtained, as without their cooperation the
research could not go ahead in any practical sense. However, after introductory
meetings with one of the Legal Aid Board area offices in which the nature of
the proposed research was discussed, full cooperation and assistance was
offered. The research project began in earnest in October 1994.
The consent of the individuals whose cases were being heard also had
to be gained. This was stipulated by the Legal Aid Board as well as the 'codes
of ethics' of the SLSA, BSA and others, a factor in the research which was to
prove a bit problematic. Consent forms were produced and were sent out to
appellants with other material from the Legal Aid area office when they were
informed about their case and its hearing etc. However, the return rate for these
forms was exceedingly low, the reason for this was felt to be that the consent
forms just tended to get thrown-out without much consideration. Also presumed
to be a factor was that the return of the forms required 'effort' on the part of the
applicant to read and return the consent form. This problem was overcome by
asking for consent from the appellant or their representative on the actual
occasion of their hearing. This was not done by myself but rather by the
tribunal clerk (member of the Legal Aid area office), the reasons being that it
was felt that the tribunal clerk could explain that it was not part of the hearing
and that refusal would in no way affect their application and hence lessen any
pressure to allow access. This was felt to contrast favourably with refusing the
researcher face to face, which was perceived to be more difficult as the
researcher obviously has an interest in obtaining the cooperation of the
appellant. Further, it would have been impractical for the researcher to obtain
consent as it needed to be obtained when other cases were in progress and the
researcher necessarily otherwise engaged.
the research team will have access to the relevant tapes and texts relating to
each case. Thirdly, that at the end of the research project all material relating
to the research not contained in the theses or related reports, shall be destroyed,
i.e. tapes wiped and legal documentation shredded.
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Although gaining consent from the appellant was very successful in this
manner, as most were more than willing to participate in the research once it
was drawn to their attention, it was only possible to gain consent and access to
the cases which involved some form of representation. Thus cases which did
not involve any attendance did not occasion the possibility for gaining consent
in this manner. Hence only a limited number of unattended cases were
observed.
In the original outline of research agreed with the Legal Aid Board and
the Legal Aid Board area office it was arranged that, for those cases for which
consent had been acquired, access to the relevant texts would be provided
approximately seven days prior to the relevant tribunal. This in effect meant
being sent at the same time as the tribunal panel members the documents that
they receive to read prior to the cases being heard. However, due to the consent
for the research in most cases not being gained until the day of the hearing, the
documentary material accompanying the cases was generally not provided by
the Legal Aid area office until after the event when access had been confirmed.
Although it was not felt that this made any significant difference to the research
process.
1.3 Research Sites.
The actual type of venue for the tribunal hearings varied depending on
the location. The Legal Aid Board does not have its own offices in the region
away from the area office and so venues are negotiated locally, and hence vary
in type depending on availability. One location was a regional Law Society
office's conference room, another was a courtroom in a town's County Court,
and a third was a church hall.
Although the building type and venue 'status' changed depending on
location the actual internal layout tended to be very similar. The tribunal panel
of four would tend to sit in a row facing the appellant and/or their
representative, although on occasion one of the panel members may be located
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to the side at a ninety degree angle depending on the size of the table(s)
everyone sat around. The clerk from the Legal Aid Board area office would
usually sit to one side of the table at a ninety degree angle. I would either be at
a similar location on the opposite side of the table to the clerk or, more usually,
sat three or four feet back from the table at about a forty-five degree angle
facing towards the panel.
It is worth noting that I was always wearing a suit, would be already
seated when an applicant entered the room from the waiting area outside, and
would not appear much different from the clerk and lawyers on the panel. This
was felt to cause the minimum amount of distraction to the tribunal process.
The Clerk and panel members would all have piles of documentation in
front of them while I would be sat with a note pad taking notes throughout, a
tape recorder was placed in the centre of the table between the panel and the
appellant. The tape recorder was of a Dictaphone type and hence fairly small
and inconspicuous. Certainly no appellant drew attention to it and panel
members only rarely so, usually only when the tape was being changed or when
they were talking about informal or 'sensitive' topics, as they attended to them,
between case hearings.
1.4 Outline of thesis.
After this Introduction the literature review in Chapter Two covers a
number of areas starting with an outline of the historical and statutory material
surrounding legal aid, viewing disputes and tribunals in a broader perspective
before returning to research on legal aid. We see how the focus on language
and law provides a suitable orientation that may be adopted towards the
investigation of tribunal, and that the ethnomethodological perspective is a
highly recommended research strategy in this area.
In the following chapter, Chapter Three, we shall try and clarify what
ethnomethodology is, what post-analytic ethnomethodology is, and how both
have been adopted and adapted to our research concerns. Initially we will focus
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on the research 'method' of ethnomethodology by concentrating on Garfinkel's
'Studies in Ethnomethodology' (1967a) locating some focal points of reference
for this thesis. It will be suggested that a fuller understanding of Garfinkel's
ethnomethodology can be obtained when viewed in relation to the similar
'ethnomethodological' projects that developed alongside and from his initial
work, and we will briefly look at the cognitive sociology of Aaron V. Cicourel
(1973) and the conversation analysis of Harvey Sacks (1992). Returning to the
work of Garfinkel we shall look at the current nature of his work as reflected
in the 'studies of work' programme, and contrasting this with formal analysis
methodology, note ethnomethodology's concern with the description of the
methods members use to produce phenomena of order*. Following this we
move to a focus on the post-analytic position of Lynch and Bogen (1996),
noting their concern with 'epistopics'. We will refer to Lynch's (1993)
programme for research and describe how this has been interpreted and
implemented in this thesis.
Chapter Four, the main data chapter, initially discusses the way in which
the data in the thesis is to be presented is described; the form of presentation
being very much part of the whole methodological orientation of the research
and not separate. Following this, Section Two instead of an overview in which
we gloss the work that is done in the tribunal, presents instead two 'perspicuous
instances', one of an unattended case and one of an attended case. These two
cases are presented and described separately. From the 'attended' case it is
noted that the tribunal members display attention to four 'phases' in the
tribunal, these are summarized as: 1. Discussing the case and deciding on what
to ask the appellant; 2. Discussing the case with the appellant; 3. Considering
the case and coming to a decision, and; 4. Delivering the decision of the panel
to the appellant.
This chapter continues with a third section which explores some of the
activities that occur in Legal Aid Tribunals which were not present in the two
'perspicuous' cases of the second section. Again, rather than through the use
of glosses actual instance from the data are presented to the reader, here use is
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made of data segments although full case transcripts and description are
provided in Appendix Three. A fourth section attempts to provide a corrective
to the development of the four phases described above, this is to illustrate that
the 'four phases' can not be adopted as an all encompassing descriptive model.
Reference is made here to the work of Zimmerman (1971) as we as illustration
from 'perspicuous' cases.
Chapter Five investigates the 'epistopic' of legal positivism as both a
theoretical position and a practical orientation by legal practitioners. Beginning
with a review of legal positivism and its critics, the focus moves to the issue of
legal decision-making and the positivist approach to this referencing the
empirical data of this thesis. It is then suggested that some of the seemingly
intractable debates surrounding legal positivism can be clarified via an
ethnomethodological respecification of the epistopics around which much debate
centres. Such a respecification, it is argued, is not the adoption of either
scepticism or relativism, but an attempt to understand what legal 'objectivity'
is. Such a move, it is suggested, inevitably leads us to re-evaluate the view of
objective legal decision making within the positivist/relativist debate. This
position is illustrated from both the work of jurors and scientists in studies by
Garfinkel (1967a, 1967b) and Livingston (1993).
Chapter Six concentrates on the role of textual documentation in the
legal aid process and reviews an number of studies and commentators who have
researched textual documentation claiming some influence from, or orientation
to, ethnomethodology. In reviewing this material it is been suggested that much
of it appears to be methodologically problematic, this is not a claim that these
studies are without merit but a highlighting of the degree of difficulty involved
in such projects. We shall see that both Dorothy E. Smith and A. W. McHoul
amongst others have, to a greater or less extent, had significant insights about
why the use of textual documentation needs to be investigated, but have had
problems in designing and carrying-out coherent research programmes. It will
be suggested that the research that comes closest to addressing our research
interests and methodological concerns is that deployed by Lynch and Bogen
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(1996). This chapter then investigates specific instance of textual usage in Legal
Aid tribunals and it is suggested that we can seen that the documents provide
not a single representation of events, but provide for a number of
representations which are situationally invoked and deployed by the various
participants. It is suggested that these representations, although invoked during
the on-going situated interaction may also relate to varying temporal periods
depending upon the concerns of the participants. This data not only confirms
some of the observations made about the 'simplistic' view of representation
adopted by legal positivism made in Chapter Five, but also highlights
methodological problems raised with regard to the investigation of texts by
investigations discussed earlier in the chapter. It also suggests reasons why
tribunal panel members prefer appellants to attend tribunals, in that by doing
so they can help unravel what the texts are intended to represent as appeal
documents.
In the concluding discussion of Chapter Seven we cover the four main
areas of concern for this thesis: a) to provide a description of the activities that
can occur in Legal Aid Tribunals, b) to explore the use of documentation in the
tribunal practices of tribunal panel members, legal aid clerks, appellants and
their representatives; c) to do so through the adoption and adaption of a post-
analytic ethnomethodology, and d) to apply this to an epistopic discussion of
legal positivism.
As is noted through this thesis that the post-analytic ethnomethodology
that Lynch and Bogen advocate, is both relatively recent, and I suggest,
methodologically sophisticated, radical, challenging and not yet fully worked
out. Part of this thesis has been concerned with an exploration and explanation
of this 'methodological'. As a result of this the conclusion contains within the
discussion of post-analytic ethnomethodology my view of what can be
understood, or at least what I have understood by it.
It will be necessary to then enter into a discussion of the possibility of post-
analytic description, and how its 'post' analysis rather than 'anti-analysis' can
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be applied in practice. The point to be stressed again here is that this is all very
exploratory. Finally, comment is made upon the 'policy' implications of this
thesis.
9
Chapter Two - Ethnomethodology and Socio-Iegal Studies.
The review presented in this chapter focuses on the presentation of a
coherent picture of the existing literature relevant to this thesis. Any review in
such circumstances is destined to be only partial as the amount of material
published of potential relevance is extremely large. The aim has been to use the
literature review to orientate the reader to the central concerns of the thesis and
in doing so it has been necessary to neglect much material on jurisprudence, the
philosophy of language, the history of science, the sociology of science, the
sociology of law, critical legal studies, literary criticism and much more besides
which has in some fashion influenced this thesis.
At times the discussion necessarily covers the literature in a broad
fashion, at others it is more in-depth. Initially we shall look at legal aid before
moving on to disputes and their resolutions in general. The next topic is that of
tribunals and then specifically legal aid tribunals. Following this we move to the
issue of language and law where a case is made for the use of
ethnomethodology as suitable research method for this thesis.
2.1 Legal Aid.
The current form of civil legal aid as a means of financing legal action
in Britain has its origins in the Rushcliffe Committee which reported in May
1945. Civil legal aid was to replace the Poor Persons Procedure, but was also
to be available to those of moderate means. Depending on ones wealth it would
be free or there would be a requirement of some form of contribution (Hansen
1992: 85). Unlike the changes to the provision of health services that the welfare
state brought about, the structure of the legal profession remained largely
unchanged. This was due to the committee adopting almost in whole a reform
plan put forward by the Law Society, the solicitors own representative body.
In this the Law Society was the administrative body handling the day-to-day
running of the scheme, and remained so-doing until the Legal Aid Act of 1988
10
which transferred it to the newly formed Legal Aid Board.
There has been a considerable erosion of eligibility for the award of
legal aid since it was first set up, although the 'poor' have always been, and
still remain, eligible for free legal aid. However, those of 'moderate means'
initially included in the scheme have been dramatically reduced as a percentage
of recipients over the past two decades, to the extent that eleven million adults
lost their eligibility for civil legal aid between 1979 and 19904 (ibid:88). On
12th April 1993 further tightened means-testing resulted in millions more
people losing their entitlement to legal aid (Hansen 1993:9), when Lord
Hailsham as Lord Chancellor was the first to actively to reduce eligibility. As
part of the same cost-saving exercise remuneration for solicitors was also cut.
The reason for this was due to rapidly increasing legal aid expenditure which
had soared from a net £191.8 million in 1981/82 to an estimated £698 million
in 1991/2, and to £857 million to 1992/3 even though eligibility had decreased.
The cost increase being due to both an increase in the number of cases, and to
increases in the average cost of each case. These cost increases might have
remained less visible except for the fact that the budget for criminal legal aid
moved from the Home Office to the Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD).
This made that growth more obvious, relative to the comparatively small budget
of the LCD. On the civil side, a rising divorce rate and increased home
ownership have led not only to more cases but also to more complicated and
protracted property disputes (Hansen 1992: 87).
Over recent years the future of the legal aid scheme has been a major
subject of concern and speculation. Legal aid work itself was seen as the least
profitable, or even as loss-making, work by a majority of solicitors in a survey
conducted by the Law Society Research and Policy Planning Unit in 1989. But
since the 1960's onwards, it has also been seen as a central aspect of civil
justice within the legal profession itself, embodied in the setting up by lawyers
committed to the expansion and improvement of publicly funded legal services
4 Data from Michael Murphy, Civil Legal Aid Eligibility Estimates 1979-90
(1990), quoted in Hansen (1992:88).
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in 1971 of the Legal Action Group (LAG) (Ibid:91-93). This group now
coordinates much of the campaign against the erosion of the legal aid scheme.
Since the start of the 1990's the legal system as a whole has been under
various reviews, many of which have a direct impact on the provision of legal
aid. At the same time the Legal Aid Board has introduced franchising into the
provision of legal aid. Franchising, initially piloted in 1990 whereby solicitors
offices take over aspects of the administration of legal aid from the Legal Aid
Board area office, was initially criticized as an attempt to restrict the number
of solicitor's offices dispensing legal aid for economic reasons, although it was
recognised that such a move did offer potential for greater quality control
(Ibid:97). The system is now almost fully in place, although it still runs
alongside the previous system of area office administration, though changes to
the provision of legal aid are by no means over and suggestions for the revision
of practices are constantly being suggested."
2.1a Legal Aid - An Outline of Process.
There are three main forms of legal aid, these are: Legal Advice and
Assistance (also known as the Green Form scheme) which covers advice and
help with any legal problem, and in some cases, under what is called Assistance
by Way of Representation (ABWOR), also covers going to court; civil legal aid
for when a case has to go to court; and criminal legal aid for some criminal
offences." The Legal Aid Board administers Legal Advice and Assistance
(including ABWOR) and legal aid for civil proceedings under the general
guidance of the Lord Chancellor. For this purpose England and Wales are
5 An example of such a suggestion is that of the introduction of health
services type reforms, as applied to District Health Authorities and budget-
holding general practitioners for internal markets, be introduced by the Legal
Aid Board (Carter and Forest 1992:30). Since legal aid, like health reform, is
highly political it is likely that the new government will introduce its own
reform programme.
6 As outlined in the pamphlet 'A Practical Guide to Legal Aid' (1994:2).
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divided into a number of areas." Each area has a Legal Aid Board office and an
area committee made up of practising solicitors and barristers.
The area office decides whether an application for civil legal aid satisfies
the merits test. The merits test checks that the applicant "has reasonable
grounds for taking, defending or being party to the proceedings... there are
reasonable grounds if:
(a) there is an issue of fact or law which should be submitted to the courts
for a decision;
(b) the solicitor would advise the applicant to take or defend proceedings
privately, i.e. if he had means that were adequate to meet the likely costs
of the case or would make payment of the likely costs possible although
something of a sacrifice; and
(c) the applicant shows that, as a matter of law, he has reasonable
grounds for taking or defending proceedings, i.e. that there is a case or
defence which has reasonable prospects of success, assuming the facts are
proved." (Legal Aid Handbook 1994:58)
There is a also a means test which is carried out by the Legal Aid
Assessment Office.8 The area offices can either grant or refuse? legal aid, but
if applicants or their legal advisers are dissatisfied with the decision of the legal
aid officials, they may apply to an appeals tribunal or area committee'? which
7 There are twelve area Legal Aid Offices covering England and Wales.
8 The Legal Aid Assessment Office is a part of the Benefits Agency and
carries out a means assessment of the applicant's disposable income, capital and
any contribution if they are eligible.
9 Apart from a merits test the case is also subjected to a reasonableness test,
they can be refused on this even if they have passed the merits test. An
application is "likely to be refused as unreasonable if:
(a) the application reveals some illegal motive or the conduct of the applicant
is such as to be unacceptable to the court (but moral character on its own is
should not be a bar to a grant);
(b) the proceedings are not likely to be cost effective, Le. the benefit to be
achieved does not justify the costs." (Legal Aid Handbook 1994:59)
10 Area committees do not have a static membership and each meeting of the
area committees may have a different membership constitution - solicitors and
barristers would register with the Legal Aid area office for them to be entered
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deals with appeals against refusals of legal aid. If they are still dissatisfied they
may seek an appeal for judicial review, for which legal aid is available if
criteria are met. 11
The administration of criminal legal aid is the responsibility of the Lord
Chancellor (A Practical Guide to Legal Aid - Pamphlet 1994:3). The provisions
relating to legal aid are contained in the Legal Aid Act 1988 and regulations
made by the Lord Chancellor. Part III of the Act covers Advice and Assistance
(including ABWOR), Part IV covers civil legal aid and Part V covers criminal
legal aid (Ibid:4).
2.2 Disputes and Resolutions.
Legal aid as both a concept and practice is situated within the domain
of literature on disputes and their resolutions, as such it will be useful to has
some familiarity with this area before continuing. Many socio-legal studies take
as their focus 'disputes' and use 'dispute' as an analytical category, 12 but it must
onto the committee rota of members. Further area committees do not meet in
one location in the area but rather in a number of locations usually dealing with
local cases. For the area of this particular research there were five locations
spread throughout the area that committees would meet at. Each area committee
tends to be constituted from the practising solicitors and barristers of that
locality.
II Of interest here is the advice given to solicitors in one of the texts that
acts as a guide for practising solicitors with regards legal aid:
"In taking a particular decision, officials may be following policy - or
they may be taking an arbitrary action. If the latter, a complaint to the official's
superiors may be more effective and quicker than a formal appeal under
regulations; if the decision was based on policy, the Board may be persuaded
to change that policy." (Hansen 1993: 11)
This form of 'appeal' is however, outside the orbit of this research
project.
12 Trubek (1980-81a:494) justifies his use of a disputes focused approach by
stating a concern for the social relations and conflicts behind the formal
structures of the lawsuit. Such abstract concerns always needing the use of
theoretical concepts.
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be realised that a 'dispute' is something carved out and constructed from
ongoing activity. Also, that a "Dispute overlaps but is not co-extensive with
civil lawsuit. Not all lawsuits are disputes, and few disputes become lawsuits"
(Trubek 1980-81 :489).
While we must remain aware of the theoretically constructed nature of
the concept of a dispute," it will be informative to look at some of the literature
which references phenomena in this way. For instance, disputes have been seen
to be normative claims to entitlement whose validity has been contested.
However, for grievances to become disputes they must be communicated to a
person who denies validity, or refuses to satisfy, the claim." Hence disputes are
seen here in the context of grievance processing" (Lempert 1980-81: 708- 711).15
A much more rigorous approach to the notion of disputes is taken by
Robert L. Kidder (1980-81) who believes: "What we need to know is how the
mechanisms for dispute processing, both formal and informal, get created,
modified, and incorporated into the strategies of competing interests"
13 The construction of 'disputes' is not just an issue at a theoretical level as
Edelman, Abraham and Erlanger (1992) report that the theoretical construction
of disputes by lawyers and legal theorists actively shapes organisational
structures and responses.
14Kritzer (1980-81) has a similar definition of disputes as grievance
processing, and one bearing similarities to the occurrence of a dispute that goes
to a legal aid tribunal:
"We conceptualized a dispute as a social relationship created when
someone (an individual, a group, or an organization) has a grievance, makes a
claim, and has that claim rejected. A grievance is a belief in entitlement to a
resource which someone else can grant or deny. A claim is a demand or a
request for the resource in question made to a person or organization with the
ability (at least in the mind of the claimant) to accept or deny the claim."
(Kritzer 1980-81 :510)
1.5 Lempert is interested in the implications of effective or ineffective and
biased or unbiased systems of dispute settlement. This critical socio-Iegal
research although not without interest, is not of central concern to this thesis,
neither are the associated discourses on power and justice at the macro-social
level, although Legal Aid is often discussed in these terms.
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(ibid:724).16 Kidder advocates the dropping of the 'dispute processing'
terminology which he sees leading to functionalist research strategies and the
recognition of the ideological nature of dispute settlement (ibid:725). While
Kidder too is concerned with macro issues such as access to justice, power and
class dynamics, he nevertheless recognises the need for a focus, at least
initially, on the actual practices of dispute processing. From the above we can
see why Trubek (1980-81b) notes disagreement among commentators on the use
of 'dispute' as a conceptual link between legal and social phenomena. Trubek
states in relation to these differences that the "problem is not one of method, in
the narrow sense of surveys versus observation, but one that reaches to the
nature of social research itself" (ibid:3-4).
An important observation on the nature of disputes is that made by
Felstinger, Abel and Sarat (1980-81) in their article 'The Emergence and
Transformations of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming', when they observe
that:
"In the conventional view of disputes, the sources of claims and rejections
are objective events that happen in the past. It is accepted that it may be
difficult to get the facts straight, but there is rarely an awareness that the
events themselves may be transformed as they are processed". (ibid
p637)17
Nevertheless, for transformations to occur they must be actively done through
the practices of individuals throughout the career of a dispute, and these
practices must be researchable with reference to situated activities not the
abstractions of general models. Though such research will not answer the
16An example of what this might reveal is give by Edelman, Erlanger and
Lande (1993) who illustrate how disputes in Civil Rights Law issues in the
workplace get recast as managerial problems. The paper also illustrates how
Alternative Dispute Resolution can actually undermine legal rights.
17Miller and Holstein (1995:57) suggest that a form of a dispute "might
change so radically as it shifts interpretive locales that it may be problematic to
treat it as the same dispute in different settings."
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questions that Felstinger, Abel and Sarat had in mind for such research."
A related research issue is that much of the research in the socio-legal
field, whether focusing on disputes or not, is concerned with legal reform either
for social or financial reasons. Such research requires methodological precision
in obtaining systematic data about law, and calls for vastly different personnel
and material resources from 'classical' legal research focusing upon case
decisions, statutes, commentary, and other documentary sources of law then
applied to legal theory (Rosenburg 1980-81 :474-475). Rosenburg like many
others displays a limited view of the types of research methods that might be
brought to bear, nevertheless it will be informative to look at some of these
studies to see the methods used and the analytic tools deployed.
Kritzer (1980-81) identifies three fundamental sampling units: the case,
the institution, and the participant, noting key aspects and limitations of each
and concluding "the utility of a mixed strategy to dispute processing."
(ibid:504-505) Coming from the Critical Legal Studies tradition Kritzer's
approach, allowing as it does the validity of ethnographically orientated
research, is more open in the type of methods to be used than some more
traditional socio-legal research which rely upon quantitative research methods.
Nevertheless, Kritzer's methodological recommendations depend upon imposing
a predetermined methodology upon the phenomena. Increasingly many socio-
legal studies now employ a combination of methods in their research, often in
an attempt to overcome the perceived limitations of one method over another,
rather than because the phenomena under investigation drives such an approach.
Vidmar (1984) for example reports an empirical study of a Canadian small
claims courts and notes the use of random sampling of cases, the use of
18 Their hope for such research being that:
"By directing attention to dispute antecedents, the study of
transformations should illuminate both the ways in which differential experience
and access to resources affect the number and kinds of problems that mature
into disputes and the consequence for individuals and society when responses
to injurious experiences are arrested at an early stage (e.g. depoliticization,
apathy, anomie)." (Felstinger, Abel and Sarat 1980-81:649-650)
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interviews with both plaintiff and defendant before the hearing, the observation
of cases that went to trial, and the use of follow-up interviews. These
contemporary social-legal research methods being combined with the more
classical legal research method of examining of court records.
Socio-legal research frequently seems to focus on the reasons for
behaviour, whether on macro concepts such as economic factors shaping basic
decisions affecting the careers of disputes (Johnson Jr. 1980-81), or less
tangible concepts such as the management of uncertainty (Flood 1991). Studies
using ethnographic methods have highlighted the role of interaction, noting for
example that "Corporate lawyers spend roughly 55 percent of their chargeable
time in some form of talk with others" (Flood 1991 :48).19 The focus on
language in socio-legal studies is especially evident in studies of ADR practices
such as mediation. Cobb and Rifkin (1991) in their study of neutrality in
mediation examined neutrality as a discursive practice with a focus on the
management of stories. In this instance the analysis highlighted "the surface, the
definitions, metaphors, semantic frames, and narrative content that are specific
to the way mediators 'talk' neutrality" (ibid:37). In such research the use of
video or audio tapes is a necessity for any real understanding of the talk, which
otherwise could not be recorded adequately. Cobb and Rifkin used a
Foucaultian perspective, and though analysis of recordings in such research
varies with different methodological perspectives the importance of such
focuses on the language of law is its anti-foundational shift, as Cobb and Rifkin
(1991) state:
"The shift from a foundational to a poststructural perspective on
mediation requires, as we have noted, a shift in our understanding of the
nature of language - from the notion that language represents reality
toward the notion that language constitutes reality. The shift focuses
attention on the process in and through which meaning is managed, the
way that dominant discourses are bought forth, reconstituted in practice,
and contested; and how alternatives to them are marginalized and, on
19Throughout this thesis, unless stated otherwise, all emphasis within
quotations belong to the original texts.
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occasion, transformed". (ibid:50-51)
In recent years there has been a lot of interest in aspects of disputing
involving less distinctively "legal" processes and personnel (Fitzgerald and
Dickens 1980-81), tribunals often being seen as representatives of such
alternatives. This can be seen in the context of there being an incalculable
number of disputes and resolution practices occurring in society which may be
more or less institutionalised. Where resolution practices are institutionalised
it is often the distribution of financial resources which will affect the manner
in which parties may approach disputes (Mcintosh 1980-81:841), the idea of
legal aid of course being to overcome such disparities. However, this support
is often seen to be a process by which disputes are pushed into a legal arena,
and there is some concern about this legalisation, although admittedly more
emphasis is given to the cost of this process. Nevertheless, the movement of
disputes into the legal arena is seen by some as not necessarily an undesirable
outcome since this both legitimises action, and shapes the objective possibilities
of success should action be taken (Miller and Sarat 1980-81:527). However,
they stress that "availability is not accessibility" (ibid:540).
The issue of accessibility and the desirability of legally minded dispute
settlement which led to the introduction of legal aid in post-war Britain, was
also an issue in the U.S.A. where lack of money to bring or defend a court
case, was felt to be preventing many disputes from being adequately settled
(Hurst 1980-81:443). To a greater, or lesser extent, through legal aid and
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) initiatives in allowing adequate
provision, concern has moved towards their quality. However, such a move
needs to be taken with caution for, for as Bush (1989) notes in relation to ADR:
"ADR is not an alternative to the courts [and] the litigation/ADR
distinction is more fiction than fact... the litigation/ADR dichotomy
obscures the many important distinctions between different ADR
processes, lumping them together as if ADR was one homogeneous
institution set apart from the courts". (Ibid:342-343)
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Clarity is needed here to avoid imprecise characterizations of processes,
through the adoption of ready-made categories. If looking at a singular dispute
resolution process, whether court based or ADR, we need to know the process
thoroughly itself rather than assume some process due to categorization
practices in the literature. While I am not rejecting some notion of generalisable
goals common to disputes, they should not necessarily be prioritised over
contextually situated practices. This calls for a more focused research into
decision-making practices than a broad generalising, and here our focus is on
tribunals, and legal aid's administrative tribunals in particular.
2.3 Tribunals.
The majority of administrative tribunals in existence at present are a
result of the Welfare State which had its origins in the National Insurance Act
of 1911,20 and the social security programme of the post-war government and
the policy of increasing regulation (Wraith & Hutchinson 1973:39). Although
a minority originated during the industrial revolution e.g. the adjudication
processes in the development of the railways, with only the General
Commissioners of Income Tax surviving as an example of a tribunal system of
any great antiquity (ibid: 17). Presently more than fifty tribunals are overseen
by the Council on Tribunals, although a small number of tribunals exist outside
of this regulatory system.
The growth in the number of tribunals within the Welfare State led to
the Franks Committee on Administrative Tribunal and Inquiries of 1955, which
reported in 1957. The report identified the tribunals as a new phenomenon
existing on the borderline between Administration and the Judiciary, and
20 "In an earlier measure - the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908 - the Liberal
Government had learnt from the discouraging experience of workmen's
compensation and had avoided the courts, placing the administration of the
scheme in the hands of 'pensions committees' of the major local authorities. An
appeal against their decisions lay first to the committees themselves and thence
to the Local Government Board". (Wraith & Hutchinson 1973:33)
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resulted in raising the status of such tribunals. The Report itself emphasised the
social, as opposed to the legal, requirements of natural justice and highlighted
citizens' rights, although the Report has been criticised for failing to see the
potential scope of a tribunal system and making recommendations on such a
basis. Instead, "The Committee apparently saw itself as merely initiating a
review of tribunals, of beginning a task which would be continued by the
proposed council [Council on Tribunals]" (ibid:41-42).
Contemporarily, it is the social aspect identified by the Franks
Committee that has been felt to be under threat in the tribunal system,
ironically, just as tribunals and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) systems
in general have become high profile in areas from matrimonial to commercial
disputes. This threat is especially felt to be the case in the ever more court-like
industrial tribunals, where cheapness, speed and informality have been
undermined by a long-term trend towards legalism (Lewis and Clark 1993:7).
However tribunals appear in relation to the courts, it is claimed (Hasenfeld et
al. 1987) that any encounter that a member of the public is likely to have with
a tribunal will take the form of as bureaucratic interaction with welfare state
system. Although as rights under the welfare state are not universal and services
are not equally distributed, with welfare bureaucracies having correspondingly
varying administrative structures and processes, such encounters will be as
diverse in nature as the welfare services themselves. These structures and
processes influence the content and form of the bureaucratic encounter. 21
Hasenfeld et al. nevertheless believe four dimensions to such encounters are
21 Hasenfeld et al. note with regards to the diversity the Welfare State:
"Although the term 'welfare state' is a loosely used term, it is possible
to stake out some general boundaries of the concept. In the definition guiding
most empirical research, the welfare state refers to the non-market,
governmental provision of, or direct funding of, consumption needs in such
areas as income, housing, and health care. Core programs are income programs
for the elderly, medical care, unemployment subsidies, and various forms of
public assistance". (1987:389)
Though some care is needed in the acceptance of such boundaries as
they have already be described as rhetorical constructs.
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identifiable:
"(a) the social correlates of the demand for services that is linked to the
extent of rights to and awareness of the sector's services; (b) the sector's
structure, which includes the universality of its domain, the scarcity of its
services, and the administrative control over them; (c) the sector
administration, which refers to the discretion of officials and their level
of professionalization; and (d) the norms governing the bureaucratic
encounter." (ibid:399)
While these should therefore also be applicable to Legal Aid provision, the are
at a level not the focus of this research, more directly relevant is the
observation that Welfare Sector processing of people involves the bureaucratic
activities of:
"(a) determination of the organizational jurisdiction over applicants and
their needs; (b) a determination of eligibility to organizational goods and
services; and (c) a determination of the amount of goods and services to
which the applicant is entitled." (ibid:401)
From this we can gather that a member of the public's encounter with
such a Welfare bureaucracy encounter initially revolves around information
processing. The bureaucracy will have developed a decision-making system that
circumscribes practice, with a concern for universalism, predictability, and
accountability, although usually without eliminating all discretion. Importantly,
such systems often allow applicants to challenge the system's decisions through
an appeal procedure, as is the case with legal aid. The appeals processes
themselves tend to be passive mechanisms which must be activated by members
of the public pro-actively. This activation varies from service to service in the
Welfare system, and certainly it appears to be the case in the area of legal aid
that appellants for services may be informed and encouraged by their solicitor.
This does not of course mean that motivation and commitment is evenly
22
distributed either among appellants of solicitors. 22 The issue of the effect of a
solicitor on tribunal proceedings and outcomes, and not just legal aid tribunals,
has been a salient issue in debates on civil justice, and consequently a concern
for the Council on Tribunals.
In its annual report" for 1994/95 the Council on Tribunals" reports on
the Green Paper" entitled "Legal Aid - Targeting Need", which discussed the
then governments intended changes for the delivery of legal aid, changes
intended to improve access to justice. The Council acknowledged that it had no
"legitimate basis for offering comments" on the provision of publicly-funded
legal services, but maintained an interest in proposals for the public funding of
work in the area of social welfare law contained in the Green Paper, and
"invited views on whether this should include the funding of representation at
those tribunals whose jurisdiction covers that category of work" (Council on
Tribunals 1995). Without going into detail of the Council's views on the Green
Paper, on the question of whether legal aid should be available for
representation in non-court based proceedings including tribunals, the Council
stated:
22 Legal aid is not dependent solely on the proactive efforts of the appellant
as: "Failure to advise a client who is financially eligible about legal aid would
probably amount to a breach of the solicitor's duty to act with reasonable skill
and care, and would therefore be actionable on the part of the client.. .failure
to do so could lead to a finding that the solicitor had provided inadequate
professional services, and in serious cases a finding of professional misconduct,
as well as giving rise to a claim in negligence". (Hansen 1993: 1)
23 The Annual report of the Council on Tribunals 1994/95, London, HMSO.
24 The Council on Tribunals was set up by the Tribunals and Inquiries Act
1958 and now operates under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992. It is a body
which exercises supervision over some seventy-three systems of tribunals in the
United Kingdom. Although, rather ironically considering its concerns over legal
aid, not the Legal Aid Appeals Tribunals.
25 A Green Paper is a command paper containing policy proposals to be
discussed by the British Parliament.
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"We were firmly of the view that it should. We welcomed the recognition
given in the paper to the importance of the research in this area conducted
by Hazel and Yvette Genn, and reminded the Government of the main
findings of the Genn Report, as detailed in our 1989/90 Annual Report,
and of their direct relevance to the issue in question." (ibid:7)26
In their 1989/90 Annual Report (Council on Tribunals 1990) they note
that in response to the Legal Aid Act 1988, their Annual Report for 1987/88
registered concern at the Act's lack of provision for legal aid to those attending
tribunals. They state that they believed that the reason for this was due to the
Lord Chancellor's commissioning of research on this issue by Genn and Genn,
and that it was unlikely to come to any decision before that report was complete
(ibid:9). In the 1989/90 report the Council discusses the Genn and Genn Report
(1989) and their discussion with Hazel Genn, they state: "The Report provides
incontrovertible evidence not only of the importance of representation at
tribunals, but also of the need to ensure that the formality and complexity of
certain tribunals is taken into account when deciding what level of
representation should be appropriate" (Council on Tribunals 1990: 10). That
success at tribunal was "significantly affected by the fact of representation and
by the quality of representatives coming before tribunals" and that "Poor
representation has a detrimental effect on the conduct and outcome of
hearings ... " (ibid: 11).
The Genn and Genn report itself, entitled 'The Effectiveness of
Representation at Tribunals' (1989), was a result of research commissioned by
26So as not to misrepresent why the Council believed that representation
was a desirable thing, it is to be noted that they state" ... we continue to come
across major deficiencies in the provision of effective advice and representation,
leading to examples of unmeritorious cases clogging the lists,
of unnecessary and wasteful adjournments or delays because parties are poorly
prepared or ill-equipped for the hearing and, most disturbingly apparent, of
prejudice to the outcome through the absence of effective representation"
(Council on Tribunals 1995).
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the Lord Chancellor's Department" following the Legal Aid Scrutiny of 1986
and a White Paper" in 1987. The Scrutiny had "envisaged a planned approach
to advice and tribunal representation which would make 'effective use' of the
skills of lay advisors and solicitors", but the White Paper required research into
the effectiveness of representation at tribunals before any extension into this
area of law (ibid.I)." The questions underlying the research were: "are
represented cases more likely to succeed?; and, if so, what is it about
representation that causes cases to succeed, or what is it about tribunals that
renders representation necessary or desirable in producing successful
outcomes." (ibid:4) Briefly, the study was a comparative one investigating the
operation of four types of tribunals: Social Security Appeals Tribunals;
Industrial Tribunals; hearings before Immigration Adjudicators; and Mental
Health Review Tribunals. Data was collect in the form of; quantitative data
analysis of tribunal files, observation of hearings, and interviews.
In their summary" Genn and Genn report that:
"Interviews with appellants and applicants conducted at tribunal hearings
have provided evidence of the extent to which representation can reduce
the difficulties faced by appellants and applicants in pressing their cases,
increase participation in the process and contribute to the feeling that
appellants and applicants have had a fair hearing. Interviews also provide
evidence of the extent to which representation can make the process of
losing tribunal cases more acceptable to appellants." (ibid:242)
27 The Lord Chancellor is a Cabinet Minister in the Government and is head
of a department that has responsibility for the judiciary in England and Wales,
and also responsibility for legal aid. Legal aid had previously been the
responsibility of the Home Office.
28 A White Paper is an official government report which sets out the
government's policy on a matter that is or will come before Parliament.
29 Legal aid is available for some tribunals such as the Mental Health
Review Tribunals.
30 This is only a limited discussion of the their findings. The summary
includes a large number of findings and gives policy recommendations.
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In all the tribunals examined the presence of a representative was found to
significantly increase the probability of a successful hearing, although this
increase is only significant where the respondent" is unrepresented (ibid:243).
Other factors were found to be associated with success and these included the
type of case, the number of witnesses, and geographical location (ibid:244).
However, what will be more interesting for us here is their finding that:
"The experience of representatives is that unrepresented appellants and
applicants are disadvantaged at tribunal hearings because there is an
imbalance of power between the parties, because appellants and applicants
do not understand the law, are unable to present their cases coherently
and are unaware of the need to furnish the tribunal with evidence of the
fact that they are asserting." (ibid:244)
It was also felt by tribunal members that representation made their job easier
(ibid:245). Genn and Genn conclude that, unless representatives are seen to
allow unmeritorious claims to succeed, representatives improve the accuracy of
the tribunal decision making process. Further, and significantly, that:
"Representatives do this by furnishing tribunals with the information
needed to reach decisions, based on all the relevant facts of the case, and
on the law that relates to the case. In investigating cases, obtaining
evidence, and advocating cases, representatives are ensuring that
appellants whose cases have merit, are given the best possible chance of
succeeding before the tribunal." (ibid:247)
In this current study we are not interested in the fairness or otherwise
of tribunal decision-making processes, or the role of representation in achieving
this. Rather our concern here is what it is that representatives do and how they
31 A respondent is "a person against whom a petition is presented, a
summons issued, or an appeal brought" (Osborn' Concise Law Dictionary:290).
In the legal aid tribunals there is no respondent as such as the respondent
is in effect the Area Legal Aid Board who have assessed the claim and refused
it. Although no respondent is actual interviewed by the tribunal panel, the panel
may at times direct questions to the tribunal clerk who is a member of the legal
aid office which has assessed the application.
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achieve it. From Genn and Genn, it is suggested that representatives coherently
'furnish' tribunals with information, "relevant facts", and "on the law which
relates to the case". What we are not told though, and it was no doubt not Genn
and Genn's intention to do so, is how they actually do this. To do this the
research methodology needs to look at the 'law-in-action', which as Travers
(1996) observes needs a qualitative approach which may involve specialised
methodologies focusing on action, such as symbolic interactionism,
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Such approaches allowing us to
see what the work of the representative is, and how they go about achieving it.
Such an approach being applicable to the description of Legal Aid tribunals.
2.4 Legal Aid Tribunals.
We have already covered some aspects of legal aid previously and noted
that this aspect of the Welfare State, like most others has been under the
spotlight of reform over the past few years. Much of the literature about the
reform of legal aid has concerned itself with the ongoing debate about the
reform of Civil Justice under Lord Woolf. A review of how this debate has
developed in the 1990' s can be obtained through three texts produced by the
Legal Action Group edited by Roger Smith: 'A Strategy for Justice: Publicly
Funded Legal Services in the 1990's' (1992); 'Shaping the Future: New
Directions in Legal Services' (1995); and 'Achieving Justice: Appropriate
Dispute Resolution for the 1990's' (1996). The theme of these texts is a pro-
active debate on the provision of social justice, with the provision of legal aid
as an essential component of this provision. The texts are wide ranging
including: the history of legal aid (Smith 1992:3-30), current trends and
changes (Smith 1995:7-42), and developments in other countries (Smith 1995
and 1996). However, actual research into the delivery of legal aid is
unfortunately not reported. One reason for this is that there is little research into
the delivery of Legal Aid to report, although an exception to this is Young and
Wall's (1996) edited collection 'Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers
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and the Defence of Liberty'. This is a wide ranging collection of essays from
a largely critical perspective, although the focus is on criminal legal aid rather
than civil as in this thesis. The study in this collection of closest relevance to
this thesis, although crucially on criminal legal aid rather than civil legal aid,
is that reported by Adrian Wood (1996) in 'Administrative Justice Within the
Legal Aid Board: Reviews by Case Workers and Area Committees of Refusals
of Criminal Legal Aid Applications' .32 This study of legal aid refusal by the
magistrates' courts notes that there are two routes that can be taken in appeal
against this decision. The first of these is a re-application back to the court,"
and the second being appeal before the area committee of the legal aid board.
This process is different from that of civil legal aid in which refusal is not by
the court but by the Area Legal Aid Board itself, although similar in that both
types of appeal are dealt with by one area committee, i.e. there are no separate
panels for criminal and civil cases. This practice of both types of appeal being
heard by the same area committee, is in fact one of the criticisms made by
Wood of the system, as he believes his study shows that area committees tend
to be made up of practising solicitors knowledgeable about civil law practices,
but not so knowledgeable about criminal law practices.
The article covers a number of the Legal Aid Board's practices in
handling Criminal Legal Aid, though of direct interest is the observation of
eight area committee meetings. Wood's comments, regarding professional
practitioner dominance of the review process," that "It is clear from the
32 Wood's paper is based upon research undertaken by Wall and Wood
(1994) discussed below.
33 A study report of the practices of court clerks in deciding on legal aid to
applicants at court is provided by Richard Young (1996).
34 Unlike appeals against Civil Legal Aid decisions which go to tribunal, the
Criminal Legal Aid appeals, although they go to the same area committee, are
termed Ireviews'. The reason apparently being that, a decision of the court
going to an appeal tribunal was perceived to reflect badly on the judiciary,
however since civil legal aid decision are not by the judiciary but by legal aid
clerks the term 'appeal tribunal' was seen to be unproblematic.
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documentation used for the appeal process that the area committee review
system is designed to be used by professionals for the benefit of professionals"
(ibid: 173). An opinion which we may assume to be applicable to civil legal aid
also. Woods, however, does note two significant differences between civil legal
aid and criminal legal aid appeals: firstly, that the civil legal aid appeals tend
to have their appellants invited to attend, which is not the case for criminal
cases; and, secondly, the criminal legal aid committee does not get to see the
documents before the case appeal. These are I suggest quite significant
differences, as will be seen in the case descriptions of this thesis.
Central to Wood's critique of criminal legal aid is the lack of any
uniformity in criminal legal aid decision-making, and he gives the statistics
from six area offices to illustrate this. This lack of uniformity is seen by Wood
to indicate injustice being perpetuated by the system, and he indicates that this
is somewhat due to the lack of guidance from the Legal Aid Handbook as to
Criminal Legal Aid appeals decision-making, Civil Legal Aid being better
covered. To illustrate this finding Wood states that:
"At the time of the survey, full and detailed reasons for granting or
refusing legal aid were advanced in only two of the 2,716 files perused.
In all other cases decision-makers merely invoked a statutory criterion
without further explanation to the applicant." (ibid: 185)
Without doubt the conclusion of Wood is that legal aid decision-making, in
criminal cases, is inconsistent, without criterion, and uninformed by the
practices of the courts which it relates to.
Wood's study is an interesting and informative one, however in relation
to this thesis it is one of its flaws which proves most interesting. This flaw is
that while it comments, as we have seen above, on the area committees'
decision making practices, they have not been investigated in any depth. Wood
did engage in observation, but comments on these add up to a few quotes from
clerks on their practices and the observation that each 'review' "rarely took
longer than 45 seconds to consider" (ibid: 176), possibly Wood felt that there
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were no practices of any substance to describe. Nevertheless, a major problem
that I detect in Wood's research is that he felt he could adequately infer from
the reports of the clerk to the area committee decisions. That because detailed
reasoning was only recorded by the clerk on two occasions, citation of
statutory criteria being used on all other occasions, that this reflected actual
decision making practices. As we will see below, this is to grossly
misunderstand the nature of bureaucratic documents usage and practice.
However, at this point it is worth noting that since Civil Legal Aid cases
usually take much longer than forty-five seconds, they are more likely to be an
observable phenomenon than in Criminal Legal Aid review proceedings.
Though as to what they may look like Wood cannot inform us.
Wood, along with David Wall, had conducted an earlier piece of
research for the Economic and Social Research Council 'The Administration of
Criminal Legal Aid in the Magistrates' Courts of England and Wales' (Wall and
Wood 1994), upon which the above (Wood 1996) was largely based. This study
was a comparative analysis of four Magistrates Courts and their associated
Legal Aid Board Area Committees, the aims of the research being:
"a) to research into the extent to which the present structure of
administering legal aid leads to delay, inefficiency and inconsistency.
b) to respond to legislative and administrative developments arising since
the original research proposal was submitted and broaden the scope of the
research to fully evaluate the effects of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 on
Legal Aid decision making.
c) to suggest a model to overcome any perceived limitation in the system,
in order to promote greater efficiency, consistency and fairness." (Wall
and Wood 1994: 12)
The research methodology being; the collection of statistical hard data
which is then elaborated upon by reference to the soft data of qualitative
interviewing and observation." Whilst their research methods did not involve
35 Wall and Wood (1994) also used 'decision making exercises' as a form
of investigation in the attempt to validate their findings, however, this technique
suffers in its possible relation 'real world' situations and its critique is covered
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the actual recording of the situated activities of the area committees themselves,
and they have little to say on the practices of the committee members, they do
give us an insight into what to such research might expect to find:
"On the whole, the discussion of cases by Area Committees tended to be
un-focused and based on a combination of hearsay, and commonsense.
Rarely did detailed consideration the s.22 criteria occur, and if it was
granted, the clerk to the Committee was usually left to suggest a suitable
criterion to support the decision." (ibid:37)
Although based upon their limited observations this indicates that even in the
'limited' Criminal Legal Aid 'reviews' by the Area Committees there will be
some interesting activities to describe.
What I suggest that these to studies illustrated is that to understand the
legal aid appeal tribunal processes we need to focus on the practices themselves,
and at a level at which the basic phenomena of interaction within bureaucratic
institutions operate. 36 Further, and what these studies do not illustrate, is that
the investigation of such Welfare bureaucracies will involve having regard to
the written documents which are the life-blood of such systems. Dingwall
(1992:163) with regard to process evaluation puts the point succinctly:
"Process evaluation demands a methodology which is capable of
capturing the dynamic aspects of the organisation rather than simply
logging its movement from one point in time to another. This can only be
accomplished from the inside, by watching and listening and by studying
the documents by which its members produce to orchestrate or justify
their activities. "
the 'Hawthorne Effect' of experiments in social psychology. This is why there
is a preference for actual juries rather than mock ones (see Baldwin and
McConville 1979).
36 Bogoch (1994) looks at legal aid in Israel with a focus on the interaction
between legal professionals and clients. But in terms of relevance to our study
here, apart from being a different legal system, the interaction is not of an
appeal tribunal but of that within the lawyers office, and is concerned to model
power relations based upon discourse strategies.
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Thus our focus would seem to need to be on the spoken and written
word in Legal Aid Tribunal practices. Such a focus however, opens up a whole
field of legal scholarship to review, the subject area known as 'Language and
Law'.
2.5 Language and Law.
This area of legal studies is now quite substantial, fortunately there are
a handful of reviews of area as a whole and by going through these in temporal
order we can cover a large area initially and become more focused later in this
chapter.
The first of these review articles, Danet' s (1980) 'Language in the Legal
Process' , focuses on the interrelations between language and law and the cross-
disciplinary research studying how language relates to the functions of law in
society. While Danet seems to view linguistics as the only form of language
study, she does draw attention to linguistic philosophy's concern with the issue
of 'meaning as object' and 'meaning as act', of which she notes:
"In its most extreme form, the former view holds that meanings are either
entities in the mind or sounds corresponding to entities in the external
world .... This view, which dominates the thought of Russell (1956) and
the early Wittgenstein (1961), underlies the logical positivism of
twentieth-century natural and social science and has been the object of
sharp attack in recent years .... A very different view of language underlies
all contemporary work on language in context. Wittgenstein came to
reject the view of language just described. In his Philosophical
Investigations (1968) and Blue and Brown Books (1964) he developed the
concept of the language game." (ibid:456)
Although she mistakenly describes the latter view as 'constructivist' Danet
indicates the importance of this view not only in legal discourse and theory but
importantly, its centrality to phenomenological sociology, symbolic
interactionism, ethnomethodology, and "even in scientific theorizing"
(ibid:550).
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At around the same time Mather and Yngvesson (1980-81) in
'Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes' were also arguing
against a static vision of language in law. Their central concern being with the
ways in which disputes are transformed, and the role of the participants.
Significantly, they note "that changes in the content of a dispute may not be
distinguishable from changes in form, since the inclusion or exclusion of facts
or issues affects the way options are articulated and solutions are perceived"
(ibid:777). An observation that would seem to imply the uniqueness of
individual disputes.
Four years later Goodrich's (1984) review 'Law and Language: An
historical and Critical Introduction', while noting that on the whole lawyers
and legal theorists have ignored the historical and social features of legal
language, like Danet tends to view language research in terms of linguistics.
Although he (correctly in my view) critiques legal studies as a discipline for
using "deductive models of law application in which language is the neutral
instrument of purposes peculiar to the internal development of legal regulation
and legal discipline" (ibid: 173). Both linguists and legal theorists have, for
Goodrich, "viewed their objects of study as being the 'systems' or 'codes' that
govern, respectively, language usage and law application as potentialities rather
than empirical actualities" (ibid:174).37He believes that the reason for this has
been the allure of clarity and "abstract verifiability in terms of propositional
logic and presupposition" (ibid:181). Goodrich observes that this "sterility" was
not evident in the earliest traditions of legal criticism which did not distinguish
37Goodrich (1984: 179) notes: "As the foundation of linguistics, Saussure
inserted the distinction between language -system (langue) and language use
(parole) and argued that the status of linguistics as a science was dependent
upon its restriction to the study of the laws of the language system as a
normative ideal or synchronic (static) systematicity - as a set of logical
universals, internally defined in a language totality conceived as a 'state of
affairs' existing (notionally) outside of society and outside history. "
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law from the general rhetoric of discourse." Mather and Yngvesson, like
Goodrich, do not accept the separation of legal language from other discourses,
and instead view language "as varying along a continuum, with everyday
discourse at one end and highly specialized 'language of law' at the other"
(1980-81 :781). Goodrich recommends that:
"To understand the paradox of the social discourse of the law requires an
interdisciplinary approach to legal texts as well as to the informal
practices of the legal institutions, and will include the study of the
rhetoric of law, and the analysis of the context and pragmatics of legal
speaker and legal institution, the empirical examination of the functions
and affinities of law viewed as communication and as function"
(ibid: 191).
As such we can see Goodrich advocating the language in action approach
identified with the later Wittgenstein.
Stepping out of temporal sequence, Elizabeth Mertz's (1992) review
essay 'Language, Law, and Social Meanings: Linguistic/Anthropological
Contributions to the Study of Law' while noting the 'new' view of language,
points out that it is not language alone that is important:
"There is a rich and complex dynamic that includes those aspects of
language use but also includes the shaping of the interaction by discourse
forms (appellate briefs, oral arguments), the complicated speech context
of the institutional setting in general (the court), the influence of
particular individuals involved in this instance (the judge, other court
personnel, the attorneys, the litigants in this case), the creation of new
meanings and relationships and contexts by on going oral and written
communication." (ibid:419)
Stressing that the law is the confluence of both oral and written
language, Mertz is also keen to emphasise the socially grounded and creative
aspect of this convergence. In her review of past research she notes that this
38 A similar point is made by Button with reference to the separation of logic
as a topic from its original basis in ordinary discourse (Button 1991).
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focus is most evident in process orientated research, especially that based upon
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.
The growth in the research over ten years in the area of language and
law had been such that by 1990, Judith N. Levi (1990) in 'The Study of
Language in the Judicial Process', was able to note the striking diversity of
contributions to the subject area from the disciplines of anthropology, English
literature, law, linguistics, political science, psychology, sociology - and
various combinations of these to the study of language in legal processes. She
notes three focuses: 1. the "law as a special context in which to explore patterns
of linguistic organisation and use"; 2. where "the analysis is more an instrument
for understanding the legal system than an object of inquiry itself"; and, 3.
where "the primary emphasis is on society or culture or human psychology, as
each of these may be revealed through the study of human language in the
context of our legal system" (ibid:3-4).
She notes the expansion in this area of academic interest having occurred
since 1975,39 with little of this actually filtering through into the legal
community.
This growth can be seen as a result of developments in language
philosophy and its impact on other disciplines, but also in the development of
sophisticated recording techniques for data collection, replication and
verification. Post-Wittgenstein ordinary language philosophy having had a great
impact epistemologically in the social sciences with the development of
39 Levi (1994:iv) states:
"Until the 1970's, there was no academic field of "language and law"
to speak of, neither from the perspective of legal scholarship nor from that of
social science - despite the ready availability of Law Professor David
Mellinkoff's now classic study, The Language of the Law (Little, Brown,
1963). This began to change in the 1970's, however, when a few social
scientists (including those that formed the inter disciplinary Duke University
Law and Language Project in the mid-1970's) began to recognise and appreciate
the critical role that language plays in legal interactions, legal processes, and
legal development - and to study that role empirically. As a result, by 1982
there was enough published scholarship to provide some 400 entries ... ".
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alternatives to 'positivism', suggesting learning about the world by discovering
its inherent order (ibid: 10). Levi also notes the importance of the development
of ethnomethodology within this new epistemological alternative to positivism,
"whose commitment to careful analysis of naturally occurring social interactions
has proven to be especially suitable for the study of spoken language in legal
settings" (ibid: 11). A defining characteristic being attention to the detail of the
practices they describe. However, she notes that much of this has been
conversation analytic studies of plea bargaining, courtroom discourse, and
conversations entered as evidence in criminal trials, but that, and not just by
ethnomethodology, written legal language has been less of a focus.
Significantly, that which has been published "concentrates on analysing
documents and texts, either for the purpose of improving their
comprehensibility or for more purely theoretical purposes (e.g., stylistic and
semiotic analyses)" (ibid:25).40 Although she notes exceptions to this such as
a special issue of 'Text' edited by Brenda Danet (1984) on legal language in
both its written and oral forms.
The most recent and extensive review, 'Language and Law: A
Bibliographic Guide to Social Science Research in the U.S.A.', is again by Levi
(1994) although this second review is vastly more extensive. Discussing the
many topics, disciplines, and methodological approaches of the bibliography
together, she states that they all converge on the question of "How does the
multidimensional linguistic phenomenon that is live spoken language interact
with, and influence, the multidimensional social phenomena that is our judicial
system?" (ibid: 1).
We cannot discuss all of Levi's over-view of the now extensive
research, but some of her observations are worth noting. Firstly, Levi remarks
upon the skew in the research that has been carried out towards proceedings in
40 This analysis of legal language in written texts independent of their
situated use, is not a focus of this thesis. This form of text analysis, e.g.
Westman's (1984) analysis of strategy in differing types of legal texts, will not
be included in this language and law review.
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formal courtrooms, with the consequent neglect of other areas (ibid: 11). 41
Secondly, and related to the first, that apart from a few early studies, the
spoken language of lawyers amongst themselves has been ignored which, Levi
notes, "is somewhat surprising since the same technological advances that made
microanalysis of courtroom discourse possible could be used just as profitably
in studying the patterns and implications of discourse among lawyers." (ibid: 12)
Finally, that the area of 'written language and the law' which ironically "is the
one most lay people associate with 'language and law', apparently corresponds
to the smallest amount of scholarly analysis of the three major categories in this
bibliography" (Levi 1994:29). These three major categories being: Spoken
Language in Legal Settings; Language as a Subject of the Law; and Written
Language and the Law.
From these reviews of the language and law as both a topic and a body
of existing research, we can see that emphasis has been put on the situated use
of language, for it to be viewed as a dynamic process, and that it should not be
isolated from the activities of which it is part, especially the use of written
documents. Finally, it has been suggested by more than one commentator that
the research methodologies influenced by the post- Wittgenstein studies of
language, such as ethnomethodology, have provided some of the best examples
of research in this area.
2.6 Ethnomethodological Socio-Legal Studies.
41 Levi notes in the discussion on the research into the discourse of plea
bargaining that Douglas Maynard emphasizes that "our understanding of the
role of language in the judicial process will remain hopelessly skewed if almost
all the scholarly work on spoken language in legal contexts remains restricted
to the trial proceedings in formal courtrooms" (Levi 1994: 11). Though she
acknowledges that one of the problems with informal settings research is the
logistical factors of the research process. An example of research which the
ethnomethodological perspective is employed in a non-courtroom legal context
is Travers (1994). Here a ethnographic, rather than conversation analytic,
ethnomethodology was employed. Such studies however, require extensive
fieldwork.
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Levi (1990) has indicated that much of the interesting research in the
area of 'language and law' has been ethnomethodologically orientated, in this
section we will look briefly at some of these studies.
Atkinson (1981) in 'Ethnomethodological Approaches to Socio-Legal
Studies' notes it is impossible to adequately describe the range and complexity
of the work that has been inspired by ethnomethodology in a single chapter.
What was true in Atkinson's case is even more so here where we have even less
space. Although like Atkinson we can say that what these studies can be seen
to have done is to have examined everyday practices for deciding matters of fact
and resolving disputes (ibid:211-212), and found that "it may be more sensible
to look to places other than the legal definitions and procedures if one is to
come anywhere near an understanding of what practices might constitute such
competence" (ibid:215).
Barring the work of Harold Garfinkel which will work we focus on in
the following chapter, possibly the most well known ethnomethodological study
of law and language, at least in Great Britain, is Atkinson and Drew's 'Order
in Court' (1979). Using conversation analytic (C.A.) ethnomethodology these
studies provide, among other cases an analysis of the details of evidence given
to the Scarman Tribunal (Tribunal of Inquiry into Violence and Civil Disorder
in Northern Ireland in 1969), focusing on the work of the counsel and witness. 42
However, this is an example of tribunal of inquiry set up by the government as
a 'one off', and as such is significantly different from the tribunals 'of appeal
against' that typify those under the jurisdiction of the Council on Tribunals and
the Legal Aid Tribunals which are ' standing bodies' .
Pomerantz and Atkinson (1984) in their paper, 'Ethnomethodology,
42 Atkinson and Drew's data was not recorded by them, but came from the
transcriptions taken during the tribunal by the clerks. The reliability of this
form of transcript has been questioned by Walker (1986), who suggests that
there may be some serious inadequacies with the recording of such data. Not
in its use for those whom it is designed but as representations of original
phenomena for social researchers. Beach's (1985) study discourse analytic study
of 'time-travel' in legal discourse also suffers from the use of such transcripts.
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Conversation Analysis, and the Study of Courtroom Interaction', a study of a
London Small Claims Court describing the practices involved in presenting
evidence in court, found that participants in a court hearing closely orientated
themselves to the immediate local relevances of the interaction in which they
were engaged. These relevances were not static as:
"... what counts as relevant for the participants may change during the
course of an unfolding sequence of interaction is not only demonstrably
the case; it is also one of the main reasons why ethnomethodological
studies are centrally concerned with taking the interactional setting, or
intermediate local relevances of particular actions, seriously into
account." (ibid:295)
Context changes throughout a hearing and the impact upon the application of
rules is illustrated by Pomerantz (1987), again using data from a Small Claims
Court in London, when she notes the significance of even matters that are
neither in dispute nor centrally relevant to substantiating either side's claims:
"These straightforward indisputable facts nevertheless are described
differently on different occasions. These variations are not due to the
conflicting interests of the parties but to differing uses of the descriptions
within the course of the hearing" (Pomerantz 1987:226-227).
Whereas Pomerantz and Atkinson (1984) used audio tapes, Maynard and
Manzo (1993) were able to use videotape in their single case study of jury
deliberation to investigate the use of the term 'justice' as it is embedded in
juror's practical reasoning. The result being the explication of "the use of
'justice' as part of a temporally situated, in-course, commonsense, lively, and
contingent determinations of jury members" (ibid: 174). The use of practical
reasoning in legal decision making had been argued by Moerman (1973) in a
study of Thai legal decision making. He argues that the results of legal
reasoning are neither arbitrary nor accounted for by formal deductive logic, and
he challenges "the adequacy of accounting for them by purely legal reasons"
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(ibid: 196).43This does not mean that there are not normative rules of relevance,
"But, unlike what is conventionally called formal or mathematical logic, their
application and accomplishment is informed by the social contexts in which they
are used" (ibid: 196).44 This was a perspective adopted by Blimes (1981) in a
focused way in his attempted to see how in legal discussion participants
negotiate their relations to each other via the topic of discussion and how these
are related to general goals. His aim being to do this with reference to
conversational structure and development rather than personalities and
attributed motives, and to display how conversation is used not just structured.
Pollner (1979) in 'Explicative Transactions: Making and Managing
Meaning in a Traffic Court', while recognising the situated character of
discussion and meaning cautions that: "While an outside observer may
acknowledge that meaning is situationally constituted, whether or not
defendants in the setting actually orient to, analyze, and use the explicated
meanings and structures remains problematic" (ibid:237). The orientation to
context has to be displayed and not assumed, methodologically it cannot be
investigated through asking the interactants since, as Pollner footnotes:
"Mead's thought invites an interesting revision of the Durkheimian
exhortation (1938) to 'consider social facts as things'. Durkheim was
animated by the need to overcome the commonsense thinking which led
to easy and loose theorizing about social process. Treated as things,
social facts would be recognized as objective processes requiring close
43This is not an unopposed view, Caesar-Wolf (1984) argues against the
ethnomethodological position believing that legal profession need their own
frame of reference. Of the ethnomethodological stance she says: "Such an
approach, in our view, is sociologically unsound since courts have developed
institutionally, precisely to deal with those types of conflict which have proven
insoluble in everyday life ... Hence, differential pattern of communication must
be expected as the normal form in court." (ibid: 194) This criticism, and
implicitly, the problems of a decontextualise content analysis which Caesar-
Wolf advocates will be shown in the following chapter to be misconceived.
44 This view of mathematical logic as independent of social context has been
challenge and is seen to be crucial in the solving of Fermat's last theorem. My
thanks to Martyn Hudson for this point.
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and persistent examination. From a Meadian point of view, the
commonsense perspective also poses a problem in that the primordial
process character of meaning is often masked by the objectivated
meanings it produces. Thus, as good members we are much more apt to
see ourselves as reacting to meanings than as enacting them. To overcome
the retrospective illusion of commonsense requires a conception of
meanings not as things but as process. " (ibid:253)
The conversation analytic approach of ethnomethodology is not without its
criticism. In relation to Atkinson and Drew (1979), Mertz (1992) for example
believes "this understanding of the effect of language on social interaction is
limited by its focus on the immediate speech context" (ibid:425). Brennis (1988)
also criticizes the conversation analytic approach stating:
"Such accounts as Atkinson & Drew's consideration of courtroom
interaction in English courts, Philips' descriptions of Arizona courtroom
speech, and Maynard's analysis of plea bargaining discourse provide
invaluable data insights. They necessarily focus, however, on particular
junctures in the course of conflict. While past events may be discussed
and accounted for in court testimony, such language is about earlier
stages; it does not produce what was actually said. The process
perspective so central to contemporary legal anthropology is made
irrelevant, and the range of events and practices through which disputes
take their shape over time are necessarily neglected. The court as
institutional setting is the focus; we see one of the last stages rather than
the entire process of a dispute." (ibid:222-223)
While this may be a legitimate critique of C.A.45 in terms of the objectives of
legal anthropology, they are not necessarily ones which C.A. would feel it
needed to address." Nevertheless, if our aim is to provided a description of the
45Mertz is not critical of conversation analysis of language use as such, and
notes of C.A.:
"The process demands scrupulous attention to transcripts; such phenomena as
the management of tum-taking and inter-speaker continuity have been elegantly
described and analyzed. Whether or not one agrees with their theoretical
premises, these studies provide exemplary models for the investigation of
discourse." (1992:228)
46Maynard (1983a) reviews three texts on language in court, one of which
is Atkinson and Drew's (1979) the other two coming from anthropological and
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legal aid tribunal as a whole, they are a methodological consideration we must
note."
2.7 Summary.
Throughout this review we have seen the case made for a focus on the
actual practices of dispute processing rather that some abstracted representation
of them. Research into tribunals, notably that of Genn and Genn (1989), while
raising concerns as to the effect of representation on the tribunal process has
tended to use analysis that fails to investigate practices in situ. This being
largely true of other research on legal aid tribunals, e.g. Wood (1996) not
looking at area committees' decision making practices in any depth. Though
Wood's comment that:
"On the whole, the discussion of cases by Area Committees tended to be
un-focused and based on a combination of hearsay, and commonsense.
Rarely did detailed consideration the s.22 criteria occur, and if it was
granted, the clerk to the Committee was usually left to suggest a suitable
criterion to support the decision." (ibid:37)
suggests that to understand legal aid appeals we need to focus on the practices
themselves.
Scholarship in the area of 'Language and Law' (Mertz 1992) has
emphasised the situated use of language to be viewed as a dynamic process that
should not be isolated from the activities of which it is part, especially the use
of written documents. And suggested that the research methodologies
political science perspectives. However he refrains from suggesting that one
perspective is more informative than another, calling instead for further
research in the area.
47 I realise that there is a great amount of material not covered in this brief
review, the work of Douglas Maynard (1982, 1983b, 1984a, 1985, 1988, 1989)
on plea bargaining is obvious by its absence, but it has not, as indicated earlier,
been possible to review here all the literature of interest.
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influenced by the post-Wittgenstein studies of language, such as
ethnomethodology, have provided some of the best examples of research in this
area. In the following chapter we will look further into ethnomethodology as a
research method and to understand how it can be deployed in this thesis.
43
Chapter Three - Towards a Post-Analytic Ethnomethodology.
"Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings."
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'On Certainty'. 1
We saw in the previous chapter that the research methodology that
would appear most suitable for our investigations is ethnomethodology. This
chapter outlines the ethnomethodological programme/ and develops an
interpretation of post-analytic ethnomethodology. Initially the discussion is of
Garfinkel's (1967a) 'Studies in Ethnomethodology', highlighting aspects which
are relevant to this thesis. As ethnomethodology differs from
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'On Certainty', No 229,:30e, Oxford, Blackwell.
2 It is not the case that this chapter is going to be able to state what
ethnomethodology 'is', at least in any fixed and definite sense.
Ethnomethodology is a socially constructed entity continually under re-
negotiation, the history of previous failed negotiations being that the present
state consists of various disagreeing factions. This is not problematic in any real
sense most of the time, the reflexivity recognised by ethnomethodologists to be
inherent in social action, means that it probably could not be otherwise - it
certainly does not prevent ethnomethodologists continuing with their studies.
Though as consequence of this any description of a unified ethnomethodological
position is problematic. Fortunately, I do not believe that such an object is
necessary. Instead then, what this chapter provides is 'a' version of
ethnomethodology, a version which influenced by some ethnomethodological
commentators more than others. This version has be designed for, and
reflexively influenced by, the application of my understanding of
ethnomethodology, and the explanation of this application, in the research for,
and construction of, this thesis. It will become clear that this thesis has been
influenced by Michael Lynch's versions of ethnomethodology, or at least my
understanding of his versions. I say versions rather than version, as his work
is not static but continually developing - whether this is a progression or not,
is an issue of negotiation in the ethnomethodologicalcommunity at present. One
of the aspects of this thesis is to come to some, if somewhat tentative,
conclusions myself on this issue. The empirical needs of this thesis as a piece
of research however, mean that this assessment is more of a by-product of the
research rather than its central aim.
I am aware that I have critiqued material in the literature review
apparently as if there was a unified ethnomethodological position, however,
rather than assume there is a unified position I have been assuming that there
are some 'central tenets'. Although I would not wish to assume these are static.
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conventional/classical/formal sociological analysis it will be necessary to
contrast the two positions and this is done in the section describing
ethnomethodological studies of work. This is followed by a description the
concerns of Michael Lynch and 'Post-analytic' ethnomethodology. The chapter
concludes with a summary intended to highlight those aspects of
ethnomethodology which are being drawn upon in this research.
Ethnomethodology as it is conceived here is perceived to be of an essentially
exploratory nature, especially in terms of its methodology, and this is reflected
in its adoption here. Details of its interpretation and application in this thesis,
along with its influence on the presentation of material, conclude this chapter.
3.1 Ethnomethodology.
Ethnomethodology' cannot been seen as a singular research tradition
having followed a singular line of development. 4 It has branched at various
times in its short, but eventful history to the extent that in 1981 Max Atkinson
felt able to write "ethnomethodology has developed and diversified to a point
where it no longer makes sense to treat the range of approaches now being
pursued as if they represented an identical or unified theoretical orientation"
(Atkinson 1981:201-203). By 1993 Lynch went as far as to say
"Ethnomethodology has become an increasingly incoherent discipline, despite
incessant efforts by reviewers and textbook writers to define its theoretical and
3 Michael Lynch states "Ethnomethodology can be described briefly as a
way to investigate the genealogical relationship between social practices and
accounts of those practices" (Lynch 1993: 1). For a sophisticated, yet readable,
description of ethnomethodology see Chapter 1 'Ethnomethodology', in Lynch
(1993). It may not be a description that all 'ethnomethodologists' would
subscribe to, but it is the version subscribed to most closely in this thesis.
4 "Although the term 'ethnomethodology' now tends to be used to refer to
several related approaches to research, it was not originally intended to denote
a social scientific methodology in the same sense that surveys, experiments, or
participant observation are methodologies" . (Pomerantz and Atkinson
1984:284) It was rather meant to relate to a topic for investigation.
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methodological programme" (Lynch 1993: 183). It is with these observations in
mind that we describe the etbnomethodological 'position' adopted in this thesis.
However, whatever the ethnomethodological approach one adopts there is only
one starting point.
The origins of ethnomethodology stem from problems encountered by
Harold Garfinkel while researching jury decision making processes for the Law
School of the University of Chicago in 1954 ..5 The research data consisted of
'bugged' tape recordings and their transcripts of a jury room in Wichita.
Garfinkel was to focus on the knowledge resources drawn upon and used by
these jurors, and the methods by which they achieved their deliberations and
'findings'. Garfinkel invented the term 'ethnomethodology' to describe the
methods by which a member of society uses the 'common-sense' knowledge of
that society to make decisions and act. (Garfinkel 1974:156, Livingston 1987:1-
37)
Ethnomethodology's historical development is not straightforward after
'Studies in Ethnomethodology' (1967a)8; there is cognitive ethnomethodology
5 See Kalven, H. and H. Zeisel (1966) The American Jury, Boston, Little
Brown.
6 This chapter in Turner (ed) (1974) is an excerpt from Richard J. Hill and
Kathleen Stones Crittenden (eds), Proceedings of the Purdue Symposium on
ethnomethodology, Institute Monograph Series no. 1, Institute for the Study of
Social Change, Purdue University, 1968, p. 5-11.
7 As Livingston (1987) states of ethnomethodology; "It was to be the 'study
of people's methods,' of practical action and practical reasoning" (ibid:3).
Although ethnomethodology did not originate as the study of the methodology
but was a descriptive term of peoples methods.
8Ruggerone (in an unpublished paper) presents Garfinkel's work as having
three stages of development. The first is seen as being from 1952 till the mid
Sixties and is marked by the heavy influence of Schutz's phenomenology mainly
but also that of Parsons. The second stage comes with the writing of the first
chapters of 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' and is dominated by an interest in
natural language. Here the influence ofWittgenstein becomes evident. The third
stage, which Ruggerone gives no date for, is associated with the notion of a
radical reflexivity and indexicality, and a concern for epistemological issues.
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work of Aaron V. Cicourel, the conversation analysis instigated by Harvey
Sacks and developed by others such as Emmanuel Schegloff, and the 'studies
of work' programme led by Garfinkel.
3.2 Garfinkel's Original Studies in Ethnomethodology
In 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' (1967a) Garfinkel states that the
central "recommendation" of his text is that "the activities whereby members
produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with
members' procedures for making those procedures 'accountable'" (Ibid: 1).
Meaning that members? have accounting procedures by which they describe and
understand the activities that they produce with other members in the situated
activities that they engage in. Though these accounting procedures have a
'looseness', preventing them ever being fully spelt out. As Garfinkel
summarises: "Members' accounts are reflexively and essentially tied for their
rational features to the socially organized occasions of their use for they are
features of the socially organised occasions of their use" (Ibid:3-4).10
Basically, the rationality of an account is not independent of that
account, instead its rationality is constituted in and of that account. Therefore,
9 When Garfinkel uses the term 'member' he is not referring to a specific
individual, rather it is used as a 'dummy variable'. "To talk about competencies
that are tied to particular situations, Garfinkel employed the dummy variable
'member'. Just as infinity is not a number like other numbers in mathematics
but is to be read as one anyway, so 'member' is not a person (or 'members'
groups of persons) but serves the syntactic and semantic functions of one for the
purpose of talking about competencies" (Schwartz and Jacobs 1979).
10 The need for reflexivity in investigations of social phenomena can be seen
in the Wittgenstein inspired discussions of Winch (1958). Its form in
ethnomethodology according to Ashmore (1989:32), "refers to a general and
useful feature of accounting procedures. The essential reflexivity of accounts,
as the phrase goes, is taken to reside in the mutually constitutive nature of
accounts and reality." Although alongside this reflexivity of accounts, it is also
used in relation to 'actors'. The 'reflexivity of actors' referring to the ability of
actors to consider their own actions, in contrast to the 'cultural dope' model of
actors.
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every individual rendering of an account is unique, a uniqueness best
understood in terms of the indexical nature of words and expressions. Not
because they are indexical, but because indexical expression are temporal
phenomenon and it is temporal positioning that is unique; the same expression
in another temporal position within an interaction does not necessarily make it
a replica of the first. This uniqueness is not normally problematic for members
who overcome this temporal indexicality by treating it as a practically situated
issue resolvable from observable rational character of action by and for each
member. Simply put, members while recognising the inherent reflexivity of
their actions, and thus the difficulty in their 'objectification' for others, make
observable the rationality of these actions to others. Although this is not
necessarily a conscious effort, but part of the everyday 'communicative act' as
"recognisably rational properties of their common sense inquiries - their
recognisably consistent, or methodic, or uniform, or planful, etc. character -
are somehow attainments of members' concerted activities" (ibid: 10).
Thus understanding is achieved in such apparently unfavourable
circumstances because of the order that is a property of both indexical
expressions and actions, an order recognisable by cultural members going about
activities with shared 'methods' of doing so. Methods which have both meaning
and logic recognisable by other cultural members, it is to the study of these
phenomena that Garfinkel give the name Ethnomethodology. However,
although indexicalitybegan to be seen as central to etbnomethodology Garfinkel
eventually discarded the term as an indistinct concept, and its status now, as
Lynch prosaically puts it, is as "a ticket that allows entry into the
ethnomethodological theatre, and is torn up as soon as one crosses the
threshold" (Lynch 1993:18).
Now we are in the theatre, so to speak, I would like to return briefly to
the idea of 'looseness' mentioned earlier. What Garfinkel meant by this was that
definitions and situated meanings could never be spelt out fully. The
impossibility of this becomes clear when it is attempted, as each attempt
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multiplies the features to be explained (see Garfinkel 1967a:24-31).11 The best
way to think of this is as a notion of adequacy in the sense that it is adequate for
the task intended, i.e. for all practical purposes. This 'looseness' is not
sloppiness however, and adequacy here does not mean that it just suffices,
rather it means it adequately performs the job intended. Garfinkel explains this
with reference to the work of members of the Suicide Prevention Centre (SPC)
in classifying deaths for the coroner: "Thus over the path of his inquiry the
investigator's task consisted of an account of how a particular person died in a
society that is adequately told, sufficiently detailed, clear, etc., for all practical
purposes" (ibid:15).12 The importance of this, in terms of 'looseness', is
especially significant for this thesis in relation to document use. Garfinkel
discusses the work of coding medical documents by research students, and their
necessary use of ad hoc considerations in deciding upon the fit between the
documents and the coding frame. He states that:
".. .if the coder has to be satisfied that he has detected a real clinical
occurrence, he must treat actual folder contents as standing proxy for the
social-order-in-and-of-clinical-activities. Actual folder contents stand to
the socially ordered ways of clinic activities as representations of them;
they do not describe the order, nor are they evidences of the order. It is
the coder's use of folder documents as sign-junctions to which I mean to
be pointing in saying the coder must know the order of the clinic's
activities that he is looking at in order to recognize the actual content as
an appearance-of-the-order. Once the coder can 'see the system' in the
content, it is possible for the coder to extend and to otherwise interpret
the coding instructions to the actual contents, and in this way formulate
the sense of actual content so that its meaning, even though it is
II Garfinkel gives a fuller description with examples of this phenomenon in
Chapter Two of 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' (1967).
12It is worth noting that Garfinkel states that: "It is hardly news that on the
way to a decision what a decision will have come to was reviewed and foretold
in light of the anticipated consequences of a decision" (Garfinkel 1967: 15). For
example, that for a decision to be adequate for its practical purposes, those
purposes and what an adequate decision must be capable of performing are part
of the decision making process. This in many ways is the phenomenon that we
will be explicating in the study of Legal Aid Tribunals.
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transformed by the coding, is preserved in the coder's eyes as a real event
in the clinic's actual activities." (ibid:23)
The documents are 'loose' descriptions, but they become adequate and
sufficient when their user, in this case the coder, has the members knowledge
for their practical use. In relation to this current study, the significance is that
tribunal panel members, who themselves are practising solicitors and barristers,
can be seen to ad hoc in a similar fashion. When presented with case
documents, just like the coders in the above description, they do not interpret
them with strict reference to the Legal Aid Handbook but rather, read them as
competent members and so ad hoc the Legal Aid Handbook guidelines to make
them relevant to the case contents and the 'system' they 'see' within them."
The transformation through coding that Garfinkel notes has important
repercussions as "the coded results consist of a persuasive version of the
socially organised character of the clinic's operations, regardless of what the
actual order is, and without the investigator having detected the actual order"
(Ibid:23). In relation to legal aid tribunals any retrospective analysis of cases
from looking at the case files, Le. after the cases have been decided upon, is not
going to retrieve the actual order of the case hearings. The conclusion that can
be draw from this is that if research into the work of the decision making
process of tribunals cannot adequately be achieved through the mechanisms of
coding of case decisions from case files using the directives of the Legal Aid
Handbook, we need another method.
Since we wish to investigate the actual, rather than documented,
activities of legal aid tribunals we must look at the ad hoc, or 'contingent
achievements', that constitute the 'adequate activities'. What we are looking to
investigate is the 'common sense' world of members in, and through, their
activities and expectancies. However, as Garfinkel points out, if we were to ask
13 Interestingly, during tribunal panel members' work of decision making,
actual reference to the Handbook Le. coding frame, is rare and used mainly at
times of 'tension' , disagreement, or uncertainty.
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the member about these expectancies they would have little or nothing to say
(ibid:37), largely because members are not consciously attending to them. To
overcome this silence, Garfinkel, drawing on Alfred Schutz's concept of 'the
attitude of daily life' and 'the world taken in common and for granted',
developed a series of studies that attempted to detect some of these background
expectancies. The significance of these was the finding that members have a
background understanding of their everyday world which they expect 'others'
to possess also." To uncover these expectancies Garfinkel then developed his
'famous' breaching experiments where 'scenic events' were modified so as to
'disappoint' the members' taken for granted common sense knowledge and
competence. IS
The significance of these experiments" here (for the importance which
Garfinkel attached to them at the time see Chapter Two of 'Studies in
Ethnomethodology), is that members have taken for granted background
expectancies which they use in common with other members to interpret their
14 Garfinkel (1967a:53-54) notes: "Common sense knowledge of the facts
of social life for the members of the society is institutionalized knowledge of the
real world. Not only does common sense knowledge portray a real society for
members, but in the manner of a self fulfilling prophecy the features of the real
society are produced by persons' motivated compliance with the background
expectancies .... Seen from the person's point of view, his commitments to the
motivated compliance consist of his grasp of and subscription to the "natural
facts of life in society. "
IS The basis of the breaching experiments lay in designing a situation in
which a breach could be achieved, but where the situation could not be
transformed into joke or play or the like. The member would not have sufficient
time to redefine their real circumstances, and they would not have consensual
support for the redefinition of the situation (Garfinkel 1967a:58). Garfinke1's
experiments pick up some of the classic small group conformity research of
social psychology (of Asch, etc.). What is novel is his attempt to explain why
these findings arise and to show how people deal with them.
16 The breaching experiments did not, as Parson's theory would seem to
predict, render situations senseless or meaningless for the subject. They
revealed the 'moral' accountability of action i.e., that we are held accountable
for our actions. They also illustrated the reflexive relationship between action
and structure. (From a discussion with David Greatbatch)
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world. Also, that when these are disrupted they will try and reconcile the
versions, rather than act as judgemental dopes'? and accept their common sense
knowledge as incorrect. 18
The manner and effects of treating events as those performed by
judgemental dopes are expanded upon by Garfinkel," and are a key aspect of
his critique of classical social science." One of the ways a member may be
made out to be a judgemental dope is by over-looking the et cetera clause aspect
of interaction. The et cetera clause is the notion that any 'agreement' between
members is subject to unknown conditions in the future which lead that
17 The 'judgemental dope' notion comes from Garfinkel's critique of the
methods of sociological (and psychological) investigations using 'cultural
dopes' (and psychological dopes), especially Talcott Parson's model in 'The
Social System' (1951) combining action theory and functionalism. Garfinkel
states "By 'cultural dope' I refer to the man-in-the-sociologist's-society who
produces the stable features of the society by acting in compliance with the pre-
established and legitimate alternatives that the common culture provides"
(Garfinkel 1967:68). The significance being that these models of human
behaviour treat a member's common sense knowledge as an 'epiphenomenon',
and ignore it in explanationsof standardized expectancies and courses of action.
18 What is worth noting here is how many of the students actually went
along with the experiment and accepted their position as incorrect. For what the
experiments would seem to produce is 'cognitive dissonance', and one would
expect the greater the dissonance the greater the effort to reduce it. As
Festinger notes: "Another way of reducing dissonance between one's own
opinion and the knowledge that someone else holds a different opinion is to
make the other person, in some manner, not comparable to oneself. Such an
allegation can take a number of forms" (L. Festinger 'A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance', quoted in Richard Milton, 1994:107-108). This did not appear to
occur to any great extent though this may be explained as being due to the
overwhelming evidence/pressure created by the research design for them to
accept their incorrect interpretations.
19 For full details of this studies see Garfinkel's 'Studies In
Ethnomethodology' (1967a:68-70).
20 A good example of the real problems of treating members as cultural
dopes is in the development of technology to assist in existing forms of work.
Heath and Luff (forthcoming) report on this in the development of electronic
record systems for General Practitioners and relate this back to Garfinkel's
(1967a) observations on medical records.
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agreement to be "retrospectively reread to find out in light of present practical
circumstances what the agreement 'really' consisted of 'in the first place' and
'all along'" (ibid:p74).21 By 'agreement' what is meant is not some written
contractual agreement, although it could encompass even these, but rather the
agreed norms of behaviour and action in determinist theories of structural
functionalism. I draw attention to this to counteract any notion that we should
view any legal norms as wholly determinative of any of the interaction covered
in this thesis. In fact Garfinkel notes that manipulation of the et cetera clause
is well developed in certain professions, lawyers especially. 22These issues will
be expanded upon later in the thesis in relation to legal positivism.
3.2a Documentary Method"
Along with the indexical nature of interaction a central feature of
Garfinkel's 'Studies in ethnomethodology' is the concept of documentary
method which Garfinkel adopted from Karl Mannheim:"
21Garfinkel also notes that it is a mechanism by which disappointments etc.
are managed, a sort of post-rationalisation process, though Garfinkel does not
use that term.
22This can be seen in Lynch and Bogen (1996:154-158) where Oliver North
and his attorney gradually gain greater and greater freedom from the legal
procedures of the Congressional Hearing throughout the hearing. Lynch and
Bogen illustrate how this was achieved.
23 It should be kept in mind when reading this section that Garfinkel
(1996: 18) notes: "The documentary method of interpretation is a convenient
gloss for the work of local, retrospective-prospective, proactively evolving
ordered phenomenal details of seriality, sequence, repetition, comparison,
generality, and other structures. The gloss is convenient and somehow
convincing. It is also very powerful in its coverage - too powerful. It gets
everything in the world for practitioner/analysts. Its shortcomings are
notorious: In any actual case it is undiscriminating and just in any actual case
it is absurdly wrong."
24 Mannheim (1956:53-63), 'On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung', in
'Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge'.
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"The method consists of treating an actual appearance as 'the document
of', as 'pointing to', as 'standing on behalf of' a presupposed underlying
pattern. Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual
documentary evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in
their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 'what is known' about the
underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other." (Garfinkel
1967a:78)
A key point here is that the documentary method does not locate
propositions in a 'scientific corpus' of a static nature, but rather locates them
in a common sense background assumption position dependent on prior and
ongoing specification." Garfinkel shows that such a description is essentially
a depiction of the methodology which members themselves use. A example of
this is 'Some Rules of Correct Decision Making that Jurors Respect' (ibid: 104-
115) where Garfinkel presents these methods as a series of normative rules
derived from a series of observations focusing on Jurors decisions. Garfinkel
notes that they are not substantially different from those they make in everyday
activities, except, and importantly, that the juror is required to treat the decision
making as a theoretical endeavour. Though this change is a significant one for
the juror since normally straightforward aspects of daily life become equivocal
when explained by the contending advocates, the versions of the advocates
being incompatible with each other (ibid: 110-111).26 The result of this for
Garfinkel, is that the juror adopts a position different from everyday decision
making, in that, rather than think someone testifying is mistaken or lying, the
juror takes the position that each seriously believes what they contend.
However, rather than the juror becoming judicious or taking on an 'official
25Garfinkel stresses that this documentary method is used, though rarely
recognised, by all sociological research no matter how positivist it may portray
itself. Also, that in reading sociological accounts readers must employ the
documentary method (see Garfinkel 1967a:96). In the same way the Legal Aid
Appeals Committee must also employ the documentary method in interpreting
their written materials.
26A contemporary example of this is provided by Goodwin (1994), where
the question becomes was Rodney King beaten? Or were the police acting in a
reasonable manner? Both accounts being argued for by respective advocates.
54
juror line', Garfinkel found that "jurors did not have an understanding of the
conditions that defined a correct decision until the decision was made"
(ibid: 114). The significance of this is applied to everyday decision making then
is that:
"... decision making in daily life would thereby have, as a critical feature,
the decision maker's task of justifying a course of action. The rules of
decision making in daily life, i.e., rules of decision making for more or
less socially routinised and respected situations, may be much more
preoccupied with the problem of assigning outcomes their legitimate
history than with the question of deciding before the actual occasion of
choice the conditions under which one, among a set of alternative possible
courses of action will be elected." (ibid: 114)
This justification aspect of decision making fits in well with the et cetera
clause and redefinition of earlier actions due to the needs of present
circumstances. At the same time it makes any model of linear decision making
difficult to sustain: a key aspect of the empirical focus of this study.
The production of lists or normative rules is not to be taken, any more
than breaching experiments are, as the necessary form of etbnomethodological
description. In 'Passing and the Managed Achievement of Sex Status in an
"Intersexed" Person Part 1', for example, Garfinkel uses a single case study of
an individual - Agnes. The study was the result of approximately thirty-five
hours of conversation with Agnes which were recorded, and his report is based
upon these materials and materials of his collaborators Stoller and Rosen
(ibid:121). This case study is presented in the form of a 'reported biography',
some of the material being presented with reference to game playing," and
other material in terms of the inability of game playing," as well as a critique
27 That "basic rules are available for use by players and presumed by players
to be available as required knowledge that players have prior to the occasions
under which these rules might be consulted to decide among legal alternatives"
(Garfinkel 1967a:141).
28 "There are many occasions which fail to satisfy various game properties.
When the game is used to analyse them, the analysis contains structural
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of Goffman' s role playing method of interpretation. Garfinkel proceeds by
giving examples of situations that Agnes has reported herself as being placed
in, and illustrating some of the 'passing' devices she used, though Garfinkel is
keen to stress that 'passing' should be seen as an active mode, rather than in a
static past tense. Garfinkel admits that there are some problems in adequately
describing what Agnes' troubles were (ibid: 167). Finally, it is worth stressing
that the goal that Agnes was attempting to achieve was not clear and defined
prior to the actions that had to be taken to achieve it, and in this sense we see
the similarity between Agnes and the Jurors above.
A key study which Garfinkel reports with regards to this thesis is
,"Good" organizational reasons for "bad" clinical records' , a study in which the
initial aim was to code the clinical record folder contents, though Garfinkel
encountered so many 'bad records' that they became a phenomenon for the
research. The 'troubles' that Garfinkel encountered were troubles that any
social scientist will encounter "if he consults the files in order to answer
questions that depart in theoretical or practical import from the organizationally
relevant purposes and routines under the auspices of which the contents of the
files are routinely assembled in the first place" (ibid: 191).29 Simply put,
documents are tied to other routinised and valued practices than those the
investigator is interested in." Garfinkel notes that part of the problem of 'bad
incongruities " (Garfinkel 1967a: 145).
29Another problem in using documents is that they be seen as only being
one aspect of a larger process. The documents at legal aid tribunals, for
example are produced in relation to the legal aid system as a whole, at least that
run by the LAB area office. This is of course a critique we saw raised by Smith
above.
30 Garfinkel notes that this problem can not be overcome by the researcher
insisting on self report form being completed in a particular fashion as this
"runs the risk of imposing upon the actual events for the study a structure that
is derived from the features of the reporting rather from the events themselves"
(Garfinkel 1967a: 195).
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records' can be resolved if instead of being seen as 'actuarial' records" they are
seen as 'records of therapeutic contract'. Hence, when a record is attempted to
be read as an actuarial record, and interpreted as such by a social scientist, it
appears as a 'bad record'. Garfinkel likens folder contents to a conversation in
their occasionality, in that:
"the remarks that make up these documents have overwhelmingly the
characteristic that their sense cannot be decided by a reader without his
necessarily knowing or assuming something about a typical biography and
typical purposes of the user of the expressions, about typical
circumstances under which such remarks are written, about a typical
previous course of transactions between the writers and the patient, or
about a typical relationship of actual or potential interaction between the
writers and the reader. Thus thefolder contents much less than revealing
an order of interaction, presuppose an understanding of that order for a
correct reading. The understanding of that order is not one, however,
that strives for theoretical clarity, but is one that is appropriate to a
reader's pragmatic interest in the order." (ibid:201)
Significantly, what the documents were talking about did not remain
identical in meaning but changed depending on the occasions of their use. It is
the present circumstances of their reading that decide their usage (ibid:201-
202).32 The important conclusion of Garfinkel's for this current study is that:
"Which documents will be used, how they will be used, and what
meanings their contents will assume, wait upon the particular occasions,
purposes, interests, and questions that a particular member may use in
addressing them." (ibid:203)33
31An actuarial record can be understood as similar to an account payment
record book, a standardised account record.
32"Hence, whatever their diversity, a folder's contents can be read without
incongruity by a clinic member if, in much the same way as a lawyer 'makes
a brief,' the clinic member 'makes a case' from the fragmented remains in the
course of having to read into documents their relevance for each other as an
account of legitimate clinic activity" (Garfinkel 1967a:203).
33 A key point is that: "the competent reader is aware that it is not only that
which the folder contains that stands in a relationship of mutually qualifying and
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Documents cannot be seen as standing on behalf of something which is
independent of their organizational uses. Such usage is not singular and neither
are contents of the documents. It is possible to see how the use to which a
folder can be put is not necessarily decidable in advance, but only once the use
has been made.
Finally, Garfinkel's point, and it is beautifully simple, is that a social
science that describes the actions of members in terms of a scientific rationality,
a rationality that is not used in the 'everyday lifeworld' of members, is trying
to use two incompatible systems, and consequently ironicising common sense
rationality (ibid:276). Hence, the troubles social science has in describing social
action and rationality are "due not to the complexities of the subject matter, but
to the insistence in conceiving actions in accordance with scientific conceits
instead of looking to the actual rationalities that person's behaviours in fact
exhibit in the course of their managing practical affairs" (ibid:277). As a
conclusion to 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' Garfinkel states: "In a word, the
rational properties of conduct may be removed by sociologists from the domain
of philosophical commentary and given over to empirical research" (ibid:282).
3.2b Summary
We have looked at Garfinkel's 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' and this
has given us some key focal points for this research methodology of this thesis.
However this text was published thirty years ago and much has happened
determining reference, but parts that are not in it also belong to this too. These
ineffable parts come to view in the light of known episodes, but then, in turn,
the known episodes themselves are also, reciprocally, interpreted in the light
of what one must reasonably assume to have gone on while the case progressed
without having been made a matter of record" (Garfinkel 1967a:205). Absence
is a reflexive aspect of documents.
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since."
Garfinkel describes the research in 'Studies in Ethnomethodology'
(1967a) as seeking "to treat practical activities, practical circumstances, and
practical sociological reasoning as topics of empirical study, and by paying to
the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention usually accorded
extraordinary events, seek to learn about them as phenomena in their own
right" (Ibid.I)." The focus, in other words, being upon practices taken for
granted by individuals in society, practices of mundane profundity but which
are the basis of all other 'higher' practices - including that of sociological
understanding itself! 36
The activities that make up an 'action' or 'event' are exactly those
'things' which make the 'action' or 'event' evident and understandable, in other
words for competent members (masters of natural language; participants)
interpretation is possible without access to anything other than those actions and
the activities which constitute them. Understanding can be achieved with
recourse to only what is 'observable-and-reportable'. This should not be taken
to mean that these activities have some form of static meaning which is readably
34 The description below is essentially historical, see Garfinkel (1996) for
his most current statement on his ethnomethodological position.
35 The position of Garfinkel at this point was criticised as remaining within
a positivistic framework: "Ethnomethodology seeks to 'rigorously describe'
ordinary usage, and despite its significant transformation of standards for
conceiving of and describing such usage, it still conducts its inquiries under the
auspices of a concrete, positivistic operation of adequacy." (Blum and McHugh
1971:98-99) However, with the Wittgensteinian turn and the development of the
'studies of work' this critique would no longer be applicable.
36 Peter Eglin (1975:386) states: " ... scientific explanation and description
has no 'logical' or in-principle superiority over commonsense explanation and
description .... More importantly, it is that commonsense work of interpretation,
whether found in the practice of scientists or of other societal members, that is
the proper object of sociological inquiry and explanation". This does not mean
that in practice it is not attributed a superiority, but it is not this attribution that
is the topic, rather actual practices.
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'the same' on each occurrence, as we have noted above they are reflexive."
3.3 Developments in Ethnomethodology.
The stance towards social phenomena taken by Garfinkel is derived
largely from the social philosophy of Alfred Schutz and the phenomenological
philosophy of Edmund Husserl." As Garfinkel notes:
"Husserl spoke of expressions whose sense cannot be decided by an
auditor without his necessarily knowing or assuming something about the
biography and the purposes of the user of the expression, the
circumstances of the utterance, the previous course of the conversation,
or the particular relationship of actual or potential interaction that exists
between the expresser and the auditor." (1967a:4)
A fuller understanding of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology can be obtained
if we see it in relation to the similar 'ethnomethodological' projects that
developed alongside and from his initial work, the two most useful here being
the cognitive sociology of Aaron V. Cicourel (1966) and the conversation
37 Reflexivity. "In short, the relation between a given particular to be
disambiguated and any particular in its disambiguating context is reflexive, for
the given particular is part of the context needed to disambiguate the particulars
in the context. ... Here, then, we cannot conceive of the whole as assembled out
of pre-existing parts, nor the parts as determined by some pre-existing
whole .... Thus the concept of reflexivity holds that context and particular are
mutually elaborative rather than being analytically independent terms. This
relation of the reflexive mutual elaboration figures in the specific determination
of meaning on a given occasion, and it is the simultaneous seeing of particular
and context in their reflexive relation that constitutes the transparency of
displays" (Wilson and Zimmerman 1979-80:59).
38 A brief but general outline of the influence of Edmund Husserl and Alfred
Schutz is located in Chapter 3, 'The Phenomenological Input', in John Heritage
(1984a). However, as Rogers (1984:166) notes "Those who look to
phenomenology for insights into ethnomethodology, however, enter a blind
alley. Ethnomethodology exhibits no consistent relationship to
phenomenology." Lynch (1993) notes: "Garfinkel renounces any attempt to tag
ethnomethodology to philosophical predecessors, although he has suggested a
practice of 'ethnomethodologically misreading' the philosophers" (ibid:163ft).
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analysis of Harvey Sacks, whom Douglas (1971 :32) refers to a situational and
linguistic ethnomethodologists respectively.
Garfinkel's ethnomethodology has been described as neither an objective
or subjective perspective but rather 'relativistic' due to its rejection of 'implicit
rules' as somehow providing invariant explanations of orderly activity (Peyrot
1982:278). It is this rejection of the 'implicit rules' or 'standard rule account'
in interpretation, that came to be seen as a distinguishing factor (among others)
between the work of Garfinkel and Cicourel, work which in both cases
critiqued classical sociology. 39 While Garfinkel rejected the 'cultural dope' of
sociological theories he rejected also need to investigate cognitive processes,
unlike Cicourel whose interest in 'normal forms' focused on 'socially relevant
cognitive properties' (O'Keefe 1980:201).40
O'Keefe gives as the reason for this difference as Cicourel's retention
of Schutz's" focus on consciousness as a basis for the explanation of social
phenomena," while Garfinkel denies interest in such inquiry and develops more
39 Whatever may be said of his later work Cicourel' s 'Method and
Measurement in Sociology' (1964) is an excellent early critique of mainstream
sociology methodology from an 'ethnomethodological' position. Though I agree
that Cicourel's position is better regarded as 'proto-ethnomethodological'
(Lynch 1993:11). For a discussion of Cicourel's 'Method and Measurement'
see Lynch (1991:83).
40 However, it seems to me that 0'Keefe (1980) is not willing to come down
completely on this point and qualifies his position by saying that they are not
too far apart from each other: "So while not overlooking the important
differences, we might still be able to say that Cicourel's and Garfinkel's work
could be neatly melded" (ibid:214).
41Michael Lynch (1991:84) notes the influence of Alfred Schutz in the early
work of both Garfinkel and Cicourel: "The abstract themes under which Schutz
elaborated the attitude of daily life, and the contrast he drew between the
natural and human sciences - as well as between the presuppositions of the
attitude of scientific theorising and those of the 'natural attitude' of daily life -
were incorporated wholesale into Cicourel' s and Garfinkel's proto-
ethnomethodological early studies" .
42 However, Cicourel takes phenomenological first person inquiry in a
different direction from Schutz - toward the orientation of cognitive science.
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in line with the Anglo-American philosophy of Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig
Wittgenstein, both in the area of the philosophy of language (ibid:202).43
Although the early work of Garfinkel was influenced by the work of
Schutz, just as was Cicourel's, Garfinkelian ethnomethodology (and
conversation analysis) developed a concern primarily with the phenomenon of
social organisation as a system of activities, rather than as a set of interpersonal
relations (Sharrock and Anderson 1987 :293).44
Conversation analysis is now probably the most widely known form of
ethnomethodology, and illustrates well via comparison the direction and nature
of Garfinkel's writings on ethnomethodology in 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' .
There are occasions when conversation analysis and ethnomethodology are
taken to be essentially the same (West and Zimmerman 1982:506), other
commentators however have noticed misgivings within ethnomethodology to the
'constructive' and analytically 'distanced' analysis of conversation analysis
where "a sequential/structural representation is studied from the position of
He does not retain the first person explicative stance of Husserl or Schutz. I am
grateful to Michael Lynch for this observation in a personal communication.
43 In contrast to Cicourel's 'Cognitive Sociology' (1973) which retained
more of these tradition sociological concepts, Garfinkel's ethnomethodology
and Conversation Analysis both, but especially the latter, went on to
concentrate on language independent of such concepts as 'status' and 'role'. As
Schegloff (1987:217-218) notes:
"All kinds of conversational, linguistic, so-called nonverbal, and other
interactional behaviour have been related to such classical dimensions of social
organization as class, race, ethnicity, and gender. Although one may choose to
proceed along the lines of such a strategy in order to focus on important aspects
of social structure in a traditional sociological sense, the risks of
underspecification of the interactional phenomena should be made explicit, and
with them the risks of missing the opportunity to transform our traditional
understanding of what is important in social structure. Although the trade-off
may be made in order to benefit important sociological or sociopolitical
concerns, even these concerns may suffer if the interactional phenomena are not
completely explored on a technical basis."
44 Cognitive issues are part of Garfinkelian ethnomethodological studies only
to the extent that they become researchable as situationally constructed
phenomena (see Jeff Coulter 1989).
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'anybody'" (ten Have 1990:41).45
Without going into the history of Sacks's intellectual development" the
move to the 'sequential/structural' aspect of conversation is tied into Sacks'
belief in "the possibility of a stable social-scientific account of human behaviour
of a non-reductionist sort"? an argument which provided a grounding based on
the existence of science, unlike anti-positivist and anti-scientific basis of
Garfinkel's work (Schegloff 1992:xxxi-xxxii). The importance of this shift by
Sacks, as we shall see below, is that it moves from taking the analyst's
understandings as the initial point of departure, to taking that of the co-
participants.
3.3a Conversation Analysis.
While ordinary conversational interaction between interactants can be
problematic, is not always, or even ordinarily so. The assumption made by
conversation analysis is that the reason for this is that the descriptive and
organisational practices are 'on show' to the interactants, are readable by them,
and for that reason, are investigatable (Lee 1987:30). It is the design principles
of these organizational practices that concern conversation analysis (Wootton
45Lynch (1993: 191) notes that the divergence of conversation analysis and
ethnomethodology can be located as being after Garfinkel and Sacks' (1970)
paper 'On the Formal Structures of Practical Action'.
46Sacks died prematurely in a road accident in 1975, for many years the
vast bulk of Sacks' work, notably his lectures, were not widely available. These
were eventually published in two volumes (Harvey Sacks 1992), the
introduction to this work, by Emmanuel Schegloff contains a substantial
overview to both Sacks and his work.
47Schegloff (1992:xxxi-xxxii) states: "Sacks concluded, from the fact of the
existence of natural science there is evidence that it is possible to have (1)
accounts of courses of human action, (2) which are not neurophysiological,
biological, etc., (3) which are reproducible and hence scientifically adequate,
(4) the latter two features amounting to the finding that they may be stable, and
(5) a way (perhaps the way) to have such stable accounts of human behaviour
is by producing accounts of the methods and procedures for producing it. "
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1989:239).
The design of conversation is seen to be built into its utterances and the
context that sequences of utterances form over time, where the interactants
constantly document their understanding of the conversation in and through the
orderliness of the conversation itself." The conversational 'machinery' thus
allows the achievement of intersubjectivity by members (Lee 1989:38), and the
discovery and evidencing of orderliness within interaction by analysts (Wootton
1989:243-244), the discovery of the observable technologies of conversation,
rather than uncovering the hidden meanings of interactants (ten Have 1990:37).
As a basic summary we can agree with Heritage (1989) that:
"The basic orientations of conversation analytic studies may be
summarised in terms of four fundamental assumptions: (1) interaction is
structurally organised; (2) contributions to interaction are both context
shaped and context renewing; (3) these two properties inhere in the
details of interaction so that no order of detail in conversational
interaction can be dismissed a priori as disorderly, accidental or
interactionally irrelevant; and (4) the study of social interaction in its
details is best approached through the analysis of naturally occurring
data." (ibid:22)
Central to CA's analysis is the principle of conditional relevance, with
'turn-taking' and 'adjacency pairs' often considered to be independent
phenomena working within the conditional relevance. Adjacency pairs display
public understanding, for CA, by the addressee or second speaker of the prior
talk. As Heritage (1989) states:
"Thus second pair parts not only accomplish (or fail to accomplish) some
48 Sometimes the conversation is depicted not so much as being driven by
the participants, but driving them, as an independent 'self'. This view of
conversation by C.A. as a "self-explicating system" is criticised as a threat to
the social character of C.A. 's phenomena (Sharrock and Anderson 1987:313).
The problems of approaches that attempt rule governed approaches to
conversation have been outlined by Wieder (1971) and would seem applicable
to such a development, if it were taken up by C.A ..
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relevant next action, they also display some form of public understanding
of the prior utterance to which they are directed." (ibid:25)
The evidence for this is seen to be in terms of recipient design with
examples such as next speaker selection and orderly tum-taking," a 'simplest
systematics' (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974), in which "respective actions
interlock to produce that normatively required state" (Lee 1987:42). Achieved
through continuous "monitoring and analysing of utterances, with each
utterance analysed for its consequences for any given next utterance" (ibid:44).
Since such displays are public conversation they can proceed without need for '
speculation, thus avoiding inquiry into cognitive processes as in Cicourel
above, focusing instead on the ".. conversational practices for achieving and
exhibiting understanding" (Sharrock and Anderson 1987: 312).
Conversation analysts do make occasional references to mental states,
of a vernacular sort, to what speakers and participants know, think, 'have in
mind' etc. Although this is done supposedly only to be able to make reference
to the mechanics of conversation, it seems hard to reconcile this with the C.A.
methodology as it is the mechanics of turn-taking which are supposed to
produce the 'context' of conversation. There is neither space nor real need here
to critique C. A. 's methodology. 50 Rather, what I wish to draw attention to is
C.A. 's notion of being scientific, a notion Garfinkel rejects.
3.3b Ethnomethodological Studies of Work
49 West and Zimmerman (1982:523) note: "For example, if a current
speaker selects a next speaker by employing an initial event - or 'first-pair part'
- say, a greeting, this procedure also selects the next action by that speaker,
namely, a greeting in return. The selected speaker, in seeing that a greeting has
been issued and then offering a greeting in return, will not only satisfy
constraint engineered by the initiation of the sequence in the first instance, but
also thereby display to the first speaker, to others present, and potentially to an
analyst how the initial remark was understood."
50 For a critique of conversation analysis see 'Molecular Sociology' Chapter
Six in Lynch (1993), see also Lynch and Bogen (1994, 1996).
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It was noted above ethnomethodology has no unified position, and we
have noted the directions that Cicourel' s cognitive sociology and the
conversation analysis directions took from the early Garfinkelian position.
Lynch (1993), without wishing to split ethnomethodology into traditions,
believes that current work in conversation analysis is going in a different
direction than ethnomethodology(and early ethnomethodology and conversation
analysis)," but that there is not an irrevocable split. The aim in this chapter is
not so much to give a genealogy of ethnomethodology, as to lay open to view
the key aspects as I see them, to make this current study comprehensible. In so
doing it now becomes necessary to leap forward to the current' state of the art'
in 'Garfinkelian ethnomethodology', and attempt some clarification. 52
Garfinkel believes that the corpus of work that forms the 'studies of
work' offers "evidence for locally produced, naturally accountable phenomena
of order*, logic, reason, meaning, method, and so on, in and as the unavoidable
and irremediable haecceity of immortal, ordinary society" (Garfinkel and
Wieder 1992:175). My aim here is to first of all explain this sentence."
51 The case has been made by Michael Lynch and David Bogen (1994) that
Conversation Analysis has developed in a way contrary to the direction that it
would have followed if had kept to Sacks' notion of a 'primitive natural
science'. They also note (1996:274) that "conversation analysis (as this off-
shoot is called) has developed independently of Garfinkel's initiatives. "
52 Garfinkel's current writings on ethnomethodology, as was 'Studies in
Ethnomethodology' (1967), are not very 'accessible' to the average reader.
They, due to a language attempting exactitude, are dense and demanding. The
arguments contained are complex and sophisticated, and what is written below
is just skimming the surface of the ethnomethodological project as he sees it.
This thesis is an empirical study with strong ethnomethodological 'overtones',
it is not an exploration of ethnomethodology thought and practice.
53 It will be useful to start with an explanation of the use of the asterisk on
the term 'order*'. This derives from the use of ordinary vernacular terms in
ethnomethodological description, but vernacular terms which are used
tendentiously. This is explained in the following terms: "In speaking
tendentiously, a term is written with its asterisked spelling, for example,
detail*. In that spelling, we use detail* knowing that by detail* is meant
something other than and different from what the reader would explain or can
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Sociology and ethnomethodology are both concerned with the
investigation of order, or in ethnomethodology' sease, order*. However, in
ethnomethodology's case, order* is seen to be a locally produced and
accountable phenomenon, in contrast to formal or classical sociology's 'order'
which is seen as extra-local rather than local.
When looking at order* ethnomethodological focus has been upon
'haecceity'." Haecceity is understood here as the:
"just thisness: just here, just now, just what is at hand, with just who is
here, in just the time that the gang of us have, in and just what the local
gang of us can make of just the time we need, and therein, in, about, as,
and over the course of the in vivo work, achieving and exhibiting
everything that those great achievements of comparability, universality,
transcendency of results, indifference of methods to local parties who are
using them, and for what they consisted of, looked like, the 'missing
what' of formal analytic studies of practical action." (ibid footnote:203)
Now we can see that the concern of ethnomethodology is with locally
produced and naturally accountably order* which has a 'just thisness' which
produces a society containing occurrences which appear stable but are made of,
or constituted by, a multitude of 'just thisnesses'. What Garfinkel and Wieder
claim is that ethnomethodology has offered evidence of this.
The evidence is from ethnomethodological studies of work, which have
explain with any of the detail's many vernacular 'straightforward' meanings,
thus at the same time knowing that detail * is used as a corrective on the readers
understanding" (Garfinkel and Wieder 1992 footnote:205). So if we return back
to 'order*', we see that "order* be read as a proxy for any topic of reason,
logic, meaning proof, uniformity, generalization, universal, comparability,
clarity, consistency, coherence, objectivity, objective knowledge, observation,
detail, structure, and the rest" (ibid footnote:203). The asterisked vernacular
term is used instead of inventing words to describe new phenomena, or more
exacting usage of existing terms.
54 Haecceity as a term replaced the earlier use of the term quiddity which is
used as a more exact meaning of detail, or rather detail *. However, the term
quiddity had a familiar connotation of essence and since ethnomethodology is
not concerned with essences, haecceity was adopted instead as it does not refer
to any essence.
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described or demonstrated topics of order*, or rather phenomena of order*, as
being respecifiable as consisting of, or possessing, "two incommensurable,
asymmetrical alternate technologies in and as of the particular phenomenon's
production, observability, recognition, accountability, demonstrability, and so
on" (ibid: 175-176). These two, or rather paired, technologies being; those of
formal analysis and ethnomethodological description. Their relationship being
the "unavoidable, irremediable details of the particular phenomenon of order*"
(ibid: 176).
These two technologies are evident when both formal analysis and
ethnomethodology move from the topic of order* to the respecification of a
phenomenon of order*, both disciplines requiring certain, but differing,
emphasis be included in their respective technologies for that respecification of
the phenomena of order. The central issues for both technologies of
respecification (i.e. 'classical' and 'ethnomethodological') are the issues of
descriptive precision and probity (that an issue can be settled). However,
whereas ethnomethodology emphasises the "production and accountability of
order in and as ordinary activities" (ibid: 178), formal analysis uses one or other
of its many forms of 'transcendental' analysis. In terms of probativeness,
ethnomethodology is concerned with issues restricted to those in the
phenomenon of order* itself, whereas formal analysis is concerned with the
issues of how transcendental issues such as equality ,justice, power etc. affect
members, ethnomethodology is indifferent, displays indifference, to any such
concern with 'transcendental' issues unless they are phenomena to be
investigated in situated activity. So ethnomethodology is interested in the details
of order* displayed within activities rather than through the imposition of some
external conception of order.
This difference is so fundamental that any attempt at reconciliation is
considered 'pointless'. To clarify this further it will be worth contrasting
ethnomethodological and formal analytic methods.
3.3c Ethnomethodology Contra Variable Analysis.
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In this thesis the ethnomethodological orientation to research is placed
in the context of sociological research in general. 55 This has already been
achieved to an extent above in this discussion of ethnomethodological studies
of work, and the discussion of Garfinkel and Wieder's (1992) 'Two
IncornrnensurableAsyrnrnetricalTechnologies of Social Analysis' . But the task
can be completed with reference to Douglas Benson and John Hughes' (1991),
'Method: evidence and inference evidence and inference for
ethnomethodology.' This text puts the case for ethnomethodological research
in a clear emphatic manner, doing so with recourse to a contrast to variable
analysis as the standard by which sociological research is measured.
The contrast with classical sociology that ethnomethodology, as
alternative way of investigating phenomena, provides, is both significant and
not easily over-emphasized. As such it warrants some space here." The most
prevalent form of research method in classical sociological studies has been
55 It is generally regarded that due to the phenomena it investigates that
ethnomethodology, while distinctive, is located within the sociological
enterprise. This is the case, for instance, with Wilson and Zimmerman (1979-
80:53) who note that ethnomethodology has "antecedents within the larger
sociological tradition notably in the works of Weber and Marx". Though they
do believe there is a is tension between ethnomethodology and conventional
sociology, and this lies in ethnomethodology's conception and use of
'reflexivity' (ibid). It is reported that "Garfinkel's view is that the failure to
scrutinise the nature of sociological phenomena themselves is at the root of the
problem and explains the continued production of equivocal results [by
conventional sociology]" (Lee 1987:22).
However, the relationship between ethnomethodology has recently been
described by Lynch (1993:38) in the following terms: "In a sense,
ethnomethodology is a parasite on the host discipline of sociology, but unlike
a parasite that reduces its host to a lifeless husk, ethnomethodology tries to
invigorate the lifeless renderings produced by formal analysis by describing the
'life' from which they originate."
56 Lynch and Bogen (1997) provide an interesting contrast between classical
sociology and ethnomethodology in terms of developments in the sociology of
scientific knowledge.
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variable analysis," and has become a standard of adequacy for judging other
approaches, even the participant observation tradition has been overshadowed
by dominance of the systematic investigation by methods of variable analysis
(Benson and Hughes 1991: 109).
Methodological debate within sociology is usually discussed, and taught,
in terms of qualitative versus quantitative methods. At times in sociology's
short history this has occasionally taken the form of opposition between two
camps, much to the detriment of the debate. 58 The result being for Benson and
Hughes, that little was achieved in "trying to deal with the problem of securing
adequate empirical reference" (ibid: 110). Much of the problem is seen to lie
with the attempts of sociology to copy the methods of the natural sciences, an
issue that seemingly just will not die, largely due to the practical successes of
the natural sciences. Also, perhaps, encouraged by the growth of sociology and
its professional associations with funding institutes in the post World War Two
period. One area of concern due to the emulation of the natural sciences has
been the attempt to apply mathematical reasoning to human phenomena.
This focus on the mathematical is problematic for a number of reasons, 59
but what is of import here is that the mathematically based methods require the
aggregation of phenomena, rather than remaining with individual instances, and
as such require the homologizing of the social and the mathematical. This takes
the form of the mathematisation of social phenomena, transforming the social
world into a mathematically rule governed object. A necessary aspect of this
process is the classification of social phenomena into units of equivalence. In
this classification, equivalency rules are employed that ignore the fact that "that
members of society also deploy 'rules' for the determination of equivalency
57 The term variable analysis was originally employed by Hubert Blumer
(1956), 'Sociological Analysis and the "Variable"', American Sociological
Review, Vol 19:683-690.
58 For an outline of this debate see Alan Bryman (1992) 'Quantity and
Quality in Social Research' , London, Routledge.
59 See Benson and Hughes (1991: 112-117) for a full description.
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within their contexts of action" (ibid:119). Hence, even if the mathematical
procedures do allow the use of classification rules deployed by members, their
mathematical abstraction results in our knowing "little about the properties of
the underlying phenomena; only how it looks through the imposition of the
format" (ibid: 121). This is a key aspect of the ethnomethodological critique of
'formal analysis', 60 and important to this thesis in that formal analysis is
prevalent in socio-Iegal research.
The ethnomethodological critique of formal analysis is that it obscures
the categories that the members of society themselves have, and significantly,
they conceal "the way in which members use the categories they do in order to
make the social world visible and organisable in ways relevant to them"
(ibid: 124). Formal analysis imposes upon phenomena a grid of sociological
descriptive practices irrespective of the displayed properties of that phenomena
(ibid: 125). This criticism is fundamental."
Instead of the aggregation of individual phenomena, ethnomethodology
60 Garfinkel (1996) in 'Ethnomethodology's Programme' sounds almost
conciliatory when he states: "Formal Analytic (FA) technology and its results
are understood worldwide. Almost unanimously for the armies of social
analysts, in endlessly analytic arts and sciences of practical action, formal
analytic procedures assure good work and are accorded the status of good work.
FA's achievements are well known and pointless to dispute" (ibidp5). But adds
that, "Ethnomethodology (EM) is proposing and working out 'What More'
there is to the unquestionable corpus status of formal analytic investigations
than formal analysis does, ever did, or can provide" (ibid:6).
61 "The claim is, first, that there is a bona fide and unresolved problem for
sociological inquiry which is that of the organisation of everyday affairs as
such, and second, that this problem cannot be examined from within, or by
simple modification of, the established framework of investigation" (Sharrock
and Anderson 1987:295). And in relation to the criticisms of ethnomethodology
by formal analysis: "Thus, the kind of criticism to which this alternative
proposal is subjected are prevailingly to the effect that it will not explain this
issue or be able to account for that one, criticisms issued on the assumption that
the proposal outlines and envisages a comprehensive scheme for the treatment
of all the problems which might conceivably fall within the domain of
sociology .... What a strategy might achieve is really only something to be tested
out in practice by applying it and seeing how far it will go." (ibid 1987:296)
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looks at singular occurrences of individual instances and the mechanisms by
which they are achieved. By mechanisms, it is meant that singular instances of
,actual occurrences' are "the products of a 'machinery' that constitutes
members' cultural competence" (ibid: 130). Though by reference to mechanisms
it should not be presumed that this entails a mechanistic and essentialist view
of human action, as noted in the explication of haecceity above, such a position
is untenable. Ethnomethodology uses singular instances, the number of
instances being immaterial to the proof of a description. This does not mean
that observations are not taken to be applicable to other occasions as:
"The 'mechanism' is an orientated to feature of the culture to produce
that action, and it is this which provides for the trans-situational character
of an ethnomethodological description. In making visible the methods by
which persons assign sense to their environment, one has secured a
characterisation of what methods are utilised by persons in everyday life
to produce its orderliness in all its fine detail." (ibid:131)
So at this point a 'mechanism' would seem to be depicted as something
that will occur on another occasion, but this is not necessarily the case as:
"Once the 'machinery' is described, any more instances do not provide
any more evidence for the description. What more instances do is provide
yet another example of the method in action, rather than securing the
warrantability of the description of the machinery itself. Given this
attention to naturally-occurring instances, there is no sense in trying to
specify a collection of data in advance, as required say, by sampling
procedures, since prior to investigation it cannot be known what an
instance is a sample of." (ibid: 131)
But machinery is too rigid a term with connotations of repetitively
similar actions in industrialisation, perhaps a better metaphor as to what
members methods consist of is 'skilled practices' such as those belonging to
pre-industrial artisans where no object produced was an exact replica of
another. This then, I suggest, this makes the concept of uniqueness stable in the
multiple deployments of members methods. The confusion which I perceive
possible in the above quotations, results from talking about ethnomethodology
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with the terminology of formal analysis, and its attachment to scientific
principles of replication, and is possibly a good reason for ethnomethodology
to fully abandon such formal analysis discourse. This is especially so, I think,
if the language in which a discourse is to be carried out is, due to its hegemony
in the social sciences, always going to end up using terminology which is
incommensurable with the ideas of ethnomethodology. Fittingly we shall move
from a contrast of ethnomethodological and formal analysis methods and focus
on those of the former.
3.3d Ethnomethodological methods.
To a large extent we have defined ethnomethodology by what it is not,
rather than what it is, although historically this is how ethnomethodology has
gone about its self-description. In many ways this is because ethnomethodology
has no prescribed methods, instead there are 'guideline to objectives' .
".. the ethnomethodological objective is to generate formal descriptions of
social actions which preserve and display the features of the machinery
that produce them. This requirement of 'unique adequacy' stipulates the
aim of describing in detail members' competence in producing everyday
action." (Benson and Hughes 1991:131)
This statement does two things: it gives ethnomethodology's aim and it
notifies us of a stipulation for ethnomethodological practice. What it does not
do is define ethnomethodological methods. The reason for this will become
clear if we recall that ethnomethodology is the description of the methods
members use to produce phenomena of order*. A "phenomenon of order* is
available in the lived in-courseness of its local production and natural
accountability" (Garfinkel and Wieder 1992: 182). The result of this that: "The
technical, distinctive job of EM, the craft of EM, consist of in vivo tasks of
discovering phenomena of order* as instructible achievements in and as their
coherent details. EM's results are identical with radical phenomena of order*"
(ibidI81). This does not outline a method but informs us what
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ethnomethodological descriptions should be doing; revealing the methods of the
phenomenon of order*. These are intimately tied to the phenomenon itself, and
cannot be specified in advance of any phenomenon of order* they seek to
describe." All that can be said in advance is that the methods consist of
descriptions. Instead of looking at the issue of methods of description," it may
be more useful at this point to look at the requirements of method.
One requirement of methods by ethnomethodology is that of unique
adequacy. The unique adequacy requiremenr" has two aspects, these are
referred to by Garfinkel and Wieder (1992:182) as; the weak use, and the
strong use. The weak use is the requirement that "the analyst must be vulgarly
competent in the local production and reflexively natural accountability of the
phenomenon of order* he is 'studying' .... that the analyst be, with others, in a
concerted competence of methods with which to recognize, identify, follow,
display, and describe phenomena of order* in local productions of coherent
detail" (ibid). So the ethnomethodologist should have the member's
competencies to be able to recognise and describe the phenomenon of order*
they are investigating. The strong sense should be familiar to us now in that it
means: "Just in any actual case a phenomenon of order* already possesses
62 A question may remain as to how this adequacy is to be assessed.
63 In 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' (1967a) we saw Garfinkel deploy
various descriptive practices, some of which would now be seen as problematic
e.g. breaching experiments.
64 The 'unique adequacy' of methods is where the concern is to:
".. operate from within the competence systems they describe.
Accordingly, their descriptions of orderly and socially organized inquiries do
not present an opposition between the practices described and the practices
which make such description possible. Instead, the studies recognize the
prevalence of inquiry as the phenomenon they confront in their entry into the
scenes of work's accomplishment. In presenting accounts of these competencies
ethnomethodologists variously seek to exhibit those socially located inquiries
in such a way as to bring the "reader" into the common setting of practical
conduct. Such demonstrations entail more than a stipulation of rules of conduct,
or of theoretically informed interpretations of the social actions in the particular
settings studied" (Lynch and Woolgar 1988:6).
74
whatever as methods could be of [finding it] if [methods for finding it] are at
issue" (ibid) (brackets and italics in original). It is sometimes assumed that the
issue of unique adequacy implies some sort of 'black box' of activities, that are
somehow so unique to an activity that their understanding is only accessible via
full membership of the profession or group that undertakes such activity. This
is not actually the case as to do so would be to propose, for example in science,
"a picture of each science as a bounded epistemic container with well-defined
zones of 'inside' and 'outside'" (Lynch 1983:278). Using Wittgenstein's
discussion of "family resemblances" in language games as an analogy, Lynch
argues that such isolationist view of practices are misunderstandings of
Garfinkel. To a large extent this explains why the focus of etbnomethodological
interest has moved to 'epistopic' themes, instead of any attempt at describing
isolated practices in specialised activity and only understandable to members of
that specialism, activity, profession etc ..
Another requirement of methods is the use of 'perspicuous settings'.
This relates to ethnomethodological methods being embedded in the culture
producing the phenomenon of order*, since it is only in such settings that the
"material disclosures of the practices of local production and natural
accountability in technical details with which to find, examine, elucidate, learn
of, show, and teach the organizational object as an in vivo work site."
(Garfinkel and Wieder 1992: 184) become available. Such settings teach the
analyst about work practices of the members. It is not the case that the analyst
is already proficient in the methods of these members already and hence cannot
be taught them, to do so would be to erroneously fall back on the view of
methods as transcendental, but it is also not the case that the analyst is not
without some knowledge as to what these practices consist of or their
experiences as a member of the general culture which supports such activities.
Along with indifference, which has been discussed above, unique
adequacy and perspicuous settings can be seen as the main requirements of
ethnomethodological studies in the studies of work programme of Garfinkel and
others. Recent developments in the 'studies of work programme', have
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described ethnomethodology as being post-analytic, and we shall look at these.
3.4 Post-Analytic Ethnomethodology and its Application in this Thesis.
Though this work is given a separate section this is more for the
simplicity of description as Lynch's work can been seen as a continuum of
Garfinkel's original studies and/or part of the Garfinkel led 'studies of work'
(discussed above). Initially we will briefly look at Lynch's view of the study of
science and how this can be related to our interest in legal positivism and legal
practice. We will then look at Lynch's view of post-analytic ethnomethodology,
and how that has been interpreted and adapted for use in this thesis.
3.4a Science.
Lynch's interest in science is an ethnomethodological one in which the
very positivity of science becomes a topic, and where positivist techniques such
as become topics of order to be respecified (1991: 79). Such a respecification is
not the rejection of positivism as such, and certainly not of its techniques of
practice, instead these are things which are considered with indifference and the
concern is with how these are a phenomena of social order. The concern with
positivism is with how this is itself and organised practice of a discipline
through the articulation of the rules and methods of 'science'. However,
ethnomethodological studies of positivism in science invariably investigate the
'ordinary' "practical and contextual production of measurable
phenomena"(ibid:82-83). Any Schutz ian contrast between scientific theorising
and the 'natural attitude' of daily life are now rejected from
ethnomethodological studies:
"The conventional distinction between scientific and common-sense
measurements - which holds that the former are precise, disinterested,
and correct to the extent permitted by the state of the art, while the latter
are approximate, interested, and often erroneous - is no longer of any use
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to ethnomethodology." (ibid:97)
There concern instead is with how locally organised practises of science
become acceptably 'true' definitions of the positivist scientific project.
However, it is through this abandoning of the scientific/common-sense
divide that we come the application of the ethnomethodological studies of
science's applicability to the investigation of legal positivism. if we look at
Lynch's (1988a) discussion of Schutz's distinction between science and
common-sense when Lynch posits counter-proposals to the five proposals on
the relationship between science and everyday knowledge attributed to Schutz.
Lynch states in relation to his counter-proposals that while they:
"call into question the entire picture of science as a 'principled' or
'rational' activity. This does not imply that scientists are 'unprincipled'
or 'irrational' , but that any set of general epistemological or
methodologicalrules for scientificactivity stands in a problematic relation
to the phenomenon." (ibid:81)
It is this same attitude which I am suggesting can be applied to the
positivism of law, just as it has been successfully applied to the positivism of
science. The result is not to suggest that legal practice and practitioners are
'unprincipled' or 'irrational', but to suggest that the positivist explanation and
understanding of legal practice needs to be respecified. This is not to suggest
that all rule-like expressions in legal positivism are necessarily 'wrong' but to
suggest that they are necessarily incomplete due to the situated nature of their
actual 'use'. As Lynch states:
"The theoretic import of the critique of the rule is that rules are not
descriptions of actions, but take on their relevance and adequacy as
accounts of actions in a dependent relation to the 'work' that is done to
establish their relevance while adapting to the contingencies of a
particular situation." (ibid:84)
Just as Lynch states that common-sense can not be seen to be
independent of developments in science (ibid:85), the same may likely be true
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in relation to legal positivism in the common-sense of legal practitioners. What
we expect is that there some symbiosis, but even more likely that such a
description is a gloss for the activities themselves.
3.4b Post-Analytic Ethnomethodology.
Lynch's most complete articulation of post-analytic ethnomethodology is argued
in the 'Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action' (1993), although we will
initially look to the explication given by Lynch and Bogen (1996) in the
methodological appendix to 'The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text, and
Memory at the Iran-Contra-Hearings'.
Sociological readers, they note, expect a nonnative stance and reference
to existent theories in the presentation of data, this makes ethnomethodological
adherence to indifference" in its studies appear as nothing more than 'mere-
description'. This derogative association is attended to by Lynch and Bogen by
reaffirming that ethnomethodology's task is to, investigate intelligible actions
performed on singular occasions looking at the resources used by members on
such occasions, in terms of their dialogical production. Indifference does not
mean that interpretation" is denied, but that adherence to a pre-determined
theoretical position is. They state:
"The difference, on the one hand, is between starting out by isolating and
defining the structures and elements of meaning, and, on the other,
beginning in the midst of the action and describing how speakers in an
ongoing exchange commit themselves to doing (and meaning) something
through what they say. Although both starting points, in principle, can
get at the intertwining of linguistic forms and situated usage, they lead to
very different understandings of the role of formal structures in
communicative actions." (ibid:267)
65 For a more exacting definition of 'ethnomethodological indifference' see
Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), also Lynch (1993: 141-147).
66 The idea of description without interpretation is recognised as
'problematic' .
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Lynch and Bogen, in a move heavily influenced by Wittgenstein, locate
themselves as starting in the midst of action, focusing on the local discursive
methods in a descriptive fashion away from any craving for generality. They
do not deny large powerful social structures, but instead of endowing them with
some 'transcendental' status, believe they are to be "investigated in the local-
historical situation of their production" (ibid:272), and respecified. Lynch and
Bogen stress how this is a manifestly different direction from that being adopted
currently by conversation analysis, developments which they have critiqued
elsewhere" as having normative and foundational tendencies. 68 They state that
ethnomethodology is post-analytical when it describes how "the sources of
intelligible action and defensible judgement are not contained within even the
most elaborate system of prescriptions and specifications" (ibid:287).
The objective of the 'studies of work' programme and post-analytic
ethnomethodology can be described as an attempt to study the 'missing what',
that virtually all sociological studies 'miss'. The just 'what' of the interaction
that constitutes the work of the occupations studied (Garfinkel and Wieder
1992, Lynch 1993:271). Initially Garfinkel insisted that an adequate mastery of
the occupation to be studied was necessary for any ethnomethodological
descriptions, hence there was a strong requirement for participant observation
in the early ethnomethodological 'studies of work'. This 'unique-adequacy
requirement of methods' required that the researcher master the practices to be
studied (Lynch 1993:273). While these studies searched for the quiddity of
interaction in an occupation, it should not be thought that each occupation has
67 See also Lynch (1993) 'Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action' Chapter
6, and Lynch and Bogen (1994) 'Harvey Sacks's Primitive Natural Science'.
Lynch, in a personal communique, has stressed that he is not making a
sweeping rejection of the conversation analytic programme.
68 While the epistemological positions adopted by practitioners of
conversation analysis are not all alike, an example of the type of stance that
Lynch and Bogen would seem to have in mind is provided by Drew and
Heritage (1992) in their introduction to 'Talk at Work'.
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a fundamental essence that can be sought and described (ibid:278). Rather than
an essence the search, for Lynch, becomes one of locating particular
,epistopics', recurrent themes that are associated with the classic conceptions
of truth and knowledge, and to "explain how a general epistemic theme is part
of a local complex of activities" (ibid:281). Lynch explains the use of epistopics
as the following:
"I use the neologism epistopic to suggest that the topical headings
provided by vernacular terms like observation and representation reveal
little about the various epistemic activities that can be associated with
those names. The epistopics are classical epistemological themes, in name
only. Once named as - or locally identified as a competent case of -
observing, measuring or representing, an activity and its material traces
can be shown to be governed by a set of rules, a body of knowledge, a
method, or a set of normative standards associated with the particular
theme. But once we assume that nominal coherence guarantees nothing
about localized praxis, we can begin to examine how an activity comes
to identify itself as an observation, a measurement, or whatever without
assuming from the outset that the local achievement of such activities can
be described under a rule or definition" (Ibid:281-282).
Epistopics, rather than being "metaphysical unities" are glosses for
recurrent themes in the description of the local production of work (Ibid:282).
An investigation of the epistopics of work therefore does not stop at the level
of the epistopic or gloss, but investigates how that epistopic in its vernacular
usage is uniquely adequate to its use in practice. This is relevant to the issue of
legal positivism as we can investigate the theoretical conception that law has of
itself by looking at the localised practises that it actually deploys in its practical
activities. This is not to say that the theoretical terms are not in some way
deployed in practice, but that if they are they will have specifically localised
uses. Lynch's investigation of scientific practices is relevant to legal positivism
since legal positivism, as will be described in Chapter Five has attempted to
adopt the 'logic' of science as a justification of legal rule. Just in another era,
and currently in other cultures, it has used the dominant paradigms of the day
such as religion.
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This respecification of the epistopic (Ibid:283), requires investigating
singular occasions of conduct for their orderliness. Unlike mainstream social
science where single occasions are deemed problematic, they are here seen as
intuitively recognizable and vernacularly describable phenomenon, that this is
so being that if this was not the case "how participants manage spontaneously
to produce mutually coordinated activities would be a complete mystery"
(Ibid: 285- 286).69
Lynch's 'Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action' (1993) culminates in
the outlining of "a 'programme' of investigation that combines
ethnomethodology's treatment of ordinary practical actions with the sociology
of scientific knowledge's interest in the 'contents' of scientific practices"
(ibid:299). The research aim of the 'programme' is the investigation of
scientific and practical reasoning epistopics, discursive themes such as:
observation, description, replication, measurement, rationality, representation,
and explanation (Lynch 1993:299). Although these may seem to be the topics
of epistemology they are nevertheless also vernacular categories, categories of
order*. This 'programme' has been adopted and adapted in this thesis to the
investigation of legal practice. I believe this to be unproblematic in that Lynch
does not indicate that the 'programme' is solely for the investigation of
scientific phenomena, and doubly so since practices of natural science are
inseparable from the everyday practices of the life-world (ibid:297, 3(0). What
I wish to do below is set out the programme as Lynch describes it, then,
following this, describe how these have been interpreted in their implementation
for this research. The programme suggests that:
1. "Begin by taking up one or more of the epistopics." This involves
searching for "perspicuous settings" in which the epistopic has "a prominent
vernacular role" (ibid:300).
2. "Search for primitive examples" (Ibid:300). Following Wittgenstein,
69 Lynch notes that this necessitates the rejection of the idea of a
presuppositionless enquiry, the researcher always finds the research phenomena
to a greater or lesser degree intelligible (Lynch 1993:286).
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rather than Garfinkel, Lynch suggests that there is no requirement of a thorough
mastery of the practices to be investigated ethnomethodologically (ibid:301).
3. "Follow the epistopics around and investigate actual practices in detail.
An ethnomethodological transformation of Wittgenstein's approach would be
to search for "naturally occurring" primitive language games and to investigate
their performance in detail" (Ibid:301). However, while "No single case stands
for all others, but the 'conceptual binding' among the cases supplied by the
epistopic lends general significance to the investigation" (Ibid:302). Each
investigation says something about the epistopic.
4. "Investigate each case in accordance with the unique adequacy
requirement" (Ibid:302). This will greatly influence the presentation of the
material to the reader, Lynch states: "For epistopics like observation,
measurement, and explanation, the task is thus to construct exercises in which
readers are led to conduct observations, measurements, and explanations - or,
at the very least, to follow along vicariously as the accomplishments of others
are elaborated in detail - so that they are able to examine the various
performances" (Ibid: 302- 303).
5. "Apply ethnomethodological indifference to the fact of the existence of
science" (Ibid:303). The translation of this into an ethnomethodological study
of legal practice would be that, the research must suspend treating the practices
of lawyers as being 'epistemologically special'. Though this does not deny the
training needed to become a lawyer, nor however, does it mean that legal
practice should not be a 'special topic' for sociology. Rather, it is to see that
legal decision making involves practices that can be seen as constituting rational
decision making. This can be clarified by Lynch, who states in relation to
observation in physics. "Although there is no reason to privilege the way that
physicists conduct their observations, their practices can inform, in an
interesting way, the heterogeneous practices that are identified under the
concept of observation. This would not foreclose studies of various other modes
of observation in and out of the sciences; in fact, one would want those cases
also" (Lynch 1993:304).
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6. "Use a 'normal science' methodology" (Lynch 1993:304). Lynch
attributes his use of the notion of 'normal science' not to Kuhn's use of the
term, but rather to Chomsky where it "in this sense uses ordinary modes of
observing, describing, comparing, reading, and questioning, and its constituent
activities are expressed in vernacular terms ... This normal science offers an
analysis that is thoroughly 'contaminated' by native intuition, vernacular
categories, and commonsense judgements" (Ibid:304-305).70 To achieve this the
description of epistopics must "both enable the practical reproduction of an
intuitively recognizable action and provide a notational index of the transparent
details of that action's performance. Both of these transparencies are collapsed
into a single textual object, but when enacted over the course of a reading they
become distinctively 'instructive' temporal moments" (Ibid:305).
7. "Relate the 'findings' back to the classical literatures" (Lynch
1993:305).71 Rather than an engagement in epistemology as such, he suggests
that this type of investigations may instead displace the framework of
epistemology.
These have been adopted and adapted to this research along the
following lines:
1. This research was begun with the aim of investigating document use and
the related talk in administrative tribunals. A perspicuous setting was found in
legal aid tribunal, so the research was instigated with an aim that was not
initially informed by the investigation of an epistopic. However, although the
70This appeal to 'normal science' is not an appeal to commonsense, but
rather an attitude of indifference to the epistemological statuses associated with
social science methodologies (Lynch 1993:305).
71A point Lynch footnotes here, and worth restating is: "This is the final
point in the programme that I have outlined here, but it is not necessarily the
end of the game. What I have proposed is a way to get started from within the
confines of an academic field. A more 'advanced course' in ethnomethodology
would pay more attention to the possibilities of developing 'hybrid' disciplines
from out of the praxiological exchange between ethnomethodological research
and the practices studied .. " (Lynch 1993 ff:305-306) A discussion of this
though is well beyond our present concerns.
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research setting and data collection were not informed by the notion of
epistopics, because they were chosen with a view to an ethnomethodologically
orientated piece of research they have afforded the possibility of building this
into the research. The manner in which this has been done is, to take as an
epistopic the issue of legal positivism. This is a liberal interpretation of what
Lynch means by 'epistopic' in that residing mainly in legal literature it does not
have such a general usage as the vernacular term 'representation' for example.
Nevertheless, since the vernacular 'representation' is, when investigated in the
setting of laboratory practice, a term of order* within the context of scientific
practice and hence the science 'community's' vernacular, this lack as an
everyday term in 'ordinary conversation' by 'legal positivism' is not so
problematic. Further, since the investigation of, again for example
'representation', does not rely upon the use of the term itself, but the activities
which are seen as constituting it by members, that legal practitioners may not
overtly pronounce an activity as an instance of 'legal positivism' may not be as
problematic as it initially appears. Though the choice of legal positivism as an
epistopic does originate from an initial interest at the outset of this research into
the possibility of using the ethnomethodological approach, so successful in
respecifying aspects of practice relating to positivist science, applied to legal
practice. This is something that the post-analytic ethnomethodological approach,
in the exploratory fashion that imbues this whole thesis, in particular could
facilitate. Although the investigation of an epistopic has had to be situated
within the context of the original aims of this research to investigate document
use in administrative tribunals, fortunately the two have not been too
incompatible.
2. Lynch's second 'tenet' has also not be applied from the start in that the
choice of the legal aid tribunal as a setting was achieved before the issue of
epistopics entered the research. However, even if retrospectively, the choice of
legal aid tribunals can be seen as providing 'primitive examples' of legal
positivism and legal representation. Although the High Court might be regarded
as the epitome of legal practice, the selection of tribunals for research would
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possibly have occurred anyway for reasons of accessibility. Firstly in that the
High Courts are not available to ethnomethodological research needing audio
tapes as their use is illegal. Secondly, in relation to the issue of 'unique
adequacy'. In that, although not being a trained lawyer before initiating the
research is, as Lynch drawing on Wittgenstein has noted, not problematic as
such. The choice of a research site which is not too 'formalised' involving the
use of highly specialised practises makes the description of the situated
activities less problematic. Problematic in the sense of simplifying specialised
activities to an audience not experienced in those specialised activities.
With regards the selection of which data to present to the reader, this
choice has been on the basis of which case can, in the limited space available,
illustrate the concerns of the thesis. Not all of the data refers to a particular
epistopic as the data has also been required to display the tribunal process as a
whole, and the use of documentation within that. This again does not fit in with
Lynch's programme for a post-analytic description of epistopics, unless one was
to claim to be taking 'tribunal' as an epistopic. This is not the case here,
although it also would be worthy of such research.
3. As noted above, the investigation of the epistopics and description in
detail of actual practices has been tempered by the aim to provide some form
of description of the whole of the phenomena of the legal aid tribunal. Further,
the descriptions of practices are shaped by the description in detail of the textual
practices, an aim that constituted the original focus of the research. However,
these are not incompatible and are used elucidate the epistopic of legal
positivism in Chapter Five as well as the use of texts in Chapter Six.
In describing the processes of tribunals as a whole, a number of
individual cases have been described, and as the ethnomethodological position
is that each instance of a phenomenon is unique it may be thought that nothing
could legitimately be said about the phenomena of legal aid tribunals. That even
to attempt to do so within an ethnomethodological 'framework' could be
methodologically flawed. However, while the unique cases described here are
not claimed as representative of tribunals as a whole. However, by modifying
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Lynch's concept of 'conceptual binding' rather than a 'general significance'
being present in relation to the stated epistopic alone, I have worked on the
basis that this is applicable to more than just the stated epistopic. The basis of
this is that, any particular sequence of situated activity does not have only one
researchable epistopic within it, especially so when we are dealing with
extended transcripts i.e. large pieces of data. Rather, it is merely the case that
the research has highlighted one specific epistopic for investigation. Therefore
if a 'general description', even if inevitably affected by the concerns of the
researcher, is presented of phenomena which are understood to be instances of
another phenomenon e.g. tribunal, readers will notice the conceptual binding
of other possible epistopics that have not been explicitly drawn to their notice.
So whereas the description of cases has focused on the textual and
representational aspects of the data, the generalised nature of the description
provides the possibility for the reader see conceptual bindings of other potential
epistopics.
In this thesis, although all the instances of the situated activity are
unique, the reader may spot the conceptual bindings that make all these as
instance of the potentially explorable epistopic 'tribunal', 'legal aid tribunal',
'attended tribunal', 'bureaucratic encounter' and more. These are not explicitly
stated here or formulated as epistopics, but they are nonetheless potentially
there for the reader. Thus more is conveyed than just a number of accounts of
unique phenomenon in relation to an epistopic or research 'themes'. The
problem is not in these connections being made by the reader in their reading
practices, but of a researcher making such 'connections' explicit in terms of
some abstract theorization instead of the ethnomethodological description of
epistopics.
Thus I believe there is some legitimacy in saying that a number of
unique instances will provide some sort of larger picture of legal aid tribunals,
but that the researcher can not unproblematically make claims about what this
is, as the frontispiece quote from Wittgenstein notes, the difficulty is to stop.
That this is at all possible, I suggest, depends on the nature of the presentation
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of the data. If provided with extracts from cases alone, I suggest that such a
display of the 'tribunal' would not be possible. Hence not only are full
transcripts of the data provided in Appendix Three, which I recommend are
read after this chapter and before engaging in the rest of the thesis, descriptions
of the data follow each transcript. Of course, some sort of analysis is
unavoidable here, as we shall see below, but I have attempted to restrict this as
much as feasibly possible. The use of a basic conversation analytic type data
transcription system, rather than some other transcription system, was adopted
not only due to my, and my anticipated readers familiarity with it, but because
I believe it does not detract from this provision
4. This research has been supported by the ESRC and to gain this funding
the research has had to have build-in policy objectives, although due legal aid
tribunals being largely previously uninvestigated phenomena rather than being
dominated by policy issues the thesis has been more explorative. As noted
above the desire to describe the whole process of the legal aid tribunal and
focus on documentation remained central throughout. The presentation of
material in line with Lynch's programme has proven to be a difficult task, not
only due to the design of the research and collection of the data occurring prior
to the general adoption of Lynch's programme." but also because of the large
space such descriptions consume, as is evidence in their presentation in
Appendix Three. Further to this, Lynch's position is a sophisticated one and as
Ph.D student undertaking their first ethnomethodological piece of research,
understanding, never mind adhering to Lynch's programme, resting as it does
for its sense on the whole ethnomethodological cannon, is challenging enough.
The fact that Lynch (ibid footnote p302) reports Garfinkel as noting that only
four studies have satisfied the 'unique adequacy' requirement as applied to the
presentation of data, displays the difficulty of the process.
In an attempt to satisfy the programme's requirements for the
72 This Ph.D was in fact initiated in the same year that Lynch's (1993) study
was published.
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presentation of data this thesis has adopted the 'thick description' of extended
data, although as noted above this has been presented differently from anything
Geertz (1973) may have had in mind. The aim has been to describe the various
performances in some detail while also elaborating upon aspects of interest. In
doing so the aim is to try and allow the reader to enter the phenomenal field of
the member's practices. However, this is difficult using description alone,
without the resources and subject matter that a post-analytic research project
might be designed around e.g. the practical articulation of a prism.
Nevertheless within the limitations of the use of transcripts the data has been
rendered into description that I believe does allow reader to examine the
members' performances. Although it has only been possible two cases in this
fashion in the main body of the text, the other cases being presented in
Appendix Three.
5. This research, especially due the requirements of the funding body and
initial research design has not attained ethnomethodological indifference in its
narrowest sense. However, with regards adoption of indifference to the fact of
the existence of legal positivism, the research has suspended treating the
practices of lawyers as being 'epistemologically special'. Though this is not to
deny the training needed to become a lawyer, or that legal practice should not
be a 'special topic' for sociology.
6. Lynch's tenet about the use of a 'normal science' methodology ties in
with the above observations made above in 'four', the use of 'normal science'
being tied in with data presentation and description. The description of the data
in this thesis has tried to use vernacular descriptions of the activities rather than
the technical language of sociology or law. Where technical language is used
by the members in their activities attempts have been made to clarify these for
a non-specialist reader. What to an extent has proven to be difficult has been
providing only descriptions that are "thoroughly 'contaminated' by native
intuition, vernacular categories, and commonsense judgements" as Lynch
prescribes (lbid:304-305). The slip from native intuition, vernacular categories,
and commonsense judgements of the activities into those of a practising
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sociologist within the ethnomethodological tradition is one that has to be
constantly watched out for. An example of this has been the temptation, not
completely avoided, to making observations on the data that are informed by
studies in conversation analysis, but which have become part of my 'intuition'
and 'commonsense' as a sociologist. To combat this throughout the data
description I have concerned myself with critiquing conversation analytic
practices, this has to an extent enabled me to be aware of the some of the
assumptions derived from conversation analysis that I have imported into the
descriptions. Since these critiques are not central to this thesis they have not
been presented in it, but the influence of this perspective on my descriptions
remains evident.
The inevitability, or not, of analysis in description has been one of the
central methodological concerns in the provision of the data description (see the
following section). Although the length of descriptions has ultimately led to
them being contained in a separate appendix rather than in the main body of the
thesis. Briefly, I believe no description avoids the influence of the researcher's
perspective, all that the researcher can do is to be reflexively aware of this
'problem' and attempt to keep it to a minimum, certainly no claims are made
as to total absence of such and influence in this thesis. What has been produced
here for the reader are descriptions of the intuitively recognizable actions
displayed in the data, with selective detailing of those actions relating to the
epistopic and 'themes' that have been set out as the interests of the research.
The textual object which is produced by this is one in which the individual
phenomenon become represented through a re-presentation which constitutes,
among other things, a doctoral thesis, this is an issue which has been reflexively
present throughout. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the production of this text has
also allowed each described phenomenon to display the details of its
performance and as such be instructive for the reader. A conscious effort has
been made to allow the description to perform this detailing and instruction
without a reliance on previous studies on the described activities. The difficulty
here has been in avoiding the learnt academic practice of continually displaying
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ones background reading and 'learning' to the reader. This, although attempts
have been made especially in Chapter Four and Appendix Three to avoided it,
manifests itself in a study such as this in copious referencing of 'relevant'
literature, and can result in a tendency claim more than is warranted by the
data.
7. The final tenet of Lynch's programme relates to how the epistopic of the
research is developed. In this I have related legal positivism to 'classical
literature' in light of the 'findings' of this research. This has been presented in
a single chapter and separate from the descriptions of the phenomena in Chapter
Four and Appendix Three, so that the discussion will not affect the data
description via the introduction of theoretical issues. Chapter Six is a discussion
of 'themes' relating to texts and representations, but these themes are not
developed into, or intended as, epistopic investigations. Instead this is an
investigationof textual practice which is necessary for facilitating members' use
of any epistopic theme, e.g. representation'.
3.4 Summary.
In the above description of ethnomethodologicalabove we noted that this
is only one possible 'version' as ethnomethodology has no one unified position,
although Garfinkel's (1967) 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' it is generally
accepted as a defining moment its genesis. Central to the ethnomethodological
'project' was the rationality of an account is not independent of that account,
instead its rationality is constituted in and of that account. This implies a
uniqueness initially to be understood in terms of the indexical nature of words
and expressions. This uniqueness of actions and event is not to be seen as a
problematic situation since members who overcome this temporal indexicality
by treating it as a practically situated issue resolvable from the observable
rational character of action by and for each member. It is these methods of
displaying and recognising the meaning and logic of actions that are the
phenomena of ethnomethodology.
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Having looked at some of Garfinkel's 'studies' we concluded that
research into the work of the decision making process of tribunals cannot
adequately be achieved through some 'sociological' technique such as the
coding of case decisions from case files using the directives of the Legal Aid
Handbook, since what we need to investigate are the members 'common sense'
activities and expectancies and that to achieve this we need another method.
However, while we looked at various studies by Garfinkel what became evident
was that ethnomethodology does not, as such, has a prescribed set of techniques
that can be just adopted to undertake a study, that although Garfinkel produces
lists and normative rules, uses breaching experiments and interview cases
studies, none of these can necessarily be adopted as a definitive form of
ethnomethodological description and methodology. It has been suggested that
there is no set of predefined methods as such, instead the ethnomethodological
position, simply put, is that the activities that make up an 'action' or 'event' are
exactly those 'things' which make that 'action' or 'event' evident and
understandable. That since for competent members understanding is possible
without access to anything other than those actions and the activities which
constitute them, studies should make recourse only to only what is 'observable-
and-reportable' about phenomenon. In terms of this position in contrast to
'formal' of sociology, while both 'formal' sociology and ethnomethodology are
both concerned with the investigation of order, or in ethnomethodology's case,
order*. For ethnomethodology order* is seen to be a locally produced and
accountable phenomenon, in contrast to formal sociology's 'order' which is
seen as extra-local rather than local. While ethnomethodology emphasises and
describes the local production and accountability of order in and as ordinary
activities, formal analysis uses one or other of its many forms of
'transcendental' analysis. Although ethnomethodology provides a critique of
formal analysis in that it obscures the categories that the members of society
themselves have and conceals members' 'accounting' practices, this has not
been our main concern here.
While we are not able to define any ethnomethodological methods in the
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form of predefined research techniques in the 'classical' sense, it has been
suggested that we can say what ethnomethodological descriptions should be
doing and that that is, revealing the methods of the phenomenon of order*.
However, these methods, or 'ethno-methods', are intimately tied to the
phenomenon itself, and cannot be specified in advance of any phenomenon of
order* they seek to describe. We have suggested that all that can be said in
advance is that the methods consist of descriptions. Therefore instead of looking
at the issue of methods of description, we looked what were 'the requirements
of method'. Although again it was suggested that this was not definitive or
final, we noted among these requirements, the use of 'perspicuous settings',
unique adequacy and indifference.
Focusing on the work of Michael Lynch and post-analytic
ethnomethodology we noted ethnomethodology's interest in science, one in
which the very positivity of science becomes a topic, and where positivist
techniques as such become topics of order to be respecified. The objective of
post-analytic ethnomethodology and the 'studies of work' programme of which
it can be seen to be a part of, being the attempt to study the 'missing what', that
virtually all sociological studies 'miss'. It was suggested that such an approach
would seem applicable to our interest in legal practice and that this 'form' of
ethnomethodology' should be adopted and adapted to this current study. To this
end Lynch's 'programme' was outlines and a description of how it has been
adopted and adapted for this study provided. However, no assumption is made
by myself, nor by Lynch and Bogen I believe, that this as yet constitutes a fully
worked out methodological 'programme'. As such it should be clear that the
methodology of this thesis is not that of some off-the-shelf programme for doing
social research, though at times I have envied those who choose such an option,
instead it is an exploratory, not fully worked-out, evolving, and situationally
deployed research perspective. It is this which makes it both demanding and
rewarding.
In the following chapter we shall look at some descriptions of Legal
Case Tribunal cases and the data which constitute the representations of those
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phenomenon, where there will also be an initial discussion of what we may
understand by 'post-analytic description.
93
Chapter Four - Four Phases of Legal Aid Tribunals (and Critique).
'A rule stands there like a sign-post. Does the sign-post leave no doubt
open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to
take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or
cross-country? But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether
the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one?-And if there were,
not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on
the ground-is there only one way of interpreting them?-So I can say, the
sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather it sometimes
leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a
philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.'
Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (1958:No. 85)
"Given a future, any future, that is known in a definite way, the
alternative paths to actualize the future state as a set of stepwise
operations upon some beginning present state are characteristically
sketchy, incoherent, and unelaborated. Again it is necessary to stress the
difference between an inventory of available procedures - investigators
can talk about these quite definitely and clearly - and the deliberately
programmed stepwise procedures, a set of pre-decided 'what-to-do-in-
case-of' strategies for the manipulation of a succession of actual present
states of affairs in their course. In actual practices such a programme is
characteristically an unelaborated one."
Garfinkel 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' (1967a:97-98)
This chapter is an introduction to the work of the tribunals, which rather
than an overview in which a descriptive gloss the tribunals is produced, here the
reader is initially presented with two unique cases which I believe can produce
a similar, and I suggest better effect. Better because this use of two
'perspicuous instances', of an unattended and attended case respectively, allows
the reader a chance to 'enter into' the phenomenal field of the tribunal action.
The aim being for the reader to gain a ready comprehension of Legal Aid
tribunals without forming a standard version independent of actual cases, at
least not to the extent an overview produces. Although it is admitted that any
such introduction necessarily directs our understanding of the phenomena, all
that can be hope is to minimise the negative aspects of the 'glossing' involved
in this.
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The two cases which are described in the second section are preceded
by a section which discusses the description practices adopted for the
description of the two cases and the description of all the cases contained in
Appendix Three. This section is concerned with explaining the applied
methodology as developed from the methodological discussion of the previous
chapter.
In the second section following the description of the two cases it is
suggested that the second case provides for an understanding of the processing
of the attended tribunal as consisting of the adoption of a four 'phase' process
by the panel members. It is suggested that this not purely a theoretical
imposition on the data but can actually be seen to be one attended to by the
participants itself. This 'four phases' is then used as a descriptive term when
discussing other cases, notably in the full descriptions provided in Appendix
Three. However, as is illustrated in the fourth section of this chapter this us of
phases is meant only as a 'loose description' when applied to other cases and
is not meant to have any foundational connotations, although this is an of step
to take it is one that should be exercised with all due anti-foundational caution.
Section Three then uses extracts from other cases to display activities
that can occur in Legal Aid tribunals but which are not practices that occurred
in either of the two perspicuous cases described in Section Two. It is intended
that the presentation of these segments of data, even though they are removed
from the context of the other ongoing activities in which they occurred (these
of course are provided for the reader in Appendix Three), they do provided a
fuller depiction of Legal Aid Tribunals without the 'glossing' activities of a
theoretical abstraction.
In the fourth section of this chapter we will look at three cases which
display the problems of adopting a four phase model as an over-arching version
of the activities of an attended Legal Aid Tribunal. These cases display the
members of these tribunals as subverting the 'normal' four phases 'model'
described previously for the situated needs of their activities in progress. This
section displays the inherent dangers in adopting and over-arching model of the
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a process independent of the unique occasions of its occurrence.
Finally in Section four we shall look at the use rule-following as a
descriptive version of phenomenal events in terms of previous
ethnomethodological research in this area, principally that of Zimmerman
(1971). Then, with reference to the two options that initially face an appellant
those of either a non-attendedor attended tribunal, it is suggested here that what
distinguishes them, apart from the fact that one has the presence of an appellant
and the other does not, is the difference between presentation based only on a
written text, and those that have a oral dimension. A description of this
distinction will be provided in terms of Lynch's (1982) discussion of monologic
and dialogic talk. It is suggest that the use of such descriptive categories can be
a useful to for understanding phenomena but that they should not be taken as
foundational or supersede the actualities of situated activity.
4.1 The Presentation of the Data Descriptions.
As has been noted in the previous chapter one of the requirements of
ethnomethodological studies is that they brings the reader in to a close
understanding, an almost 'seeing', of the activities that are at work. This is
usually achieved by the description of singular instances, however throughout
this thesis we are afforded the possibility of looking at multiple rather than
singular occurrences', although each is described in terms of its singular
! The use of singular cases is not perceived as problematic in
ethnomethodology, as it is so often perceived in classical sociology. Single
cases are unique but also formally composed and methodical. As Sacks
(1984:21) states, their "description consists of the description of sets of formal
procedures persons employ" (quoted in Maynard and Manzo 1993:177). As
Maynard and Manzo (1993: 177) observe "of course no analysis of a social
event, such as the deliberation, can involve all its elements, but with an
appropriately limited investigative scope, it can render some class of
phenomena that emerge and bear a relationship to other aspects of the event".
However, the Sacks quote must also be seen in the context of Sacks' statement
on the same page as the above quote, that "sociology can be a natural
observational science" (Sacks 1984:21), see Lynch and Bogen (1994) for a
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occurrence. The individual cases are seen as individual projects which, just like
the projects in laboratory science, appear 'bounded' with definite beginnings
and endings. Though, just as projects in a laboratory setting can be linked to
each other in a variety of ways, so can the cases in a tribunal session.' Whilst
such a presentation of cases does not compromise ethnomethodology' s
methodological requirements, it is acknowledged that two or three cases any
more than one from a series of Legal Aid Appeals tribunals, does not provide
a complete picture, nor is that being claimed here. Rather, it is the more modest
claim that two or three instances may be more informative than one when
presented in the fashion adopted here. That detailed descriptions of more than
one instance allow the reader to intuitively make comparisons, comparisons
which I suggest are not 'scientific', and as such any comparative analysis thus
provided for by the text is developed without making any foundational claims.
This is the case even when in the final discussion of the chapter the notion of
monological and dialogical decision making is discussed, it is intended that in
this fashion text goes some way to providing a post-analytic description and
reading;'
The description of a number of unique phenomena may be thought to
inevitably lead to an ironicization of their uniqueness due to viewing them
critique of this and how it has been developed in conversation analysis.
2 Each individual case is heard by the tribunal individually, but also as one
of a number they will be engaged in during a session, due to cases being
granted individually and not as a session this aspect cannot be investigated
further here. For comments on the nature of projects in laboratory science, see
Michael Lynch (1985), especially Chapter Three.
3 Due to the limitations it is mainly in the second section of this chapter and
in Appendix Three that the attempt a post-analytic descriptions are fully
pursued. In a sense what is produced is a rendering, a transformation of a
living process for examination. However, whereas in certain biological
processes such data collection and display necessitates the killing of the subject,
and hence the next phase is that of a new subject, here it is due to practicalities
of description and limitations of space. Although the desire to provide more
than one case is a factor too.
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collectively, this is undoubtedly a valid point. Nevertheless, the aim in this
research is to avoid this as much as possible by maintaining the focus on the
individual cases at hand. The research remit from the ESRC does have
implications which inevitably lead to some discussion of aspects of the larger
phenomena of Legal Aid Appeals Tribunals and it is not being pretended
otherwise. However, attempts to avoid some of the gross ironicizations of
classical sociology have been made by saying less rather than more in the data
descriptions.
The use of extended transcripts in Section Two and Appendix Three is
a consequence of the desire to convey to the reader, within practical limits, the
details of the individual phenomena in the most complete fashion possible.
Reference has already been made to the limitations of a narrative punctuated
with the 'odd' example from the data, and the aim here has been to provide the
reader with as much of the data and its description as possible." The reason for
this is the attempted post-analytic description without the assistance of some
practical apparatus for bring the reader into the phenomenal field. I believe that
the next best way of doing this here has been to provision of extended
transcripts. The use of extended transcripts is not without problems of course,
for instance the number of instances of unique phenomenon is severely
curtailed, and the amount of detail into which discussion can enter is also
limited - at least for a balanced description. This, however, would only be
problematic if the descriptions of the phenomena were intended to go into as
much detail, and for the same analytic reasons, as say conversation analysis
enters. Fortunately, the aim here is not to do conversation analysis of extended
transcripts, but do a different form of ethnomethodology. Nevertheless, it is
anticipated that the transcripts contain much that could interest conversation
4 Perakyla (1997:204) notes that audio recordings may "entail a loss of some
aspects of social interaction, including (a) medium- and long-span temporal
processes, (b) ambulatory events and (c) impact of texts and other 'non-
conversational' modalities of action." Although video analysis would have
proven informative with regards some of these, (a) and (c) are attended to in
some way by the use of extended transcripts and the focus on texts respectively.
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analysis. Indeed I have been aware of this through the production of this thesis,
though at the end of the day I have had to be aware that this was not the aim of
the thesis.
One of the aims of the use of the extended transcript has been to view
activities as they occur and develop temporally, and to be able to view these
activities within the context of other ongoing activities. Much empirical
research using recorded transcripts has a tendency to display the data in a 'cut
and paste' style, where often minimal contextualisation is provided and the
segment presented as if 'self-explanatory' or context free. Of course the
presentation of data depends greatly on the type of analysis and the restrictions
of space. Nevertheless, a result of the use of data segments is that it places the
reader as being to a large extent dependent on the interpretation provided by the
author, S and consequent loss of the ability to develop their own interpretation.
There is the danger of ironicization when displaying the data in such a fashion
due to the use of a 'generalising' description to provide the context. In this
thesis while full transcripts and the description of each 'case' discussed are not
practical to provide, every attempt has been made to provide as much as
possible. While only two cases are described in this fashion in the main body
of the text, others are provided in Appendix Three. Since an aim of this
research is to provide a description of the phenomenon of Legal Aid Appeals
Tribunals, I believe such use of data and description can only enhance the
readers' understanding of those phenomena. Of course it is not being pretended
that the descriptions provided in this thesis are somehow without perspective,
but they are indifferent in the terms described earlier.
The data presented in the second section of this chapter is in the form
of a series transcription segments, unsegmented transcription being located in
Appendix Three, these are each followed by a general description of what is
occurring. Further, discussion is then made, after a case summary following the
5 One way of formulating my aim here is to see it as corresponding to
Lynch's (1988) attempt at allowing readers to access the adequacy of what he
is saying by allowing them some independence in viewing the data.
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final case segment description, on certain issues which arise that are worth
closer attention, the criteria of which are that they are pertinent to the concerns
of this thesis. The text which accompanies the transcripts is not meant to be an
analysis as such, although it by definition includes some degree of this, but a
description of the activities of the member's work in a Legal Aid Appeals
Tribunal. Reference to specific activities will be drawn to the reader's attention,
but it is not being suggested that these are the only points of interest, as
extended transcripts can provide for a number of epistopics and related themes.
While some references are be made to research by others which reflects on the
'activities' of the members in their interaction, these are minimal in an attempt
not to loose contact with the phenomenon being described.
The separation of data, description, and discussion adopted here may
seem unusual since they are often inter-twined, the reason for this is so that the
reader can move through the descriptions of the cases without constantly
distracted from the activities that are being described. Such distraction, usually
in the form of a particular theme and usually at some distance from the data
itself, I believe, overly affects the reading that the reader has of the data. This
may make the contentions of the author more plausible but do so by ironicizing
the data, even if it looks like the discussion is 'data driven'. The description of
the activities recorded in the data are there to 'bring' the reader 'into' the
setting of the tribunal and the practical activities that are taking place. I suggest
that when these descriptions are overlaid with discussion of various over-
arching themes, the effect is to bring the reader out of the setting into an
abstract reading of the activities." Of course outside of Section Two and
Appendix Three it has not been possible to avoid the use of data segments,
although full transcripts are provide for the reader elsewhere.
The transcription method used here is a simplified version of that
6 Of course the author is always directing the reader in some fashion, for
example with the use of headings (see Harweg 1980). The aim is not some
naive attempt to eliminate the role of the author in the presentation, but rather
to minimise that role.
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designed by Gail Jefferson and the reader is directed to Appendix Two for a
description of this and the abbreviations employed in this thesis. The precise
details of performances has not been entered into in the descriptions as it is felt
that the level of description engaged in here is sufficient for the aims of this
thesis. The aim is to go through the actions that occur and due to the amount of
data and number and variety of actions performed, the descriptions do not enter
into 'every detail'. Where great detail is undertaken this is selectively achieved.
This may seem unsatisfactory, but the reason for providing the extended
transcripts is not only provide a description, but also to provide context for the
reader of any particular focus.
Finally, in Section Two the use of 'headings' for each individual
segments described and presented before the reader reads the transcript, it is
recognised inevitably directs the reader. These headings must therefore be
recognised as somewhat ironicising the data, since they provide an abstract
notion of what is to occur before it is presented. This is an unfortunate bowing
to convention on my part, and the reader is encourage to take these headings not
as rigid definitions but as a 'loose' description. Certainly the title of a segment
does not reflect all the activities that can be found to be occurring in the data.
This can in some degree be mitigated if, as recommended, the reader refers to
the full transcripts in the appendix before looking at the data descriptions
presented here. Preferably the reader would have access to the audio tapes also,
but for both practical and confidentiality reasons this is not possible.
4.2 Two 'Perspicuous' Cases of Legal Aid Tribunals.
When an applicant for legal aid is refused assistance by the area Legal
Aid Board, they are given the opportunity to seek a second opinion, should they
care to do so, in the form of an appeal to a legal aid appeals tribunal. Should
they decide to do so they will have they opportunity to either, (a) send in the
appropriate documentation and have the tribunal make a decision in their
absence or, (b) send in the appropriate documentation and attend in person at
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the tribunal. We can see this as being could see this as a choice between the
presentation of purely written text based documentation on the subject of the
decision making, or verbally based documentation of the subject.7 This is
however a little too simplistic" in that attended appeals also have written textual
presentation present. So the dichotomy can therefore be seen as one of either
(a) written text only or (b) verbal and written text.9 Of course any verbal
presentation may be recorded and transformed into a written text for later
usage, this is due to what I believe to be the priority of the written documentary
7 It is interesting to note the difference between literate cultures' with law
enshrined in the written text, and primary oral society where the law "is
enshrined in formulaic sayings, proverbs, which are not mere jurisprudential
decorations, but themselves constitute the law. A judge in an oral culture is
often called on to articulate sets of relevant proverbs out of which he can
produce equitable decisions in the cases under formal litigation before him"
(Ong 1982:35).
8 There is a split within the work upon communication which usually divides
interaction into written or spoken e.g. "Written discourse develops more
elaborate and fixed grammar than oral discourse does because to provide
meaning it is more dependent simply upon linguistic structure, since it lacks the
normal full existential contexts which surround oral discourse and helps
determine meaning in oral discourse somewhat independently of grammar"
(Ong 1982:38). However, in this work I try not to have an either/or view but
one which looks at a simultaneous existence of both in the single phenomenon.
9 It is worth clarifying the use of the term 'text'. Ong (1982) in his
discussion of 'primary oral' or pre-literate society notes: "In concert with the
terms 'oral literature' and 'preliterate', we hear mention also of the 'text' of an
oral utterance. 'Text', from a root meaning 'to weave', is, in absolute terms,
more compatible etymologically with oral utterance than is 'literature', which
refers to letters etymologicallyl (literae) of the alphabet .... But in fact, when
literates today use the term 'text' to refer to oral performance, they are thinking
of it by analogy with writing" (ibid: 13) As this thesis attempts to show, in
certain situations oral texts are 'intertwined' with written texts in certain
instances of communicative interaction. Ong believes that in literate cultures
such as ours there does not exist a clear dichotomy between orality and writing
since the form of orality that exists in our culture is not primary orality i.e.
orality unaffected by writing forms, rather we have a secondary orality i.e. an
orality that has incorporated forms derived from the essentially abstract written
word. Ong argues that written communication essentially alters the nature of,
not only describing the world but of understanding it.
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form in contemporary bureaucratic procedures in general. 10 Also, even in the
case of the solely written text presentation, at some point in the dispute career
there is likely to have been some form of verbal interaction e.g. when a solely
text based presentation is in front of a panel, or more than one individual, as it
has to be in a legal aid tribunal, then verbal discussion will ensue. II However,
the essential difference between a non-attended tribunal and an attended
tribunal, as noted above, is the reliance on textual documentation only in the
former, and the supplementation of textual documentation with verbal
documentation in the latter. This difference can be shown not to be an abstract
observation if it can be seen, as will be the case, to be demonstrable in the
actions in which the participants engage."
The descriptions below are based upon a combination of my direct
observations, field notes, tape recordings and personal recollection. The appeal
can, I suggest, best be understood as consisting of the interactional
accomplishments of the participants in doing the work of decision making
processing of a 'tribunal'. It is not intended that each case should be seen as an
exemplar by which others can be judged - some form of ideal type - rather these
cases were selected on the basis that they clearly illustrate members attending
to the work of tribunals.
10 Ong (1982) as noted above, would not restrict the primacy of the written
'text' only to bureaucratic procedures.
II Murray (1988:370) notes: "Literacy and orality are not dichotomous, nor
do they represent ends of a continuum along which various types of literate and
oral modes can be placed as a result of their specific
characteristics .... Moreover, people move among modes and media even within
the same interaction" .
12 I am not suggesting that this is how all cases are handled. Every case is
unique and should be seen as being so. However, this uniqueness is not so
extreme as to bear no similarities to other phenomenon of a similar form. Any
group of people who have to repeat a task, even if it varies on each occasion,
will tend to develop some form of routine and here, in a bureaucratic setting,
this may be seen to be even more so the case.
103
4.2a Case One13 - A Non-Attended Tribunal Hearing.14
Venue.
As some venues occur more than once the descriptions of all the case
venues are given in Appendix One. At the beginning of each case description
the reader will be directed to a description of the relevant venue. For Case One
see Appendix One venue number one.
Organizing the Panel.
cl :Right we'll make a start (0.2) would you care to appoint a
chairman?-
: [we have done (0.4)
:and that is?
[I 1 got lumbered I'm afraid (.)













The clerk brings the tribunal to a start by attracting everyone's
attention" and asks if they would like to appoint a chairperson (lines 1 and 2),
the chair being appointed from among the independent practitioners by
themselves and not by the Legal Aid Board. A panel member indicates that they
have already done so (line 3) this having done so displaying their knowledge of
the tribunal practices. The chair plays a significant role and the clerk asks
whom has been nominated as he needs to record who is performing this role as
13 Data session I tape 1 case 1.
14I had written consent from five appellants to sit in on their case hearings
and the clerk had seen fit to bring these five cases forward to be dealt with first.
The clerk felt this would be more convenient all round. The cases are not
placed in an order for any specific reason so it should not make much difference
to the process as it is usually.
15See J. M. Atkinson (1979), 'Sequencing and Shared Attentiveness to
Court Proceedings', for further discussion of these practices.
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well as whom to treat as the chair (line 4).16 The person nominated as chair
indicates that they have been chosen (line 5) to which the clerk says the chairs
name as being the chair, seemingly to be in coordination with making a written
note of the fact for the record, indicates that they have noted this and states case
one and the name of the case (lines 6 and 7).
















:have we got a PI specialist amongst us? (.) you are aren't you?
[no
(.) well not really but I
: [oh [I thought you did some
[ I thought erm
(0.2) I thought there was something quite (.) quite serious here (.)-
[yes
:-and that she ought to certainly have legal aid for (.) a medical
report and then counsels opinion (.)
:yes that was my my view as well (.)
:1 I felt the same I thought primi facie there appeared to be a case
of negligence (0.4) and there ought to be (.) a grant (0.2) for a
medical report from doctor (name) and for counsel's opinion (0.8)
The chair starts the case, following on from the clerk, by asking if there
is a personal injury (P.I.) specialist among the panel and asking directly panel







16 Before the first case is heard, and at various instances throughout the
tribunal session there are 'informal' sections of interaction. The research was
not concerned with this informal interaction when it occurred outside of a case,
and permission had not been gained to record this interaction. However, what
was apparent was that these occasions were used for constituting and
maintaining the relevant identities of the panel members. This also happens
throughout the interaction that takes place, but is more explicit in the
'unofficial' interaction. This issue of official and unofficial interaction is
discussed later in this chapter. Unfortunately the focus on text based activity has
not permitted any discussion on the issue of identity and accomplishment of
social activities. Identity as a situationally constructed and maintained
phenomenon in legal interaction would be possible area of further research in
the 'informal' settings of tribunals.
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two starts to deny this (line 9) to which the chair indicates surprise (line 11),
panel member two carries on to partially deny that they are a specialist in this
area (line 10) to which the chair interrupts'? reiterating their position that they
thought they did some of this work (line 11). Panel member two continues what
they were saying, and in so doing disattending to the chair's line of inquiry, to
state their opinion of the case and to give their recommendation as to what
action should be taken (lines 12, 13,15, and 16). The chair then goes on to state
that their view was the same (line 17), to which panel member three states that
they were of the same opinion and restates the recommendations of panel
member two, adding "negligence" as an aspect of the case and naming the
doctor to make the medical report - the doctor's name being named on the
appeal claim form (lines 18 to 20). So we can see the case has got off to three
of the panel members having made virtually a similar reading of the merits of
the case prior to the case hearing.
We see here the chair starts off asking if anyone here is a specialist in
the area of law to which the case at hand appertains, after no response she
appends an additional question which presupposes there is, and that it is panel
member two. However, member two denies this (line 9), but then when this is
met with surprise by the chair they modify this to a partial denial (line 10). The
panel member attempts to continue but is interrupted by the chair querying the
denial. What is interesting is that rather than explaining their denial the panel
member proceeds to give their opinion of the case. So we have a disclaimer to
expert knowledge by the panel member in response to a question by the chair
that would seem to indicate that if there is an expert in this area then they
should be the first to give their opinion. The panel member attributed with the
expert knowledge disclaims this (line 9), but then immediately produces a
modification, or amendment, of this (line 10) in a variation of a 'Yes, but .. ' or
!7 By interruption in these descriptions what is meant is an instance of a
speaker beginning speaking while another member was still speaking. Also, this
speaking interruption occurs when the first speaker was hearably intending to
continue.
106
a 'No, but..', thus leaving open the possibility of expertise, before going on to
offer up an opinion of the case i.e. a topic change or shift, thus putting the topic
on hold (lines 12, 13, 15 and 16), after the chair questions the modification of
line twelve (line 11). Note that the members favour the use of "thought" rather
than "think" at this stage, possibly as a past tense it allows more flexibility in
manouvering ones position. This disclaimer of expertise would seem to remove
some of the strength of their opinion, which a claim to expertise would confer
upon it. It may be suggested that the reason is that in a peer group of
professionals one is cautious about making a definite statement on the off
chance that the statement is fallacious and can shown to be so. Thus denial of
expertise may be a way of preventing, or at least limiting, any 'loss of face'
should one be shown to be incorrect. As it happens, the panel member's
position is not met with disagreement but is immediately agreed with by both
the chair (line 17), and one of the other panel members (lines 18 to 20). The
disclaimer by the panel member may also be seen as a case of 'modesty' or of


















:1 mean I felt the quantum was (0.2) quite substantial (0.4)-
[might well
-be (.)
:-if they got home on liability (0.2) errm I felt (.) not able to (.)-
[yes
[yes
:-comment on the medical side because it does seem horrendously
complicated and there is all sorts of different medical conditions
(.)
:that's right (.) but we had no actual medical report before that-
[umm
[no
:-did we (0.2) so
[no I thought that errr that was unfortunate omission but
18 See Pomerantz (1978), 'Compliment Responses: Notes on the Co-






















perhaps there isn't one (.)




:erm (.) there seemed prima facie there was a case (2.0)
The chair then goes on to state that in their opinion the quantum" could
be quite large (line 21), to which panel member two agrees it could be (lines 22
and 23). This is a 'weak' agreement in that it is tentative and is being given in
a qualified fashion, leaving room for doubt or the pursuance of stronger
agreement. The chair continues their statement by specifying it could be
substantial if a case for liability was successfully made in court. The chair adds
though that they could not comment on the medical nature of the claim/injury
which they thought to be very complicated (lines 24, 27, 28 and 29). Panel
member three then clarifies that there had not been a medical report carried out
before the legal aid application (line 30 and 33), to which the chair states that
this is unfortunate if there is one but it has not been included, but perhaps one
was not made (lines 34 and 35). Panel member three adds to this that they find
the medical descriptions in the application forms they have before them to be
a rather general description (lines 36 and 38). Panel member two agrees (line
19 Quantum is a term relating to amount derived from the term quantity
originally of Latin origin. Whilst this would seem adequate explanation for its
usage, in legal discourse the term is more specific and it in fact seems to be
being used here as an abbreviation of quantum ramifactus; the amount of
damage suffered. Although the amount of damaged suffered is being interpreted
in terms of monies in respect of such damage. This is notable in that it is
unproblematic use of an abbreviation which could equally be used for the terms
quantum meriut; amount of money earned in relation to a contract for services,
and the related term quantum valebant; the amount of money in relation to
goods supplied (Osborn's Concise Dictionary of Law 1983:273).
It is also a specific term in physics relating to a discrete unit quantity of
energy (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1973: 1725), though this is not the
meaning being invoked or understood by the tribunal members here. As such
this is a good example of the precise meaning of a word being used and gaining
its meaning from the situation of its usage, and how the indexicality of words
is usually unproblematic for members in situated activity.
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39) and panel member three continues to state that they thought that there did
seem to be a valid case (line 40).
The chair introduces the possibility of 'liability' into the discussion, and
if 'liability' can be proven by the appellant in the legal case at court (although
no comments are made as to the merits of the case in its ability to do so as it is
not the role of the tribunal to do), then large monies i.e. quantum size, would
be involved. Reference to quantum relates to the fact that one of the criteria for
legal aid funding for a case is that quantum should exceed one thousand pounds,
smaller amounts not being eligible. Hence not making the thousand pounds
would be a legitimate reason for refusing the case. By establishing the fact
between them that if the case was successful it would go beyond this threshold,
the panel create a reason for granting the case - although it could still be
rejected on other criteria.









































:do you agree with this (name of)? (0.2)
:well speaking as the err divorce specialist it looked like a good
PI claim to me (.)
:(laugh) (0.8)
:yeah (.) I mean its if it is going to go home on liability it is
certainly going to go over a thousand in damages (unclear) (.) by-
[(unclear)
:-a street (.)
:1 think it's seven thousand for loss of life isn't it? (0.2) they (.)




[bereavement damages you mean (.)
:bereavement damages yes (.) plus the pain and suffering that the-
[ummm [ummm
:-child obviously experienced (0.2) throughout his life so I would-
[(unclear)
:-think that it's a very substantial claim (.)
:yep (.) so Iwould say (.) we should grant it (.)
:can we give a limited certificate for medical reports counsel's
opinion on merits (.) please (clerk' forename) on that one (5.0)
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63 cl :okay (.) err which takes us on to err six (4.0)
Following this, and after a short pause, the chair asks panel member
one, who until now has remained silent, if they agree with the view of the case
taken by panel member three - and, seemingly, the others (line 41). Here we
can see the chair doing the work of a chairperson rather than a panel member. 20
Panel member one, who until this point has remained silent, responds to this by
stating that as a divorce specialist it looked like a good personal injury claim to
them (line 42 and 43). This is an accounting for their silence performed through
a joke, but one which still allows them to offer an opinion - it may also relate
back to the earlier issue of expertise with here expertise being admitted but in
a area not relevant to this case." This elicits a laugh from panel member three
(line 44).22 Panel member one continues that if it succeeds as being a liability
case it will certainly go over one thousand pounds (lines 45, 46 and 48). One
thousand pounds being the minimum threshold for a claim which can be made
for legal aid assistance of this form. The chair then states that they believe that
the award for "loss of life" is seven thousand pounds plus a lump sum and, after
20The chair is both a chair and a panel member and as such can be seen to
be involved in two sets of compatible activities. In the descriptions of the data
the title is of 'chair' is used as an omni-relevant device, even when the chair is
engaged in activities that may not necessarily be those of a 'chair'. However,
this use of the category chair is demonstrably relevant to the on-going activities,
e.g. focusing the panel's deliberations. Sacks states: "An 'omni-relevant device'
is one that is relevant to a setting via the fact that there are some activities that
are known to get done in that setting, that have no special slot in it, i.e., do not
follow any given last occurrence, but when they are appropriate, they have
priority. Where, further, it is the business of, say, some single person located
via the 'omni-present device,' to do that, and the business of other located via
that device, to let it get done. (Sacks Vol2 1992:313-314)
21 It is notable that the expertise that is discussed by the panel in this case
is expertise internal to the practise of law and bearing on the panel's tasks. This
expertise within law differs from expertise that may be called upon in the form
of expert witnesses, or the documentary reports of such experts e.g. medical
reports.
22 For a discussion of the role of laughter in interaction see Glenn (1995).
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a lack of response by other panel members, asks for verification on this from
the clerk (lines 49, 50 and 53). Panel member three clarifies/rectifies that the
chair is talking about bereavement damages (lines 54), to which the chair
confirms, plus money for the child's "pain and suffering" throughout life which
they believe would make this a "very substantial claim" (lines 55, 57 and 59).
Panel member one concurs with this and states that they think: they should grant
it (line 60). Thus all the panel members agree that the case is to be allowed its
appeal. The chair then asks/instructs the clerk to note for the record that the
case judgement be given as a limited certificate for a medical report and a
counsels' opinion as to the merits of the case (lines 61 and 62). After a five
second pause in which the clerk makes a note of the panel's judgement on the
case, the clerk confirms the chair's request ending the case, and moves
proceedings on to the next case (line 63).
As we observe the case goes on to be granted legal aid, though limited
to a medical report and counsel's opinion. Of interest is that the chair
specifically asks panel member one who has not yet offered an opinion on the
case, whether they agree with panel member three's statement (line 41). This
act by the chair can be seen to be one of checking if the panel is gaining a
consensus, the panel having a consensus being a preferable state of affairs. The
panel member would seem to have the possibility of endorsing the view of the
rest of the panel or discussing the problems of the case on whatever grounds.
However, what panel member one does is actually make an opinion but with a
disclaimer (lines 42 and 43). By again raising the issue of expertise panel
member one states that the claim "looked" good, but that they were speaking
as someone specialising in another area of law. This statement is taken as being
witty by the rest of the panel (line 44). Panel member one continues this
statement by agreeing with the chair's earlier statement (lines 21 and 24), that
is if the case managed to prove liability then it would pass the thousand pound
level Le. passing one of the criteria pertinent to the acceptance of the case (lines
45, 46 and 48). This is taken by the chair as the panel having a consensus on
the merits of the case, with reference to the quantum surpassing one thousand
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pounds, and goes on to emphasise this point by referencing statutory levels of
compensation (lines 49,50 and 53). The chair states that the clerk may provide
assistance an this point (line 50), although the clerk does not respond.
After what can be heard as a minor technical terminology correction by
panel member three (line 54), in that he repeats the correction by panel member
three of his designation "loss of life" (line 49). The chair goes on to
reemphasise the case's merits in terms of possible levels of quantum being "a
very substantial claim" (line 59). It is panel member one though who, following
this statement by the chair, suggests that the panel should accept the case (line
60). It is noteworthy that it is panel member one who was last to give their
opinion and to provide the desired consensus that attempts, and succeeds, in
finalising agreement on the case. It is the chair who brings the case to a close
by asking/instructing the clerk for limitations in terms of what the award will
be for (lines 61 and 62). This statement by the chair should also be noted in that
it is directed not only to the clerk as such, but also to the record that the clerk
makes of the decision of the panel. The chair's statement is for the record. The
clerk acknowledges this and then moves the tribunal on to the next case (line
63).
4.2b Summary.
We observe that this non-attended text only tribunal was completed in
a single 'phase', the issue of 'phase' will become apparent in the following
attended case. The work of this case entailed the 'glosses' of what were
described as: organising the panel; searching for an expert; assessing the case;
and obtaining a unanimous decision. The actual activities of which have been
described using 'thick' or 'rich' description. It is not intended that it be
assumed that the work of the tribunal in all non-attended cases are performed
in the same manner, though we can assume that there are similarities even if
each inevitably has its own dynamics and 'requirements'.
Although there are a large number of activities that could be focused
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upon, this case hearing can be summarised as: a panel member gives an opinion
of the case, although they denied expertise. The denial of expertise is not
however a denial of being the person most qualified relative to the other co-
participants. An interpretation is made of the case and then agreement is offered
or with-held. A case is made for why it should be granted (although it could
have been for rejection), possible problems e.g. lack of specific documents are
noted, and in this case 'overlooked'. Consensus is established and a decision
made and its implications delivered to the clerk. The whole time the panel only
have recourse to the documents provided by the Legal Aid Board, which
include those provided by the appellant, any input and argument on behalf of
the appellant can only be made by the panel themselves working from the
documents provided for them.
A specific instance worthy of note is when panel member three states
that there had not been a medical report carried out before the legal aid
application (line 30 and 33), to which the chair states if there is one but it has
not been included it would be a shame (lines 34 and 35). The chair is not totally
certain that the documentation in question not available, but is limited in
pursuing this as the case is that of a non-attending appellant, where information
lacking or not clear in the documents can not be checked with the appellant.
The chair when drawing attention to the medical details that "seem
horrendously complicated" (lines 27 and 28) would again seem to indicate an
issue on which an appellant might shed some light as it seems that the medical
details provided are not in a suitable form for the panel to use to make any
judgement.
We will now look at an attended tribunal.
4.2c Case Tw023 - An Attended Tribunal Hearing.
Venue. See Appendix One Venue Number Two.
23 Data session 9 tape 1 case 2.
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Moving Orientation to a New Case.
shuffling of paperwork as previous case vacates the room
1 cl :Neil you're ok for the next one too (0.4)
2 pml :is (unclear) around C.)
3 cl :yes (2.0)
From the end of the last case footsteps of the last attender leaving can
be heard on the wooden floor, and there is the rustling of documents as the
paperwork of the previous and up-coming case are sorted by the panel and the
legal aid clerk. Unfortunately my observation of the tribunal does not allow my
to say with confidence exactly what activities are engaged in while doing this.
The transcript begins with the clerk informing the researcher that they have
permission from the appellant to record and sit in on the case (line l).
Immediately the clerk is asked a question - which is unclear on the tape - to
which the clerk answers in the positive (lines 2 and 3). The question is asked
while the other members are still busy sorting their papers and before the panel
gets down 'properly' to the business of the new case.
What we can see here is that the clerk, while the previous case appellant
is leaving the room, starts the process orienting the panel and researcher to the
next case. This is achieved via reference to the researcher. 24






:is this number two (0.2)
:(appellant's name) yes (5.0)
24 A likely reason as to why I would have been orientated to here is possibly
because of my need to know whether or not to switch off the tape recorder
before deliberations began. This would have also served to alert the panel that
the new case was about to begin.
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Panel member three (line 4) questions if the next case is number two on
the agenda, and in so doing seems to initiate the first move towards 'formal'
interaction." The question is answered with the name of the appellant of the
next case and confirmation of the question (line 5). The documents which the
panel members receive have a cover sheet with both a name and a case number
for the session. By effectively reciting both name and case number the clerk
allows the panel members to confirm that they have moved on to the correct
case documents. Here, I suggest we can see the focusing of members onto the
specific case at hand and the documentation relevant to it.
Establishing formal orientation to the work of Decision making.
ch :now in the normal way we we (.) we look at this in case (.) we
have formed a view of reading (.) on this occasion we have got (.)




After a short pause the chairperson (lines 6 to 8) moves the session into
the 'formal' stage proper by stating explicitly that they, the panel members look
at the paperwork they have brought to the tribunal. Having been supplied with
the case documentation prior to the hearing, to see if, in their individual
25 The difference between formal and informal is discussed here in a largely
unproblematic fashion (which it is for the panel members), although in practice
delineating between the two in the data is not so unproblematic. As with the
contrast between the scientific and everyday attitudes towards the world in the
phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, the two blur into one another in practice
(Lynch 1988:84-86). This shift is achieved quite quickly but is not a sudden,
or at least jarring, shift. Neither is it just verbal, it involves a physical display
of bodily orientation and expression of attention, phenomena that are not
recorded on audio tape. Unfortunately, the use of these terms appears then as
a analytical device, and to the extent that I have chosen to emphasize this aspect
of the data it is. Thus we can see that the distinction is in some sense arbitrary,
but it does seem to be attended to, the question is to what extent emphasis
should be given to it? Arguably only that given to it by the members
themselves, unfortunately it probably lends itself too well to the textual
practices of data description and becomes treated as a generic and uniform
phenomenon. Some clarity to this is provided by J. M. Atkinson (1982).
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readings, they have formed an opinion of the merits of the case. The chair
distinctly references a "normal way" (line 6), indicating that there is some
normative pattern to how they 'usually' conduct their affairs. By making this
statement, he seems to be providing a common temporal 'present' in the
'systematic procedures' that the members undertake when evaluating a case.
The case evaluation starts 'properly' here, I suggest, in that it is directed to all
the panel assembled and to convene their attention to the act of decision
making, whereas panel member three's and the clerk's statement's (lines 4 &
5) do not seem to necessarily address the whole panel in the same manner. 26 in
relation to line one above the clerk by addressing the researcher of the
possibility of recording the next case hearing, 'indirectly' informs the other
panel members of progression of the tribunal business. This develops in line to
the inquiry to the clerk of the next case number, this and the answer from the
clerk are hearable by all panel members. This is then followed by the chair
addressing the other panel members in line six, this he does in a manner which
indicates, and is attended to (line 9), as being in his capacity of chair of the
panel, this relates back the issue of omni-relevant devices discussed above.
Here we can seem the move to 'formality' as being built up by drawing the
members attention together, and the adoption of the formally designated role the
chair.
The chair also notes that this case has a lot of documentation attending
the case, this draws the attention of the panel member's to the official
documentation, and the actions they have taken towards this in their capacity
as tribunal panel member (lines 6 to 8). This would seem to work alongside the
activities described above in moving to the 'formal' activities of the tribunal.
26 The reader might think that this statement by the chair of 'normal'
procedure is somewhat peculiar as the panel would be expected to be aware of
the procedures. However. although it could therefore be interpreted as being
intended for my benefit as a researcher present at the tribunal I do not believe
this to be the case but rather. as described above. as a method of introducing
'formality' to the proceedings.
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Deciding on a Course of Action.
9 pm2 :counsel' s er put a lot of doubt on it (unclear) unless he comes up
10 with that (.) gets us'him over that hurdle (0.4) he must fail (0.6)
11 eh :right (.) then I think we can do no better than have him in (.)
12 cl :okay (35.0)
The statement from panel member two (lines 9 and 10) refers to one of
the documents in front of the panel, which states the counsel's opinion of the
merits of the case. This is that unless the appellant can provide information
which can overcome the counsel's doubts the appellant must fail in their appeal.
Of interest is how the beginning of this utterance produces a frame, based on
the 'counsel's opinion', for a negative appraisal of the case by panel member
two. The chair agrees with this and states that they "can do no better than have
him in" and speak to the appellant directly (line 11), as the whole appeal would
appear to hinge on this point. I suggest this can be seen as signalling that they
have completed the work of deciding on their reading of the case and what to
talk to the appellant about. They can now move to the work of discussing the
case with the appellant." This is not to suggest that this move cannot be halted
by the other panel members. The Legal Aid Board clerk acknowledges this (line
12) and leaves to bring in the appellant. Note the indirectness of this request,
yet the clerk treats this as expecting action. The clerk certainly appears to takes
this general statement to signal that they have reached the end of what, I
suggest, can be seen as the first general work task. Of course line 11 can be see
as both a signal directly to the clerk to bring in the appellant - one of the clerk's
tasks - while also performing its general function as agreement and signalling
the end a first phase. The actual phrasing of line 11 also acts to legitimate the
27 As we shall see in Section Four the move to the discussion in 'phase two'
with the appellant is not without variations in practice, although if an appellant
has come to the tribunal the panel seem always to talk to the appellant.
However, even if an appellant is in attendance, a decision on the case may be
made based upon the documentation and thus rendering it very similar in
decision making to a non-attended case.
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move to the next phase by accounting for and warranting such a step. Note that
the appellant is brought in after very little discussion of the texts. This could be









Clerk leaves the room to get the attending appellant
:good opinion isn't it (0.4)
:yeah (20.0)
Clerk returns from waiting room with appellant
Following the end of the first phase we have what I suggest to be a
transition period or less 'formal' period (lines 13 to 16). It essentially consists
of the period which it takes the clerk to go to the waiting room and bring in the
appellant. This period may vary in length and mayor may not involve some
discussion by the panel members. It can be seen as indicating the boundaries
between possibly discrete activities, though work does often get performed in
this period. At first the members are engaged in reading their documents, which
is a 'typical' activity in such periods. We can see in this case that, after a period
of thirty five seconds (line 12), the chair states a positive appraisal of the
counsel's opinion (line 14). Panel member two agrees (line 15) without
pursuing further. After another 20 seconds the clerk returns with the appellant
allowing the work of discussing the case with the appellant to begin.
The 'transition period' provides the opportunity for doing important
work i.e. looking through documents and reflecting upon action. Although these
activities are not always verbally displayed and hence not recorded, that they
are looking, and to some extent how they are looking, is displayed and made
available.
Discussing the Case with the Appellant.
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:please sit down mister (name) (.)
:thankyou (5.0)
:mister (name of clerk) are you going to
:mister (name) you had (.) legal aid (.) err last year to enable you
to (.) be represented in the case involving (company name) (.)
:yes (.)
:err the legal aid certificate has been discharged by the (.) legal aid
board staff you are now (.) exercising your right of appeal to the
area committee this afternoon (.)
:umhuh (.)
:err the members of the committee who are here this afternoon
who are all (.) quite independent of the legal aid board have had
a chance to consider the papers (.) they'll have some papers er
they'll have some questions for you and you can add what you
wish afterwards (.) the committee have had the counsel's opinion
of the 4th of november (.) err your notice of appeal (.) a letter ff
(.) from you dated the 9th of january (.) and various other papers
(0.4)
Once the clerk returns there are the initial practacalities of getting the
appellant seated (lines 17 to 20), then the chair asks the clerk if they are going
to start (line 21) at which point the clerk starts before the request is completed
(line 22). This can be seen, I suggest, as being where the 'informal' mode
finishes and 'formal' work on the case begins again. The clerk begins what can
be seen as the second 'task' 'properly', by stating in a more 'formal' manners
in this instance also indicated by lexical choice, the case history of the
appellants legal aid application (lines 22, 23, 25, 26 and 27). This work of the
clerk in some sense is provided for by the prior actions of getting the appellant
seated and facing the panel, thus creating an expectation of activity in all the
members present. There is a five second pause after the appellant takes their
seat (line 20), this silence by all parties seems to provide the context for the
2S The transcript does not include intonation indicators as they are not really
the main aspect of the analysis.
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move to 'formal' activities. The fact that the appellant does not ask if they saw
the football match of the previous night, or the chair ask the appellant if he has
the latest test score, etc. which provides the move to formality with any
preamble drawing together the members attentions. This expectation of the start
of the formal proceedings is taken up by the clerk who addresses the appellant.
This address is a formal one "Mr .... ", also, the rest of the clerk's talk is
distinguished by a formal and 'legal' lexical choice. Thus, the formal
proceedings of the tribunal can be seen as being indicated by the tone and
lexical choice of the clerk. This is all collaborated in by the appellant through
the use of minimal responses, the absence of responses also helping to form the
'formal' in contrast to 'informal' nature of the interaction."
This, I suggest, can be seen as a chance to verify that the case and
appellant are one and the same, the appellant verifying that they have had legal
aid to represent the case described by the clerk (line 24). Further, the clerk
describes the past action by the legal aid board area office, that of 'discharging'
it Le. cancelling the funding of any further action chargeable by the appellants
solicitors to the Legal Aid Board, which the appellant is now appealing against -
which the appellant acknowledges (line 28). The clerk then goes on to state that
the panel members are independent of the Legal Aid Board and have looked at
the case papers before convening (lines 29 to 31). The clerk then informs the
appellant how the case will be heard procedurally which also informs the
appellant what they are expected to do themselves (lines 31 and 33). Finally,
the clerk informs the appellant of the documents that the panel have before them
(line 33 to 36).
Introducing the Panel and Tribunal Process to the Appellant.
37
38
ch :mister (name) my name is (name) I'm sitting with mister (name)
on my right (.) mister (name) and mister (name) (.) erm as mister
29 See E. Schegloff (1982b) 'Discourse as an Interactional Achievement:

















(clerk's name) has said we've read errm (.) a statement (.) that you
gave (.) errm (.) which is (with us) (.) the helpful background you
(.) give the (0.2) reasons (.) (in this) the statement (.) that
accompanied your application I believe (.) you gave five reasons
why (.) you (.) felt that the err the (.) court judgement should be
set aside (.) you then got (.) mister (name) I think his name is his
opinion (.) errm which is (.) err though you describe it a interim
opinion it is (.) fairly (.) conclusive in my personal view but that
is dated the 4th of November 1994 (0.2) und then we have a
statement from you (.) erm regarding the notice of appeal (.) erm
and a further letter mister (clerks name) said (.) now as I say we
have read all that (.) perhaps (.) err the way we should handle the
appeal if for you to (.) add to those grounds if you want to (.)
we'll then ask you questions so perhaps you'd like to shoot away
(.)
Once the clerk has fmished the chair of the panel introduces himself and
the rest of the panel by name to the appellant and then acknowledges that, as the
clerk had said previously, they have read the documents submitted with the
notice of appeal (line 37 to 40). The absence of response here helps maintain
the formality of the discourse. The chair then notes aspects of one of the
documents i.e. a list of five reasons why the counsel's view of the case should
be set aside (lines 40 to 44), seemingly the appeal against refusal of legal aid
document or the accompanying letter, which refers to the counsel's opinion
(another document they have in front of them). The chair then goes on to give
an assessment of the counsel's opinion in doing this with reference to "my
personal view" (lines 46), thereby indicating to some extent his position
towards the case to the applicant. However, by claiming it as his personal view
he seems to be marking that it is not the decided opinion of the panel. The chair
seems to have temporarily dropped from his role of speaking on behalf of the
panel. The chair then appears to move back to speaking as the chair on the
behalf of the panel with "but that is dated", it appears that the move from
personal opinion to a statement of 'fact' in the form of a date stamp. It is the
position of this comment in the midst of the listing of the documents before the
tribunal that gives it an 'ad hoc' appearance. The chair provides for this
occasion by placing a reported opinion of the appellant, "you describe it a
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interim opinion" (lines 45 to 47), and then giving their contrasting opinion. The
intonation makes it sound separate from the surrounding talk, and hence its 'ad
hocness' , however, it can also be seen as setting an agenda for discussion by the
appellant. The chair continues by listing the other documents they have and
again states that these have been read (lines 47 to 49). This is the same list as
the clerk made though without mention of "various other documents" and hence
reinforces the named documents from those of a 'downgraded' distinction (as
mentioned above). Finally, the chair suggests the manner in which the appeal
should continue i.e. the appellant adding to the documents a verbal case to
which the panel can then attend, then passes the floor over to the appellant
(lines 49 to 53).






















:(cough) I don't think I have anything to add to the statement (.)
:nothing at all? (.)
:no (.) I mean it's it's all set out there (.) and and I don't think
there is any point in adding anything to that (0.2) I I obviously
don't agree with you in in respect of the (.) of thee barrister's
opinion (.)
:in wha: have you got a copy of there (.)
:yes Ihave (.)
:well sh.shall we refer to it because I think that it's quite important
that we don't get (.) at crossed purposes on this (.)
:okay
:cause after all it's on the basis of this appeal that urm (.) legal aid
is withdrawn (7.0)
However, the appellants response to being given the floor is to state that
they have nothing else to add to the written documentation (line 54). The
appellant has been given the opportunity to give an oral account in support of
their written account, and is stating that they believe that it is unnecessary for
them to do so. The chair further queries the appellant (line 55), a query that
makes the appellant account for their position by stating that they see no reason
to add more to the documentation they have provided, and that they have a
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different view of the barrister's i.e. counsel's, opinion to the chair (lines 56 to
59). This refusal of the appellant to add verbally to the documents, and in so
doing declining the activities the chair had anticipated for them, is negotiated
by the chair then asking the appellant if they have a copy of the counsel's
opinion to which the appellant replies in the affirmative (lines 60 and 61). The
chair then suggests that they start referring directly to the document so as to
continue the hearing without confusion and to clarify their positions on the
counsel's opinion - to which the appellant agrees (lines 62 to 64). The chair
then states the importance of the hearing for the appellants legal aid (lines 65
and 66). Thus the chair moves beyond the initial impasse over the appellants
wish not to add to their written statement.

















:1:1thought I'd actually (referred to): in in the barrister's opinion
he asks for some further information (.) from thee (.) uh (.) two
directors of the company concerned (0.2)
:can (.) can you point to them now (33.0)
:I'm not sure I've found it (35.0) in twenty nine is it is he talks
(0.4) about thee err (0.4) assertions and (.) evidence before them
to support the third defendant's contentions (4.6)
:you being a second defendant (.) they're saying "those instructing
you should contact the person pertinent for (unclear) cite all the
evidence in the possession of the defendants" (0.2)
:and I'd I'd obtained that additional information which the barrister
hasn't seen (.)
:1 see (0.4)
:and what I was asking was (.) that he could see the additional
information (.) that I have obtained (.) since he he wrote his report
(.)
The appellant starts their response to this request to look at the
barrister's opinion by stating "I thought I'd actually (referred to)" but does not
continue the sentence, rather they focus on the barrister's opinion as requested
by the chair (lines 67 to 69). That the appellant does not continue the sentence
is significant as it appears as if they were about to refer to a document they had
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produced after the barrister's opinion, the importance of which appears later. 30
However, the appellant states that the counsel's opinion asked for further
information about the case, to which the chair asks the appellant to point out
where this is in the document (line 70). This takes the appellant some time to
do but they do eventually manage to state where it is in the document and
paraphrase what it says (lines 71 to 73). The chair then goes on to quote
directly from the document the request for further information (lines 74 to 76)
to which the appellant states that they have obtained this further information
that the counsel requested, but the counsel had not seen it (lines 77 and 78), and
that the request for legal aid is so that the counsel can see it (lines 80 to 82).























ch :so really (.) that (.) you're really hanging your appeal on that
point particularly? (0.4) is that right you're not challenging (.) the
other points (.) in thee eh
[well (.) the appeal to you as far as I
understand which is in in respect of (.) allowing me to go back to
the barrister so that he can complete his opinion (.)
[okay
:right (0.4)
:in terms of the appeal against the whole case th. that this is not up
to me to talk to you about today (.)
:quite (0.2)
:Imean if I'm wrong Imean
:no no that's fine mister (name) that's that's actually quite helpful
(.) that we've narrowed (.) we've narrowed the issue down Imean
(0.2) lets just deal with it on that level to start with (.) see if we
can not
: [and the other thing that I should say is the statement I have





The chair then clarifies with the appellant that this is the main aspect of
the appeal, and that the appellant is not challenging other points made against
30 This observation may suffer from being informed by later events in the
case. Certainly the panel did not seem to pick up on it as a significant utterance.
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the case (lines 83 to 85). Though he does not get to say what those points are,
as the appellant enters the statement that their understanding of the aim of the
appeal is to get the counsel to look at the additional information (lines 86 to 88).
The appellant is here setting and clarifying what they see to be the boundaries
of the issue at hand. The chair signals that they now understand this (lines 89
and 90), while the appellant then adds that they do not think that they have to
talk about the case as a whole on this occasion (lines 91 and 92), to which the
chair concurs (line 93). The use of "quite" (line 93) by the chair would appear
to be a form of 'weak' agreement, as evidenced by the appellants response (line
94).
The appellant then asks to be corrected if it is not the case that the
claim, and hence discussion, is about monies to put new materials before the
barrister (line 94). To which the chair replies that it is fine to claim for monies
to do that, and that it has been useful to focus the debate to that point and that
they should deal with it at that level to begin with (lines 95 to 98). Here we
have almost a reversal of roles. This action seems to gain 'emphatic' agreement
from the chair, who states explicitly its usefulness. This may be because he
recognises this activity as one he might be expected to perform to preface, does
here the resetting of the agenda for discussion. At this point, and interrupting
the chair as he is about to make a suggestion, the appellant informs the panel
that the appeal document was drawn up jointly by themselves and their solicitor
(lines 99 and 100). By saying this the appellant can be seen, I suggest, to be
possibly trying to add weight to the strength of argument in the text Le. up-
grade its status, by stating that it was co-authored by the appellant's solicitor,
it may also be seen as an attempt by the appellant to have the focus of the
discussion move from the barrister's opinion to their appeal documents and the
additional information contained. This may account for why it is done at this


























:yes sure (.) yes (0.2)
:1 have nothing else (.)
:okay (2.0)
:1 can anticipate what your answer will be but this additional
information that you've found is it encouraging (0.2) do you feel?
(1.4)
:yes a do (2.0)
:Inotice (.) on the (.) statement in support the err notice of appeal
that a (.) bundle of additional evidence was submitted with that (.)
err we haven't seen it (1.0) including of course the comments from
the legal aid board (.) and er how extensive that (.) bundle is
which (unclear)
[well that's that's the bundle that was sent to the legal aid
board (1.5)
:hhhhh (0.4)
After acknowledging the last statement by the appellant (line 101), in a
fashion which with the use of "yes sure" seems a little dismissal of this point.
Certainly, it is not taken up for further discussion by the panel. One of the
panel members states they have nothing additional to ask the appellant (line
102) which the chair acknowledges (line 103), then, after two a second pause
panel member two asks the appellant a question (line 104 to 106). It seems that
the extended silences at the end of the chair's comments (lines 101 and 103),
are treated as 'problematic' and it is only after two of these pauses other panel
members join in the discussion. It would be likely here that the chair has used
non-verbal signalling e.g. turning-towards, to be an invite to the other panel
members to ask any questions they have. Panel member two, taking-up the
second of these pauses, asks the appellant if they think the new information will
make the case stronger, but it is interesting that the question is prefaced with
"I can anticipate what your answer will be but .. " (lines 104). This preface to
the question would seem to indicated to the others that the panel member knew
what the likely response to the question, possibly detracting from any naivety
that it might be attributed with. The appellant responds in the affirmative
without any elaboration (line 107). Following this, and a third pause, panel
member one asks the appellant about the 'bundle' of information referred to in
their appeal document which they, the panel, have not seen (lines 108 to 112),
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to which the appellant responds that the 'bundle' was sent to the legal aid board
(lines 113 and 114). At this the chair gives an audible sigh (line 115).31
Overcoming the Problem.
116 pml :donno what (.) what (.) we could consider today (1.0)
117 ch :that addresses the err point (unclear) that if we if we turn to
118 paragraph (.) paragraph thirty in (account) (.) the final closing
119 paragraph (.) he sez that "in my opinion unless the second
120 defendant is able to establish the plaintiff failed to mitigate its loss
121 or actively worsened it by failing to secure satisfactory (unclear)
122 was carried out or a fair price was obtained (0.6) err then no
123 prospects of setting aside the judgement" (unclear) (.) though I
124 take it that the additional evidence you've been able to produce
125 addresses that particular flaw
126 ap [yes it does (.) the oth: the other two
127 defendants are (.) are directors company that actually borrowed the
128 money I'm not (0.2)
129 eh :fine (.)
130 pm2 :the there's also the question of contr: seeking contribution from
131 the other (.) two defendants (mumble) (0.2)
132 ch :good (.) okay (.) thank you very much (.) have you any other
133 questions? (0.4) no (0.2) fine mister (name) if you'd like to (.)
134 (wait) out side (.) you can leave your papers here if you like (.)
135 leave your coat (.) sorry (0.2)
31This sigh may well be a change-of-state token (Heritage 1984), but it is
not the case that what can be seen here is a reality disjuncture in terms of those
described by Pollner (1975), since it is not the case that one party has a 'true'
understanding of the situation to which the other is converted. Rather, here it
is the case that neither party understands the full nature of their problems until
the missing documentation comes to light. This also goes some way to
answering the empirical question raised by Pollner, "If reality disjunctures are
infused with potentially endless equivocalities, how are they ever resolved?".
In this case it is through the locating of a reason for the 'disjuncture' via the
work of a 'larger' practical activity, in this case the work of doing a tribunal.
In this case such a resolution also avoids consequence of discrediting the other's
perception of reality in favour of that of one party, instead a suitable
'resolution' is located which sustains the credibility of prior perceptions of both
parties with a mutual commitment to the 'new version'. This is also an example
of 'rationalization' as a practical activity that creates rather destroys our world
(See Peter Eglin: 1979). The position here, following Lynch's (1993:37)
discussion is anti-foundational not anti-objectivist.
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136 ap :thankyou (11.0)
Once the chair has given a sigh of acknowledgement to the situation that
has occurred i.e. an incomplete set of documents having been given to the panel
for consideration. Panel member two states that they do not know what they can
"consider today" (line 115), which seems to indicate that they believe that
documentation necessary for the appeal is not available to them. However, the
chair, not directly responding to the previous comment of the panel member,
moves to overcome this problem by again referring to counsel's opinion (lines
117 to 125), and refers everyone to paragraph thirty which the chair then reads
(lines 119 to 123). The quote refers to facts that the appellant needs to establish
for the case to have a chance in court, the chair then asks the appellant if they
have been able to establish these (lines 123 to 125), to which the appellant
confirms and elaborates on (lines 126 to 128) which the chair then
acknowledges (line 129).
After this panel member two raises the issue of contributions in terms
of finance towards the case (lines 130 and 131), but this issue is not taken up
as the chair starts to bring this second phase of the tribunal to a close by asking
if there are any further questions (lines 132 and 133). After no immediate
response to their question the chair asks the appellant if they would mind
waiting outside, but adding that they could leave their belongings where they
were (lines 133 to 135) thus bringing phase two to a close. The appellant then
thanks the chair (line 136).
Considering the Case and Coming to a Decision.
Making a Decision.
137 pml :counsel's opinion (0.2)
138 pm2 :well I'd agree (mumble)
139 pml :counsel's opinion (.)
140 pm3 :that's me (.)

















to his satisfaction anyway (laughs) err counsel's erm (1.0)
(unclear) (haven't they) (.)
pm2&3:yeah mmmm
pm1 [if he's got the other evidence (.)
? :(mixed talk) counsel's opinion
pm3? [that was my initial reaction in this case
cl [okay right
I'll get him back in now (1.8)
ch :good good okay so now can we limit (.) the certificate here to
obtaining (.) counsel's further opinion (.)
pm1 [(unclear)
cl :yes certainly (.)
pm2 :oh yes I think that's (unclear) (2.0)
eh :okaayy (1.0)
cl :thankyou (34.0)
After a ten second silence as the appellant leaves the room, panel
member one suggests that the appellant be awarded the funds to seek a
counsel's opinion as the panel's decision (line 137), to which panel member two
agrees (line 138). Panel member one repeats their suggestion (line 139) to
which panel member three agrees that it is their opinion too (line 140), the chair
then states that the appellant has seemingly met the requirements of the original
counsel's opinion (lines 141 to 143) to which the other panel members two and
three agree, and so come to a unanimous decision. Embedded in this is the
statement by the chair that the appellant has "set aside"32the counsel's opinion
"well to his satisfaction anyway" (lines 141 and 142), and gives a short laugh.
The laughter may be due to the fact that it is to their satisfaction, rather than the
appellants that is of importance but that the missing document does not allow
them to do their work 'to the letter of the law'. It is of note that panel member
one states here "if he's got the other evidence" (line 145), thus giving voice to
the fact that the panel do not know, because it has not been provided by the
32Both "set aside" and "counsel's opinion" are examples of the use of terms
which designate routine formulations for common activities in the practice of
law. To "set aside" being used to describe the practice of removing from
consideration of an object, opinion, or testimony as relevant to a case. In a
different fashion "counsel's opinion" designates a quite routine award decision,
one of several options, available to the tribunal panel.
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Legal Aid Board, what the new evidence is like, this statement is not followed
up by the rest of the panel. Technically since they do not have the evidence on
which to make a judgement no judgement should be made, however this
'problem' does not prevent the panel from coming to a decision on the case.
Though this is achieved by ignoring the observation that they do not have
sufficient evidence, which panel member one's observation (line 145) can be
seen as making.
Following this there is some unclear talk about counsel's opinion (line
146), and to which panel member three states that that was their initial reaction
(line 147). At this point the clerk recognises that the panel has made its decision
and he indicates that he will bring the appellant back in (line 148 and 149).
Note that the clerk is monitoring the case and can recognise when the panel has
reached the end of a phase, though the clerk is not a decision maker on the
panel. At this point the chair, indicating that he is generally happy with
proceedings, asks the clerk if the award can be limited to another opinion of the
counsel (lines 150 and 151). The clerk indicates that this is possible (line 153),
to which other panel member two indicates their satisfaction with their decision
(lines 154). The chair states "okay" (line 155) and this is taken as indicating the
end of the phase by the clerk, the clerk then thanks the panel for their decision
on the case and thus brings phase three to a close (line 151).
Delivering the Decision of the Panel to the Appellant.
Granting Limited Legal Aid.
ch
clerk leaves to get the attender and then returns
:thankyou for coming today mister (name) (.) it's always (.)
very good to see an appellant rather than do it on paper (.)
:welll'm sorry you didn't have all the papers I just
[no no no you
don't (.) no no (.) you've satisfied us (0.2) you should have
another opinion from (barrister's name) (.) therefore your
certificate will be (.) I don't know what the word is renewed













166 cl: :discharge rescinded (.)
167 ch :discharge rescinded (.) I'm obliged to (name) I haven't got the-
168 pm1 [hohoha!
169 ch :-eh (.) the correct eh (.) discharge will be rescinded erm but
170 the certificate will be limited to obtaining (barrister's name)' s
171 further opinion (.)
172 ap :thankyou (.)
173 ch :thankyou very much good luck (.)
174 ap :okay thankyou (0.2) that's a relief (1.8) happens to be my
175 birthday today sir it must be a good omen hhhuhhuh
176 ch [well there you
177 are (0.6) we couldn't say more than that (.) could we except
178 happy birthday (.)
179 ap :yes thankyou (2.8)
180 ch :righhht
181 cl [you're in for the next one too neil (.)
182 ch :what is the next one? (.)
183 cl :the next one is (appellant's name) this is this erm (.) family
184 matter where they've (.) come down from (place) ......
On the completion of the decision making the clerk leaves to bring the
appellant back in. This is another 'transition' or 'informal' period but no
conversation is made during this period. The work of delivering the decision
of the panel starts with the chair thanking the appellant for attending (line 158
and 159), adding that "it's always very good to see an appellant rather than do
it on paper", to which the appellant says that they were sorry that the panel had
not seen the 'bundle' of papers referred to in phase two (line 160). Here we see
the attender and non-attender distinction being explicitly attended to by the
participants However, the chair cuts the appellant short, which also over-rides
the issue of the lack of documentary evidence and any blame to be attached to
such a situation, to inform the appellant that the panel are satisfied that the case
should go back to have the counsel's opinion again, and searches for the correct
term (lines 161 to 165) which the clerk then supplies the chair (line 166). The
chair repeats the term, thanks the clerk, and then goes on to give the full
judgement of the panel (lines 167 and 169 to 171). The appellant thanks the
panel (line 172) to which the chair thanks the appellant and wishes them luck
(line 173), thus bringing the case to a close. There follows a short burst of
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'informal' conversation involving the appellant as the case materials are
collected and the appellant leaves (lines 174 to 179), and the chair finally brings
the case to a close (line 180). This 'informal talk' can be seen as indicating the
end of the tribunal case, but is also a way in which the 'human side' of the law
can be exhibited to the appellant. 33 After this the clerk informs the researcher
that they have access to the following case (line 181), to which the chair asks
which case that actually is (line 182). In responding to this request with the
relevant details the next case gets under way (lines 183 and 184).
4.2d Summary.
As stated earlier this case was selected because it clearly shows the
tribunal members attending to the work of a tribunal, and that the work is
constituted through 'phases' of action constructed and attended to by the
members themselves in situ.
We can summarize briefly what has occurred in the tribunal as in four
phases: Discussing the Case and Deciding on what to ask the Appellant: the
panel discussed their prior readings of the case documents, to a greater or lesser
extent, and decided what issues to address to the appellant and/or their
representative. Discussing the Case with the Appellant: the appellant was
given a formal history of the case so far by the clerk, and introduced to the
panel by the chair. Then a discussion of the case ensued, initially based upon
the issues identified by the panel in 'phase one'. Considering the Case and
Coming to a Decision: in the absence of the appellant they came to a decision
on the merits of the case, based upon their initial perceptions of the case and the
additional information presented by the appellant. They also decided on the
nature of their decision, i.e. what an award would consist of, and possibly how
33 Critiques have been made of the lack of the human face of the law in legal
proceedings and how this affects appellants appreciation of their experience of
justice (see the conclusion of Conley and O'Barr's (1990) 'Rules Versus
Relationships: The Ethnography of Legal Discourse').
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this information was to be transmitted to the appellant and/or their
representative. Delivering the Decision of the Panel to the Appellant: the
appellant returned and was given the decision by the panel. On this occasion the
appellant was congratulated on the outcome of the tribunal prior to departing.
Although these 'phases' cannot be claimed to not appear here as analytic
categories imposed on the data (see the post-analytic interpretation of this in the
methodology), they are also clearly attended to by the participants, this is
evidenced in the data via the use of transition periods (this will become even
clearer throughout the following chapters especially Chapter Six). The 'phases'
are 'vernacular' categories - although the descriptive term 'phase' here is mine.
In each of these vernacular categories the work of the participants allows the
development of the case to move to its final conclusion - a tribunal decision. In
the above case the work activities of the panel was described using 'thick' or
'rich' description." The work that occurred was unique to this case, though, as
with the text-based case described earlier, there is reason to suppose that similar
activities occur in other cases. Though in no two cases will the work of the
tribunal be performed in the exact same manner.
It has been suggested that the 'formal' phases are brought into being by
members out of more informal conversation, and are punctuated by transitional
periods of informal, or less formal, discussion. As indicated, these transitional
periods, e.g. the transitional period between 'phase' one and two, may be used
for interaction, or may be left 'empty'. 35 It is possible from how I have
34 Lynch notes that the term 'thick' description is usually attributed to
Cliffort Geertz, and that: "A 'thick' description not only is more detailed than
a 'thin' one and it not only concerns what can be directly witnessed on some
occasion, but it also incorporates a 'member's' localized recognition of the
actions described, for example, like moves in a game, gestures rather motions,
and actions within a developing colloquy" (1993 p113 footnote).
35 The potential importance of periods of 'formality I and 'informality' in
relation to each other is discussed by Atkinson (1982), he notes that quite
different tasks are facilitated in each of these periods and warns against any
evaluation of the importance of one to the exclusion of the other. The utility or
otherwise of the dichotomy 'formality' and 'informality' also discussed by
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described the cases to see the work of the tribunal organised into four parts or
'phases', and to equate the work of the panel with a 'formal' interaction.
However, this is not an assertion I would recommend over-emphasising since
there is little doubt that the action of the members in the 'informal' periods, or
'transitional periods', is/can be crucial to the work of the tribunal. The
'informal' interaction, or transitional periods, are also usually present at the
beginning and end of cases and are used as a vehicle to move from one case to
another."
Whilst I have stated what generally happens in various 'formal' periods
of the tribunal, I do not wish to suggest that there is anything more than a
general pattern, since the data from other cases indicate that the occurrences
described here can be achieved in different ways. Also, the work of the 'formal'
periods has been split into four headings, yet, as is illustrated in the description
and analysis, each one of these involves constituent tasks which together make
up the hearing. What is consistent throughout all cases covered in this research
is that all parties together achieve a recognisable tribunal, even when the
outcome is not satisfactory for all parties concerned.
It was noted in the previous chapter that the transition period or 'informal' talk
between phases could be utilised for doing the work of deciding the case, in this
instance the talk is notable for its similarity to the 'formal' talk outside the
transition period. The period between the end of one phase another I have
termed the 'transition period' or 'informal' talk. Discussion here may, or may
not occur, further, it mayor may not concern the case at hand. This period may
or may not prove significant in any particular case. It is being suggested that it
Irvine (1979). She suggests that there is some utility in the terms, but that if
seen in terms of Goffinan' s (1963: 199) notion of "tightness" and "looseness",
they should be considered additive rather than antithetical (Irvine 1979:786).
36 Garfinkel and Sacks (1969) in their paper 'On the Formal structures of
Practical Actions', note that even 'informal' or everyday language has formal
structures. So when we speak of 'informality' in the thesis we do not mean that
it is unstructured in terms of its formulation, but rather that it is a structured
informality instead of a structured formality of legal discourse.
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is 'informal' in that (a) the clerk is not present (b) talk mayor may not occur,
(c) talk mayor may not be about the case in hand, and (d) the possibility of,
and length of any talk that ensues is dependent upon how long it takes to bring
the appellant from where they are waiting to the room of the tribunal. Thus, I
suggest, unlike the other phases or periods of the tribunal, talk/action in this
period is influenced to a degree by factors outside the control of the members
themselves.
3.2f Discussion.
We have looked at two cases which, in the jargon of the members who
do the work of producing legal aid tribunals, are either 'attended' or
'unattended' by appellants. Of course it must be recognised that each tribunal
as an individual phenomenon is unique. Any two cases could be separated on
a number of different criteria, for example, the salience of the relationship
between the panel members and the Legal Aid Board, or perhaps the
relationship between public servants and the public. Admittedly, the use of such
dichotomies may seem to immediately separate individual instances of unique
phenomena into one of two categories, and thereby providing them with
definitive character in abstract terms - something which I do not think can be
denied. The aim, and justification here, is that this has been done to provide the
reader with an understanding of what the 'vernacular categories' that the
tribunal panel members may orientate towards in their work may consist of."
The aim has been to look at the individual appeal case in the local work context
in which it is situated, the term 'work' here being used with reference to the
temporally contextualised practices that the individual members of the tribunal
37 At this point it is worth reemphasizing Pollner (1979) who notes, while
recognising the situated character of discussion and meaning, that whether or
not members in a setting actually "orient to, analyze, and use the explicated
meanings and structures remains problematic" (ibid:237). The orientation to
presence or non-presence may be displayed by panel members but it is not as
easy to claim this for appellants.
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panel engage in whilst considering those individual cases within tribunal
sessions.
It is appropriated to summarise some points that have arisen in the two
cases, points to which we orientate to in a preliminary focus on the role of
documentation in the discourse of the tribunal members.
In Case One, the unattended case, we see the clerk bringing the case to
'order' and starting the 'formal', or at least focused, discussion of the case
(lines 6 and 7). This is done by stating the number of the case and the name of
the appellant using the textual documentation. By doing this the clerk allows the
panel to orient to the documents before them," and also his own statement open
for assessment. Further, when the clerk states the chair's name out loud, when
everyone present has been introduced to each other informally already, it
appears to be to allows this statement to be verified, although this may be
performed by inaction, or corrected before he makes a record of it in the
documents. So we see the clerk using the texts to instigate some action, and
then action being taken to verify information that is itself to become
documented
The documentation is invoked in a different manner, and for a different
purpose, when the chair states that they felt unable to comment on the medical
details that had been provided for the appeals as they "seem horrendously
complicated" (case two lines 24, 27, 28 and 29). This document and its details
are not taken up for discussion as a 'medical report' as panel member three (line
30) states immediately subsequent to this that they have no medical report. It
appears that there are medical reports and medical reports, and that the medical
details in the document provided are not in a suitable form for the panel to use
to make any judgement. The medical report they are invoking as absent is a
38 This is similar to the attended case, case two above, where the case is also
introduced by the clerk by name, but in that instance it is in response to a query
by panel member as to the number of the case. In both cases reference is made
to both the case number and appellants name, but the way in which this is
achieved is not fixed but constructed in relation to other ongoing activities.
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medical report that has been drawn up by a member of the medical profession
specifically for use in legal decision making. The medical details that they have
in front of them do not allow the panel to rely on them as they have not been
drawn up for this purpose, and do not have the authority that such documents
carry. Different documents have different legal status in the eyes of the law,
and the panel wish to have documents that have the correct status, decisions
based upon such documents providing a back -up to the decision makers in terms
of both authority and responsibility (Raffel 1979). But the key point we should
note here is that while two documents are being invoked here, one present and
one absent, the second may not exist. As the chair states, the lack of the
medical report document is an "unfortunate omission but perhaps there isn't
one" (lines 34 and 35) - so it is an invocation of a possible document. This
would seem to lend strong support for the meaning of a document to be
situationally produced, as here the document has no materiality at all.
This lack of documentation does not, however, prove an insuperable
obstacle, instead panel member three states that this lack of medical report
allows the panel to only "talk in general terms" about the medical side of the
case (lines 36 and 38). This would seem to be indicating some problem for the
panel in making a decision on the case when comprehensive documentation is
not available to them, but panel member three continues to say that,
nevertheless, "there seemed prima facie there was a case" (line 40). This use
of the term 'case' referring to an achievement of adequacy, that the case has
met a standard, seemly relating to the legal term 'prima facie case' .39
In the second case, the attended case, the documents are again utilised
in various fashions. As the documents which the panel members receive have
a cover sheet with both a name and a case number for the session, by effectively
39 A 'prima facie case' is: "A case in which there is some evidence in
support of the charge or allegation made in it, and which will stand unless
displaced. In a case which is being heard in court, the party starting, that is,
upon whom the burden of proof rests, must make out a prima facie case, or else
the other party will be able to submit that there is no case to answer, and the
case will have to be dismissed" (Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary 1983:262).
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reciting both name and case number the clerk allows the panel members to
confirm that they have moved on to the correct case documents (lines 4 and 5).
Here, I suggest we can see the focusing of members onto the specific case at
hand and the documentation relevant to it, evident here in the response that the
clerk receives.
We also see the documents invoked again, and in a similar fashion when
the appellant appears in phase two. Here the clerk lists the documents that the
panel have considered (lines 33 to 36). A list of documents are checked off by
the clerk for the benefit of the appellant, however, the list is completed with the
'catch-all' "and various other papers" (line 35) - the repercussions of the
'incomplete' check list becomes clearer later. What also occurs here is that
particular documents are being cited by name, and hence listed as the main
documents of importance and to be discussed, while others are downgraded as
belonging to "various other papers" - this list is then repeated by the chair later.
The clerk also again achieves a mutual orientation by the those present after the
'transition period' and entrance of the appellant. Further, having to introduced
the appellant to the case and its documents appears to bring about a structured
approach to decision making.
The documents are invoked by the chair when he suggests that the
appellant, in moving the appeal onwards, add to the documents verbally to
which the panel will then respond (lines 51 to 53).40 Although the appellant
refuses with an apparent differing view on the barrister's opinion (document)
of the case, though the nature of the problem has not yet been clarified. That
a problem has arisen is taken, by the chair, to have occurred once the appellant
refuses to add to the documents. The chair now has the task of clarifying just
what the nature of the disagreement, or at least differing view, is, as there is a
need for the appellant to add verbally to the textual documentation
40 It is worth noting that chair's talk is punctuated by micro-pauses, and that
this appears in part due to the chair flicking through documents while listing
them and summarising their position. Though hearable on the tape it is not part
of the transcription detail adopted here.
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accompanying the case. The chair does this by getting the panel and the
appellant to focus on one document, the barrister's opinion (line 60,62 and 63),
stating that it is important for them not to talk at "crossed purposes". The chair
adds that the importance of this appeal is that it is on the basis of this hearing
that legal aid is confirmed as being withdrawn (lines 65 and 66), but what is
going on is a search for a resolution to their different stances towards the nature
of the continuance of the appeal, Le. why is the appellant appealing if they have
nothing to say about the counsel's opinion.
It is interesting that the appellant does not take the opportunity to add
to their case (line 54). This may be an instance of an appellant who has a good
understanding of their case. It would also seem to indicate that they have a
understanding of the processes of the Legal Aid Board, as rather than giving a
personal account of the events about which the case is about - a frequent
occurrence among appellants - they are relying on the 'correct' processing of
their documentation by the Legal Aid Tribunal. In terms of the 'rules-
orientated' and 'relationship-orientated' view of appellants in legal situations
this is extremely rule-orientated." This response by the appellant also seems to
affect the asymmetry of the tribunal where the panel members ask questions and
the appellants respond. Although the 'question' is veiled as a request for further
information, it is in effect a question nonetheless. By not responding to the
request places the onus for action back in the hands of the panel. The idea of
'informal' legal processes such as many tribunals purport to be, is that the strict
question and answer format of the courtroom is allowed to be relaxed. Thus
allowing appellants the opportunity to expand beyond the initial question
without being seen to be breaking the rules of court. It is just this 'freedom'
which the appellant here declines to take up. What I suggest we can see the
chair and the appellant doing here is narrowing down the focus of the
discussion to the barrister's opinion (document). In doing this they end up
41 The rules-orientated and relationship-orientated continuum is a concept
of categorisation of court attenders (and judges) proposed by Conley and
O'Barr (1990).
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focusing upon the requirement of the barrister's opinion for further evidence.
The appellant then informs the panel that it has been obtained but that the
barrister has not seen it. The appellant then adds that that is what they are
requesting in their appeal for legal aid, that the barrister be allowed to see the
additional information collected (documents) since he wrote his report
(document) requesting such information (documents) be made available (lines
80 to 82). Such information (documentation) being necessary for the possibility
of a successful case in court in the view of the barrister, hence the refusal to
give legal aid by the Legal Aid Board until it is made available. Note that the
chair and appellant are articulating copies (documents) of the same artifact, i.e.
the counsel's report (document).
An aspect of interaction this chapter has discussed is the use of textual
documentation.V especially in relation to problem solving and surpassing
conflicting understandings and impasses that arise during the cases. From the
outset textual documentation is central to the processing of a tribunal case, and
both cases here illustrate some of the problems that arise when such
documentation is not available. Initially, in both cases the panel discuss their
readings of the case file provided in advance by the Legal Aid Board. In non-
attended cases the panel then move on to debating the case before coming to a
decision, whereas in the attended case the appellant is allowed to discuss this
documentation and provide additional documentary support. In an attended
case, the panel then discuss what they have heard from the appellant and how
this and any additional documentation reflects on their initial readings. They
also inform the clerk of their decision, who officially records this for the legal
aid board." These official records can then be drawn up and sent to the
appellant. An attending appellant or legal representative is informed about the
42 Such documents may sometimes include photographs, drawings and maps.
43 Garfinkel's "'Good" Reasons for "Bad" Clinic Records', discussed in the
previous chapter, is worth keeping in mind here as these records will have
details that can be expected to differ in focus from the activities described in
this thesis.
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final decision of the panel, and told that they will receive an official written
record of the decision. Non-attenders receive this information from the Legal
Aid Board through the mail.
Documentation not only pervades the 'formal' interaction of the
tribunal, but can also be significant in the 'informal' or 'transition' phases. In
the informal transition between the end of one case and start of another,
documentation is used both to orient tribunal members to the case at hand, thus
delineating one case from another, as well marking the official start and finish
of the tribunal session. We have also seen in this chapter that one of the
important roles of written documentation is to help members focus on key
aspects of the case. Documents are invoked as tools for resolving disputes over
meaning that occur in the discussions. The following sections will focus on
attended cases and elaborate further on various practices.
4.3 Other Activities in the Four Phases.
When we look at data" from other cases we see that while the tribunals
can be seen to develop and be attended to by the tribunal member in line with
the previously described four phase 'model', actual situated practices are not
determined in advance. The course of action the tribunal members take is
instead being locally determined and hearably so. In the following section we
will look at a number of cases which display some of the situated activities that
tribunal members have been recorded as engaged in which display the very
locally situatedness of the Legal Aid Tribunal.
44 Here we will be looking only at segments from cases, however, Appendix
Three contains the larger transcripts from which these segments have been
taken followed by a description of that transcript. Where a transcript does not
begin at the beginning of a case a brief summary of the activities preceding the
start of the transcript is provided.
141
Case Three. 45 (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Two.)
7 pm2 :my comment about this I made uhh (.) a bit outside my field (.)
8 was about adoption (0.4)
9 pm1 :there's a possibility that they'll go that route isn't there (.)
10 pm3 :very rarely now
11 all [(unclear as all talk at once)
12 pm3 :it's very rarely (.) they go through that route to be (unclear) (.)
13 children act would (.)
14 ? :mmmmh
15 eh :yes (.) children yep (.) that would be exceptional (.)
16 pm3 :if it's it' right that he can't (.) sort the (unclear) to qualify or
17 getting a grant or resposibilty order because he's erm (.)
18 (remarried) father of the child (.) errm (unclear)
19 pm1 :what's (unclear) like (0.2)
20 eh :sorry (.)
It is not necessarily the case that all the panel members are necessarily
clear on the relevant law to any case they may be considering. Even if they are
aware of the statute it does not mean that they are aware of how they transpose
themselves into actual practice in the real world. This is illustrated in phase one
of case three where following the suggestion about adoption being an issue by
panel member two (lines 7 and 8), panel member two suggests that that that was
likely (line 9). However, this understanding of the current practices is
contradicted by both panel member three (lines 10, 12 and 13) and the chair
(line 15).
Case Four." (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Three.)
The stance taken towards a case can be phrased in terms of its inherent
qualities, or extraneous circumstances, but it not is the case that discussion
points revolve solely around statutory aspects of the law. The personal and
anecdotal opinions of the panel towards the law are also brought into the
45 Data session nine tape one case three.
46 Data session eight tape one case one.
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discussion of cases.
19 eh :there are a lot of these cases going through (.) err the courts now
20 (.) one sees them (.) all the time in (place name) at any rate (.)
21 where fathers who have absolutely hopeless cases (.)
22 pm3 :ummm (.)
23 eh :eh pursue them with legal aid and the local authority (.) and the
24 guardian err defend at immense public expense (.)
25 all :ummmh (.)
26 eh :an the judges complain all the time that legal aid shouldn't be
27 granted (.)
28 pm3 :yep (0.4) yes and the problem is you you once you open the door
29 a lot of people are going to go through it all with legal aid
30 certificates
Here in case Four we see the initial attitude towards the case taken by
some of the panel members being made in terms of larger socio-economic
framework of the law.
This does not mean that the panel members do not go on to frame the
case with an understanding and awareness of their own biases. Further in the
same case, after a negative appraisal of the situation at a 'personal level' the
merits of the case are noted.
75 pm3 :he's now living in a probation hostel (4.0)
76 ? :what is (treatment)
77 pm1 [treated by a psychologist I mean how permanent is
78 such treatment likely to prove I mean (.) is he still is is it on going
79 I mean (.)
80 eh :well he hasn't done any naughties to any boys (0.2) heh heh he's
81 quite normal in that respect (.)
82 ? :hmmmh well (.)
83 eh :it's only with (names) that he's been errm (.) interfering (.)
84 pm1 :mmm (1.0) I'd love to know how old (names) are (.) and if they
85 are teenagers (0.4) it might influence one's decisions to the the risk
86 (0.2)
87 pm2 :welliet's see what he has to say to me (.) I mean I must say I
88 don't have a lot of sympathy but (unclear)
89 pml [I start from I start from the
90 same (.) ground but (.)
91 pm2 :the work here (.) justifies the investigation (3.0)
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But this awareness of the merits of the case is still tempered by the
perceived practicalities of the implementation of that law.
92 eh :seems to me its going to take awful lot more (.) a lot of legal aid
93 money (unclear) (.)
94 all :(unclear)
95 eh :and cause enormous pain and upset to the children and the
96 mothers (.)
97 pml :and if the mothers absolutely determined that he won't have it
98 anyway (.) effectively she will stop him I mean she will just say
99 I am not doing it and the court can do what it likes (.) the court
100 is not going to take the children away from her (.) because it
101 won't let her have contact with the step father (.) so eh
102 pm3 [couldn't
103 really blame the mother for taking that action either
104 pml [no I beg your
105 pardon C.) father I'm sorry father (.) not step-father (.)
106 eh :children going to (.) horrible (that's right)
107 pml :and if the boys are living with the girls in question (.) which they
108 are according to that (.) going to upset the whole family unit
109 (0.2) I'm very (.) very
It can be the case that the panel are not sure of their exact role with regards to
assessing a case.
109 pm! :(0.2) I'm very (.) very
110 pm2 [well well I (.) suppose we take all this
111 into account see what we act (unclear)
112 pm3 [see what he sez see what he sez (.)
113 pm2 :I'm not sure whether that' enough to deny him the question (.)
114 ? :hmmm
115 pm! [that's the problem isn't we are in a sense putting ourselves
116 in the position of (.) errm
117 ? [judging
118 pml [judging the case almost (2.0)
119 ch :1suppose we have to do that to some extent
120 ? [hmmm (.)
121 pm3 :well when you are rationing money (.)
122 ch :yes (1.6)
123 cl :shall I ask (unclear) (.)
124 ch :yes please (.) thank you (name of clerk)
125 cl :(unclear)
126 ch :sorry about that (1.0) hello (name of appellant)
144
Finally it is interesting that the chair believes that it is part of their job
to ration the monies of the Legal Aid Board as this is not in fact the case, and
no mention of rationing is made in the Legal Aid Handbook 1994. Rather, if the
case warrants it, it receives legal aid irrespective of issues of how much money
the Legal Aid Board's budget has.
Case Five.47 (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Two.)
As we will discuss in Chapter Six the use of textual documentation is
often central to the discussion of a case, however it is often the case that the
panel members are not impressed with the presentation of the case to appeal and
this was often overtly referred to.
ch :-are very serious matters actually (0.2) erm my own (0.2) I made
these reservations (.) to us here (.) my own reservations is that this
is again (.) a very poorly presented (.) application a very poorly
presented appeal I mean it is all very well to (.) err refer to the act
but act actually doesn't help you (0.2) you need to go a whole lot
further into it (.) I mean to point to section two six of the further
education act (.) made it plain (0.2) well it doesn't make it plain









The chair states that the case has been poorly presented (as he believes
were earlier cases in the session"), specifying the inadequacy of a reference in
the documentation to a specific act of parliament on education." However,
47 Data session nine tape two case one.
48 This illustrates that even the presentation of the whole of a case will not
necessarily provide contextual background to the reader of some of the issues
raised by the member. Of course the provision of a whole tribunal session is not
going to guarantee this either.
49 Precedent being "A judgement of decision of a court of law cited as an
authority for deciding a similar set of facts; a case which serves as an authority
for the legal principle embodied in its decision" (Osborn's Concise Law
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rarely does this prevent the panel from coming to some sort of decision on the
case itself, although it is without doubt that in such instances the presence of the
appellant or a representative can help in making that decision a granting of the
appeal rather than its refusal. As we see later on in the case this because the,
in this instance the legal representative can situationally attend to any perceived
deficiencies in the material presentation of the case and give an account of why



















:errm is there anything else that we've (0.8) it's a matter of
judgement on this point but (.) our (.) original application was
ruled out on the basis (0.2) that we didn't have a case (0.2) I (.)
think that one (.) has got to take (.) a view of the way that
proceedings can be dealt with in this sort of tribunal which is an
appeal tribunal (.) this isn't a review of a judicial review
application (0.2) and I have not prepared it on the basis that we're
going before the court on a (.) a full hearing (.) this is a hearing
to establish whether we should have legal aid (.) there may be (.)
deficiencies in my arguments today through lack of preparation
because (.) of the nature of today's proceedings is with regard to
whether we should get legal aid (.) I would say that on the basis
of what we have put before the tribunal today (.) I think that
we've established that we've got something substantial to argue
about (.) and I think at the very least (.) it merits a decision (.) to
obtain counsel's opinion (.) at the very least (0.2)
:okay (.) fine (.) thankyou (3.0) if you would like to wait outside
(23.0)
In this instance we see the appellant's solicitor using the opportunity
afforded by the summing-up of the case to give just such an account of any
perceived difficulties.
Case Six.50 (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Four.)
The activities that occur in the latter part of a tribunal case hearing are,
Dictionary 1983:259).
50 Data session 10 tape 1 case 1.
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of course, directly related to the activities that have occurred in its previous
'phases'. Although when making a decision on a case the panel may look at the
case not just in some narrow sense but often considering other alternatives and
possibilities
8 pm2 :-forthcoming yuh err mister (solicitor's name) there indicates that
9 he had a letter inviting him to consider quantum all he has to do
10 now is contact them and consider quantum (0.2) and if an offer is-?
11 [mmmmmm
12 pm2 :-forthcoming that is satisfactory he can settle it without (.) legal
13 aid (.) I don't think a fee paying client of moderate means would
14 embark upon (.) this sort of expensive litigation (.) just for the
15 sake of ff a few hundred pounds (0.6)
16 eh :okay (.)
17 pml :1agree with that (.)
18 pm2 :it doesn't stop (solicitors first name) from reapplying at a later
19 date does it (unclear) (.)
20 ch :no (2.0) nyeh okay fine then (.)
What this also illustrates is that, even after the appellant or their
representative has discussed the case with the panel members, this does not
mean that the panel members have all come to a similar understanding about the
documents and the case. Instead, we can see that the panel members have
interpreted the case differently. It takes further discussion between them to
agree upon an interpretation in terms of the 'correct' award, but a 'correct'
award based upon the understanding that a reapplication is possible - an aspect
which is not necessarilypart of any formally defined decision making guidelines
in the Legal Aid Handbook.
Case Seven..51 (Venue - Appendix One Venue Number Four.)
Another case illustrates further the role of 'other' considerations in
decision making by the tribunal panel, in this instance for in the justification of
51 Data session 5 tape 1 case 1.
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awarding monies to a borderline case
19 ch :seems to me that C.) erh (.) its a C.) fairly good (0.2) good claim
20 that she's got (.) and I (0.2) you won't get an opinion better than
21 (barrister's?) letter will you (.)
22 ? :Cunclear)
23 pm! : [there has been some more recent cases hasn'there
24 pm3 [well there's (.)
25 nineteen seventy one (.)
26 ch :there are a lot of cases (.) err
27 pml [yes there are (6.0)
28 pm2 :it's obviously not a very big case anyway and it may be th that if
29 if it (.) it might even be a case of (0.2) the insurance company
30 could be persuaded to settle before er (.) proceedings have
31 started
32 ch [ummh (4.0)
33 cl :right I'll bring her back then (.)
34 ch :mmm (16.0)
What is also of interest here is that, though there does appear to be
unanimous agreement as to the success of the appeal, no firm decision as to the
nature of the award seems to be overtly agreed upon and yet the clerk perceives
this 'phase' of the case to be finished and is not argued against or contradicted.
This would appear to be an incomplete decision making process in an explicit
sense, yet it succeeds unproblematically for the participants as a completed
'phase', and as such is another example of the situational based nature of what
constitutes a 'phase'.
4.4 Foreshortened Case Hearings.
The three cases described in this section display that the work that legal
aid tribunal engage in, and described so far with reference to four 'phases',
does not necessarily occur in a manner easily described with reference to such
a pattern or 'analytic tool'. Instead these three cases move through the tribunal
process without following the 'pattern' which the other cases that we have
looked at appear to do. Two of the three cases described do display an overt
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reference to the fact that they are foreshortening the 'usual' tribunal process,
and as such might be seen to be the exceptions that prove the rule. However,
the third case does not show the panel members displaying any reference to the
'four phase' model that has guided the presentation in this thesis. Because of the
image of the four 'phases' built up over the thesis via the previous cases the
reader's eye searches for the four phases but, I contend, this due to the context
in which this case is displayed here rather than any activity displayed in the case
itself.
Although the 'four phase' model is not intended as a theoretical
framework imposed on the data in this thesis, and is a model which the
members themselves can be seen to be attentive, its use as an aid to description
has to treated with some caution. An aim of this section is to highlight this
point, emphasizing that it has not been intended as a determining entity
independent of the singular occasions in which it is manifested. The following
three cases will illustrate this point, as descriptions of practices whose
uniqueness can not be encapsulated via reference to a determinative model, a
point which is of course central to the ethnomethodological position used to
guide this thesis.
Case Eight. 52 (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Two.)
The transcript starts at the beginning of the case recording.
1 ch :is she coming? (.)
2 cl :she's here (.)
3 ch :is is she coming in? (.)
4 cl :err yeah well yeah I I are you happy to (0.2)
5 pm? [are we
6 ch :no (.) no no no no hang on a minute (.)
7 pm? [unclear
8 cl :no she's not much (unclear) you know
9 ch [okay (unclear) well (0.2)
52 Data session nine tape two case 2 (5).
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10 fine (unclear) (.)
11 pml :1 think we all have the view that if (.) if the other side's got
12 eh [have (name) [have
13 (name) got legal aid? (.)
14 cl :let me just check (0.2)
15 pm2 :she sez so
16 pml [she sez he has (11.0)
17 cl :yep he has (0.4) area six (0.2)
18 eh :then arguably then she must have it (.) because (.) ermm it its-
19 pm? [mmm
20 eh :-quite unfair but (.) but 1 mean we must be even handed (0.6) 1-
21 pm? [mmm
22 ch :-mean (.) you know (.) its
2 3 pm2 [can we discharge his (.)
24 ch :no (.)
25 ? :yeah (laugh)
26 cl :well you we we could certainly be putting her under (.) future
27 legal aid for the two of then could be considered (0.2) errm (0.2)
28 pm3 :if he's got it she that's fine (.) but if (unclear) (0.2)
29 ? [ummm
30 cl :mind sometimes it works out that they both have it for a short
31 time then you knock them both on the head (.)
32 ? :humm (.)
33 cl :cause err its (.) you just simply can just get into a lawyers benefit
34 and that (.)
35 eh :well 1 think so (.) 1think so (.) 1mean (l.0) arguing about the-
36 ? [mmm
37 ch :(.) mahogany box room fitting (.) clearly the pull string handle (.)
38 pml [ssssuh
39 pm3 :it'll be subject to statutory charge (0.4)
40 ? :(unclear) the toilet seat
41 pm 1 [(laughs)
42 eh [(laughs) (0.4) righto (.) well I'm (.)
43 what's the situation then in this case (.)
44 cl :right well have ermm
45 eh [no hang on (mrs name of appellant miss
46 name of appellant) she's here? (.)
47 cl :she's here (.)
48 eh :she's er he
49 pm2 [he has legal aid (.)
50 cl :he has legal aid (.)
51 eh :well 1think we will forward her and advance her (.) her appeal- cl
52 [right
53 eh :(.) err on the basis of our (unclear)
54 cl [yep (.) these are the other
55 attenders (.)
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ch :right (unclear) (15.0)
clerk leaves to get appellant, some unclear talk in the transition




Here we see early agreement that the case should be awarded legal aid,
although there is some preference shown for both appellant and plaintiff to have
their legal aid revoked. This is not a current option though, and some talk about
when this may be an option is undertaken. The notable point in this case is that
the decision to tell the appellant that they have decided to allow the appeal is
taken in 'phase one'. Also noticeable is that the chair started off by attempting
to move 'phase two' of the appeal before completing a 'phase one' (line 3). This
caused the clerk to question this action, causing him to become a bit flustered
(line 4), and illustrates that the clerk is attending to the 'normal' 'phases' of the
tribunal. It seems likely that one of the panel members has also noticed this
'deviation from the norm' (lines 5 and 7). This concern for the deviation from
the 'norm' at the beginning of 'phase one', and the lack of concern for the
suggested 'deviation' at the end of 'phase one', would seem to be due to the fact
that the work necessary for the move had not been done in the first instance,
whereas it had in the second.
The Second Phase of Case Eight - The Delivery of the Decision.
59 ch :(name of attender) I won't bother (name) our clerk should read
60 any of the notes (.) I would just say and I won't even introduce us
61 (.) ermm we have read these papers (.) over the last few days (.)
62 we have observed in your comments that (name of opposite party
63 in case) has legal aid (.) we have cofirmed with (name) our clerk
64 he does have legal aid and in those circumstances we will grant
65 your appeal so that you may have legal aid (.) I have to say
66 though that that is no guarantee that you will get legal aid
67 throughout the proceedings (.)
68 ap :1 realise that (.)
69 ch :right (.) good (.) okay (.) so there we are thank you for coming
70 (.)
71 ap :well thank you very much for (unclear)
72 ch [no my pleasure (.)












The appellant arrives and the chair addresses her by name and tells her
that he will not bother to introduce himself or the panel, that they have
considered the appeal documents and the fact that her ex-partner has legal aid
(lines 59 to 63). The chair then states that this has been confirmed by the clerk
and hence they will grant the appeal (lines 63 to 65), adding the caution that this
is not a guarantee of continued legal aid support (lines 65 to 67). Here we see
the chair divert from the 'normal' tendency to introduce themselves, the clerk
and the panel at 'phase two'. The reference to the documents and the actions of
the panel so far are features of 'phase two' but this is transformed into a
decision via reference to confirmation of details by the clerk, which is a
reference to their discussion in the previous 'phase', and the delivery of a
'granting the appeal' with reference to its possibly being temporary.
In this case we see the panel come to a decision the initial phase of the
tribunal which they consider satisfactory, although a final decision is not
usually an outcome of phase one but phase three, they then carry the 'logic' of
this through by suggesting they inform the appellant of their decision. The
second phase begins with references to the 'normal' practices of phase two,
giving proof of the 'normative' way in which they are adhered to - at least in
this case, with an explanation of why the are being deviated from. This
explanation then develops into a delivery of a decision which would have
'normally' occurred in phase four.
What we can also see from this case is that the work that is normally
performed across four phases is achieved in two. Though it must be noted that
these two phases cannot therefore be seen as examples of any of the phases
noted in the description of other cases in this thesis. Nevertheless, we can note
the overt references by the clerk and the panel members to 'normal' practices
and deviation occurring, though it must be remembered that this is itself a
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situated construction of normative procedure.
Finally we have seen that it is possible to forward the tribunal 'phases',
but that this can meet with resistance if the work which the panel is meant to do
has not been achieved, or is no longer necessary. The panel were aware in this
case when the chair asked initially if the appellant was coming in, that the work
of the panel had not been done for them to satisfactorily move to the next
'phase'. This attention to the work that needs to be done before 'moving on' is
displayed both by the clerk and one of the panel members. When the chair
suggests forwarding the case to phase four there are no objections, this would
seem to be because the clerk and the panel members realised that they have
done the work which would allow this to be possible.
Case Nine." (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Three.)
We join this case in the 'transition period' between 'phase one' and
'phase two'.
65 Clerk leaves to get attender
66 eh :so we're just going to tell him (.)
67 pm2 :mmmm (.)
68 pml :if you're happy to (laugh) (0.4)
69 pm2 :what the upshot (unclear) try and persuade us that he he's
70 (unclear) but I don't suppose for a minute will (.) do anything
71 other than the great (unclear)
72 ? [(laugh)
73 Some unclear talk ensures at a rapid pace then a pause (2.0)
74 pm1 :wh wh what financial limits are we going to set (.) what do you
7 5 think seven fifty (.)
76 ? :okay (.)
77 pm3 :yeah inclusive oh inclusive oh yeas (.)
78 eh :ahem (.)
79 [unclear comment made as clerk returns with the appellant]
We see here the transition period being used to perform work that was
53 Data session four tape two case 2 (2).
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not finished before the clerk went to fetch the appellant. That work being what
the panel are going to say to the appellant. Although the panel has not discussed
the next piece of work the chair suggests that they inform the appellant of their
decision, this can be seen as a deviation from the 'normal' pattern of work
when an appellant is in attendance, in that they would 'normally' talk the case
over with the appellant then discuss again their decision on the case and then
inform the appellant (see previous sections of this chapter). However, in such
a 'normal' case they would have decided on some issue which they wished to
discuss with the appellant which they have not done in this case, rather they
have already come to a unanimous decision in favour of the appellants claim.
The chair seems to acknowledge this deviation from the 'norm' in the
suggestion that they just "tell him" (line 66), and seems to be recognised as
such by panel member one when they respond with "if you're happy to" (line
68). The rest of the panel also give assent to this proposed course of action.
It is notable that panel member one raises as an issue the nature of the
award they are to give the appellant (lines 74 and 75). This is interesting in that
the panel managed this piece of work earlier and to the agreement of all the
panel. It seems possible that this resurfacing of the question of the amount of
the award is raised again due to the departure from 'normal' procedure,
procedure which, after discussion with the appellant, raises again for discussion
the nature of the award to the appellant.
In this case it is possible that the move to the delivery of the decision
was influenced not only by a decision having been made on the case, but also
due to no decision having been made as to what to ask the appellant. Once the
panel end phase one and enter the transition period between phases the chair
realises this and suggests the foreshortening of the case. Even though a decision
had been agreed on the case the panel had not agreed to foreshorten the
'normal' process, this seems to be support by the fact that once it is suggested
the panel member once again agree the award with each other, an occurrence
that seems to be in response to the newly agreed foreshortening.
Although direct reference is made to the change in practice from
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'normal' procedure does make reference to this deviation in the transition
period, the four phases do not adequately describe this adaptation of the
transition period into the final decision-making occasion.
Case Ten.54 (Venue - Appendix One Venue Number Three.)
We join this case in the middle of a discussion of the case by the panel






































[well it does sound strange but there's no
there's no letter from mister (solicitor's name) err (.) suggesting
that (.) the opinion given is different to the one given in
conference (.) and I'm afraid given the err the opinion we have
now (.) that we have no alternative (.) mister (appellants name) but
to say that we must dismiss your appeal (0.2) if you want to go
back and talk to mister (solicitor's name) about it he will advise
you as to what you might be able to do next (.) errah but given the
(0.2) the advice (.) in writing from mister (name) of counsel (0.2)
which puts your chances at under fifty per cent (.) errm (0.4) then
we have ah (.) no alternative in the present circumstances I'm
affraid but to dismiss that appeal (0.6)
:so (0.2) don't a (0.2) so (1.2)
:what happens now well you go back and discuss with mister
(solictor's name) what happens now I think is the answer (1.0)
:yeah but (.) like a say I mean you're dismissing it on the (0.8)
grounds of what the barrister said (0.4) and a' ve come to appeal -
[ummm a p
:-so (2.0) that's not much of appeal (0.6) because like (0.4) you- eh
[umm
:-know what he sez in the first place I know what he sez
[no C.)
we only know that he said forty per cent to you in conference and
fifty in his written und erh less than fifty per cent in his written
advice that's all we know on that (0.4) you're telling us he said
fifty per cent in conference (.)
:quoted fifty per cent und then he said forty
[well (0.2) we can't go behind that C.)
54 Data session four tape two case 4 (5).





























you go back and discuss it with mister (solicitor's name) mister
(solicitor's name) may advise you as to what might be able
to do (.) in terms of perhaps getting another opinion from a
different barrister (.) which might leave you in a position to make
a fresh application for legal aid (.) but (0.2) that would have to be
a very strong opinion I think to get over (slight laugh) this one
(0.2) but we are left with this opinion now (1.6) what we are
saying is as I said to you at the beginning of this hearing we are
not here to try the case we are not the judge (.) I know you say "I
don't agree with it" but we cannot we have to accept the advice
that you have been given by your barrister (.) he's acting on your
side (.) and the advice he's given is that it's less than fifty per cent
(.) and we are not here on this appeal to say well let's make our
own minds up on what your chances are (3.0) we're here to say
(.) we've seen the facts there is no evidence the barrister was (.)
totally misdirected himself (.) and therefore we must we must
accept his assessment (3.0) right (.) so that's it I'm afraid the
appeal is dismissed and I suggest you go back to you solicitor








:next one is mister (appellants name)
This case is an appeal which in 'phase one' the panel are agreed upon
the interpretation of the case documents which they had received prior to the
tribunal. That they indicated that the case should be refused legal aid and that
this opinion meant the appeal should be refused as it stood at that point in time.
However, since the appellant can introduce new material at the tribunal, and
they can not refuse the appeal without checking this, they move on to 'phase
two' to discuss the case with the appellant. However, in 'phase two' it becomes
evident to the panel that the appellant does not have any new material to present
before the tribunal. Once the chair has established this he can be seen to
develop the discussion with the appellant, informing the appellant that the panel
are not able to grant the appeal against the refusal of legal aid and in so doing
delivers the decision of the panel as being such. The chair does this without
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moving the tribunal to 'phase three', the reason that the chair can do this is
because it was established that the case warranted a refusal unless new material
was made available, and since it has not been the chair can presumably assume
the panel's opinion on the case. The appellant has raised some issues about the
case with the panel but these have not affected the key point of the appellants
own barrister's opinion which is unfavourable towards the appellant. As none
of the panel has taken the appellant's information to override their initial view,
by raising this in the discussion with the appellant, the chair assumes previous
position of the panel and informs the appellant of the refusal without proceeding
to 'phase three'. The chair does this, and in doing so differs from the two
previous examples of foreshortening, without conferring with the other panel
members. This case also differs in that not overt reference is made to the 'four
phase' 'norm', by the panel members or the clerk. Even if the panel get through
the work that is associated with the four phases that have been described
throughout this thesis as evident in other cases, this does not mean that the
panel have been attending to the four phases in a way that describing their
activities with reference to such a model would not be a distortion.
It is notable that in this case the panel are not allowing any testimony of
the appellant to allow an amendment to the situation depicted in the
documentation. The barrister's report as a document is being accorded a status
that is not necessarily accorded to other documentation, in that its content is
being taken as unambiguous. This would seem to indicate that all documents are
not accorded the same status as representations of external situations, this does
not necessary mean that they are better representations, but that they are
accorded institutionalised legitimacy, that causes their contents to be accorded
a much narrower negotiable meaning. A meaning that is designed to be referred
to in specific bureaucratic processes and practices. Although the relevance of
the document and its content still require situated negotiation and application.
This case displays what appears as a phase two initially to be transformed due
to situational circumstance to be transformed, not into a phase four, but into
something that is neither.
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4.4a Critique of Four Phases.
What we have seen in the three previous examples, is that the tribunal
does not necessarily always move through the 'four phases' that were evident
in the descriptions the previous cases of legal aid appeals tribunals in this thesis.
Also, we have seen that when foreshortening of the 'typical' procedure does
occur, it does not necessarily occur at the same time or at the same place
illustrating that the tribunal panel do the work of deciding an appeal with some
considerable flexibility of process. This flexibility would seem to revolve
around the specific requirements of individual cases and the approach that the
panel adopts towards their assessment. The specific approach is not taken from
a set of fixed options at the beginning of each case tribunal, but rather develops
from the interactions of the panel members, clerk and appellant. Nevertheless
it all seems to be recognisable and acceptable, at least to the panel members if
not all the appellants," as being successful instance of legal aid tribunals.
What seems to be a requirement of the foreshortening of the 'normal'
tribunal process, is that the work which is typically performed in the 'phases'
to be 'passed over', has either been performed already or is not applicable to
that particular case. Although the work necessary to assess a particular case is
not fixed in advance, but is instead a result of the developing interaction of
those involved. The three examples of foreshortening described here, are not
meant to be 'typical', or the only variations that are available, instead they are
just illustrations of individual unique instances in the data of this thesis. Also,
what the third example of the foreshortened case displays, is that foreshortening
is not restricted to cases which involve the granting of legal aid. Hence,
foreshortening can not be explained by such typification as assuming that it is
the positive nature of their decision which allows the panel to deviate from their
'typical' procedure.
56 There were occasions when appellant's have been 'upset' with the panel,
their decision and legal aid system they are perceived to represent, resulting in
abusive behaviour by the appellants.
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4.5 Descriptive Categories in Description
In this section we will look briefly at a study of rule-following in
administrative bureaucracy by Zimmerman (1971) in which the focus of
explanation is given as being necessarily focused on explanations of situated
activity. Following this it will be suggested that a more abstract description of
activities, here derive by me from the work of Lynch (1982) can be
informative and explanatory, but it should not be seems as foundational and
must be directly related to situated activity.
4.5a Zimmerman on Rule Following.
The issue of 'administrative rationality', the extent to which personnel
adhere to the letter or at least intent of formal organizational rules of conduct
has been investigated ethnomethodologically most notably by Zimmerman
(1971). Zimmerman notes that the numerous studies of bureaucrats have shown
them adhering to set operational guidelines, but in doing so have tended to fail
to look at actual occasions of rule following. He notes as a consequence of this:
"For the investigator to make decisions about rules without
clarifying the basis of such decisions - particularly without reference to
how personnel make such decisions - invites the treatment of rules as
idealizations, possessing stable operational meaning invariant to the
exigencies of actual situations of use, and from the practical interests,
perspective, and interpretive practices of the rule user." (ibid p223)
Zimmerman takes the view that investigations need to look at how rules
are implemented in practice and suggests that "the operational import of formal
rules and organizational policy is decided by personnel on a case-by-case basis
warranted on reasonable 'grounds'." (ibid p225).
Reporting on an investigation of a Metropolitan County Bureau of
Public Assistance reception desk's application of organizational rules and
policies, he first notes that looking at the practices as a set of steps is misguided
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if it is taken from the perspective of the applicant since for the receptionist
applying the institutional rules the perspective is different. Rather, for the
receptionist in stead of a series of steps in a process, as it is for the applicant,
the receptionist instead of being concerned with steps is concerned with
practacalitiesof matching the pace of work with demands in a busy office where
multiple activities taking place. The result of which is that the production of a
step-like appearance in the processing of cases, is not due to a concern with
steps per se, but with 'timing and scheduling' as critical features of task
completion. Hence Zimmerman notes that the processing of a case gains "its
temporal specification by reference to the press of demands and available
resources at the time." (ibid p229) By this Zimmerman does not mean that the
activities are rule governed in some fashion, but that these rules may not be
either exactly those of the organization nor those of a theoretical analyst.
Zimmerman investigatesthese practices on occasions of the use of 'short
cuts' in processes due to the disruption of the 'system' by 'problem cases'. In
terms of this studies relation to this thesis that Zimmerman is concerned with
the ordering of cases in a process rather than the work of deciding those cases.
Rather than looking at the work of the interviewer his concern is with the
activities of the secretary in delegating the work of others, not on case decision-
making as such.
Zimmerman does not suggest that the organisational rules are not
adequate most of the time, but he suggests that "what the rule is intended to
provide for is discovered in the course of employing it over a number of
situations" and that it is when things go wrong that what the rule intended 'all
along'. It is action as a result of recognising what the rule intended that interests
Zimmerman who suggests that:
"action-in-accord-with-a-rule is not a matter of compliance or non-
compliance per se but the use of various ways in which persons satisfy
themselvesand others and others concerning what is or is not 'reasonable'
compliance in particular situations." (ibid:233)
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What I suggest we can see in our processing of cases by decision-makers i.e.
tribunal panel members, in Legal Aid Tribunals is activity that relates to 'what
the rule intends'. This is in contrast to seeing it as some sort of transcendental
rule breaking or theorised activity pronouncing an invalidity of such decision-
making activity. As Zimmerman concludes that:
"The use of formally prescribed procedures viewed from the perspective
of the notion of their 'competent use' thus becomes matters not of
compliance or deviance but of judgemental work providing for the
reasonableness of viewing particular actions as essentially satisfying the
provisions of the rule, even though the action may contrast with invocable
precedent, with members' idealized versions of what kinds of acts are
called for by the rule, or with sociologists' ideas concerning the
behavioural acts prescribed or proscribed by the rule." (ibid:237-238)
Thus Zimmerman illuminates not only the reasons for deviations from
'normal' procedure in Legal Aid Tribunals, but confirms the caution that needs
to be adopted when imposing a generalising model instead of concern for the
uniqueness of situated activity. For the production of such transituational
categories and descriptions, as Wieder (1971) explains in his critique of
semantics in 'On Meaning by Rule' is abandoned by ethnomethodology as a
goal and becomes instead a topic. When descriptive categories are used they
should not be adopted as some form of foundational descriptive version of
events.
4.5b Monological and Dialogical Presentations.
If we return to Section Two we can see that the panel members attended
to individual tribunals as either 'attended' and 'non-attended', whilst these are
glosses for individually situated cases, by exploring these I suggest we will
clarify some aspects of document use that will help inform some of the practices
we will investigate in the following chapter's re-specification of legal positivist
decision- making.
Michael Lynch (1982) notes that arguments can be either monological,
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where a speech is a constructed argument, or dialogical, where speech is seen
as being 'in' an argument. Lynch goes on to use this distinction to talk of
'Argument' (dialogical) and 'argument' (monological), where the former
consists of a social interaction "produced through the interrelated activities of
two or more parties in dialogue." The latter consists of a more classic form of
speech "delivered by one party to another party or parties" (ibid:287).57
What I suggest below is that the non-attended case and the attended case
can be seen as monological and dialogical respectively. By this it is meant that
the discourse in a non-attended case concerns a written appeal, a monological
text. By contrast, the discourse produced in an attended case is 'in-argument',
in a dialogue between the appellant and panel. In an attended case the appellant
is also required to submit a monological argument, and dialogical argument
between panel members may occur in unattended cases, but the distinction does
apply to the appellant's part in the tribunal. The appellant has the option to
pursue either or both monological and dialogical argument if they attend the
case hearing. If the appellant does not attend the case hearing, then they only
take the option of a monological presentation.
What I hope to illustrate below is that this distinction is consequential,
not necessarily in the out-come of the case hearing, but in the case evaluation
i.e. the situated practices.
The distinction between monological and dialogical argument describes
two options for Legal Aid appeals tribunals: those at which the appellant is
absent and the panel members work only from the texts they have in front of
them, and those at which the appellant or their legal representative attends the
tribunal. If we contrast the two cases presented in Section Two we can focus
upon the consequences of the presence of an appellant. In the first case, a
problem arose over a medical report that a panel member said was submitted
57Lynch footnotes that his use of monological and dialogical is not based
upon Habermasian universals in idealised speaking situations, but, following
Harvey Sacks, "sequences of utterances by different speakers in actual
(recorded) interactions" (Lynch 1982:287 footnote).
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when the initial legal aid application was made (case one lines 30 and 33). The
chair states that it would be unfortunate if such a report had not been included,
but then considers that one may not have been made (case one lines 34 and 35).
This incident highlights the limits of the monological case: the fact that
information is lacking or not clear from the documents, and cannot be checked
with the appellant. This contrasts with the dialogical case (case two) in which
the appellant is given a 'check-list' (lines 39 to 49) of documents the panel have
read, and is able to note any omissions.
As illustrated in case one when the chair states that they felt unable to
comment on the medical details because they "seem horrendously complicated"
(case one lines 24, 27 and 28), the monological case presentation limits the
ability of the panel to clarify aspects of the case. The panel are forced to
speculate or ignore aspects which cannot be clearly understood from the
documents. In the dialogical case speculation is done in the presence of the
appellant, whose immediate responses provide the panel members with an
additional resource for clarifying problematic aspects of the case. In fact, as we
saw in case two the appellant may be brought into the tribunal process very
early when the panel raise an issue that they believe the appellant can clarify.
The two cases involve different uses of documentary evidence. In case
one, the chair states that the absence of the medical report is an "unfortunate
omission but perhaps there isn't one" (lines 34 and 35). This uncertainty about
the existence of documentation is not without some foundation. In contrast the
appellant in case two was able to inform the panel that documents which were
not presently at hand had been provided. The absence of the appellant in case
one did not allow the panel to pursue the notable absence.
A limit of the monological option is that the panel only have recourse
to the documents provided by the Legal Aid Board. These include records
provided by the appellant, but any dialogical input on behalf of the appellant
can only be submitted by the panel themselves. In case one this did not prove
fatal for the appellant, but it might have been troublesome if the appellant in
case two had relied upon a monologic approach and thus had been unable to
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inform the panel that certain documents had gone astray. Also, as we saw in
case two, the ability of the panel to focus on what the appellant is actually
claiming is greatly facilitated by the presence of the appellant, a point the chair
explicitly states (case two lines 158 and 159). The chair expresses a preference
for dialogic hearings over monologic hearings in decision making. This
expression compliments the appellant for taking the trouble to attend, and may
be taken by the panel as a demonstration of the appellants seriousness and
concern towards the case. It also seems to imply that a significant number of
appellants do not attend. Thus, we can understand monologic and dialogic
presentations in terms of the possibilities of the types of work they afford.
The main aspect I wish to draw attention to here is that whether a case
is monological or dialogical creates a contextual situation which affects the
nature of the decision making practices of the panel. Although as was stressed
above this use of a binary categorization tool has to be recognised as in essence
a loose, but informative description, rather than a foundational categorization
technique to be imposed upon a phenomenon. The unique situatedness of a
phenomenon an its associated activities always remains paramount.
4.6 Summary.
This chapter has covered a large amount of data - tent cases and a large
amount of activities - phases. To bring them all under a single discussion would
be to recover issues that were raised and discussed in some detail in each of the
sections, as they will all be seen to be relevant in the following two chapters.
One of the aims of this thesis has been to show through the presentation
of unique instances the practices involved in legal aid appeals tribunals. One of
the problems which is associated with doing this is that in presenting the data
in some sort of systematic way, such as in the four 'phases' of this thesis, we
impose an order that can too easily become a rigid constraint on what are
unique occurrences. Such a constraint on the data can become a theoretical
model in which we then view similar phenomena. It is hoped that, while pains
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have been taken in this thesis to keep the reader aware of the problems of doing
this, case five of this section gives a clear example of why this caution needs
to be taken.
In brief, we have seen on occasions what is evident is that it appears that
actual documentation and its deliberation, even after the discussion with the
legal representative and/or the appellant, does not result in an unambiguous
interpretation of events and their relation to the legal statutes and legal practice.
The key point being though, that this does not necessarily prevent 'adequate'
legal decision making.
We also saw instances where this disparity of views on the
documentation and rules was not evident in the delivery of a decision, on the
contrary the very same documentation and rules were given as justification for
the panels decision, and presented as being uniformly agreed upon. Although
it is necessary to stress again that this practice does not mean that the decisions
are necessarily 'wrong', 'mistaken', etc. just that they are the practices that on
occasion constituted actions recognised as legally valid.
Also we saw case descriptions where the presentation technique of the
use of 'phases' did not adequately reflect actual practices on occasions, and that
that was due to the flexibility of members to the specifics and circumstances of
individual cases. Yet again this did not indicate that such practices were any
less legally adequate than others and that their 'legality' and validity as tribunal
processes must be in actuality situationally organised and agreed upon by the
panel members concerned. In fact, it was suggested that if we considered the
work of Zimmerman (1971) on rule-following in an administrative bureaucracy,
that such rule-breaking activity could possibly be best understood as situated
activities of contingent activity based upon the 'meaning behind the rules'.
Finally, it was suggested through the description of non-attended and
attended tribunals as either monological and dialogical respectively our
understanding of these phenomena could be facilitated. However, it was
emphasised that the use of descriptive categories should not be taken in
foundational terms and must not subsume the specifics of the unique situated
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activity itself.
In the following chapter we will look at the issue of rule following
specifically in relation to the repecification of legal positivism in legal practice
and jurisprudence.
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Chapter Five - A Critique of Legal Positivism.
"Viewed with respect to the practices for making it happen, a routine
inquiry is not one accomplished by rules." (Garfinkel 1967b: 174)
What makes law different from the natural sciences is that the
subject/topic of legal theory, laws themselves, are themselves artifacts. As are
the institutions built up around them, not just the documents recording the laws,
legal activity and terminology. It is not surprising that there is a sceptical stance
taken towards the essential positive view of law, and has been from Plato
onwards. Scepticism of law is seen as being either weak or strong. In its strong
sense such scepticism makes a call for the abolition of law and has been
associated historically with anarchist and utopian writers, as well as some
Marxist commentators. It is the weak form of scepticism towards law that is of
more interest to us in this thesis. In its weak form:
"From Rabelais to the modern school of legal realism, sceptics have
argued that legal decision-making is divorced from legal rules and that the
power of law-making lies in the unfettered discretion of judges, tribunals,
and law enforcement agencies." (Goodrich 1995:472)
This is a issue an empirical investigation such as ours can shed light on as it
investigates the actual practices of legal interaction in situated activity.
In this chapter we will focus on the Iepistopic I of legal positivism and
shall look at this theme as both a theoretical position and a practical orientation
by legal practitioners. Legal positivism is a major philosophical orientation
within jurisprudence and we will not be attempting to address all of the possible
orientations to legal practice that it encompasses. Instead in the first section of
this chapter we will briefly sketch the philosophical history of positivism in law
before focusing on the issue of rule following, decision making and aspects of
related document use, the arguments discussed will not be legal positivists I, but
those relating to Dworkin Is defence of law as epistemologically special and the
inherent positivism in his approach. It will be suggested that such theoretical
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debates can only be resolved by empirical research. This section is focused
heavily on a few arguments, and while quite technical I suggest it highlight
certain aspects of our research descriptions. In the second section we will move
on to the issue of decision making and the positivist approach to this, and look
at these issue with reference to the empirical data of this thesis. In the final
section the theme is the issue of decision delivery and their accounting
practices, here as well as referring to the empirical data of this thesis, it will be
suggested that we can be facilitated in our investigations by reference to the
ethnomethodological studies of science. It will be suggested that some of the
seemingly intractable debates surrounding legal positivism can be clarified via
an ethnomethodological respecification of the epistopics around which much
debate centres.
5.1 Legal Positivism.
Although there is not space, or need, to concern ourselves with the
history of philosophy of law in any great detail, it must be noted that the history
of the philosophy of law has had as an abiding concern the differentiation of law
from other practices and principles of human decision making. A central
concern here for the philosophy of law is in its separation from ethics, politics,
history and social theory, since Law is both an institution and product of human
reasoning:
"Laws and legal systems, like their human makers and subjects, somehow
belong to the four sorts of order with which human reason is concerned -
roughly, natural, logical, moral, and cultural. Using the conventional
symbols of an ordinary language, and supplementing them with new
conventions and techniques, legal rules articulate conceptions of the
natural order (which reason does not make but only considers), of logical
consistency and implication, and above all of rightness and wrongness in
official and unofficial deliberation and action." (Finnis 1995b:469)
Legal theories tend to focus on one of these paradigms of order at the
expense of the others. If a theory is simultaneously attempting neutrality
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adopting anyone orientation in order to define law is problematic though, as
to do so is to adopt an a priori position towards any substantive issues in such
a definition. The most common form of such reductionist theories of law have
been attempts to reduce law to some form of logical, or positivist, order e.g.
Hobbes' notion of contractual obligation where a breach is equated with logical
absurdity, these have been seen to fail though as "the normativity of practical
reasoning and legal norms is not reducible to logic's normativity, but rests on
the necessity of means to or respect for basic ends" (ibid:471). In the
philosophy of law this might now be a recognised situation but it has not always
been the case. 1
A form of legal positivism first arose in the fourth century B. C.. Legal
positivism here being in the form of the assertion that "to be described with
realism and clarity law must be considered without regard to any moral
predicates which it attracts in discourse (e.g. moral-political evaluation) outside
the philosophy of law. " (Finnis 1995a:465) This was in contrast to 'natural law'
theory in which law was intrinsically linked to the community in which it
operates, a division in legal theory which still operates today. Although a
positivist orientation to law can be traced back to the age of Plato, the stance
of positive law and the term itself is attributed to Thierry of Chartres circa
1135, with theoretical definitions via Thomas Aquinas in the Thirteenth
Century, Jeremy Bentham in the Eighteenth Century, and John Austin (via
Thomas Hobbes) in the Nineteenth Century (ibid:465-468). So as we can see
the positivist view of law has been a central tradition throughout the history of
the philosophy, and as such has tended to be the position around which many
of the debates in the philosophy of law focus.
The move to 'legal positivism' developed out of the utilitarianism
climate where law as it is and law as it ought to be were distinguished. That law
1 The idea that laws are positivist in that they are designed by and for human
co-ordination has been contested by legal realism, where law is instead defined
as the prediction of judicial action (Finnis 1995b:471), and by Dworkin where
the reliance is on judicial individualism.
169
as it is and as it ought to be should be seen as separated was advocated by
Jeremy Bentham who asserted that law and morals were separate. Here legal
obligations we not seen to cease when an individual decides that a law cannot
be followed for reasons of morality, the legal positivist view being that the
judicial validity of law remained, although this did not prevent laws being
condemned on moral grounds (Lloyd 1964:99-103). Legal positivism acquired
its pretensions to 'science' with Bentham's development of utilitarianism, but
it was his disciple John Austin who is attributed with development of 'the
science of positivist law'. Austin emphasising even more the distinction
between is and ought in law, with the is being the province of the science of
legal positivism. For Austin Law is a self-contained body of rules open to
scientific investigation exposition of its working and deliverance across
'developed' legal systems via the conceptual understanding of jurisprudence
(ibid: 107-108).
This conceptual approach can be seen to be criticised on at least three
accounts; firstly, that it develops a version of law as having a coherent inner
structure which new developments in law must adhere to. Secondly, that it
promotes a 'logical' view of the development of law which disregards the role
of policy. And the third criticism, and one directly aimed at Austin, being that:
"Austin seemed to overlook that the level of investigation on which he
contemplated that his science of positive law would operate was really
only what we would call second-order facts, namely the rules of law as
contained in the statutes, recorded cases, and law-books associated with
given legal systems." (ibid:110)
In doing so Austin ignored the mass of first-order facts of the situated
actions of members of the legal professions and those who have dealings with
them. That once law is placed back in the hands of members in situated activity,
crucially, the issue of the separation of the is and ought notions of law can
become problematic. This issue of morality, the ought, and its situated fusion
within legal practice has often been a central topic in the discussion of legal
positivist jurisprudence, and one attended to by H.L.A. Hart in 'The Concept
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of Law' (1961) a defence of legal positivism! in the following definition:
"Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean a simple contention that it
is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain
demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so." (ibid: 181-
182)
The reason that Hart attends to the issue of morality is because of his
concern with the scope of law that jurisprudence is to concern itself with. Hart
argues for the concept of law to be a broad rather than narrow definition, one
that will include laws that may, for whatever reason be seen to be too iniquitous
be judged as valid - the narrower version excluding these. The adoption of the
broader definition being preferable as it includes the narrower version, the
significance of this being that Hart sees the narrow version leading to confusion
since any such exclusion divides efforts to investigate law and oversimplifies
the moral issues involved. Whereas the broader version allows a separation of
the concepts of the invalidity and immorality of law which the narrower version
confuses (ibid:204-205).
2 Legal positivism does not exists as a single coherent body of thought, and
although Hart describes five core meanings of legal positivism in contemporary
jurisprudence (below), not all representatives of legal positivism hold to each
of these five meanings.
"(1) the contention that laws are commands of human beings;
"(2) the contention that there is no necessary connection between law
and morals or law as it is and as it ought to be;
"(3) the contention that the analysis (or the study of the meaning) of
legal precepts is (a) worth pursuing and (b) to be distinguished from historical
inquiries into the causes or origins of laws, from sociological inquiries into the
relation of law and other social phenomena, and from the criticism or appraisal
of law whether in terms of morals, social aims, 'functions', or otherwise;
"(4) the contention that a legal system is a 'closed logical system' in
which correct decisions can be deduced by logical means from predetermined
rules without reference to social aims, policies, moral standards; and
"(5) the contention that moral judgements cannot be established or
defended, as statements of fact can, by rational argument, evidence, or proof
("noncognitivism' in ethics)." (H. L. A. Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and
philosophy:57-58. Quoted from Davies and Holdcroft 1991 :3)
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The is/ought debate is an extensive one in jurisprudence and in what
follows we will cut a path through this looking at issue located within it this
debate, that of law as rule following.
5.la Rule Following.
Weissbourd and Mertz (1985) note that the idea that the law is a system
of rules is central to many Western concepts of law. They believe H.L.A. Hart
exemplifies this tendency by conceptualising legal practices as social processes
in a decontextualized and static fashion.' In contrast, Weissbourd and Mertz
argue for a "legal creativity" which emphasises non-deductive reasoning, that
argues that law is practice as well as a system of rules. Their critique stems
from a linguistic position in which they accuse Hart, and others, as being biased
towards a semantic, and de-contextualised, view of the role of language in law
(ibid:623-624). They draw a parallel between the legal philosophy of Hart and
the linguistic philosophy of John Searle. Accusing both of a concern for rules
over process, and of their use of the distinction between 'creativity' and
'supposition', suggesting that such a distinction is not evidenced in everyday
speech, and that the legal view of language relies heavily on notions of
supposition in language.
Weissbourd and Mertz note that the conception of law as an a priori set
of rules or principles to be consistently applied fails to reflect the 'reality' of
legal practices. That the process of applying rules in differing social contexts
results in changes in the meaning of the rules in question (ibid:640). They assert
the peculiarity of Western law in neglecting this, and show that legal
anthropology demonstrates that in other cultures legal ideology sees the
discourse itself is as an aspect of what 'occurred', not just its content to support
this assertion. The Tswana are cited as an example here, since for the Tswana
3 Although Hart's (1961) notion of 'defeasibility' does suggest that laws are
not always applicable despite their seeming relevance. Heath and Luff
(forthcoming) illustrate this concept in relation to the use of medical records.
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all social facts are seen "as culturally constructed products of ongoing human
speech interaction .... Rather than emphasizing the prerequisite, static aspects
of law, the Tswana put the most weight on creative, contextualized interaction"
(ibid:646).
The reason why Western legal theory, as exemplified by Hart, down-
plays the context of legal processes is, Weissbourd and Mertz believe, due to
the process of abstraction:
"While other cultures frequently look to the actual dynamics of contextual
interaction for underlying 'truths', the Western system, in its appellate
courts, in its law schools, in the way its law-makers talk about the law,
contrasts a system of rules with unanalyzable contextual factors. This
viewpoint downplays, in the language of semiotics, the 'pragmatic' or
context-bound elements." (Ibid:649)
In conclusion Weissbourd and Mertz suggest that "we must look for
some particular socio-cultural basis for this insistence on a deductive
decontextualized regimentation wherein a system of definitional equivalences
provides the guiding framework, and whereby legal process becomes simply an
instantiation of rules. " (ibid:657) The emphasis here given to the absence of the
role of context in the application and interpretation of rules is a criticism made
not only by Weissbourd and Mertz.
Costas Douzinas et al. (1991), in an attempted deconstruction of the
positivist interpretation of legal process" via a critique of Dworkin's critique of
4 While there is no space to discuss Douzinas et al. 's (1991) adoption of
deconstruction, Lynch (1984), noting the ethnomethodological alternative,
states of deconstruction:
"Deconstruction is not exempted from the problems associated with
correspondence. The task of deconstruction often is defined as one showing
how statements, initially held out to be unmeditated representations of 'reality',
are actually bound-up in rhetorical strategies, forgotten histories, and muted
controversies. Such a conception of the deconstructive task remains committed
to a view of representation as a relation between linguistic or non-linguistic
'statement' and what the statement purports to represent. That view itself needs
to be 'deconstructed', but in a different way." (p 147-148)
This move from the critique of legal positivism, to the
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Hart, notes that:
"Formalist theories usually distinguish between the structure, grammar,
or code (langue), and their instantiationsor propositions (parole). The job
of theory is to classify the workings of the machine, show how the rules
formally cohere, while the instantiations are left relatively untheorized. "
(ibid:55-56)5
This critique is similar to that of Weissbourd and Mertz, though
Douzinas, recognises that Hart does deal with the instantiations of law. That
Hart does so through the use of categories of 'core of settled meaning' and
'penumbra of doubt', which introduce judicial discretion as a factor into the
law. It is exactly these notions that are problematic for Dworkin, since for
Dworkin this results in the positivistic notion of the law being threatened. Not
that Dworkin denies the existence of discretion as such, but rather what he
terms Hart's 'strong discretion' (ibid:56).
Dworkin's own theory, to counter that of Hart, Douzinas et al. state is
that:
"The grammar of principled legal meaning both sets in motion and
delimits acts of legal interpretation and application. It is in this sense that
'right answers' exist to all legal problems. If all legal meaning, the whole
object 'law', is produced through the bringing to the surface of
underlying values, every new act is an instantiation of the code in a new
context and therefore necessarily an application of those principles. Right
answers exist because the law itself is a 'grammar of rightness'."
(ibid:56-57)
Through this mechanism differences in the application of the law come from
'reasonable' disagreements in the application of those principles, but there is
ethnomethodological critique of representation, is not as large as it may seem
since the ethnomethodological critique of representation stems from
investigations into the investigations of positivist natural science.
5 This position contrasts with the Russian Formalism of Bakhtin who
believes that the discussion of instances and their context is not unscientific, but
'differently' scientific (Bakhtin 1986:160).
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only a narrow band of 'reasonable disagreements' as certain theories fail to fit
with legal materials.
However, Douzinas et al. claim that Dworkin's theory's attempt to
transcend the problems of positivism is built upon the inapplicable use of
aesthetics and hermeneutics. Derived from Kant, aesthetics is used to provide
judgements with validity and universality since "the aesthetic point of view
allows the individual to transcend the twin dangers of abstract universalism and
blind individualism, rigid objectivism and uncontrolled subjectivism. " (ibid:59)
The method is simple, the transference of the conceptualisation of aesthetic
judgement out of the realm of aesthetics and into some other realm of
judgement. A move used by both Hegel and Rousseau, and also used by various
modernist theories. When used by Dworkin in legal theory the resulting
conceptualisation is, for Douzinas et al., that:
"Law is an interpretative exercise. Legal interpretation resembles the
interpretation of literary texts which can therefore be used as a model for
understanding the law. At the centre of the edifice lies an aesthetico-
hermeneutic hypothesis. All interpretation is constructive, it imposes 'a
purpose of an object [of art] or [social practice], to make it the best
possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong'
(Dworkin 1986:52)." (ibid:60-61)
A test of adequacy rather than aesthetics, transferred into practice this becomes:
"The judge must construct a theory of political morality that will show the
law in its best possible light. The theory must fit both the institutional
history of the community's laws and include normative claims about the
purpose of the enterprise. Judges may reasonably differ on this, as do art
critics on the question of where aesthetic value lies." (ibid:61)
In this fashion Dworkin attempts to counter the problems caused by the
acceptance of judgemental discretion in positivist legal theory.
A different perspective on the positivism of Hart and Dworkin is taken
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by Jackson (1988)6 in a study of the phenomenon of adjudication in court/ here
he attempts to put into relief the complex activity of adjudication in contrast
with the formalist version of "normative syllogism", 8 stating that:
"This complexity consists not merely in the different interactional
contexts which make up this 'activity'; it is constituted also by the
inevitable involvement within these discursive practices of non-legal
structures of understanding." (ibid: 1)
By this Jackson means the use of forms of understanding which are not
subsumed under the title of positivist modes of objective legal rationality.
Jackson, in a discussion of Dworkin's version of judicial interpretation in the
legal positivism of Hart, believes that although Dworkin puts the question of
legal rationality at issue, Dworkin himself adopts too narrow a interpretation
of legal rationality in decision making. Especially in relation to what can, and
can not, be explicitly stated by judges in the course of justifying their decisions,
Jackson believes that Dworkin's stance against the positivism of Hart, itself
contains three major tenets of positivism. These are:
"First, that 'the Law' exists as a single unified system, and that only one
system exists within any [nation] state; second (to put the matter at its
6 Jackson notes that while both Hart and Dworkin were claiming to describe
judicial discourse they were in fact probably describing legal disclosure and
doctrinal discourse respectively - Jackson himself claims to be focusing on a
third discourse, that of adjudication. Though he does not suggest that their
relative descriptions provide adequate semiotic accounts of these - this is not
surprising of course, as neither of them were aiming to do so. This raises the
question as to whether they are not all talking about different things and that
critiques in each others' terms is misconceived!
7 Jackson believes adjudication to have achieved the status of the paradigm
of legal activity (1988: 1).
8 Syllogism is a deductive inference by which a conclusion is derived from
two propositions a major and a minor premise. A form of deductive reasoning
from the general to the particular. So normative syllogism is a form of
deductive reasoning based upon prescribed norms, in this case the Law.
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weakest) that there exists an intimate connection between decision-making
and interpretation, and that normally interpretation of the law is
determinative of its application to facts; third, that there exists a
specifically legal form of interpretation, one that belongs to an
autonomous legal universe." (ibid: 131)
Jackson, discussing the first of these, makes the point that within the
teaching, discourse upon, and practice of the law there exists a co-referentiality
to a single entity which exists outside any particular discourse, and that entity
is "the Law" (Ibid: 132).9 Jackson takes issue with Dworkin's adoption of the
metaphysical and posits an alternative view of legal rationality, derived from
the semiotics of Greimas, and focusing on the notion of semiotic groups. A
semiotic group being a group "within which messages are sent, received and
understood, without necessarily implying any authorial intention on the part of
the 'sender' as to the identity of the particular 'receiver'" (ibid: 134). Jackson,
contrary to the 'unified' version of law by Dworkin, believes that by showing
that within the semiotic group of English Law there exist a plurality of smaller
semiotic groups and this plurality of groups generates "a powerful semiotic
argument against the positivist postulate of the unity of 'the Law'" (ibid: 135).10
The second tenet of positivism that Jackson claims to locate in the work
of Dworkin is that there is a necessary relationship between interpretation and
decision making, and that the former determines the latter. Jackson notes that
this position has already been attacked by legal realists who argue that decision
making often differs from this positivist model and that judges decide cases
differently from the normative syllogistic way in which they explain their
9 Of note here is the similarity between the conception of the entity of 'the
Law', and the conception of 'reality' in positive natural science discourse which
also exists as an external entity outside any individual discourse. Thus both
legal and scientific positivism seem to make similar metaphysical claims.
10 This positivist notion of the singular unity of the law as further attacked
by Jackson whose Greimasian semiotics argue that such concepts as 'the Law'
do not have a metaphysical existence, but are instead internal constructions of
discourse (1988: 140-141).
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judgements. II This we have seen illustrated in Chapter Six above in the phase
four delivery of decisions and in the formalising of the version for the
documentation at the end of phase three. Jackson, however, disagrees with the
legal realist position claiming that their version of the divergence of
interpretation and decision-making is a contingent one, i.e. that it may occur in
some circumstances, rather than a conceptual one, i.e. that by definition they
must be separate. Jackson argues that interpretation is an exclusively
propositional affair based upon semantic and syntactic relations, while decision-
making is based upon pragmatics. It is these conceptual differences, he argues,
that are conflated by Dworkin and end up reinforcing the positivist tenet of the
interrelationship of interpretation and decision making. (Ibid: 143-146)
Before developing this second aspect further we must comment on the
third positivist aspect of Dworkin's position for Jackson; the autonomy of the
law." For Jackson, the autonomy of legal reasoning is in fact" ... a facet of the
narrativised struggled for the autonomy of the legal profession" (Ibid: 148).13
II A claim that is also made in relation to the practices of natural scientists
in the presentation of their results (see Livingston 1993).
12 This might look compatible with Jackson's own semiotic method, but he
claims that this is not the case. He denies the positivist acceptance of a unitary
justificationary discourse claiming that the role of unconscious reasoning and
the 'narrativisation' of pragmatics annul such a claim (Ibid: 147). Jackson notes
that his own semiotic position has been described as a form of positivism,
especially by P. Goodrich in 'Review of Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory',
Modern Law Review 50 (1987),117-123, and unconvincingly, in my view,
argues against it.
13 This is a narrative struggle for autonomy, rather than being struggle to be
autonomous in 'fact', or 'reality'. Foucault's view of the judiciary is that: "In
the Middle Ages there was a change from the court of arbitration (to which
cases of dispute were taken by mutual consent, to conclude some dispute or
some private battle, and which was in no way a permanent repository of power)
to a set of stable, well defined institutions, which had the authority to intervene
and which were based on political power (or at any rate were under its
control)." Foucault, Michel (1980), 'On Popular Justice: A Discussion with
Maoists' (Chapter 1 in .. ) 'Power/Knowledge', Hemel Hempstead, Herts.
Harvester Wheatsheaf. Originally published as 'Sur Ie justice populaire: debat
avec les maos', in Les Temps Modernes 310 bis, 1972. A state of affairs which
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This would seem to fit in with the retention of the positivist model by legal
practitioners in the face of the positivist decline as the jurisprudential model.
Jackson illustrates Dworkin's conflation of interpretation and decision
making by referring to the supposed differences between 'hard' and 'easy'
judicial cases. An 'easy' case being one in which the answer, locating it within
a body of judicial reasoning, appears unproblematic, a 'hard' case being where
this is problematic. These cases being referred to as 'core' and 'penumbra'
respectively. Jackson's point here is that such divisions of cases are in fact
rhetorical strategies "relevant to the justification of the resolution of cases"
(Ibid: 146). Focusing on Dworkin's claim for the existence of 'easy' and 'hard'
cases. We can further say that 'easy' cases are those in which decision-making
is seen to be, in a positivist fashion, determined by interpretation, "through a
version of syllogism itself, or quite simply by stipulation of the decision as self-
evident, not requiring justification" (Ibid: 147). 'Hard' cases, on the other hand,
being those where there is no obvious unproblematic answer or decision
available, thus allowing rational dissent (Ibid: 146).14 Reasoning by decision-
makers in 'hard' cases, is for Dworkin somewhat parallel, though not identical,
to that of literary critics.
There are two comparisons Dworkin makes when he talks about literary
methods, though as Jackson remarks he seems to use them interchangeably. The
first is that Dworkin sees the literary critic as confined to interpret the text with
regards to the narrative consistency, and unable to introduce issues that are not
'available' in the text. In the same way, Dworkin believes, according to
Jackson, the "law is to be regarded as a literary whole, but consisting of norms
rather than facts" (ibid: 149). This seems to indicate that Dworkin sees the law
he believes remains to the present day.
14This dividing into 'easy' and 'hard' is what the ethnomethodological
viewing of cases as unique avoids. Although we saw in Chapter Six cases arise
where decisions are made in a fashion displaying disagreement among decision
makers, the practices the members employed on these occasions were clearly
situationally dependent on the case and its presentation as on-going activities
rather than with reference to 'easy' or 'hard' external categorisations.
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as a unified whole which has an underlying set of norms, and the decision
maker can only make a legal decision if they remain within this narrative of
norms.
The second analogy which Dworkin makes between law and literature,
is with the 'chain novel' .15 Here Dworkin believes that as the novel is passed
from one author to the next in the chain novel, the freedom of successive
authors becomes more restricted. Jackson believes that Dworkin confuses the
role of the judge with these analogies, because in practice the judge is both
author and critic (ibid:150).
Jackson, picks up on the problems of a positivist version of legal
decision making which allows processes similar to those of literature, especially
when, as Jackson notes, the difference between 'easy' and 'hard' cases is
actually a semiotic construction independent of how the case is solved
(Ibid:151).16 The implication being that, if we take the difference between
'easy' and 'hard' cases to be a rhetorical or semiotic constructs, the documents
of all legal cases are open to the methods of literary interpretation, and all cases
can be 'affected' or 'use' literary techniques of interpretation.
The key issues that Jackson raises are: 1) the inevitable involvement
within legal discursive practices of non-legal structures of understanding; that
within the semiotic group of English Law there exist a plurality of smaller
semiotic groups and this plurality of groups generate an argument against the
positivist postulate of a unified' Law'; 2) that decision making often differs
from the positivist model in that judges decide cases differently from the
normative way in which they explain their judgements; 3) the autonomy of legal
reasoning is in fact a narrative struggle for the autonomy of the legal
IS This connecting of law and literature exists elsewhere in legal studies,
notable among these is James Boyd White (l984:xi) who aims to " ... set forth
a rather different conception of law from those that presently prevail in
academic circles: as an art essentially literary and rhetorical in nature, a way
of establishing meaning and constituting community in language" .
16That there is no clear dividing line between 'clear' and 'hard' cases is also
held by McCormick (1995).
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profession; 4) the difference between 'easy' and 'hard' cases is actually a
semiotic construction independent of how the case is solved.
In his critical essay 'Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law
and Literature' (1989a) Stanley Fish picks up on Dworkin's use of literary
methods in 'Law and Interpretation' .17 Fish interprets Dworkin's position as
"concerned to characterize legal practice in such a way as to avoid claiming
either that in deciding a case judges find the plain meaning of the law 'just
there' or, alternatively, that they make up the meaning 'wholesale' in
accordance with personal preference or whim." (Ibid:87) Fish focuses on
Dworkin's use of the 'chain' novel as an example of document production and
use in law to illustrate that Dworkin's characterisation of legal practice is
confused. The exact details of this critique are not significant here, and we will
instead focus on its textual aspects.
Fish states that Dworkin sees decisions based on texts as being
constrained by that text, and that disagreement can be settled by reference to
that text. But, Fish points out, it is due to the fact that the text can lead to
different assumptions in different circumstances that disagreements occur in the
first place. 18 In relation to the example of the chain novel, contrary to Dworkin,
Fish believes that the first writer is no less constrained than the last, that the
first author does not have absolute freedom to write, which is how Dworkin
perceives their position, but are as confined to the genre in which they are
working in as much as the last writer. In doing so Fish dismisses Dworkin's
negative analogy whereby the judge, like the first author in a chain novel, can
make any decision they like. With regards the last author, Fish argues that they
are as able to head in new directions to the same extent as the first author, as
17 Richard Dworkin, (1982) "Law as Interpretation", Texas Law Review,
Vol. 60.
18 This would seem to be illustrated in our data when tribunal panel
members disagree upon their initial readings, which they have undertaken prior
to coming to the tribunal, and how these may then change in the changing
circumstances of the following phases of the tribunal.
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long as it make sense within the genre, and so it is also the case for the judge."
In fact Fish accuses Dworkin of embracing both the positions he wishes
to deny. Since Dworkin believes that position of a judge is analogous to that of
the author at the end of a chain novel, in that they are prevented going off in a
new direction due to the precedent of the earlier writer, and that so are judges
by the precedents of earlier judges. Dworkin's position, Fish states, is that:
"Interpretation that is constrained by the history one finds will be responsible,
whereas interpretation informed by the private preferences of the judge will be
wayward and subjective." (ibid:93) The critique Fish makes of this is that:
"he [Dworkin] assumes that history in the form of a chain of decisions
has, at some level, the status of brute fact; and he assumes that wayward
arbitrary behaviour in relation to that fact is an institutional possibility. "
(Ibid:95)
And that by doing so he assumes the two positions, those of legal positivism
and legal realism, that he is trying to avoid.
Fish's own position is that:
"it is neither the case that interpretation is constrained by what is
obviously and unproblematically 'there', nor the case that interpreters, in
the absence of such constraints, are free to read into a text whatever they
like." (lbid:97)
This is in fact the position which, as we saw above, Dworkin wishes to
adopt, but which he does by allowing the two possibilities which he denounces,
as being possibilities. In arguing against these possibilities he ends up adopting
a position which involves both of them. Dworkin's problems arise, for Fish,
19 From our data in this thesis we can say that the decision making and
interpretations of the panel members are not totally sequentially constrained in
some determinative fashion. Members can introduce new interpretations at
potentially any point in the decision-making process as to the 'meaning' of the
documents and related activities. At the same time the decision making
activities are not without order.
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due to his confusion over the interpretation of texts.
Fish, contrary to Dworkin, does not see explaining and changing texts
as opposed activities, but as the same thing. Fish critiques Dworkin's
understanding of the act of interpretation, whereas Dworkin wishes to impose
constraints, for Fish "interpretation is a structure of constraints, a structure
which, because it is always and already in place, renders unavailable the
independent and freely interpreting reader." (Ibid:98) I suggest that the
activities of the legal representative, appellant, and panel members in Chapter
Four illustrates how the various interpretations negotiated by the participants
in the course of the situated activities of persuasion and clarification do 'change'
the texts. But our position is that the texts do not have a fixed interpretation
independent of the activities in which they are invoked, so any change must be
within this context.
This concept of freedom of interpretation by Dworkin is mirrored in his
concerns over 'intention'. Dworkin believes that to focus on intention is to
bypass the important interpretive context of historical practices and
conventions. Fish criticizes Dworkin's view of an independent or unique
interpretation as a possibly entity, one which could be focused upon at the
expense of the 'proper' context. Fish instead argues that "Simply to do
something in the context of a chain enterprise is ipso facto to 'have' an
enterprise-specific intention, and to read something identified as part of a chain
enterprise is ipso facto to be in the act of specifying that same intention."
(ibid:99) By this Fish means that intention is an interpretive fact, that intention
must be construed, and it is "therefore impossible to oppose it either to the
production or the determination of meaning." (Ibid: 100) Fish's conclusion that:
"In order for a case to appear readable independently of some interpretive
strategy consciously employed, one must already by reading within the
assumption of that strategy and employing, without being aware of them,
its stipulated (and potentially controversial) definitions, terms, modes of
inference, etc. This, at any rate, would be the argument I would make,
and in making it I would be denying" (Ibid: 101)
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Fish explores Dworkin's analysis further in 'Wrong Again' (1989b).
Here Fish explains that Dworkin believes that the organisation, style and
figures of a text allow themselves to be used as a measure by which a proposed
reading of a text can be made. Fish, in contrast, holds that these are in reality
interpretive facts which are themselves established in the course of elaboration,
thus disqualifying themselves as an objective measure. (Ibid: 106) For Fish, this
claim of Dworkin's is based upon the distinction between change and
explaining, and is directly a result of his above misunderstanding of the nature
of Interpretation," and can not be invoked without embracing positivism.
(Ibid: 107) What I suggest our research can add to this is that, as displayed in
Chapter Four by the appellant, that while an interpretive strategy is employed,
this interpretation is not static. Instead the interpretive 'strategy' employed by
the legal representative, panel members, and appellant is continually reflexively
related to the on-going actions and interpretations of the co-present members.
Any interpretive strategy by a member is 'potentially' open to negotiation and
challenge by the other co-present members, the final understandings of the
documentation being arrived at through this process. The legitimacy of any
interpretive strategy being both open to challenge and legitimised during the on-
going interaction.
Fish, in his introductory chapter to 'Doing What Comes Naturally'
(1989c) defines his own theoretical stance is anti-formalist, that he does not
believe that words have clear meanings independent of the usages in specific
occasions, and that "meanings that seem perspicuous and literal are rendered
so by forceful interpretive acts and not by the properties of language" (Ibid:9).
20 Fish believes: "... Dworkin is simply confusing a fact about interpretation
in general - that the construing of intention can always begin anew even when
the intention is one's own - with a supposedly special fact about aesthetic
intention - that it leads to the creation of texts that live untethered to any
intention whatsoever. . ..The matter, however, is at once more simple and more
complex. Neither artists nor anyone else can produce texts capable of being
detached from intention; but since intention is an interpretive fact, there is
nothing to prevent the intention of a text, including one you have yourself
written, from being interpreted again." (Fish 'Wrong Again' ibid: 118)
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This anti-formalist position may be thought to invoke some form of relativism,
but Fish is not arguing that there are no constraints to interpretation, but instead
that the constraints that are in place are themselves interpretive (Ibid:27). This
position is anti-foundational in that, although there will be "situations in which
theory will be consequential, the direction and shape of this consequentiality
will be a local, contingent matter" (Ibid:28). This anti-foundationalism does not
argue that there are no foundations, but that the foundations are based upon
cultural and contextual discourse."
The key points here, and ones which much of our research gives support
to are: texts can provide for different assumptions in different circumstances of
use; explaining and changing texts are not opposed activities, but are the same
thing; interpretation is not constrained by what is obviously and
unproblematically 'there', nor is the interpreter free to read anything into a text;
the distinction between hard and easy cases may be an empirical fact (as
something one might experience), but not in terms of a basic difference between
cases that are self-settling and cases that can be settled only by referring them
to the history of procedures, practices, and conventions; the content of texts are
interpretive facts which are themselves established in the course of elaboration,
thus disqualifying themselves as an objective measure of interpretation (a point
worth noting with regard to any attempt at an ethnomethodology of reading as
we saw in Chapter One). The argument is not that there are no constraints to
interpretation, but instead that the constraints that are in place are themselves
interpreti ve.
Finally, it must be noted that Fish's anti-formalist and anti-foundational
stance has been contested directly by Steve Fuller (1989) in his article 'Beyond
the Rhetoric of Antitheory: Towards a Revisionist Interpretation of Critical
Legal Studies'. Fuller believes Fish and other anti-foundationalists actually
share many of "the deepest presuppositions of their 'positivist' foes ... ".
21 See Fish (1989c):30 for why anti-foundationalism is not a contradiction
itself.
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(Ibid:134) Fish's definition of theory, states Fuller, is itself a positivist
reduction. (Ibid: 137) Although Fish has stated that anti-foundationalism is
equally open to the anti-foundationalist thesis itself, and can be so without
contradiction until another argument "holds the field against it". (Fish
1989c:30) Whilst this in itself sounds like a reference to falsification theory, the
criticism Fuller makes of what he calls 'Fish's positivistic theory of "theory"',
is that:
"As Fish sees it, the theorist aspires to the algorithmic in that he would
like to discover rules that can function as a guide to a humanistic
discipline's practice in all cases by being sufficiently explicit and neutral
for any practitioner, regardless of her particular interests, to follow the
same result. A rule with heuristic status, by contrast, can guide practice
only in certain cases which cannot be determined in advance of practice
but only, in retrospect, once practice has been successfully guided by the
rule. In short, the desired distinction is between "the fool proof method"
and "the rule of thumb." (Fuller 1989:136)
Fuller's critique of Fish's anti-foundationalism is quite extensive though
the focus seems to be aimed at the politics of Critical Legal Studies, and putting
the case for legal realism - issues which are not of direct interest to us here.
However, Fuller's raising of the issue of heuristics in the context of positivism
is. In his conclusion Fuller notes: "A philosopher of science happening upon the
antitheory debates would immediately by struck by the narrowness of the
philosophical spectrum occupied by the disputants." (Ibid: 149)
5.1 b Section Summary.
Starting with a brief outline of legal positivism we have looked at debates upon
this issue that have attempted to show its problematic nature, these have
revolved largely around, not legal positivism itself but the problems of Dworkin
in trying maintain that law is epistemologically special while trying to avoid a
legal positivist position. We have seen that one aspect of the arguments that
have been levelled against Dworkin revolve around the role of documentation
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in the legal process. Whilst these arguments have proposed a view of legal
practice that in many ways are supported by the earlier chapters of this thesis,
the debates have tended to remain at a theoretical level. The result being that
these debates, as we saw in the case of Fish end up being challenged at a
theoretical level themselves, and apparently failing to resolve the issues raised.
Even Jackson's arguments such as the inevitable involvement within legal
discursive practices of non-legal structures of understanding and of the
existence of semiotic groups, never leaves the theoretical level to enter into
empirical investigations. We have only looked at one small aspect of the legal
positivism debate, the material present though did raise, even if only at a
theoretical level, some interesting issues as to the nature of legal practices.
However, we have to move out of the jurisprudence forum to locate any
concern for empirical research, not surprising , it comes from those concerned
with real-world practical concerns. For example, Hawkins (1983) whose
concern is largely with parole policy in the U.S. notes the "lack of research
explicitly focused on the question of how decisions are made actually made is
surprising" and calls for a rethinking of legal theory on decision-making and
calls for this to be based upon ethnographic research. It is through empirical
research, and possibly only empirical research, I suggest that these issues can
be resolved.
5.2 Section Two - Decision-making.
So far we have looked at some of the issues relating to legal positivism
as they have been attended to by a number of commentators at a theoretical
level within discourse on jurisprudence, now we shall move to some of the
debates within the sociology of law and then address these to the empirical
findings of this thesis.
5.2a Sociological positions.
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An issue that legal positivism has to deal with is that new laws are often
created superseding old laws. The existence of the possibility of change in law
brings with it the awareness of the fact that a "given valid law constitutes a
selection achievement and is valid due to this continuously alterable selection"
(Luhmann 1985:161). So although a law may be on the statute books, positive
law can not assume that a law is good for all time. Legal positivism recognises
that laws are dependent upon sovereign power, or its equivalent, and a change
decreed by the sovereign produces a change in law which will be accepted by
officials as the rule of practice for legal decision making. There is some
similarity here with Popper's (1959) method of falsification, although
hypothesis testing does not have its equivalent in the positivist view of judicial
law validity. 22 Laws are treated as true until overturned, and in spite of the fact
that they may be overturned. It may be argued that the differences between the
nature of legal and scientific laws and rules of procedure differ from each other
in their subject matter to such an extent as to make any comparison void.
However, I would suggest that this is not the case, to the extent that both have
built into them the possibility, even the likelihood, of their current practices
being over turned. Although how this is achieved is not necessarily similar.
However, just as Kuhn (1970) has shown Popper's 'falsification theory'
to be inapplicable to scientific practices, so the sociology of law rejects
'positive law's' inability to incorporate social processes into legal change -
except by ignoring them. Though this issue of positivism in law is not one of
22 Case Law would seem to seem to hold similarities to the method of
falsification but, I would argue, that although case sets precedents, these
precedents are not as such falsified, but 'joined' by contrary judgements. These
contrary judgements can, and usually are, used to set new precedents to be
followed, but it is not the case that new precedents can not be themselves
replaced by the original precedents they overturned. The method of
falsification, firstly, does not set precedents to be followed as such, rather
shows the previous theory to be incorrect, though the falsification may be
accompanied by a new theory but it is not necessary to prove the prior theory
incorrect. Secondly, the scientist, unlike the judge, can not reinstate the old
theory/precedent by making a decision in accordance with it. Theories and legal
precedents differ subtly in their modus operandi.
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the situated action of legal practice since the positivity of law in the philosophy
of law and legal science is grounded in the statutory nature of law and its
validity of emergence and basis, and that the study of law in practice should not
be confused with the social processes of law making. A position which contrasts
with the concerns of positivism in science which see itself based on empirical
findings and associated practices. As Luhmann (1985) states, "classical legal
scientific positivism is met by broad rejection today (more so, by the way, than
scientific positivism)" although notably adding that "serious attempts at
replacing it with another theory of law are not apparent." (Luhmann 1985: 159)
Central to Luhmann's critique of legal positivism, is that it is important
not to see the functioning of law as emanating from the hand of the legislator,
but from society at large. That legislative procedure is rather, "the selection
from and giving symbolic dignity to norms as binding law. The process of law
formation embraces the whole of society. A procedural filter is employed within
it through which all legal thoughts have to pass to become binding law for
society" (1985: 160). Hence, a positivist attribution to the validity of law on a
originating moment does not provide an explanation of causality, Le. "the
historical fact of legislative decision making is ... not a sufficient indicator for
the positivisation of the law thus established" (1985: 160).23
However, while Luhmann may be correct in his dismissal of legal
positivism as holding any real currency for any social theorists of law, it is not
necessarily the case that practising lawyers are of the same opinion, in thought
or action. As Cotterrell (1992:2) notes:
"In the Anglo-American legal world, and indeed to a greater or lesser
extent in most modern highly-developed legal systems, a positivist
23It is worth noting the similarities of this critique of positivist legal theory
with the descriptions of the adoption of new laws in science by Thomas S. Kuhn
(1970). Although constituent communities are not the same, and science would
not see normative change in society in general as determinative of change in
scientific law. At least not in the sense the Luhmann attributes to changes in
legal law.
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outlook on law is the typical outlook of lawyers and informs much legal
scholarship and teaching. Law consists of data - primary rules - which
can be recognised as such by relatively simple tests or 'rules of
recognition' (Hart 1961) ..... According to a positivist conception, these
rules of law - possibly with some subsidiary legal phenomena - constitute
the law, the data which it is the lawyers task to analyse and order. In this
sense, law is a 'given' - part of the data of experience. If it can be
recognised as existing according to certain observational tests it can be
analysed. The tests by which legal positivism recognises the existence of
law or particular laws are thus analogous to those by which a scientist
might recognise the presence of a particular chemical." (Italics added)"
Thus while legal positivism at an epistemological level may have come
under much attack, this does not indicate that it is not a working
epistemological position, or justificatory one, for practising legal professionals.
It may be thought that practising lawyers use of 'positive law' differs from
'positive science' in their avowed aims in professional practice; that science is
a dynamic progress rather than a static application of rules. Although as this
thesis has shown the idea that lawyers implement a static implementation of
rules is not necessarily the case. Nevertheless, this does not mean that lawyers
do not rationalise that they take up 'positive law' in a fashion which Hart terms,
as "dependent upon the idea of an ultimate rule, the rule of recognition, which
is accepted by, and motivates the action of, officials within the system" (Davies
and Holdcroft 1991: 142). Although it would be to underestimate the dynamic
aspects of law which are affected by the work of practising lawyers and the
outcomes of their work.
Though Cotterrell (1992) does take a similar position to Luhmann in his
critique of positivism, that it looks at law "as far as possible without looking
behind the legislative rule to the process by which they are created, and without
24 Here I suggest we can see a basic similarity with the position taken by
Lynch (1985) who suggests scientific facts are those constituted in laboratory
practice rather than abstract theoretical constructs. Although without doubt,
Cotterrell is suggesting that lawyers do see law as 'given', much as in the way
a laboratory scientist may take a scientific fact to exist as a naturally given
independent object.
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considering judicial attitudes or values" (ibid: 10) Cotterrell believes, reflecting
aspects of the debates about legal positivism discussed above, that though there
are:
"... powerful professional reasons for [the] maintenance of a positivist
outlook in legal analysis" .... "it is significant that, as a philosophy of
law, positivism has come under powerful attack in recent years. It has
been charged that it ignores the role of values in law and the way law is
established in interpretation, that in treating rules as the given data of law
it assumes a certainty and clarity in rules that is by no means apparent,
that it can not cope with the complex relationship between rules and
discretionary powers of officials in legal regulation in complex
contemporary societies, and more generally that it cannot provide an
adequate basis for understanding processes of legal change." (ibid: 10)
For the issue of legal positivism to be in some way clarified we need,
I suggest to move away from the abstractions of theoretical jurisprudence, and
taking a lead from sociological studies of science look at the actual situations
of law as practised by legal practitioners, something that our descriptions of the
previous chapters can illuminate. Since much of the theoretical debate, and the
justificatory notions expressed by Cotterrell relate to the application of rules we
will look at these initially.
5.2b Positivism and Legal Decision Making.
The idea of legal activity as being the rational application of rules is
central to law's understanding of itself. Although it would be going too far to
say that legal reasoning believes itself based wholly on deductive reasoning,
deductive reasoning is seen by many as what gives legal reasoning its legal
character. This view of legal reasoning adopts a logic of rule-application which
is positivist in nature and which can be described as:
R (rule) + F (facts) = C (Conclusion)
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or, as MacCormick (1995:x) elaborates:
"Rules are hypothetical normative propositions, stipulating that if certain
circumstances (herein after, certain 'operative facts') obtain, then certain
consequences are to (or 'must' or 'ought to') follow or be implemented."
Although legal decision-makers may have to adjudicate over competing
versions of facts or circumstances, but that notwithstanding, the model is as
simple as above. Reasoning from these rules can be problematic however,
especially when the rules are indeterminate for application to particular facts or
circumstances. When this occurs the model of legal reasoning needs further
elaboration.
5.2c Rule, Objectivity and Decision making.
If we look at Case Six, we have here a case which I suggest that the
legal positivists would see as a good clear example of objective legal decision
making. The essential formulation that the panel decide upon is the following:
4 pm2 :no I would refuse it because I don't think that a fee paying client
5 of moderate means bearing in mind the quantum of the claim
6 would would proceed with it (0.4) unless of course an offer was-
This would seem to fit the model mentioned above, where: Rule + Facts =
Conclusion, although the actual formulation of panel member two is delivered
as: "I would refuse it" (Conclusion), justified in terms of "I don't think that a
fee paying client of moderate means bearing in mind the quantum would
proceed with it" (Fact or at least "Fact"), based upon the principle that: "..a
grant of legal aid will not be justifiable: ... (b) ... if time and resources are used
up by cases which would not be pursued in the absence of legal aid because the
applicant, were he/she a person of moderate means, would not have paid
privately for the proceedings;" (Legal Aid Handbook 1995:68-69) (Rule). The
rule is not made explicit as a separate statement but is, I suggest, implicit in
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panel member two's statement.
In Case Seven, again we get the decision making done in the manner of
conclusion first:
12 pml :grant limited to the close of (proceedings?) (.)
13 pm? [ummm
14 eh :yeah weell I'd grant to close of pleadings (2.0)
15 pm2 :I would say counsel's opinion (.)
16 pm3 :no I think counsel's opinion as well (.)
17 pm2 [mmm yeah (0.4)
Although there is initially some disagreement as to the exact nature of the
conclusion, the panel do suggest the conclusion of the decision making process
first. However, the Fact and Rule aspects of the positivist equation are not so
obvious:
19 ch :seems to me that (.) erh (.) its a (.) fairly good (0.2) good claim
20 that she's got (.) and I (0.2) you won't get an opinion better than
21 (solicitors?) letter will you (.)
22 ? :(unclear)
23 pml : [there has been some more recent cases hasn' there
24 pm3 [wellthere's (.)
25 nineteen seventy one (.)
26 ch :there are a lot of cases (.) err
27 pml [yes there are (6.0)
28 pm2 :it's obviously not a very big case anyway and it may be th that if
29 if it (.) it might even be a case of (0.2) the insurance company
30 could be persuaded to settle before er (.) proceedings have
31 started
32 ch [ummh (4.0)
33 cl :right I'll bring her back then (.)
34 ch :mmm (16.0)
The Chair (lines 19 to 21) believes that the claim is a fairly good one, but seems
to rely on the appellants letter from counsel as evidence for this, but does not
articulate either facts or rules. Over the next couple of turns (lines 23 to 27),
panel members one and two and the chair talk about previous cases which, can
be seen to be an articulation of precedence. But, articulation of facts and rules
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does not seem to be evident in an explicit form, although it must be borne in
mind that the previous phase of the tribunal will have also dealt with some of
these issues. Nevertheless, in terms of legal decision making the positivist
model does not seem to be evident, in fact it is panel member two's (lines 28
to 31) comments as to the possibility that the case may not come to court that
is the final statement of the panel. However, this does not deter the clerk from
seeing a valid decision having been made (line 33)
Case Five Phase Three differs from the first two in that the conclusion
of the decision making (in terms of the equation) does not come at the
beginning, instead, the beginning of 'phase' three deals with attempting to
clarify the rules relating to the case (lines 3 to 9 below).
3 pml :how (did you claim for the) (unclear) (1.0)
4 pm2 :1 understand the point about the fourteen point (.) 1 eh (.)
5 (unclear)
6 pml [I think 1 got to grips with it eventually but (.)
7 ch :what they are supposed to for a for a (.) 1 can't give you a
8 statutory reference for it (.) what they are supposed to do for a (.)
9 a fourteen year old who's (.) statemented (.) but it's eh (.)
10 pm2 :but but it's don't before or after birthday it seems here that they -
11 ch [no












Following this they attempt to deal with the facts of the case (line 9 to 12
above). But the crucial piece of information in the decision making process
seems to be, the parental concerns of the mother (lines 21 to 24 below).
pml :what she's concerned about is that if he is (.) removed from this
present school he's got nowhere to go (.)
:ummh (.)
:well 1 can understand that (0.6)
:and he's (.) 1mean this is a common concern with many children
who are perfectly normal who in the maintained sector if they are
chucked out of (.) sufficient schools and (unclear) (0.8) the statute
sez that where you have a child of special educational needs (.) the
council has a duty to provide for those needs and then (.) and that
that's their best point which (.) they're not







Though the chair then generalises this point to parents in similar situations
(lines 25 to 27), he then associates the case at hand with a specific legal statute
(lines 27 to 29), but notes that this is not the legal point on which the appellants
solicitor is asking them to evaluate the case (lines 29 and 30). A fact which is
confirmed by panel member one (lines 31 and 32). It is immediately following
this though that the decision to grant (conclusion of the equation) the case is
suggested.
That this decision is not based upon "rules", however, is illustrated by
the reaction of the chair (lines 41 to 44 below).
ch : [if you all to the library and get the book (.) you can all read
it and come to some decisions on it [tapping a large volume of
apparent statutes] (.) can't we (.) I mean I did that (0.2) (inhale)





The rules he seems to be indicating are the statutory rules written in the text he
has at hand. However, this awareness of deviance from a rule based decision
making model does not prevent him carrying on with the tribunal process (line
44). This case is interesting as it seems evident that the tribunal members are
not following the rational decision making model outlined above. The issue for
us here is whether this case becomes an instance of non-legal subjective
decision making not following the rules, or a case of objectivity and rule
following but in the Wittgensteinian and ethnomethodological sense of situated
activity. The first thing to note here is that it does not get treated as
problematically non-legal by the panel members or the clerk, and the chair goes
on to provide a final conclusion to the decision making process.
If we decide that the case is legitimate, which we must when our criteria
are that it is attended to as such by the panel members themselves, it would
seem to indicate that the issue of objectivity in legal decision making, as
something dependant on rule following (positivists), or as an impossibility
(relativists), needs to be re-evaluated in light of a respecification of what
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objectivity and rationality in relation to rule following actually means. A re-
specification that highlights the situated nature of any evaluation and decision-
making.
5.2d Ethnomethodology and Decision Making.
It is not being suggested that these observations on the decision-making
of Legal Aid Tribunal members is unique, or that it has only just come to light
that such activities occur within ethnomethodology there are a number of
studies that draw attention to this phenomenon. In the previous chapter we
noted that of Zimmerman (1971), and in Chapter Three in the discussion of the
documentary method we noted Garfinkel's study 'Some Rules of Correct
Decision Making that Jurors Respect' (1967 104-115) where Garfinkel observed
on Jurors decisions making and noted that "jurors did not have an
understanding of the conditions that defined a correct decision until the decision
was made" (ibid:114) and that jurors were:
".. preoccupied with the problem of assigning outcomes their legitimate
history than with the question of deciding before the actual occasion of
choice the conditions under which one, among a set of alternative possible
courses of action will be elected." (ibid: 114)
We noted how this would make any model of linear decision making difficult
to sustain. Another study by Garfinkel (1967b) which also shed light on the
same issue is study of the practical reasoning of workers at the Los Angeles
Suicide Prevention Centre (SPC), unfortunately no cases or specific cases are
described, but what he states supports his comments on the work of jurors. He
notes that the decision-making involved features of practical inquiries that were
encountered in other situations (ibid: 172) and notes:
"... for the practical decider, the actual occasion as a phenomenon in its
own right exercised overwhelming priority and the rules or theories of
decision-making were without exception subordinated in order to assess
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the rational features of the occasion rather than those of the rules." (ibid.)
Garfinkel notes that enquiries to necessarily occur in a step-like fashion, and
that: "Viewed with respect to the practices for making it happen, a routine
inquiry is not one accomplished by rules." (ibid: 174) The decision-making
practices and concerns that Garfinkel describes as the concerns of the SPC
members in deciding upon cases of suicide could equally well be applied to
those of the tribunal members:
"SPCer's must accomplish that decidability by considering the 'this's':
They have to start with this much; this sight; this note; this collection of
whatever is at hand. And whatever is there is good enough in the sense
that whatever is there not only will but does. One makes whatever is there
do." (ibid: 177)
Although, at least in the case of attended tribunals, the tribunal panel members
get to talk to the main party concerned, but in the unattended tribunal there is
a sense in which the LAB documents etc be seen as equivalent to the SPCer's
'body on a slab', The SPCer's see themselves as scientific, and as Garfinkel
notes "their inquiries are made recognizable to members as scientifically
adequate for all practical purposes." (ibid: 183) In the same way the tribunal
pane members' decision will be seen by them and their colleagues as both legal
and positivist 'for all practical purposes' .
Whilst we have seen the practices that decision makers engage in during
Legal Aid Tribunals and that they are similar observations to those which have
been made by Garfinkel and other, it is the case that they are just descriptions
of similar cases. However, while more descriptions do not for
ethnomethodology provide for the warrantability of that or any other
description, they do display other instances of that practice in action. This may
in itself be enough justification for ethnomethodological research, however, as
we noted above, our aim in this chapter is to investigate the 'epistopic' of which
this tribunal decision making is an instance, legal decision making see 'for all
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practical purposes' as legal positivist in nature. We have already looked at the
'theoretical' aspects of legal positivism as they are discussed by commentators,
in the following section we will try and 'unravel' this further with reference to
the 'sociology of science' .
5.3 Section Three - Legal Positivism and the Sociology of Science.
As has been noted above a charge a against the positivist philosophy of
law has been that it:
" .. ignores the role of values in law and the way law is established in
interpretation, that in treating rules as the given data of law it assumes a
certainty and clarity in rules that is by no means apparent, that it can not
cope with the complex relationship between rules and discretionary
powers of officials in legal regulation." (Cotterrell 1992: 10)
Implicit in this critique is that law, in its widest sense is, in practice, different
from the idealised versions portrayed by its positivist philosophy. For Cotterrell
a positivist view of law becomes a problem when it compartmentalises
knowledge and thus becomes "a barrier to [the] recognition of the complexity
of law as a sociological phenomenon" (ibid: 14). However, the type of
sociological phenomena which Cotterrell is talking about is of a specific type,
a largely abstract macro phenomenon. Though as we have already seen,
Cotterrell believes that practising lawyers address the law in a different manner
from the philosopher and theorist of law. This position is not dissimilar from
findings reached in the sociology of science, in that it is reacting against the
notion that practising legal decision makers stick to a more rigid interpretation
of the law dependent of theoretical and philosophical considerations.
5.3a The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.
Until relatively recently scientific knowledge was regarded as objective
and having an epistemological status beyond sociological analysis. However,
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as noted above, Kuhn's (1970) studies of scientific revolutions brought this
edifice into dispute. Kuhn's work can be said to have had a greater influence on
the sociology of science than on the philosophy of science, especially in its
implicit critique of Mertonian position of an accumulating scientific knowledge
through conformity to institutional rules. This overturning of the Mertonian
position is illustrated in Mulkay's analysis of the 'Velikovsky affair'", which
broke the scientific "norms of universalism, organised scepticism and
communism" and for Mulkay "re-affirm[ed] Kuhn's thesis of the rigidity, rather
than the flexibility of the scientist in his attachment to paradigms and indicated
that it is this rigidity rather than the Mertonian imperatives which guarantees
the growth of knowledge." (Richards 1987:107)
Within this 'new' sociology of scientific knowledge, there are three
trends, or schools which are prominent here: the 'strong programme',
exemplified by David Bloor; social constructionism, exemplified by Bruno
Latour and Steve Woolgar's 'Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of
Scientific Facts' (1979); and the ethnomethodological studies inspired by
Howard Garfinkel, for example Michael Lynch's 'Art and Artifact in
Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop Talk in a Research
Laboratory' (1985). These three trends have more in common than they have
by way of dissimilarities, although there are significant differences between
them (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983), and can be seen as a reaction to
previous studies of science, as Lynch (1985) notes:
"Almost without exception, philosophical accounts, biographical stories,
historical interpretations, and 'empirical studies' in the science studies
literature address the practices of science as achievements to be explained
in a language disengaged from any laboratory task at hand. It is not as
though these accounts deny that science is accomplished in laboratory
settings, but that they do not provide detailed access to the practical
achievement of day-to-day inquiries. They instead give decontextualized
versions of methodic production and logical reasoning, reconstructions
25 Mulkay, M. J. (1972) The Social Process of Innovation London
Macmillan.
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of citation networks and historical lineages, after-the-fact interpretations
of historical records, and abstracted 'social aspects' of science's
institutional and administrative organization. n (ibid:3)
My argument here is that is the position taken by the philosophy and theory of
legal process by legal positivism when discussing law, has great similarities to
that taken by positivism in science. That as such we will profit from looking at
some of its insights.
It is not my aim in this chapter to focus on the sociology of science and
describe its practices and findings. An excellent summary of the development
of the sociology of science and its ethnomethodological critique, can be found
in Lynch's (1993).26 Rather the aim is to focus on some issues which have
been raised here and which can be used to understand the debate about legal
decision making and legal positivism. Nevertheless, there are a few issues
worth noting to orientate the reader to the discussion
The 'new' sociological investigations of the practices of scientists do
not, according to Michael Lynch (1982) display a single research strategy but
what they do have in common is a 'relatively uniform' rejection of:
"(a) demarcation criteria separating science from 'common sense'; (b)
rule-like logic and normative treatments of 'science-in-general'; (c) the
primacy of logic and objective necessity in explaining scientific practice
and scientific growth; and (d) identifications of science with one term in
a dichotomous separation between objectivity /subjectivity,
fact/construction, logic/rhetoric, or technical/social. n (ibid:500)
Thus they can be seen as being anti-positivist. Lynch terms these studies as
being 'critical' studies of science, but notes that some of them, unlike
ethnomethodology, are largely unconcerned with the inherent properties of
scientific practice in the laboratory. Instead, they focus on established methods
26See Lynch (1993) especially Chapters Two and Three.
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in the natural sciences and perform retrospective social scientific analysis" upon
these methods (ibid:500-501).28 For ethnomethodological studies objectivity
and critical practices are not to be found at some abstract level of theoretical
discourse, but rather in the investigation of praxis. Ethnomethodology's anti-
foundationalist stance, unlike the strong programme, does not see objectivity
as an external narrative or discourse, but rather as a locally situated
accomplishment. If we then apply this back to legal decision making, we can
see that objective legal decision making becomes free of the textual problems
that the literary analogies of Dworkin involve. Further, the subjectivity debate
which gave rise to the fears of relativism often attributed also disappears."
To illustrate this and develop our discussion we return to the data we
have previously looked at in the five cases of Sections Two and Three of
Chapter Six. Data which, irrespective of whether or not a case was seen as
constituting a possible example of a 'phase four' or of a foreshortening of the
'four phase process', in each case displayed the delivery of a decision by the
panel. 30Focusing on the rationality that is situationally attributed to the decision
27Interesting here is the that this social scientific method can be seen to
replicate the same retrospective perspective methodology that the philosophy
and history of science has employed to describe science.
28 Lynch's paper is actually concerned to display how the practice of
laboratory work incorporates a critical element, but that this critical aspect of
the work does not rely upon social science methodology or interest. An
important point made by Lynch, is that he believes that it is these in situ critical
activities that practising scientists engage in, that "make up scientific progress,
rather than a general theory about scientific progress." (Lynch 1982:511) The
significance of this is that if correct, 'critical' studies of science focusing on
'histories' of science, are searching in the wrong place for explanations of
'scientific progress', even if , unlike Lakatos, they incorporate external socio-
political and economic factors.
29These issues are worthy of more discussion than can be give here.
31ltcould be assumed that the decision of the panel for the appellant would
equate to: the granting of legal aid equalling good news, and the refusal of legal
aid equalling bad news. There is quite a lot of literature analysis dealing with
the issue of the delivery of good and bad news, especially 'bad news' , and this
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by the panel. This will also illuminate the second tenet of positivism that
Jackson (1988), as noted above, locates in the work of Dworkin is that there is
a necessary relationship between interpretation and decision making, with the
former determines the latter. This issue is a divisive one for legal postivists and
legal realists and hence a good candidate for some form of respecification. To
do this, and to illustrate the potential of the insights of ethnomethodological
studies of science, or studies of work, we will refer to a study of the
relationship of the disciplines of maths and physics by Livingston (1993).
5.3b Proof Accounts in Mathematics and Physics.
Livingston, in 'The Disciplinarity of Knowledge at the Mathematics-
Physics Interface' (1993), is concerned with scientific practice and in particular
the nature of argumentation in physics and how it makes its discoveries
knowable. In brief, the arguments of physics are usually presented as
mathematical proofs of physical phenomena adjudicated by experimental
results. However, as Livingston points out, the use of mathematics in physics
is not guided by the requirements of mathematical theorem-proving, and that
"physicists' argumentation is not mathematics; that physicists are not busy
consulting mathematics to find out if their physics is correct" (ibid:369). For
Livingston, to understand the use of mathematics in physics we need to
understand the organisation of the practice of physics at the work site in the
production of accounts." The issue of accounts is not straight forward though,
as Livingston explains, an official account refers to two phenomena:
topic has also received a lot of attention from conversation analysis. See for
example Clark and (1982), Rosen and Tesser (1970), Maynard (1989),
Pomerantz (1978,1984). However, much of this assumes a 'good news' or 'bad
news' dichotomy, a similar assumption of an externally valid rationality that I
am arguing against here, rather than describing the delivery in its own terms.
31 As Feyerabend (1993:137) notes, Aristotle believed that mathematics does
not deal with real things but contains abstractions.
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"First, it refers to the use of general theories of proving to explain the
adequacy of a proof. What makes a proof a proof, per one such theory,
is that it can, at least in theory, be translated into a formal scheme of
deductive inference." (ibid footnote:391-392)
This first form of account is the type which we have seen legal
positivism at a theoretical level aspire to attend to, and the problems of these
attempts have been illustrated. However, the type of account which Livingston
is attending to in this text is the second type where ".. a proof-account is a
description of an organization of the practices of proving necessary for a
proof." (ibid footnote:392) The importance of this being that:
"Once that organization of practice has been found, the adequacy of the
proof-account appears retrospectively to be a self-exhibiting feature of the
account. In that this transformation depends upon communally available
skills of proving, a proof account is an 'official description' of a
particular proof for the community of provers." (ibid footnote:392)
The communally available skills tied to proof-accounts at this second level,
which we can see as the level of legal practice, differ from the skills for
understanding proof accounts at the first level. Livingston does not want to tie
these into disciplinary boundaries however, but instead ties them into gestalt
shifts.
Livingston demonstrates his argument firstly by reference to the nature
of the 'Chinese proof' of the Pythagorean theorem, in which proof is not
provided by deductive inference, but by reference to the developing proof-
account and the lived work of proving (ibid:373). What is important here is that
notational detail, the practice of naming
"exhibits material detail around which proof-specific material - detail
embedded in the course of work that makes up the proof - can be
found.... Therein, notation helps provide and exhibit a level of practice
and material detail against which the distinctive structure of a proof can
be exhibited." (ibid:374)
This role of notational detail is illustrated by Livingston via a second proof of
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the Pythagorean theorem. However, the importance of this is that in both proof-
accounts, Livingston shows that in themselves notational detail is not proof, but
is only so when "it is attached to the work of proving that it is then seen to
precisely describe" (ibid:376). Only when this occurs does proof arise from the
background of figures and notation, and this requires a 'prover' to be seeking
the proof to be discovered.
These practices of mathematics, the proof of theorems, however, are
contrasted with the practices of physicists who Livingston shows are not
engaged in the same theorizing of work, instead they are involved in "providing
a gestalt description of the essential functional relationships between
experimental results and physical reality" (ibid:378) The physical reality that
physics refers to though, is not that of a shared common reality of some sort,
but that of "a referable and referenced situation of inquiry" (ibid:379).
Livingston illustrates such theorizing with reference to Richard Feynman' s
(1985) 'QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter'". Livingston takes the
readers through Feynman's proof for the sinusoidal pattern of the travel of
photons through glass, and illustrates (from an implicit comparison with the
previous mathematical proof of Pythagorean theory) that for non-physicists "the
arguments of theoretical physics begin to look like a messy soup of rhetorical
ploys, half-baked mathematics, and conjectural experimental facts" (ibid:388).
Nevertheless, Feynman's proof account does succeed in showing what it
intended, describing the photon reality of photon-glass interaction via a gestalt
description of both the experiment and the photon. Whilst for the mathematician
the mathematical formulae used are imprecise, Livingston notes that this is
because the mathematicians are 'deluded' by the presence of such formulae into
thinking that the physicists are attempting to prove their descriptions in the
same mode of proof as mathematicians, while instead physicists are doing
something quite different (ibid:389). The difference is that:
32 Richard Feynman (1985), 'QED: The Strange Theory of Light and
Matter', Princeton, Princeton University Press.
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"The mathematician uses the detail of the material argument to develop
and articulate its descriptive precision and, therein, the materially
exhibited' gestalt' of reasoning that makes up the proof; the physicist uses
the material detail and reasoning of an argument to find the developing
descriptive gestalt offered by the horizontally perceived empirical object.
The fine distinctions and detail used by the prover to organize and
describe proving's work are used, in tum, by the physicist in a
completely different way - to describe and distinguish aspects of an
empirically unfolding empirical object. " (ibid p390)
Because the formulae of mathematics and physics look the same,
mathematicians 'wilfully' assume the mathematics they represent in the
physicists' arguments are the same, and there is the same deception on behalf
of physicists who construe their proofs in terms of mathematics. The result of
this is to disengage the both the proofs and the objects from actual practices at
the work-site of the disciplines (ibid:391).
This is disengagement is not a simple one however, as Feyerabend
notes:
"Not only are facts and theories in constant disharmony, they are never
as neatly separated as everyone makes them out to be. Methodological
rules speak of 'theories', 'observations' and 'experimental results' as if
they were well-defined objects whose properties are easy to evaluate and
which are understood in the same way by all scientists." (Feyerabend
1993:51)
The way in which this connection is lost is to some extent also explained
by Feyerabend when he states that:
"Modern science has developed mathematical structures which exceed
anything that has existed so far in coherence generally and empirical
success. But in order to achieve this miracle all the existing troubles had
to be pushed into the relation between fact and theory, and had to be
concealed by ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations and other
procedures." (ibid:49)
Relating this back to the relationship between situated legal practice and
legal theory, we may interpret legal practice not as consulting positivist legal
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theory to see if its results are correct, but as 'referring' to the tenets of
positivist legal theory for justificatory reasons at some epistemological level.
The production of legal practice accounts instead seem to refer back to some
notion of logical or positivist concept of proof, even if this would appear to be
conflictory with their actual situated practices. Such referencing is not made
explicitly, but does appear implicit in their proof accounts for the record or to
the appellant. Reference may not be made to statutes or legal rules but possibly
some form of precedence. The proof accounts following such referencing
practices do, or can, appear as positivist proof accounts, and the accounts do
infer deductive practices.
Similarly, legal practice proof accounts also seem to be retrospective
and to rely upon 'agreed' communal skills and practices of legal practitioners.
Skills which seem to involve a gestalt switch away from the 'intuitive' or
commonsense reasoning inherent in their actual practices which would
otherwise be seen to conflict with legal positivism.
Livingston notes that the skill for interpreting proof accounts at the
scientific positivist deductive level, are separate from those at the communal
level of proof accounts, those involved in the following of the developing
gestalt of data interpretation - in the work of seeking of the developing proof.
What appears to occur in situated legal practice proof accounts is that, the use
made of theoretical legal positivism is similar to the use of mathematics in
physics. It is used in the formal account, but it is not part of the developing
gestalt needed for the developing proof account. This instead relies upon the
ability to follow the developing gestalt, the situated communal practices of
proof seeking by legal practitioners - although to non-practitioners they may
appear in the way the mathematics of physics does to mathematicians. The
situated legal practitioner proof account practices seem to rely not only on some
aspects of legal commonsense, but also those of legal positivism. However,
neither legal relativism or legal positivism can necessarily be used to assess the
adequacy of the developing gestalt of the legal practitioner's proof accounts.
Instead, the adequacy of the accounts can possibly only be assessed with
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reference to their ability to develop the gestalt of proof accounts as they are
accepted by the members present i.e. the tribunal panel, the clerk and the
appellants.
Just as Livingston notes that mathematicians "wilfully" assume that
physicists are construing their proofs in terms of mathematics, legal relativists
may have a tendency to assume that legal practitioners are constructing their
proofs, or at least their legitimation with regards to the tenets of legal
positivism. Similarly, legal practitioners may construe their proofs with regards
to some of the tenets of legal positivism, just as Livingston believes physicists
do with regards to mathematics. This at least would seem to shed some light on
the legal positivist and legal relativist debates on the adherence or not to legal
positivism by legal practitioners, at least in relation to their accounts of their
practices, not that they can be seen as wholly separate.
Further, some of the confusion may be explained as being due to what
I believe to be legal practitioners implicit referencing of legal positivism and
deductive reasoning in its proof accounts. The existence of a unresolved legal
rationalist/legal realism debate is bound to lead to some
theoretical/epistemological confusion, though not necessarily in the unfolding
gestalt of their proof accounts - at least not for the legal practitioners
themselves. For the legal practitioners much of the potential conflict between
legal positivism and legal relativism epistemologies may be avoided in their
proof-accounts through the use of ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations
and other procedures. It is this situated nature of legal practitioner proof
accounts, and decision-making processes, that displays the need for their
respecification.
The aim of looking at this material was not just to understand the
positivist/relativist debate which would seem relevant to the delivery of
decisions in this ethnomethodological study of legal aid tribunals. Instead we
can now return to look at the legal aid tribunal data and recognise that the
accounts of the decisions at the decision deliveries will not necessarily be
compatible with the decision making practices. Further, and this is significant
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for the whole of the thesis, overt referencing of legal positivism in the literature
on law does not necessarily need to reflect the actual practices of legal
practitioners, there may be some similarity but the sociological studies of
science literature would seem to indicate the lack of the necessity of an exact
correspondence. Further, this does not imply that legal practice is incorrect, or
that the literature on the legal discipline fatuous. Instead, the incomplete
correspondence of theory and methodology to practice is a normal occurrence
in 'human behaviour', and that this does not necessarily mean that the law, any
more than science, is non-rational or non-existent, or its conclusions false, but
it does inform us as to the workings of these disciplines.
5.3c Decision Proof Accounts in Legal a Aid Tribunal.
If we return back to the delivery of decision data in Case Two we can
actually see that the panel members, and notably here the clerk, after the
decision on a case has been made, discussing on how this decision is to be
formulated. The formulation is for both the delivery of the decision to the
appellant, and for the official documentation that is to stand on behalf of
decision making by the panel, and their interaction with the appellant.
5 pm! :hhhh [exhale] it's very borderline on liable a think (.) a- ?
6 [hmm
7 pm! :-generous judge might say (yeah?) (1.0)
8 cl :would you advise a private paying client (0.6) mmuh (5.0)
9 ch? :(unclear)
10 cl :dismissed on on the fee paying client test (.)
11 ?? :[short unclear informal sounding talk by by panel members]
12 cl :em our our usual standard reasons sez something like "in view of
13 thee em (0.4) likely cost of the proceedings the modest amount of
14 the claim and thee (.) doubts as to the liability a fee paying client
15 of moderate means would not be advised to pursue the matter (.)
16 ch :thankyou (.)
17 cl :that's alright (.) we'll get him back in shall we (.)
In this case we see that the process by which the decision was made is
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one made from a position of uncertainty, even with the possibility of award in
the appeal in favour of the appellant (lines 5 and 7). This uncertainty has led to
the clerk being involved in 'directing' the panel (line 8) and helping decide the
reason for the refusal (line 10). Once the decision has been made the chair has
to deliver this to the appellant as a formal decision with an account of the
reasons for the refusal. During the talk following the clerks pronouncement of
the decision of the panel, which although unclear, seems to contain a question
to the clerk (line 11) as to the delivery of the decision. The clerk responds by
telling the chair the standard account given in such cases (lines 12 to 15). This
formulation seems to be what the clerk, who has to record the decision and send
written confirmation to the appellant and their solicitor, produce as an account
of the decision making process of the tribunal. This is a more rationalised
account of the reasons for the refusal than the process by which it was obtained.
If we see this as a proof-account, we can see that is presented as a
rational and logical set of procedures which, if somewhat succinctly, moves
from the evidence produced for the appeal to the decision. It is not necessarily
in this instance, a misrepresentation for the reasons for the refusal of legal aid,
but as a representation of the practices by which it was obtained it is not a very
good representation. This also highlights some of the problems of looking at
official accounts of practices and trying read back from them to the actual














:my colleagues and I have (.) considered the papers and we've also
(0.2) looked at they em (0.2) photos you've actually sent in in
addition (0.2) erm a have to tell you (.) that we have decided
against the appeal (0.2) erm (.) we say that erm (.) our reasons for
doing so is that (.) errm as far as we can judge from the size of
the claim it is not a large claim (0.2) it is a difficult matter of
liability (0.2) and you look at (.) that (.) erm it would be (0.4)
erm it would be very problematic as to whether (.) you would
succeed in that claim on liability (.) and er (0.2) applying what we
call the fee paying client test C.) if you were (.) paying your self
(.) if you were not legally aided would you put your own money-
[yeah






client to do it the answer would be (.) from us no (.) we wouldn't
(.) so (.) erm (.) am sorry that eh (.) the decision's gone against
you but it's gone (.) against you on those (.) three points (.) ap
:yeah (.)
If we look at the delivery of this case to the appellant we can see how
the official account of the decision has become incorporated into the delivery
of the decision to the appellant. Here the chair goes into greater detail,
referencing the practices of looking at the documents they had and the
photographs that the appellant brought to the tribunal. The account is presenting
a rational process deliberation and the application of rules to the evidence
presented, and resulting in a coherent decision by the panel. That it is adequate
as a proof account is indicated by the willingness of the appellant to accept it
(lines 33 and 38). The delivery of the account and its content develop as gestalt
of legal rationality which the appellant has followed and can accept as an
adequate account of legal decision making . We should not assume that this is
some sort of cynical activity on behalf of either the chair, or earlier, the clerk,
it is instead what proof accounts are routinely present as, an accepted by a large
community of legal professional and ordinary citizens. Sometimes accounts are
not accepted and may be challenge by receivers, but this is either due to such
accounts being not well constructed, or the validity of such accounts not being
accepted, which could be for a number of reasons.
We can see from just the five cases of the delivery of tribunal decisions
in this thesis, that they can variably considerably in their delivery and content.
Decisions that might be more favourable to the appellant may not be as complex
in their proof accounts as they may not seem too necessary either by the deliver
or recipient. However, the proof account by the clerk for the necessary official
documentation is likely on such occasions to be more sophisticated than that
made by the chair to the appellant.
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5.4 Chapter Discussion.
Michael Lynch (1983) notes that many epistemological issues have now
become topics for empirical study, but that one of the results of such research
has been a scepticism as towards these epistemological topics. Wittgenstein has
been used by many to justify this scepticism in that he illustrated how logic and
mathematical rules were the result of communal consensus (1993: 161). This
critique of the most 'objective' area of the philosophic-scientific disciplines has
lead to the scepticism of the actual objectivity of all the natural sciences. Lynch,
however, argues that the adoption of scepticism is contrary to Wittgenstein' s
writings and that rather than epistemological topics becoming issues for
sociological explanation, they are phenomenon for ethnomethodological
description (ibid: 162).
Rule following for Wittgenstein is not open to an open interpretation
separate from communal practices, but is contextualised by regularities in
common behaviour (ibid: 167). So although there are no unambiguous rules in
mathematics, an issue which has led many to scepticism, there are rules of
social convention which direct the interpretation of such mathematical rules. 33
Rather than abandoning the notion of rule following as dependent in any way
upon the relationship between the rule and the action related to it, such as the
strong programme does in its reliance on socio-historical factors to understand
practice, we should examine the 'grammar'. Wittgenstein is to be understood
as not to be concerned with displaying the relativism of mathematics and rule-
following, but to be concerned to understand what nature of mathematical
objectivity is (Ibid: 171). This is not to claim that mathematics is transcendental,
but, I suggest, to respecify the nature of objectivity - here we may assume
33 As Lynch notes: "What holds for rules can also be said to hold for
theories in the natural sciences: They are underdetermined by facts, since no
theory can be supported unequivocally by a finite collection of experimental
results. Therefore, if consensus is reached on a theory, it is not explained by
facts alone but by the social conventions and common institutions in a
community of scientists." (ibid: 168)
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objectivity to be constituted as rule following. [these rules being rules of
procedure]
Lynch, discussing Norman Malcolm's reading of Wittgenstein, quotes
Malcolm interpreting Wittgenstein as meaning that "a rule does not determine
anything except in a setting of quiet agreement" (ibid p173).34 Lynch expands
on this and states:
"When we follow a rule we do not 'interpret' it, as though its meaning
were fully contained in an abstract formulation. We act 'blindly', and we
show our understanding by acting accordingly and not by formulating a
discursive interpretation. Of course, it is possible to misinterpret a rule,
and we do sometimes wonder what the rules are and how we apply them
in a particular situation. But such occasions do not justify a general
position of rule scepticism, nor do they suggest that in the normal case we
interpret rules in order to use them in our actions." (Ibid p 174)
If we then apply this to our understanding of rule following in legal
decision, making we will see that instances of decision making that do not
attend to the statutory rules explicitly, do not be definition mean non-legal
forms of subjective evaluation have been adopted, and that objectivity has been
sacrificed on the alter of common-sense evaluation. Rather, it should lead us to
re-evaluate the nature of objective legal decision-making within the
positivist/relativist debate. Though it is important to note that this does not
mean that we can invoke rules again as being determinative of legal decision-
making actions, since as (Lynch 1994: 144) reminds us 'objectivity' is a
vernacular achievement.
34 The agreement being talked about here is not an agreement "of opinions" ,
but rather an agreement "in form of life". Lynch notes that "Agreement in form
of life is established in and through the coherence of our activities ... there is not
time out from such agreement. .. ", but that "to describe this consensus and to
specify its role in the activity is not to isolate a causal factor." (Lynch 1993
p178)
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Chapter Six - The Use of Texts in Tribunals.
"Given a future, any future, that is known in a definite way, the
alternative paths to actualize the future state as a set of stepwise
operations upon some beginning present state are characteristically
sketchy, incoherent, and unelaborated. Again it is necessary to stress the
difference between an inventory of available procedures - investigators
can talk about these quite definitely and clearly - and the deliberately
programmed stepwise procedures, a set of pre-decided 'what-to-do-in-
case-of strategies for the manipulation of a succession of actual present
states of affairs in their course. In actual practices such a programme is
characteristically an unelaborated one. "
Garfinkel 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' 1967a:97-98
In this chapter we will look at the specific issue of document use. In the
first section we will look in some detail at the studies of D. E. Smith (1990a,
1990b), A. W. McHoul (1978a, 1978b, 1980, 1982a, 1982b), and E.
Livingston (1995), before finishing with a study by M. Lynch and D. Bogen
(1996). It will be suggested through a critiques of these studies that we must
investigate the use of texts in the context of their use, and that doing so must
recognise the uniqueness of such occasions. That although the texts in a sense
drive the tribunal procedure, that procedure is not determined in advance. The
course of action the tribunal members take instead being locally determined and
that this is hearably so.
In the second section we will focus on the documentation as constituting
a 'representation', and consider what is the textual phenomenon or phenomena
that are actually being dealt with by the tribunal panel. It will be suggested that
the documents may provide for more than one representation or phenomenon,
a fact that has potential consequences for the resolution of ambiguities in
interpretation. Some of these complexities will be illustrated from data in which
the appellant/or and their legal representative is present. Our focus will be on
the use of documentation, especially how the represented 'meaning' is
negotiated between the parties involved in the situated activities of the tribunal
process.
It will be suggested the documentation which is presented to the Legal
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Aid tribunal would seem to be representations of three individual, but connected
phenomena:
a. A past event that it is claimed is in need of legal adjudication.
b. A current event, a case constituting an appeal against the refusal of legal aid.
c. A future event, a case that will potentially end up being adjudicated in a court
of law.
It will be suggested that the case documents may involve representations
all of these, although it must be remembered that they are doing all these in the
temporal present of a legal aid tribunal, and that we can thus see that role that
the documents have is a complicated one. This complicated function of the
documentary representations would seem to explain why attended tribunal cases
are preferred by the tribunal panel over unattended case, that being for ease of
understanding and interpretation of the phenomena.
Finally, it will be suggested that sociological research that takes texts as
having a singular representational meaning that can be read-off by the analyst
out of the context of their usage, such as is the case with some of the studies
critiqued in the first section of this chapter, may be ignoring the complexities
of practices and consequences of situated documentary usage.
6.1 Documents Research.
In this section we shall look at some research on document use from
socio-Iegal and bureaucratic research before focusing on ethnomethodologically
inspired research. In the latter part we shall deal with the work of commentators
in some depth so as a basis from which this thesis can develop.
A good illustration of the role of texts in Western law can be illustrated
by Sally Falk Moore (1992), she looked at the problems associated with the
imposition of Western style organisation onto African legal systems by British
colonial officers in Tanganyika at the beginning of this century. Moore notes
that the colonial plans were problematic because Western legal systems have a
general underlying reliance on written records, which was not the case with
214
African system. The key point for Moore is that there is a "considerable
difference between legal systems that are fundamentally oral and legal systems
predicated on writing everything down .... Used in law, writing is a technique
that affects substance" (ibid:26).
Although written documents have long been a focus of classical legal
research, the focus of research was with regards to texts standing
unproblematically as either records of court events, or as unproblematic
representations of 'real world' events. This is to a large extent still true of
contemporary socio-legal research, but there are examples of research which
focus on the role of documents in on-going activities of legal practice. An
example of such research is Silbey (1980-81) who employs document analysis
and case study to focus on complaint processing in the office of consumer
protection of the Massachusetts Attorney General. Silbey makes some good
observations on the role of documents in legal activity, for instance she notes
that:
"Although statutes set theoretical limits to official action, they cannot
describe how things are done within those limits ... .individual law
enforcement officers become agents of clarification and elaboration of
their own authorizing mandate .... Second, in the process of working out
mandates, organizations modify the goals they were designed to serve ...
Record keeping imposes order upon this endless process .... This is a
conception of law as a situationally defined process." (ibid:881)
The key aspect of this social situated nature of law and document use is
that it suggests that we should not try to look at events texts report, using the
texts as representations of events to be adjudicated upon, but instead upon the
use of texts themselves.' A useful text in this regard is Raffel (1979), whose
starting point, only to discredit it, is that records are meant to have some
relation to the event they record and that we are "apparently somehow able to
move from thinking about the record to thinking about what the record is
1 Two studies of interest here are Wheeler (1969) and Zimmerman (1969)
both of which look at the issue of record keeping in American society.
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'about'" (ibid:4). The question being how does the record allow access to the
event. In many cases, the record-event link is assumed rather than explicated
so as to permit inferences about the 'real world', however uncertain this may
be. The record is meant to be a reflection not an independent thing, not itself
an event since its authority lies in its relation to an event. Raffel believes
significance lies in the belief that only the present is knowable and "the record
thus makes the present permanent and eternalizes the event. The event speaks
for ever through the record, the record being identical with the event" (ibid:43-
44).2 Thus, the past is transformed into the formerly present by the record.
Interestingly, Raffel suggests a concern with bias to be misleading as "when
records are seen in terms of the grounds which make them possible, it is no
longer adequate to state that records reflect, whether accurately or inaccurately,
the givens of the real world, because the real world itself comes to be shaped
by the very idea of recording it" (ibid:48). Thus, assumptions that:
"The proper statement of the relationship of records to the world is that,
in so far as one wants to see records as corresponding to the world, one
must treat the world as revealing or presenting what must be said about
it." (ibid:64)
implying that:
"(1) The world must be formulated as telling one what must be said about
it for short notes to be able to 'represent' long periods of time" (ibid:67),
"(2) Because it is events that speak, it is even possible for a record to say
nothing and yet be adequate .... the absence of anything can be a topic of
record" (ibid:68), "(3) ... A narrative is possible in so far as things
(events) are thought to disclose themselves. Therefore, speech can be
thought of not as adding some thing but as repeating what is there.
Speech can repeat a thing if a speech need not be thought of as itself a
thing but can be 'about' other things. This view of speech is accomplished
2 Benson and Drew (1978:90) in an examination of data from the Scarman
Tribunal have shown that a record whose authority relies on correct procedures
of production can have its 'facticity' challenged on account of incorrect
procedures being followed.
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by ridding speech of any contribution except the contribution of making
a record." (ibid:70)
This view of texts, as Raffel is well aware, is problematic in light of
post-Wittgensteinian language philosophy and research into document use must
reflect this, as Raffel is well aware.' The same consideration applies to the
analysis of documents. If one does not have some understanding of the contexts
in which they are written and read and the relevant purposes of writers and
readers, then one cannot evaluate their significance." Records, reports or
whatever are not literal descriptions of some reality: they are rather, accounts
which organize and, in some sense, create the reality which they describe,
within the constraints of some particular occasion on which they are read
(ibid:21).
This aspect of textual documents, their supposed representations of an
external reality is not a insignificant assumption and the gravity of its influence
is displayed by Chau (1979) in his paper 'Democracy as a Textual
Accomplishment'. Chau's analysis is of the Preliminary Report of the Canadian
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 1965, of which he claims
opinions expressed within had been "abstracted from their original contexts,
trimmed and then recontextualized in the report" (ibid:544). The report, states
Chau, produces opinions and makes them available for inspection and in doing
so claims objectivity and facticity for the report. Chau draws attention to "the
way the opinions are used to formulate a speaker's rather than a reporter's
descriptive account of the social condition" (ibid:546). The importance of the
Ideception' being that such commissions are used in democracies to report
3 Sajo (1981) in a study of Hungarian State bureaucracy and legal rule
following, notes how regulations become the method of objectification through
the lack of any accessible way of getting from the text to the events they report.
Sajo points out that this creates a world in which "the document plays the role
of the objective of work while the client is treated as a thing, or, in fact, as the
symbol of things within the document" (ibid:76).
4 This issue of context is one which is relevant to the earlier discussion of
the use of data segments and is illuminated by that discussion.
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'public opinion' on a particular social situation and to recommend appropriate
state activities, the use of decontextualised opinions thus allowing the State to
display its democratic commitment. Chau describes how dissenting and
minority voices against the State are presented in such a manner as to be read
as individual unique items not as collective speech, yet at the same time their
reporting "serves to display the Commissioner's democratic claim of hearing
from all sides" (ibid:546). Chau notes that this is only one textual practice
employed by the State in democracies, and his aim is to display the value of
such analysis, stating: "The strong aim of such analysis should be that of
specifying how these and other practices are essential features of some segment
of ideological production and reproduction" (ibid:547). Chau stresses the utility
of ethnomethodology in such an approach and concludes that:
"The present analysis ... attempts to raise the document itself as the
analytic object and seeks to disclose how it is constituted through a series
of methodological practices, which reporters use to solve the practical
problems of doing reporting. It demonstrates that the descriptive report
is through and through a practical accomplishment filled with the
reporter's crucial interpretive and judgemental decisions. It also
demonstrates how the ostensibly democratic status of official documents,
as a genre, is suspect because such documents do not, and cannot treat all
opinions as equally deserving serious attention. To treat all opinions
equally renders a conclusive description of the social condition
problematic." (ibid:548)
Chau is not the only researcher who has attempted to apply
ethnomethodology to textual analysis, but as we shall see below there are
common problems which many of these attempts create. Chau, it is worth
noting, like Green (1983) in his study 'Knowing the Poor: A Case-study in
Textual Reality Construction', uses historical texts on which to base research.
Green too claims inspiration from ethnomethodology in the examination of the
practices of knowledge and reality construction, though acknowledges a
difference in that:
" ... whereas ethnomethodology has programmatically focused on situated
218
interaction and speech, the present work takes writing as its theoretical
object, treating it as a distinct locus of what Harold Garfinkel calls
accounting devices." (ibid:ix)
Green is concerned with the use of genre by intellectual communities to
allow written artifacts to become analyzable, that these reproduce community
boundaries at the textual level. What is interesting is that Green believes this
sort of focus will prevent textual analysis "degenerating into purely technical,
linguistic analyses" (ibid:ix). Green realises that Garfinkel's documentary
method is not a method for analysing documents but is rather concerned with
situated activities, something Chau overlooks. Documents may be resources for
Garfinkel, not the topics of analysis per se? Green notes that his project is more
like that of Dorothy E. Smith (whom we shall look at in some detail) whose
concern is with documentary reality, although he is quite critical of her
approach. Of his own analysis, which appears as a more sophisticated version
of what Chau was aiming for, Green states:
"My argument is that all such themes [alienation, anomie, community,
intersubjective fusion] are all experientially grounded in the passage from
situated to textual reality construction; a passage occurring as the
separative negation of situated fusion in being brought to writing which
then allows for looking back and looking below to what has been negated.
The problem I wish to address is how that negation is decisively
accomplished so as to leave nothing behind but a factual report." (ibid:21)
Whilst Green's project is an interesting form of text analysis, with regards to
the focus of this thesis, legal aid tribunals, it moves, although admittedly
recognising it does so, away from situated activity using texts - where Garfinkel
remains - and into textual practices. In fact, Green is interested in the negation
5 Green (1983: 16) correctly notes that Garfinkel does not explore the "inner
horizons of documents as constitutive accomplishments in writing, because his
sight is firmly fixed on situated accomplishments. This is the
ethnomethodological bias, its founding problematic, which predetermines the
significance of documents as one of usage for situated reality construction. "
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of situated activity and reality in factual reportage, and how this is achieved."
An alternative form of text analysis influenced by ethnomethodological
studies is where written texts are examined with a view to their reliance upon
characteristics of spoken discourse. This approach to textual analysis is
influenced by the conversation analytic perspective of ethnomethodology and
suggests that "an adequate understanding of how texts are produced and
responded to may remain elusive so long as the issue is pursued without making
close comparative reference to how talk works" (Atkinson 1983:230). This
position is based upon the supposed priority of spoken discourse in human
history and in each individual's linguistic development, a stance which I believe
both Ong (1982) and Olson (1984) seriously put into question. Although
Atkinson (1984) does make a persuasive case for this transmission from verbal
to textual in 'Our Masters' Voices', the use of verbal sound-bites from speeches
into newspapers does not prove the case in terms of the primacy of orality or
literacy in society.
Mulkay (1985a), another conversation analytic influenced user of text
analysis, focuses on written letters which provide an obvious similarity to turn-
taking in conversation in their basic usage. Though as Mulkay notes:
6 Green's work is extremely interesting in relation to the production of
research reports:
"Every text presenting itself as a representation of social reality will
include references to at least these separations (say as discussions of precaution
against bias, sensitivity over description versus prescription, the
operationalization of concepts, the representative adequacy of particular data)
and these will serve readers as indexical signs that the work under way is that
of producing an external reality. The work is attributed only to the investigation
behind the writing, however, and not at all to the writing being read, which is
what factual inquiry must effectively come to. In Garfinkel's terminology, the
self-reported research work of factual inquiries is a gloss on the separative work
of the text whereby it not only takes the place of situated particulars but does
so as their essential truth, there for the reading. Every factual social report
moves from a displacement of situated reality towards its replacement by textual
orderliness (towards that form of rational accountability), but in unmarked
ways. This does not mean, however, that they are in any sense
unremarkable .... " (Green 1983:19)
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"We can reasonably expect, therefore, that the findings of conversation
analysis will be more directly applicable to epistolary texts than to other
kinds of textual product which lack these features. Moreover, owing to
these similarities between conversations and letters, the analysis of
epistolary exchange may well feed back upon conversation analysis."
(ibid:202)
Mulkay's analysis looks at 'the Perry letters'? and utilises the
conversation analysis of Anita Pomerantz (1984) in 'Agreeing and Disagreeing
with Assessments: Some Features of Preferred and Dispreferred Tum Shapes' .
Mulkay's conclusion is that:
"the concepts and propositions formulated by Pomerantz in relation to
conversations have been shown to be equally relevant to the analysis of
letters ... it seems that we may have the beginnings of an empirically
informed analytic framework which can cope with the organization of
written as well as spoken discourse and the structure of both dialogue and
monologue." (Mulkay 1985:225-226)
However, whilst the similarities to conversation seem obvious it is my
opinion that they are essentially at a superficial level and tell us little about the
use of texts in situated activity.8 Mulkay, I think, was rather too optimistic
about the possibilities here and overlooks contextual aspects of orality and
literature, and the centrality these must hold in any ethnomethodologically
informed research.
So far in this section we have covered a number of issues relating to
documents and their analysis, to clarify my position further on this we shall
look at some commentators in more depth.
7 Eighty letters on a scientific debate instigated by a scientist whom Mulkay
gives the pseudonym Professor Perry.
8 The dissertations for both my B.Sc. (hons) and M.A. both focused on a
series of texts with a view to the tum-taking construction they employed,
however my conclusion was that such an approach to texts was quite limited.
In some ways it can be seem to suffer from some of the problems that I locate
in the analysis of D. E. Smith (see below), especially the lack of any situated
activity or temporal perspectives beyond those of the tum themselves.
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6.1a Dorothy. E. Smith.
The work of Dorothy E. Smith is influential in the research on texts and
social processes. Here I propose a brief review of her ideas and in particular,
two of her empirical studies, focusing on the concerns of this thesis. 9
Smith, in two volumes containing published and previously unpublished
work, 'The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of
Knowledge' (1990a) and 'Texts, Facts, and Femininity: Exploring the Relations
of Ruling' (1990b)1Oshows herself to be one of a number of figures to have
drawn on ethnomethodology, and one of few to apply them towards textual
interaction." Smith does not consider herself, and is not considered by others,
to be an ethnomethodologist, and she may be seen as yet another sociologist
pointing out the limits of ethnomethodology, but in doing so she does come up
with some interesting practices derived from those of ethnomethodology. Her
work has four major themes and influences: Marxism, Ethnomethodology,
9 A fuller critique of Smith is available (Jenkings 1995).
10 Much of the work in the two texts has been previously published
elsewhere, in their combined publication they are presented as two coherent
wholes. I have argued elsewhere (Jenkings 1995) that Smith can be seen in
these two volumes as presenting her work as representing a single 'coherent
method', that of 'Institutional Ethnography' from 'The Everyday World as
Problematic: A Feminist Sociology' (1987), and that due to the fact that most
of the papers and empirical studies were carried out prior to the working out of
this coherent method they fail to live up to this billing. Initially I worked with
the earlier versions but re-read them when they were published in this new
format, all references here will be to these collected editions. To an extent
Smith has made changes to the original work in their re-presentation, and in
some cases they are almost reinterpretations.
11 In Chapter Four 'On Sociological Description: A Method from Marx'
(1990b), which was originally published in human Studies Vol4 1981:313-337,
Smith states her concern to be to explicate "our practices of doing, hearing, and
reading descriptions to identify how these practices interpose between us and
that of which we speak" (1990b:91) Significantly, these include the practices
of the researcher as it is through these that for Smith we gain access to the
practices of others.
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Feminism, and Ideology, with the a priori position of the "fact" of women's
oppression, and the avowed aim of the relief of that oppression." Before
looking at the empirical studies it is worth noting some aspects of Smith's
relationship to ethnomethodology.
The importance of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology for Smith is that she
credits Garfinkel with "the discovery of the text as a significant constituent of
social relations" (1990b:211)13 - textually mediated social communication."
This accreditation however, ignores for example Marx's 'The 18th Brumaire'
which indicates the role of text in social relations. IS
In looking at intentions of individuals, Smith, like ethnomethodology,
believes we have to focus on their actions in events. Rather than pose an
opposition between appearance and reality, Smith in Chapter Two 'The
Ideological Practice of Sociology' (1990a)16 aims to keep her inquiry within the
12Sandra Harding (1991) epistemologically locates Smith as a Feminist
Standpoint theorist where "The distinctive features of women's situation in a
gender-stratified society are being used as resources in the new feminist
research. It is these distinctive resources, which are not used by conventional
researchers, that enable feminism to produce more accurate descriptions and
theoretically richer explanations than does conventional research" (ibid: 119).
While this is undoubtedly Smith's aim, and I do not wish here to argue the
epistemological positioning, I have to concur with Patricia Hill Collins who, in
a review of 'The Conceptual Practices of Power' states: "After Smith's initial
claims that women's standpoint can inform an alternative sociology, women as
specific knowers drop from the analysis" (Collins 1991-92:270).
13Smith indicates that she is referring to, and lists in her bibliography,
Garfinkel's 'Suicide for all Practical Purposes' in 'Studies in
Ethnomethodology' (Garfinkel 1967). However, no such chapter exists what
Smith seems to be referring to is a chapter published in Roy Turner's (1974)
'Etnomethodology' by Garfinkel entitled 'Suicide, for all Practical Purposes'
which is an excerpt from 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' (1967).
14By text, Smith means both the inscribed words of symbols and its physical
materiality both of which are produced by technical practices (footnote Smith
1990a:211-212) .
15My thanks to Martyn Hudson for this observation.
16Originally published in Catalyst Vol 8:39-54.
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'knower's experience' but also to develop an inquiry that "explores reaches
beyond that experience that are already present in it but are inexplicable by
remaining within the boundaries of experiencing" (ibid:54). Here we can see
how Smith generally regards her relationship to ethnomethodology: she agrees
with its 'position' but wants to 'move on'. This can be illustrated by her
conception of 'social relations' in Chapter Six 'No One Commits Suicide:
Textual Analyses of Ideological Practices' (1990a), in which she contrasts her
position with ethnomethodology in relation to courtroom talk. It is worth
quoting in full.
"... an ethnomethodologist might address a specific segment of courtroom
talk, say, an interruption, as a general class of speech events, receiving
the immediate setting of the courtroom as the temporal and spatial
boundaries of the event. By contrast, the method of inquiry deployed here
would treat the interruption as a feature of a social relation not fully
present in the courtroom or to observation. Courtroom talk is directed
towards the production of a formally warranted record of the
proceedings, the record has a definite legal status and legal uses. Those
responsible for it are the judge and the court recorder. The record is then
available to lawyers and at a later stage for the purposes of making
appeals and the like. Courtroom interruptions are handled in specialized
ways that clarify what is said and who said what/or the record. They take
on a distinctive character in the context of social relations. Thus 'social
relation' as an analytic device explores activities of a particular social
setting or, as here, textual instances drawn into the analytic text, as
articulated to social courses of action beyond the immediate time, place,
and complement of people. 'Social relation' enables us to go from the
moment of 'observation', in which the phenomenon arises for us in our
here-and-now, to an analysis that discloses how it is organized by and
articulated to foregoing and subsequent moments in a social relation."
(ibid: 150-151)
It might be said that the version of ethnomethodology which Smith refers to is
that of conversation analysis, but I suggest that it is a central feature of all
ethnomethodological analysis that is being condemned, the avoidance of
theoretical ironicisation. Smith's position and implicit critique is worth noting
as to what she sees as the limits of ethnomethodology's approach.
Smith's investigation are largely into the textual construction of reality .
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Smith in Chapter Six 'Femininity as Discourse' (1990b)17 summarizes her
position on texts as:
"Texts are situated in and structure social relations (extended courses of
action) in which people are actively at work. Texts enter into and order
courses of action and relations among individuals. The texts themselves
have a material presence and are produced in an economic and social
process which is part of a political economy. Textually mediated
discourse is a distinctive feature of contemporary society existing as
socially organized communicative and interpretive practices intersecting
and structuring people's everyday worlds and contributing thereby to the
organization of the social relations of the economy and of the political
process." (ibid: 162-163)
The issue here though is how is this to be investigated, and what are the
limitations that we must adhere to. A key methodological issue since for Smith,
we must not isolate texts from their practical usage but focus on "a lived world
of ongoing social action organized textually" (ibid: 163). For Smith texts fix
meaning in a material form detaching them from their transitory construction
and existence in on-going interaction, they speak in the absence of speakers. 18
It is "the distinctive formation of social organization mediated by texts, their
capacity to transcend the essentially transitory character of social processes and
remain uniform across separate and diverse local settings [that] is key to their
peculiar force (though that transcendence is itself an accomplishment of
transitory social processes)" (ibid:211). Before moving on to her empirical
studies it must be noted that Smith may be misguided when she thinks that texts
remain uniform across setting, except in their basic physical appearance. I
believe we will see that nothing else can be assumed to remain uniform. This
is not to say though that texts are often assumed to remain uniform in content
and 'meaning' by those who use them, but that this is itself a locally situated
17Originally published in Leslie Roman and Linda Christian-Smith (eds)
(1988:313-337), 'Becoming Feminine: The Politics of Popular Culture',
London, Falmer Press.
18This is an issue that will be taken up later in this chapter.
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activity. Since in many ways it is the locally situated practices that Smith is
hoping to reveal, though she does so with the view of a text as having a uniform
'nature' across time and space. We shall examine two of her case studies some
depth.
In '''K'' is Mentally Ill: The Anatomy of a Factual Account' (1990b)19
Smith "analyzes an interview which tells how K comes to be defined by her
friends as mentally ill" (ibid:11), is concerned with non-formal accounts
produced by family and friends and is probably Smith's most well known
study." The study arose from a student exercise set by Smith, and initially
based on work of Kituse (1962), where students were required to interview
people and then give a talk in class on their interviews. With one of the
transcripts Smith believed that she could give a different reading of the
interview, Le. an account of freezing out in terms of Lemert, to the students
version based upon Kituse.
To understand the method that Smith actually uses we have to realise
that the student's account, which is Smith's phenomenon, is not an account of
mental illness, but an account by a student of a respondent asked if they knew
someone they thought was mentally ill. The account itself is mediated by the
student who first of all gives a verbal presentation and subsequently submits a
written account. Significantly, the interview was not taped, but written up after
the event and hence subject to unknown 'editing'. In the 1990 version Smith
recognizes the problems here in terms of accuracy, acknowledging that the
respondent's account is directed by the interviewers question, and that the
respondent selectsaspects of events to bring to the foreground in her accounting
when responding to the question. Smith also recognizes that the interviewer has
19This paper was fist published in German as 'K ist Geisteskran. Die
Anatomie eines Tatsachenberictes' In 1976 in E. Weingarten, F. Sack, and J.
N. Schenkein (eds) Ethnomethodologie. Beitrage zu einer Sociologie des
Alltagslebens, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. And in English as 'K is Mentally Ill: The
Anatomy of a Factual Account' in Sociology 12 (1) 1978,:25-53.
20 For a review of this paper from a discourse analysis perspective see
Wooffitt (1992).
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had to 'work up' the account after the event, and Smith herself having done
some minor editing. But this does not matter to the extent that Smith is
interested in the transcript as her data and phenomena not whether K was
mentally ill or not (ibid: 17).
For Smith it is the structure of the text that provides a set of instructions
as how to read K's behaviour as that of someone becoming mentally ill. Smith
believes that we are able/made to read the account as that of someone becoming
mentally ill due to the ordering and schema of events, and that it is possible to
"analyze this account to discover (in a preliminary way) the lineaments of the
concept of mental illness" (ibid: 16).
Smith acknowledges that there is always more than one possible version
of events. Her interest is in how a version is authorized as what happened and
what those authorization procedures are. For Smith, in the account of 'K' we
are told from the outset that 'K' is mentally ill and so read the text as such
being the case, suspending our disbelief. Then, the normative definitions in the
account are those of others not 'K', 'K"s voice and version are effectively
silenced (ibid:24-25). Finally, facts are worked up and the proper procedures
followed to establish something as effectively known: Firstly, direct
observation, Angela, the interviewee and K's friend, is "forced" to recognise
facts even though she does not wish to. Secondly, a succession of independent
witness are provided whom Smith believes in reality may not be so unconnected
(ibid:28). Thirdly, and related to the latter, that judgement of each independent
witness is based on direct observation supposedly uncontaminated by the views
of 'others', and that this is emphasized as the case."
Smith believes that by being told that K is mentally ill at the beginning
of the text we can see the account as a 'problem' to which we have been told
the solution: "The problem presented by the account is not to find an answer to
21 It is important to note that both the second and third items here show that
Smith is moving from her phenomenon - a text produced by a student - to talk
about a reality behind the text, an illegitimate move by Smith's own
recommendations.
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the question 'what is wrong with K'?, but to find this collection of items as a
proper puzzle to the solution 'becoming mentally ill'" (ibid:30). Smith does not
seem to realise that because the remit of the students was to interview an
individual who knew someone who was mentally ill, which is exactly what the
student produces for Smith, that the phenomenon Smith is looking at is actually
a textual response to a problem set by Smith herself. This does not invalidate
it as a phenomena to be investigated but, as Smith's textual method informs us,
a text is an abstraction and ideological if it is not grounded in the concept of an
actuality but rather sociological theory. Since Smith's phenomenon is the text,
and the text was produced under her instructions, she is looking at a phenomena
she herself has largely determined.
This may seem a minor point but Smith's believes that her analysis has
located a 'cutting out' process going on, at the end of which 'symptoms' are
seen as 'illness' or 'disease' rather than as situationally dependent. Smith states
"I have suggested that an alternative account of what happened is possible", but
she does not realise that her own method does not allow her to treat her
phenomenon in this way. Smith again goes back to the text as representing an
actuality that can be regained, and suggest that in that actuality what was
actually occurring was a 'cutting out' process. In effect Smith is taking an
already ideological constructed text and reinterpreting the events, which on
Smiths own methodological account, cannot relate to back to any actuality,
never mind reinterpret them in term of another theory, i.e. Lemert's. This is
not to say Smith is wrong when she asserts that authorization rules lead the
reader to side with the tellers version when situationally inadequate action by
"K" occurs, and not search for other explanations.
By Smith's own methodology the paper is tragically flawed,
nevertheless, it does allow us to see what Smith's phenomena for her method
are, the practices of reading and accounts as representing an actuality but which
are in fact an ideological representations in the form of a text. Unfortunately,
Smith's account of the 'cutting out' provides an unintentional example of the
production of an ideological account, the type of account that she criticizes in
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the second study of hers we shall look at.
In 'No-One Commits Suicide: The Textual Analysis of Ideological
Practices' (1990a)22 Smith suggests that we see the difference between
'everyday language discourse' and 'ideological discourse', 23and attempts to
show how an ideological reading can be made from a primary narrative, but
again Smith breaks her own methodologicalguidelines. Using "Phyllis Knight's
'autobiographical biography' as told to and edited by her son Rolf Knight"
(ibid: 136), and for an interpretive ideology applies "assembling
instructions.... in a passage from a psychiatrist's account of depressive illness"
(ibid: 164). Smith argues that in applying the second text we discard important
features of the original narrative that explain the behaviour which the
ideological version does not allow for. However, while this is an interesting
exercise, it cannot claim to represent a real phenomenon, i.e. not a naturally
occurring phenomenon, as she has invented the example herself for the
exercise. There is also possibly some question as to the status of the first text
as a primary narrative of the mother, as it would seem to be that of the son.
In a second example, 'the case of Harriet' , Smith contrasts a case history
22This chapter, Chapter 6 in 'The Conceptual Practices of Power: A
Feminist Sociology of Knowledge' (1990) along with Chapter 7 'Ideological
Methods of Reading and Writing Texts: A Scrutiny of Quentin Bell's Account
of Virginia Woolf's Suicide' (1990a) were originally published as No one
Commits Suicide: Textual Analyses of ideological Practices' in Human Studies
1983, Vol. 6,:309-395.
23Smith makes the distinction between primary narratives that draw directly
on experience, and ideologically ordered narratives, although she makes no
claim for greater accuracy of one over the other. (1990a: 157) The distinction
is not well illustrated and seems weak, the main difference, apart from direct
experience of the renderer, being that the primary narrative has no 'agenda' to
attend to, but this seems unclear too. At the level of reading the contrast is
given as being that, in the primary narrative "the readers interpretive work
draws upon her own experience in articulating the tellers experience. This
relation is expressed in such phrases as "I knew just how she felt", "Something
just the same once happened to me" ... "In contrast, the ideological form of
narrative proceeds in a fashion that depends upon the reader's or hearer's grasp
of the appropriate interpretive schema of the professional or other textual
discourse" (ibid: 162).
229
prepared by a psychiatrist for a formal clinical presentation with a version
Smith has prepared herself from the same material as the psychiatrist had
available i.e. case notes." Smith describes the texts that she and the psychiatrist
have used as: "Much of this, in various ways, originates in primary narrative
or consists of primary narrative partially worked up into forms intending
psychiatric schemata" (ibid: 165). Smith attempts to show us how the ideological
schema of the psychiatrist is applied to primary narratives. However, since
Harriet herself is unlikely to have written any of the case notes, and that the
case notes that are there are likely to have been made by a professional or as
Smith herself would agree, someone attending to a professional schema.
Therefore we would have to be 'generous' in accepting these as a 'primary
narrative', especially one 'belonging to' the patient rather than an ideological
narrative belonging to psychiatric medicine.
Smith proceeds to illustrate how she can provide an account from the
same material, one that is more temporally orientated, in which she as a
'member' sees Harriet's case differently from the psychiatrist. Here Smith again
appears to be claiming to be able to provide an account that is able to get back
the original phenomena of the lived experience i.e. Harriet's behaviour, and
claiming to give a 'truer' account from the case materials, contrary to her
avowed methodology.
The problem here is that Smith has again produced a version which is
not grounded in the naturally occurring actual activities of actual individuals,
hence in this sense it may be seen as devoid of social relations, a key aspect of
Smith's methodology. Secondly, she removes the psychiatrist report from its
social relations as a formal clinical account whose intended reader and social
relations were undoubtedly not that of a social researcher. Smith again seems
to mistake the nature of her phenomena, and to have overlooked the importance
of the locally situated nature of texts for her research method.
24 Smith fails to inform us whether the psychiatrist and Harriet have met in
consultation previously or not, if they had it would harm Smith's basis of
comparison.
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In a third exercise, where Smith wants to create an account of how the
psychiatrist's report will be read, she compares 'Harriet's Case' to a textbook
account a type of "affective disorder associated with pregnancy and childbirth"
(ibid: 169). Smith suggests "Let us apply this textbook account, using the
pseudo-primary narrative as a substitute for the case record, treating it as that
resource from which a collection of particulars is made up" (ibid: 169). By
pseudo-primary narrative Smith means the psychiatrist's clinical report, not the
case file contents. Smith, using the 'Modem Clinical Psychiatry', then extracts
a set of instructions or procedures from which to read the psychiatrist's report
as to be a description of a case of "recurrent psychiatric disturbance involving
para-natal/actors". She lists these procedures in a schema and then goes on to
produce a fourth text which she says "using this schema to select clauses 1,3,6,
and 7 from the pseudo-primary narrative and adding some additional materials
from the resident's notes, a fully 'psychiatrized' story can be told that unites
particulars and schema, very much as the reader interprets the particulars of the
case history in terms of the schema" (ibid: 170)
Smith, I suggest, is at last focusing on what her phenomena should
actually be - the psychiatrists report, but the exercise ends up being a multi-
layered construction of Smith Is own. Such an account cannot be seen as an
account/reading of an actual report, by actual people, in actual activities that
constitutes the social relations of which the text is a part. In effect Smith does
not research the phenomena that she claims sociology should, actual activities,
and so cannot move from them to an ideological documentary method. Hence
her research does not support the conclusions Smith wishes to draw from them.
Although Smith is heavily influenced by the ethnomethodological
critique of sociological method and adopts many of the methodological criteria
that ethnomethodology adopts, one ethnomethodological criteria Smith does not
adopt though is the focus on the purely local. Rather she has constructed a
method designed to look at the relations between the local and the extra-local.
It is this concern with the extra-local that can help explain her methodological
confusion, and ultimately, the dropping of women as specific knowers, since
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not only does the 'just this-ness' of the phenomena get lost, but also individuals
as specific knowers. 25 This loss of specific knowers also raises questions about
Smith's method as a response to an ideological sociology in which Smith locates
ideological practices of abstraction being achieved via the removal of the local
from phenomena and the dissolution of the subject. 26
Finally, of central interest is the focus by Smith on the role of the
written document in local organization. Smith's research, I suggest, has
investigated in various ways and with varying degrees of success the possibility
of going about this task. The main point that I wish to make here is, that Smith
has got the phenomenon right, texts in use, but that she has not got her methods
right in researching them.
6.lb A. W. McHoul.
The second body of work which we shall look at in some depth is that
of McHoul whose etbnomethodology of texts has focused on reading practices.
A good entry-point into McHoul' s 'etbnomethodology of reading' is his paper
(1982a) dealing with the affinities between hermeneutic and
ethnomethodological work as raised by Misgeld' s discussion of Gadamer and
Habermas, and introduction of an empirical analysis of written texts.
The context of Misgeld' s discussion is the construction of versions of
25 Smith's individualist position seems to come from women's positioning
historically in relation to male knowledge, rather than knowledge of the
individual member. This feminist orientation to the sociology of knowledge
may explain some of her 'problems' with locally situated phenomena.
26 In Chapter Three 'The Social Organization of Subjectivity: An Analysis
of the Micro Politics of a Meeting', Smith (1990b:58) sticks much closer to her
advocated method, possibly due to the fact that it seems to have been carried
out after her method was published in its form of 'The Everyday World as
Problematic' (1987). Unlike the two studies described above it is a more
coherent study and, though space does not allow further discussion of it, an
interesting example of her method, although ultimately it fails to attend to both
Smith's avowed feminist concerns and her prescribed methodology.
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communicative competence in which ideal types exist independent of any
occasions of talk, and to which interactants must adhere to in any actual
occasion of talk. Habennas is seen as adhering to this position" whilst Gadamer
sees conversations as being 'highly occasioned performances' (though both are
seen to rely on some form of 'mechanism' outside of 'human construction')
(ibid:92). McHoul's criticism of both of these positions is that they remove any
consideration of what interactants do on actual occasions. It is in this sense that
McHoul takes issue with Misgeld' s consideration of the similarities of
hermeneutics and ethnomethodology, the pairing of Habermas with Sacks and
Gadamer with Garfinkel. McHoul points out that Sack's notion of rule use is
different from Habermas' in that: firstly, Sacks's use of rules is not derived
from theory but empirical investigation and, secondly, that Sacks sees rule use
as occasional dependent. In relation to the pairing of Gadamer and Garfinkel,
though both stress the occasionedness of talk, for Gadamer the participants do
not know where the talk is going, whereas for Garfinkel the reflexivity of
actions places the control in the participants hands rather than, as for Gadamer,
in some form of meta-construct.
McHoul himself aims to adopt a ethnomethodological rather than
conversation analytic approach where:
"our project inquiry would have to examine in situ occasions of some
readings as and in the full details of their livedness; as and in actual, as-
far-as-possible-naturally-occurring, practically orientated, ordinary,
ongoing activities with specific temporal and spatial locations and specific
cohorts." (ibid: 102)
He supplements this with "such materials should, where possible, be 'strong'
materials. I.e., they should preserve as fully as possible the in situ livedness of
the occasions that they can only be said to represent" (ibid: 103). McHoul
attempts an ethnomethodology of reading but undergoes a failure of the
27 For an ethnomethodologically informed critique of Habennas' 'Theory of
Communicative Action' see Bogen (1989).
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'sociological imagination' when he suggests that such data, 'ethnographies'
including audio/visual recordings, is not available for reading activities, and
that instead we must rely on reader's reports of their readings.
He suggests that "a reflexive sociology of the analyst's own reading(s)
appears to have much to recommend it" (ibid:203), which McHoul claims to
have made the first attempt at producing. The result is that McHoul presents us
with a self-reflexive report of what he monitored himself doing while reading
a newspaper. However, sociologists reporting on what they themselves do while
reading a newspaper can be seen as being problematic as a study of naturally
occurring reading activity. Thus, like Smith he seems to have problems actually
applying his methodology. 28
The 'ethnomethodology of reading' is a topic which McHoul had raised
previously in 'Ethnomethodology and Literature: Preliminaries to a Sociology
of Reading' (1978a), in this he suggests that he was moving away from
Garfmkelian ethnomethodology towards the work of Sacks - a thing, as we have
seen, he reverses in the above (1982a) study. This paper is programmatic
suggesting what a sociology of literature should look like, that it should be a
sociology of reading with its topic "the methodical ways in which members go
about making sense of the written traces of men in society" (McHoul
1978a: 114). McHoul takes a very narrow definition of his topic and takes as a
starting point "that, as far as authors and readers are concerned, the act of
28 A study along vaguely similar lines is the of Morrison (1981) where an
aim is made to analyse written texts in terms of reading practices, it fails in my
opinion due to the same reasons Smith and McHoul do. Interestingly though it
claims to be directly heavily influenced by Garfinkel's 'studies of work', and
yet still fails to avoid these problems. An example of the problems of analysts
reading text on behalf of a readership is illustrated by Keller-Cohen (1987)
reporting on the redesigning of the Midwest Bell telephone bill. The bill had
ran into problems because the design had been developed and read by company
employees, but once released into a new cultural environment it proved
problematic for readers not engaged in the situated activities typical of Midwest
Bell employees.
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reading is not a face-to-face interaction" (ibid: 115).29 This is the first
assumption that McHoul makes, but is quickly followed by a second, that
readings are achieved alone and not read out loud. From this, he then assumes
that reading is therefore not embedded in turn-taking of an ongoing interaction,
and consequently, that an understanding of the text is based upon previous
aspects of that text (ibid: 116). Further, from these preconceptions McHoul then
assumes that the reader's relation to the author is "a 'relation in anonymity'
which entails none of the 'checking' devices of communication systems which
have a turn-taking mechanism" (ibid: 116).
One of the problems of McHoul' s approach can be seen to be the fact
that he has assumed prior to his investigation what the phenomena he wishes to
investigate actually consists of, thus he has restricted himself prematurely as to
the phenomena of his potential investigations.
Whilst, this form of 'ethnomethodology of reading' is self-evidently
problematic, it is helpful to understand 'why' McHoul ended up taking this
path. This can be understood by looking at a second text of McHoul' s published
in 1978 'Wittgenstein and Criticism: Towards a Praxiological View of the Text'
(1978b). This paper is mainly concerned with essentialism in literary criticism,
and the similarities of this with the early Wittgenstein of the 'Tractatus'. 30 In the
critique of essentialism McHoul uses the work of the later Wittgenstein and the
work of Garfinkel, largely with reference to the etcetera problem and the
impossibility of a complete description. McHoul that notes:
"Instead of explaining the meaning of a linguistic term, we should simply
29Here we see the beginnings in what I have above called McHoul's 'failure
of sociological imagination', although maybe this should be 'failure of
ethnomethodological imagination' .
30 In a comparison of Wittgenstein and F .R. Leavis McHoul is keen to stress
that there is a difference in that for Wittgenstein the propositions of logic must
be compared to an empirical reality, whereas for Leavis it is only an imaginable
reality that is needed for comparison and truth of a description (McHoul
1978b:52).
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do description of its use by actual users, who mayor may not be
ourselves." (ibid:54)
I am not arguing that McHoul' s position here is wrong in the adoption
of the later Wittgenstein, but that the origin of this in literary criticism has led
to a narrow view of texts and reading. McHoul is, in my opinion, correct when
he states that an 'ethnomethodology of reading' must bear in mind that, "what
the later Wittgenstein, and other contemporary critics of essentialism point to
as an object of study is use, actual occasions of use, or the artful, and
organised, practices of users of texts" (ibid:55). Unfortunately, he equates users
of texts as isolated readers such as researchers.
After this, but prior to 'Hermeneutic and ethnomethodological
formulations of conversational and textual talk' (1982a) discussed above,
McHoul produced 'The Practical Methodology of Reading in Science and
Everyday Life: Reading Althusser Reading Marx' (1980). This is an interesting
article which takes as its problem Althusser's view of science, a view which
following Bachelard sees the history of science as non-empirical and
independent of common-sense thinking and practices. McHoul's aim then is to
do an 'ethnomethodology of reading' of Althusser's 'scientific' reading and
interpretation of the writings of Marx. McHoul wishes to show how Althusser's
reading of Marx relies upon an unexplicated use of common-sense practices.
Basically, McHoul believes that he has located Althusser using 'common sense'
and 'everyday' reading practices, namely the documentary method, in his
reading of Marx. Methods which he accuses Althusser of refusing to take in his
account of reading practices.
We have already looked at the problem of McHoul analysing his own
readings of texts, here we have him analysing Althusser's theoretical account
of how he has read Marx. Although McHoul is not relying on his own reading
here, Althusser's account of how he has read Marx cannot be taken, from a
ethnomethodological perspective, to be the actual practices he engaged in when
reading Marx. As a consequence McHoul actually deconstructs Althusser's
accounting practices rather than his reading practices, his is still one step
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removed from an 'ethnomethodology of reading' , and however interesting the
discussion he can not escape this. Again we see McHoul failing at the empirical
level.
In his Book 'Telling How Texts Talk: Essays on Reading and
Ethnomethodology' (1982b), McHoul reproduces his Ph.D thesis with
additional material from the papers discussed above. Here he describes four
studies in the 'ethnomethodology of reading', though he immediately notifies
the reader of his text that he is not honouring the distinction made in
ethnomethodology between empirical materials of investigation on the one hand
and 'constructive' or 'stipulative' theorising on the other. Rather, he believes
that since practical (empirical) action is the basis of all social action, including
all theoretical action "the analysis of (empirical) occasions of reading and work
of ethnomethodological discursive practice need not be taken as distinctly
separate forms of investigation" (ibid:ix). A position that is very close to that
of Smith. However, although theorising may be legitimately seen as a form of
practical action, I suggest it does not mean that the practice of theorising is
legitimised as an ethnomethodological method, rather it just means that it is a
potential topic for etbnomethodological study.
McHoul complains that Garfinkel's ethnomethodology is one that
'eschews' programmatics and prefers empirical investigations of local everyday
interactions. This, for McHoul, seems to result in the exclusion of questions of
text and textuality: "It is as if ordinariness magically vacated the scene once the
question of text entered it. Somehow the participants to the interaction could no
longer be considered to be co-present to one another" (McHoul 1982b:3). What
I suggest we can see here is that, McHoul has problems finding texts in
naturally occurring situated action, and that to get over this he disingenuously
claims that reading creates a co-present participant. McHoul contrasts this with
his aims which try "to find means of doing investigations of, the ways in which
(ordinary) textual objects get locally produced and sustained as (and in) the
details of situated occasions of reading" (ibid:3).
Finally, the main problem with McHoul's work, at least for this current
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study is, his inability to recognise, or at least navigate, some basic problems
with his phenomena in an ethnomethodological fashion, either conversation
analytic or ethnomethodological. For instance he notes:
"Reading, in short, is practically a non-observable. To put the problem
grossly, third-party observation of some reading's occasion or video-
recording the performance of a reading would not preserve the rational
methodical practices of those occasions for future analysis in the way
conversational recordings and transcripts do." (ibid: 103)
Here again we have McHoul displaying a narrow interpretation of the
phenomena he is engaged with, an individual reading a text to themselves, the
interaction being that of the reader and the 'author'. Of course a recording of
such interaction is not going to display any activity, as this interaction is silent
and invisible apart from eye-movement and possible non-verbal responses.
McHoul, then decides that the way for him to get beyond this problem, after
some attempts at breaching experiments, is to give an ethnographic description
of his own activities as he reads a newspaper. This, I believe, is McHoul going
off in completely the wrong direction as this is different from the
ethnomethodologist using their members' methods to understand naturally
occurring interaction."
31 McHoul quotes Roy Turner in justification of this:
"The sociologist inevitably trades on his members' knowledge in
recognizing the activities that participants to an interaction are engaged in; for
example, it is by virtue of my status as a competent member that I can
recurrently locate in my transcripts instances of the same activity." (Turner
1971:177 quoted by McHoul 1982b:95)
However, Turner is not talking about recognising the activities of the
author and how they are recognized by the reader in reading a text, he is talking
about recognising activities in a transcript of a tape recorded interaction
between two or more individuals engaged in some activity. McHoul is being
disingenuous in taking it otherwise.
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6.1c E. Livingston.
From the above we can see that there have been attempts to look at the
role of texts in interaction, that methodologies have been devised, but that a
problem has been locating suitable naturally occurring environments to record
data. This has been compounded by a misconception of the nature of what a text
is and how it is used. A useful clarification of the nature of texts and their
description is provided by Livingston (1995).
The problems that we have raised in the ethnomethodology of reading
by McHoul, and to an extent in Smith, can be illuminated by Livingston's 'An
Anthropology of Reading' (1995).32 Here Livingston looks at the properties of
reading as that reading is explicated in literary criticism. Looking at the
accounts in literary criticism of literary texts, and that the accounts of those
texts and how these literary texts should be read, Livingston defines these
accounts as providing 'instructed readings' of the original literary texts. Whilst
Livingston claims that an anthropology of reading examines reading practices
themselves, the "phenomena of reading beneath the reasoned discourse"
(ibid:5), his phenomena are actually the accounts of literary texts by literary
critics. However, Livingston is not unaware of this position and is possibly one
of the reasons he has not designated his study ethnomethodological.
Although Livingston does occasionally seem to fall into giving his own
account of the literary text as a contrast, sometimes even as the more 'correct'
version, his aim is to look at the reading practices that the literary community
use. These reading practices he designates as 'reading cultura', in contrast with
'reading simpliciter' as performed by the non-literary (laic) community." It is
32Although Livingston's studies are usually ethnomethodological in the
'studies of work' sense, he make no claim to this study being
ethnomethodological. Whilst this is the case, his anthropological approach is
very much informed by his Garfinkelian influences.
33The laic and professional reading practices are not separate entities but
are inevitably intertwined (Livingston 1995: 142).
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these reading practices and their basis in a community of readers which is a
central focus of the study. Livingston notes that a document does not provide
a full gestalt picture of whatever it describes, and may even provide
contradictory elements, and that it is the work of the readers to create the
picture of events that the documents provide. As to the question of whether the
text or the reader 'provides' the interpretation, he states:
"The interrelatedness of contextual clues in a text provides a similar
gestalt 'texture' for reading. The interrelatedness of these clues does not
lie in the text, but in the activity of reading that uncover them. Neither,
however, does that interrelatedness not lie in the text, but in a text already
and always embedded in the activity of reading. The clues fit together to
provide a description of how the work of reading should be organized,
and the clues are uncovered and fit together, in real time, by the reader,
as a developing organization of reading's prosaic work." (ibid: 14)
What is interesting about this statement, not that I perceive it to be
fundamentally flawed, in fact I more agree than disagree with it, it is that none
of the materials that Livingston works with as data is in 'real time'. If it was I
believe Livingston would possibly have termed the study ethnomethodological,
and the fact that he does not I suggest indicates that he is aware of this,
although he does not raise it as a methodological issue. The effect of this on
Livingston's study is that, when he makes claims as to the nature by which the
members of the literary culture reads its texts, he is actually relying on accounts
of how those 'should' be read. These are two separate things, as he himself has
hinted at (Livingston 1993). Livingston does seem to be aware of this at times
(1995:52) but seems to confuse them at others, this is most evident in his
ignoring the context of the reading in a social sense as he uses his texts as
secondary sources removed from any context of a reader's actual reading
activity - either of the primary or secondary texts. Thus I think we can say that
more emphasis is put on the role of the text in action than on the actions of the
reader, i.e. the emphasis is more on the facilities that the text allows as an
object - even if reading is taken to be a uniformly learnt skill, which I doubt.
Livingston does not seem to be able to escape from the interpretation of texts
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themselves to the description and use of those texts by others, the textual
instructions and reported readings not being the same thing.
Livingston designates the text as an object, but an object that is a
[text/reading] pair (ibid: 19), that communities of readers have methods of
interpreting, and non-static ones at that, but the individual and their occasions
of reading are largely ignored in his analysis. He states:
" .. all characterizations and analyses of a text have this inherent ambiguity
as descriptions and instructions. The description of something real is
always imprecise; there is always a gap between a description and
reading's work." (ibid:55)
Although Livingston's concerns are with descriptions of texts in the
prescribed readings of literary critics of literary texts, in the end we are given
his reading of those descriptions as their context when we go in search of the
reading part of the [text/reading] text. In the way that Livingston has framed his
study, as anthropological, this is not necessarily problematic, but the same
methods could not be adopted for an ethnomethodological study of situated
activities. Livingston's aim is to display how the literary community reads, and
how it always locates a rationality in a text (ibid:69), this he partially does.
One of the interesting practices that Livingston points out is the
presentation of selected quotes of the literary text and the description of the
reading that is to be made if it. This practice allows the possibility of producing
an interpretation that, if the literary text was read as a whole, would not be
viable. This point is one that is directly applicable to the presentation of data in
sociology, where segments of data are presented and translated in a similar
'free' way. But also worthy of investigation as a situated practice in
environments such as the courts and tribunals. The importance of the instructed
readings is that they "distort" the ordinary laic reading practices, adding or
modifying the reading through embedded instructions. The embedded
instructions turn the text into a "deeply reasoned object" (ibid:71). This
instructed reading can be seen to be evident also in the production of
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transcriptions of talk in the human sciences, each transcription procedure
having its own rationality and community of readers. This is not to say that
such 'instructed readings' are incorrect, as they may provide good and
accountable reasons for why a text or transcript should be read in this way. As
such they become objects in their own right (ibid:85), and such 'distortions'
may be valid within the community concerned. Such distortions of 'original'
textual objects are unavoidable in that: "Every reference to a text, to what a text
says, to an interpretation, to meaning, to grammatical structure, to rhetorical
figures, to prosody, is a reference to an instructed reading of a text" (ibid:94).
This in itself does not trivialise the practices and insights of the discipline, for
Livingston, in that the literary criticism community derived insights are still
valid discoveries of that community (ibid:99). Livingston applies this insight
onto sociology and states:
"Even though sociology is directed to real-world studies of the ordinary
society, the 'real' society has been mystified; the reality of the real
society has become the affair of a community of sociologists, and the
authority for an analysis of the society comes to reside within professional
practice." (ibid: 103)
The reading that a community has of its texts being the valid reading of texts
within that community. This being the case we can expect that the reading that
legal practitioners make of texts to be displays of the valid readings of texts in
the legal community, or at least that area of the legal community, and
indigenous to it. Though it must be noted that the notion of community that
Livingston adopts is a very unexplicated one, although one assumes it is
nebulous without fixed boundaries.
Livingston's study is of the reading practices of the literary community,
this community is a very reflexive community in that writing about its own way
of reading is part of the task of that community. Whilst, other communities may
not be so involved with their own reading practices, the legal community is
more concerned than most. However, just as the written instructions in guides
to legal practice about legal reading could not, at least ethnomethodologically,
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be said to necessarily reflect actual practice the same may be true of the literary
community. At the end of the day, we can not say that Livingston has reported
on the reading activities of the literary community, but rather upon aspects of
their reported reading in the form of 'instructed readings' that are themselves
the literary products of that community. Livingston's text is problematic, not
anthropologically perhaps, but definitely if incorporated into the
ethnomethodological 'community'.
6.1d Further Ethnomethodological Studies.
There are some ethnomethodological studies of the use of documents in
action, rather than how the are being read by the researcher themselves. One
of these is Heap's (1990) 'Applied Ethnomethodology: Looking at the Local
Rationality of Reading Activities'. This study looks the oral reading of texts by
school children in group teaching, the text is also an argument for doing
"applied ethnomethodology", which is in essence ethnomethodology without the
tenet of 'disinterestedness'. This applied ethnomethodological study aims to
assess teaching practices on learning to read, focusing mainly on the situated
nature of the identification of errors. That the identification of errors in this
teaching practice works theoretically on a one to one basis with the reader,
whereas in practice the whole class is in audio-visual co-presence. Heap
assesses the possible pedagogical rationality involved in teaching that can only
be seen via the use of an ethnomethodological perspective, invisible in
traditional educational theory which does not take into account the situated
nature of reading in a class full of pupils. This is an interesting paper by Heap,
however his concern with an assessment of the pedagogical theories means that
we only get sixteen lines of data, the rest of the text becomes somewhat more
abstract.
Heath, Luff and Nicholls (1995) looking at computer assisted
collaborative work in a news agency where texts are on screen rather than just
in a paper format note that the text "does not so much 'mediate' the interaction
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between the participants, but is rather 'ongoingly' constituted by and through
the interaction" (ibid:213). Heath and Luff (1996) note that despite the
paperless office paper documents still playa critical part in work settings, this
being due to the failure of the technology to "support intricate and complex
social and collaborative organisation which underlies even the more mundane
and seemingly 'individual' workplace activities" (ibid:354). This fact underlines
the role that documents play in the work activities of contemporary society.
Heath and Luff are themselves here concerned specifically with medical
records." Heath and Luff adopt the position that if the documents are to be used
on more than one occasion and by differing medical practitioners, they must
embody generic practices of both record production and reading. These
practices being especially important in the design of technologies to support
collaborative work, rely on viewing the text in much the same way as
Livingston (1996). Unlike much of their research work (Heath, Luff and
Nicholls 1995, and Heath and Nicholls forthcoming) and recommendations
(Luff, Jirotka, Heath and Greatbatch 1993), this paper does not rely on video
analysis of action in progress, but instead seems to rely on their own reading
of medical records - although a reading informed by much research in this area.
However, as we have seen in some of the other literature, this method can be
problematic. An instance of this here is when Heath and Luff present us with
the following record:
14/4/83 c. 'badly bruised'
cert 1/4
rlf Brook Centre
of which they state:
34 Heath and Luff (1996) discuss the computer system know as VAMP
designed to assist General Practitioners during consultations with patients. I
have looked at video data of the 'Prodigy' system for General Practitioners
being developed at the University of Newcastle on which VAMP and similar
systems are based, and this data seems to show similar document use as
reported by Heath and Luff here.
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"The first entry is rather curious, 'badly bruised' in inverted commas is
the patient's presenting characterisation rather than an assessment by the
practitioner. There is no treatment for bruising and no confirmation of the
patient's claim provided. However, whilst the practitioner appears to
suggest he could not find evidence of the bruising, the recommended
management gives a slightly different flavour. The Brook centre, to
which the patient was referred 'rlf', is a hostel for battered women. So
while the doctor seems to be ambivalent as to the evidence of the patients
'claim', he was obviously concerned enough to refer the woman in
question to the centre. The practitioner has deliberately built in ambiguity
and uncertainty into his characterisation of the consultation." (ibid:357)
This analysis rests on the us of inverted commas being read, by medical
practitioners as representing a quote from the patient. Heath and Luff on the
basis of this take it as being the case that the doctor has not seem the bruising
but that it is only reported by the patient. However, whilst this interpretation
of the inverted commas seems plausible, it is hard to believe that a patient
arrives at a doctors surgery reporting to be badly bruised from a domestic
incident and the doctor does not ask to see the injuries. Instead, the doctor
refers the patient directly to a women's refuge! Is it not possible that the
inverted commas do not represent quotation marks on behalf of the patient,
instead they could denote an understatement on behalf of the doctor - although
I would not wish to categorically state that this was in fact the case. In fact,
Heath and Luff's conclusion that the record had a built in ambiguity is not
threatened by my, or any other, interpretation. But the claim that it will be read
by another practitioner as a quote meaning that doctor is suggesting that he did
not examine the patients injuries is not so easy to maintain. What is needed is
an occasion on which the records are read by another practitioner, in which the
reading is displayed. Heath and Luff are correct in claiming that their paper
analyses how documentary records are written, and how the writing is sensitive
to the needs of potential readers. That the records are produced for a future use,
not necessarily as a record of what has occurred, something that their analysis
displays. However, the intention of the doctor writing the records is not easily
read from the records themselves, admittedly some references 'seem'
transparent in their inscriptions, others nonetheless are less so. Whether the use
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of inverted commas suggests that it will be read by another practitioner as the
doctor "suggesting he could find no evidence of the bruising" is not too
transparent."
In Hak's (1992) 'Psychiatric Records as Transformations of Other
Texts', Hak recognises that an ethnomethodologically informed text analysis
does not compare texts against some external 'reality' and judge their validity,
but that texts must be studied in the activities that are partly constituted by the
texts themselves. Hak's approach is heavily influences by Garfinkel's "'Good"
Organizational Reasons for "Bad" Clinical Records' (1967), and Hak notes that
from Garfinkel we can understand that sociologists do not have the necessary
knowledge to interpret documents and that they "can only describe the ways
competent staff members produce and use records as part of the practicalities
of their bureaucratic work" (1992: 142). Hak takes issue with this though and
suggests that:
"Potentially at least... records can be studied as a product of a
psychiatrist's 'practical theorizing' about a patient's given behaviour.
Second, a competent reading of - and by implication a competent writing
of - psychiatric records cannot completely be defined locally, and the
record must bear at least some relation to 'ideal' psychiatric competence,
for the simple reason that eventually sanctionable performances by
clinical members must be evaluated by outside experts. This means that
even a local meaning for present use can be uncovered - at least partially -
by using 'ideal' procedures and theories as interpretative tools" (ibid: 142)
This initially appears as a harmless assumption by Hak but it is bringing
into the description of situated practices forms of explanation that are in essence
35 I realise that Heath and Luff may in fact have other evidence to support
their analysis which they have not presented due to the intended audience of this
article. My aim here has been merely illustrate the need for caution in
assumptions about what the textual document can in fact reveal in and of itself,
by using an example from researchers who themselves take this as a serious
issue, I hope to have emphasized this point. In this research that caution means
focusing on the texts in use, rather than any interpretation of them myself.
Although of course I am forced to interpret texts when producing this thesis at
a number of levels as well as actually producing one.
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theoretical explanations, an aim not dissimilar to D. E. Smith.
Following this and to finally clarify our position here we shall look at
a study by Lynch and Bogen (1996).
6.lf Lynch and Bogen.
A significant study relating to this thesis" is Lynch and Bogen' (1996)
'The Spectacle of History: Text and Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings'. An
ethnomethodological study which focuses on the interplay between spoken
personal testimony and written organisational records, rather than attempting
to get back to an original event or a decontextualised account of how texts are
read." There are some similarities between the Congressional Hearings (Lynch
and Bogen actually refer to it as a tribunal) and the Legal Aid Tribunals we are
concerned with. A similarity increased due to the fact that Oliver North was
able to negotiate for his attorney Sullivan to be at his side throughout the
hearings, normally the speaker/witness is unaccompanied, North deeming it
advantageous to have legal representation, rather than not to.
The data which Lynch and Bogen had available was video tapes of the
television coverage, coverage which was extensive in the United States, and
thus different from the audio tapes collected for this thesis. Further, their aim
was not to cover the whole proceedings, but to describe selected moments in an
attempt to understand the situated practices by which historical events are
composed and decomposed (ibid: 1). These situated practices were not just the
talk itself, but the role of the written documents in the testimony. Lynch and
36 Goodwin's (1996) 'Professional Vision' which covers many similar issues
to Lynch and Bogen (1996) in relation to visual representations, especially the
Rodney King trial data.
37 The version of ethnomethodology' s position on text I have most closely
affiliated being Lynch's (1994: 146) statement that: "Wittgenstein and
ethnomethodology inform us that the extent to which expressions and texts take
on referential functions owe less to the intrinsic properties of representational
items than to deeds performed when those items are embedded in action."
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Bogen's ability to use visual data allowed them much more scope into the role
of documents than is available from purely audio tapes.
Their book covers much of interest that can not be discussed here,
though what must be mentioned is their work on documentary interrogation.
Lynch and Bogen note the amount of attention in the hearing relating to
documents, both those present and those absent (shredded), the discourse itself
being never very far removed from the substantial amount of documentation
collected for the hearing. Lynch and Bogen note that recognition of when
speech was directly from a text, paraphrasing, or non-textual in origin was not
signalled as such but was normatively audible, as were comments that we
spoken for the official record. Further, they note that it is impossible to state
whether the spoken or written word had priority, and often to even make a
distinction between them (ibid:205). An aspect which they develop into what
could be seen as an 'epistopic' debate between the ideas of Derrida and Searle.
Lynch and Bogen describe what they call the 'documentary method of
interrogation' as: "an interrogatory method (or set of methods) in which
material documents are used as resources for question a witness" (ibid:214).
This is achieved by drawing the witness into the document as an object/exhibit,
outlining various aspects of the documents, locating and reading key passages,
and relating that to their joint on-going activity in the tribunal. Lynch and
Bogen then describe some of the practices that North and Nields (North's
interrogator), employed in this document based interrogation and defense, the
interrogation relying on hearably document derived questions. Lynch and
Bogen suggest that what North displayed in his applied-deconstruction of the
document and the questions based upon them, was that the documents did not
provide unequivocal 'facts' or 'versions' and that North was able to utilise
'plausible deniability' to out-manoeuvre Nields. Of great interest here was the
fact that not only were contents of texts able to be 'denied' in this fashion, but
that texts (those that originated from North's alleged activities) had actually
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been designed with future 'plausible deniability' in mind." The Congressional
committee wanted to use documents as representations of real-world events, but
the texts did not allow this cutting the present off from the past. This 'failure'
of the documents allowed gaps in versions of events to appear which were
exploited by the 'hostile witness' North (ibid:224). Lynch and Bogen say of the
documentation:
"However definite, the referential details of a document do not act as a
foundation for the inquiry so much as they function as one set of
resources among many to be used as part of the collective, and
contentious, work of building an official history." (ibid:224)
Whilst our legal aid tribunals may not be such historical events as the
Iran-Contra hearings, the documents are used to build an official account of
sorts, and, like the Iran-Contra tribunal, going over the documents allows the
production of another, either contrary or more refined, version of events. This
production is constructed however, in the turn by turn interaction of
participants. It is worth noting that this study of Lynch and Bogen does call into
question some of the ethnomethodological accounts of the nature of textual
documents, especially decontextualised versions of reading practices. As this
study most closely attends to some of the observations developed in this
chapter, it will be from this post-analytic ethnomethodological position that
develop our methods and orientation towards the data of this thesis.
6.2 Texts in Tribunals.
We noted in previous chapters the use of textual documentation in
tribunals, especially in relation to problem solving and surpassing conflicting
38 Ways of maintaining alternative versions in cross-examinations are also
discussed in Metzger and Beach (1996), though this study is conversation-
analytic rather than post-analytic ethnomethodology. Metzger and Beach do not
focus on the role of texts though.
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understandings and impasses that arise during the cases. That from the outset
textual documentation is central to the processing of a tribunal case whether
attended or non-attended cases. It was suggested that the major difference
between them was that in the former the appellant would be present and could
be used as a resource, one aspect of which was the ability provide an additional
perspective in the interpretation of documents, a factor absent at non-attended
cases. We also saw that written documentation helps tribunal members focus on
key aspects of the case, as well as being invoked as tools for resolving disputes
over meaning that occur in the discussions.
In this section we will look at some of the practices that occur in an
attended tribunal case. In the first phase, before the appellant is brought into the
hearing, although the panel members may be aware that an appellant will
become available for questioning at a later phase, as in the non-attended case
(Case One Chapter Four) they only have the documents as a resource.
Nevertheless, as we have seen there are a range of activities which the panel
members can undertake in this the first phase of the tribunal case hearing (see
Appendix Three and Chapter Four). What we shall focus on here though is the
issue of what it is that the documents, as illustrated by their usage in the
activities of the tribunal members, are seen to be facilitating.
That the tribunal panel orientate to the documents they have been
provided with by the Legal Aid Board is evidenced by the Case Two in Chapter
Four.
ch :now in the normal way we we (.) we look at this in case (.) we
have formed a view of reading (.) on this occasion we have got (.)




The panel here can be seen to be orientated towards the documents as
evidence, the data, relating to the occurrence of some phenomenon. This
phenomenon being not some experiment, but an occurrence in the everyday
world or at least a representation of it. The panel members do not have access
to the phenomenon itself, but only the documentation relating to its occurrence.
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Nevertheless they orientate towards that documentation as being an 'adequate'
representation, and they do not, under 'normal' circumstances, doubt whether
or not that event has occurred. This is similar to the work that scientists do, in
that they discuss the data which represents the original phenomenon rather than
the phenomenon itself." Explicit reference is made in the above example to the
fact that the material they are considering is not the original phenomenon, but
rather the textual documentation standing as its representation. The chair also
indicates that this is a normal practice of the tribunal, and therefore indicates
that they have "normal" procedures. He also seems to indicate that each case
presents different circumstances for that procedure, and "on this occasion" there
is a lot of paperwork, suggesting that their work will revolve around the
contents of these documents.
Further to this we can see that the data is not seen as unambiguous or
self-evident. The members of the tribunal have all read the documentation prior







:1 I was minded to grant it (2.0) (any takers) (0.6)
:my comment about this 1 made uhh (.) a bit outside my field (.)
was about adoption (0.4)
As can been seen from Case Three (see Appendix Three for full
transcript) in the initial comment of panel member one (line 6), the chair having
just orientated the panel to which case they were to consider next, they give
their opinion and ask if any of the other panel members had also made such a
reading of the case documentation. There is no assumption here that this was
self-evidently the only interpretation that could be made. This is evidenced by
39 This is illustrated by Lynch (1985) who shows that such representations
allow phenomenon to be perceived by scientists. Lynch and Edgerton (1988)
show how such transformations use the routine aesthetic of scientists, and
Lynch (1988) investigates how these representations are used in the construction
of 'facts'. Though Lynch (1994) advises caution in the discussion of
'representation' noting that it is a topic for ethnomethodological respecification.
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the fact that panel member two (lines 7 and 8), does not give a definite opinion
of whether the case does, or does not, in their reading qualify for legal aid, but
raises an issue that they wish to discuss further. In doing so they may be seen
to be not agreeing whole-heartedly with panel member one, achieved by panel
member two by introducing a topic in relation to the documentary evidence that
needs some clarification, some further interpretation.
The difference between the panel member in an attended case, even
when at the non-attended phase as regards input from an appellant, is that the
panel members at an attended tribunal, know they have access to an individual
whom they can ask for clarification on opaque aspects of the documents. As in
the attended case (Case Two in Chapter Four) of the previous chapter they
decide immediately to use this resource. However, in Case Three the panel
members spend a short while interpreting the documents with recourse to their
own common-sense and legal knowledge. It is only after spending some time
discussing the documentation in this manner, and coming to no resolution as to





:(unclear) worry about what happens (unclear) (.)
:that's his worry (.) he expresses it somewhere in the papers (35.0)
The discussion between the panel members as to the interpretation of the
documents makes explicit reference to the texts before them. These texts are
used as references for grounding their debate, as by panel member two in Case
Three (case one line 43 above) - incidentally, this occurs during the transition
period while waiting for the appellant. 40
That the panel members treat the documentation as evidence of a
phenomenon, or state of affairs, rather than the 'natural' phenomena, would
40 It would be interesting to look in more detail at the design of such
references and to the work they do e.g. how they may request that other
look/read documents. How they may be used to support particular views; how
they may be built to cast the text in a particular light and so on, but this form
of analysis is not aimed at here.
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seem to be evidenced when they believe that they do not have sufficient data.
5 pml :we ought to have expert evidence (unclear) (1.0) reluctant to see
6 him embark upon (3.0) application until know what we've got
7 (unclear) (4.0)
32 pm2 [but surely (unclear) on this to get psychiatric report and
33 opinion (.)
This desire for further information occurs twice in the Case Four. In the
first instance (lines 5 to 7 above), panel member one does not make explicit
what the further evidence they believe desirable is, this may reflect that it
occurs at the beginning of the panel's discussion. But later on in the discussion
(lines 32 and 33), a desire for further information is requested and its nature is
made explicit. Another instance of the request for further information is made,
this time relating to the age of the children, but on this occasion the clerk is
able to provide the information (lines 47 to 48). At least partially since the clerk
does not have the age of all the children.
47 ch :how old are these boys do we know it isn't in the papers that
48 we've had (.)
49 cl :we (.) we (.)
50 ch :they presume we do know do they
51 cl :yes (.)
52 ch :how old are they (0.2)
53 cl :the son (name) is (age) (0.2) (name) is (age) there is there is
54 another child (.)
This provision of information by the clerk is notable in that it indicates
that the panel members do not have all the possible evidence, but that they have
been selectively provided it by the legal Aid Board - at least on this occasion.
The clerk has a fuller set of documentation, though as evidenced here, not
'complete', which is available to the panel if it becomes necessary.
Many of the activities that the tribunal members get involved in while
assessing a case seem to put into question what the phenomenon is that they are
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actually dealing with. We assume that the phenomenon is some event that
occurred and which is subject to legal action, of which the case documents
stand as a representation. At a basic level it seems that the tribunal panel
orientate to the documents they have been provided with by the Legal Aid
Board as representations of some phenomenon to be explained, and that this
phenomenon is an original occurrence. While this again indicates that the panel
are not looking at phenomena in the original, but rather they are working from
documentary representations, and this appears largely unproblematic for them.
The reason why this may be unproblematic we saw evidenced by Case Two
where a view is formed not just of a phenomenon as an isolated actual event
represented by documentation, but of a case in law in documentation. The panel
members are looking at the documents as representing a legal case not just an
originating phenomenon. Further the documentary representation of events is
not expected to be a 'natural' representation, but a representation orientated to
legal practices, procedure and statutes. This representation is constituted by a
number of documents which have a procedural way of being assessed, but that
procedure does not necessarily remain identical on each occasion. From this we
can see that the phenomenon that the documentary representations constitute is
not unambiguous, as it appears to be both a past phenomenon and a current one.
The current phenomenon that the documents are a representation of, a legal
case, is also a phenomenon in its own right, not just in the sense that any
representation is itself an object phenomenon, but that here that object
phenomenon is being assessed itself, not just what it represents. This
phenomenon is a collection of documents representing, and constituting, a legal
case orientated towards legal processing in the courts, but, and this will be
illustrated below, a case orientated towards the gaining of legal aid (and which
has already been refused once) that has to be presented as representing a case
going to court in order. That is if it is to satisfy the criteria of the legal aid
board for the granting of legal aid. These criteria become manifested in the
form of the legal aid tribunal member's deliberations.
To summarise, the documentation which is presented to the legal aid
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board would seem to be a representation of three individual, but connected
phenomena:
a. A past event that it is claimed is in need of legal adjudication.
b. A current event, a case constituting an appeal against the refusal of legal aid.
c. A future event, a case that will potentially end up being adjudicated in a court
of law.
Considering that the case documents are representing all of these,
although it must be remembered that they are doing all these in the temporal
present of a legal aid tribunal, we can see that role that the documents have to
perform is a complicated one.
This complicated function of the documentary representations makes it
obvious why attended tribunals are preferred by the tribunal panel, in contrast
to the unattended, for ease of understanding and interpretation of the
phenomena. Of course, the extent to which each appellant can help in the
interpretation of the documentation by the tribunal is not the same in each
instance. The more skilled the appellant at understanding the needs and
functions of the documentary representations the more likely, it can be
assumed, they will be in assisting the tribunal. This will be seen below in the
second where the appellant will have the assistance of a legal representative as
well as being present themselves.
6.2b The Legal Representative and the Focus on Textual Representation.
It was suggested that these representations could all exist in the temporal
present of a legal aid tribunal, although the focus of the panel may be on one
or other of them. The complicated functioning of the documentary
representations makes it obvious why attended tribunals are preferred by the
tribunal panel, in contrast to the unattended, Le. for potential ease of
understanding the interpretations of the textual phenomena. The extent to which
each appellant can help in the interpretation of the documentation can not be
expected to be the same on each occasion. The more skilled the appellant is in
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understanding the needs and functions of the documentary representations the
more helpful they are likely to be in assisting the tribunal, though this can not
be assumed to always be the case. A focus in this thesis being the actual
practices of legal practitioners and activities around the manipulation of the
texts which form the data which it is the panel's task to interpret.
In descriptions of the work of the legal representative as in Case Five,
it appears that documents are used as support for a preferred 'goal' i.e. the
granting of legal aid. This work entails persuading the panel of the credibility
of the interpretation that the representative wants them to read into the
documents. The manner in which this is done does not seem to be reliant on an
understanding and interpretation of the legal statutes pertaining to the case, as
much as the interactional skills and technique of negotiation and
argumentation." This is clearly displayed in this case where the representative's
activities are seen alongside the activities of their client. The client here, unlike
most other legal institutions, not being restricted by rules of formal procedure
from joining in the interaction. What is noticeable is the contingent nature of
the work of the lawyer, that he does appear to follow a set rules of procedure
which would related to the positivist view of legal procedure, but has as more
ad hoc approach. This also seems to be true of the work of the panel, as
although the chair does try and 'control' the discussion with recourse to legal
statutes, these are themselves employed on an ad hoc basis.
We have described (in Appendix Three) many of the activities that the
legal representative engaged in on behalf of the appellant, and how these
revolve around the textual documentation that is before the tribunal panel.
These activities have been seen as they occurred in the data, and they are
unique in this fashion to this particular case. Without detracting from this
description, I suggest that we can also see the work of the representative as
41 The importance of relatively subtle variations in language and
presentational style in courtroom interaction are reported to influence juror's
reactions and deliberations (Conley, O'Barr and Lind 1978). The is no reason
to suspect that the same is not true to some extent with tribunal panel members.
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negotiating a course through the tribunal, in which his aim has been to have his
version of events that the documents provide for, as the one to be considered.
In the description we can seen the representative trying to control the direction
of the case hearing. However, I suggest that this version of events can be
supplemented by viewing these attempts at control in terms of negotiation of the
three versions. Though it is not being suggested that the concerns of panel,
appellant, and legal representative are positioned in the same way in all
tribunals. Neither is it being implied that this is the only 'tactic' that the
representative employs, or that it is employed from the beginning. What I am
suggesting is that it has been employed here and that it is possible to see much
of the interaction, not as disputing versions of events, but as deciding which
representation is the salient one for the tribunal to consider.
We can track, if briefly, some of the movement from the representations
provided in the documents. Of course these have to be situationally invoked,
and other representations could undoubtably be invoked in other situations,












:so are you saying that no transition plan was drawn up (.)
:well as far as Ican ascertain no transition plan has been drawn up
and I have discussed this with mister and misses (name) (.) and eh
[they would surely
know
:-and the latest official document was the (.) latest form of the
statement (.) which (.) was dated the 14th of august ninety-two (.)
and I have a copy of that and that actually recommended that the
child remain (.) at the school where he then was which was the (.)
(name) special school in (place name) (.) and that always remained
(.) err the wish (.) of the parents (.) now its part of our case (.)
We can see early on in the second phase of the tribunal (Case Five), we
have the chair and the solicitor discussing the documents with reference to
events in the past which they represent. This pertains more closely to what I
suggested were the main concerns of the parents and we can see their legal
representative as stressing those concerns, and current wishes of the parents in









s :that's right (.) but the main thrust of my argument is really based
upon (.) that judgement that was made in december (.) erm and
(0.2) the fact of the matter here (.) is that (name of child) was
destatemented (.) there was never a considered reason why the
statementing process (.) should stop when he reached the age of
sixteen (.) the local education authority simply did that (.) they
shouldn't have done that (.)
A short while later we have the legal representative give a version of
what he believes the documentary evidence submitted as a case represents, or
what he wishes the panel to see it as representing. At this point it is still
anchored to the concerns of the parents and the situation of the child, but we
can see it as focusing on the activities of the local education authority and the













[yeah [so what (.) surely your
best point is this (.) that the the local the education authority have
not got to grips with need (.) to (.) take and make a proper
proposal (.) for this for (child's name) (0.2) am I right (0.2)
:well what I'm saying is that they are no longer maintaining a
statement (.) und that they are (.) unlawfully failing to maintain a
statement (0.2) that they've adopted a policy (.) that where
children have special educational needs and are statemented (.)
they will automatically cease to statement them at sixteen (.)
without considering whether it's appropriate (.) those are the facts
of the case (.)
:well you don't do you have any evidence of the policy (.) I mean
Yet a little further along we can see the chair trying to focus the concern
of the legal representative, and his description of what the representation
provided by the documents that the panel should be concerned with, as focusing
on the child and the local education authority's actions towards that child (lines
217 to 220). However, the legal representative maintains his stress on the
documentation as representing a policy, an 'illegal' one, and in doing so the
focus is not on the action in the past towards the child he is representing, but
a policy which needs to be revoked by action in the courts (lines 221-227). We
can see that he is not being totally unsuccessful in making the chair attending
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to the case documents in this light, although it is only to the extent that the chair








:it's it's the ceasing to provide statement (.) that we're tackling
here (.) and what we are saying is that there's a a policy (.) that
in all cases of children with special educational needs (.) they will
cease to cease to statement them (.) those individuals without
considering whether that is appropriate or
[what is your evidence
s
pm
what is your evidence for that (.)
We can see another instance of this attempt by the representative to have
the documents viewed in this light, note that by using "we" he is invoking it
also as the position of the parents whom he is representing (line 289). However,
on this occasion it is a panel member who does not see the documents as










ch :can Iask mister and misses (child's parents name) Imean (.) what
has happened so far as (.) (child's name)' s education is concerned
at the moment (.)
:he's at (name) college errm (unclear) but (.) he's there (.) he was
very borderline as to whether or not they could take him or not (.)
and he's he does have (.) very difficult problems (unclear) with
behaviour so if therefore they decided to (.) errm (.) to (dis ... ?)
(child's name) from college (.) which they are perfectly entitled to
they don't have to keep him there (.)
m
A short while after this we see the chair focusing back on the issue of
the child, and doing this not with reference to their representative, but the
parents themselves (lines 337 to 340). Here we see the focus move back to the
version of what the parents think the documents represent, a past event that has
had undesirable consequences for the child, and the mother illuminates the
repercussions of this past event (line 340). This was a shift by the chair in
focus, and can be seen as a response to the continued focus on the interpretation











:so there's no problem at the moment but your concern is what
would (.) what might (.)
:I'm not happy with him at the college I didn't want him to go to
the college and I pleaded with them to stop at school but I didn't
(unclear) (.) I mean (.) my son was ran out into the road the other
day (.) he could have been run over and killed and I wouldn't have
a son (.) that's never happened while he was at school (.) I don't
know but they really are (.) qualified enough to be looking after
him (.) und
We can see that the one of the panel members interprets the version of
the representation of the documents provided by the mother, as not being
problematic at present (lines 365 to 366). The mother contests this version with
a statement of her unhappiness with the result of the past event in dispute (lines
367 and 368), and gives an example to illustrate it and then queries the
suitability of the present situation in light of this example (lines 369 to 373).
Note that no reference is given to the policy version of concern to their legal
representative, the reference is to the current situation caused by a past event













:I'm saying that but that's a broadly based proposition that could-
[no no
:-apply to other children as well (.)
:oh I mean hah
[my my case is
[mister (solicitor's name) we got to you
mustn't (0.4) may I remind you you're seeking legal aid for
(child's name) (.) now it really is (child's name)'s needs and
(child' s name)' s concern we're dealing with today and not (.) the
general picture of education in (county name) (.) I mean it's (.)
they have not (.) I mean (0.4) mister and misses (name) you have
told us they have not provided you with full-time education (0.2)
Nevertheless, when their legal representative returns to the discussion,
he returns to his version of the representation provided by the case documents
as being the one about the policy of the local education authority. Although he
attempts to attach this to the concerns of his clients by stating their concerns
affect other children as well (lines 428 and 430). At this point we see the chair
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focus on the issue that they see the case documents as pertaining to a
representation of an appeal against the refusal of legal aid (line 434), and not
with the issue of the legality of a supposed education policy (lines 436 and 437).
The chair then returns to the parents and their version (lines 438 and 439).
s :well (.) only one point which is that this is a public law matter in
the sense that we are dealing with statutory obligations and
although (.) (child's name) was an interested party (.) there is (.)
the point that if we are challenging what we say is there policy that
does have a knock on effect for other children (.) but of course if
we are seeking judicial review we're saying (.) that they are failing










The legal representative does not however, give up on his view of what
the focus that case documents represent should be, and we can see in his
summing-up that he is still keeping this as his earlier emphasis (line 450 to
452). However, he is not ignoring the expressed concerns of the chair and their
view of what case documents represent, and words his interpretation as to
encompass the concerns of the representation of the documentation as to the
child named in the appeal (lines 454 to 456). This orientation gaining a
recognition token from the chair (line 457). So we can see that events that the
documents are seen to represent by the various parties are not mutually
exclusive in any sort of isolated fashion.
471 s :errm is there anything else that we've (0.8) it's a matter of
472 judgement on this point but (.) our (.) original application was
473 ruled out on the basis (0.2) that we didn't have a case (0.2) I (.)
474 think that one (.) has got to take (.) a view of the way that
47 5 proceedings can be dealt with in this sort of tribunal which is an
47 6 appeal tribunal (.) this isn't a review of a judicial review
477 application (0.2) and I have not prepared it on the basis that we're
47 8 going before the court on a (.) a full hearing (.) this is a hearing
479 to establish whether we should have legal aid (.) there may be (.)
480 deficiencies in my arguments today through lack of preparation
4 81 because (.) of the nature of today's proceedings is with regard to
482 whether we should get legal aid (.) I would say that on the basis





we've established that we've got something substantial to argue
about (.) and I think. at the very least (.) it merits a decision (.) to
obtain counsel's opinion (.) at the very least (0.2)
At the end of the legal representatives summing-up, we can see that he
makes a direct interpretation of the documents and what they represent, in terms
of the appeal against the refusal of legal aid (lines 471 to 474). He does this to
the extent of saying that the present appeal tribunal has to assess the documents
and what they represent, with reference to the appeal against the refusal of legal
aid (the view of the documents that the panel are concerned with). Rather than
the interpretation of what the case documents represent that he himself has been
arguing for throughout this phase of the tribunal, that they represent a case to
be answered in a court of law by the local education authority (lines 474 to
479). He even goes as far as to say that for this reason any flaws in his
argument that the documents represent a valid case in a future court case should
be over-looked (line 479 to 482). He then goes on to make suggestions about
the nature of the award of legal aid which he believes the case merits. It is
notable that he does not make reference to the representation of events that the
parents can be seen to view the case documents as representing, but remains
with that of the panel. This is interesting in that the legal representative does
not represent the interpretation that his clients hold of the case documents, but
concentrates more on his own agenda and eventually that of the panel.
In Case Five" the panel themselves seem to orientate favourably to the
information that the mother of the child furnishes them with, that she is worried
about future consequences that are not provided for at present. Nevertheless,
the information which she provides for them is continually trying to be
controlled by her lawyer, who is attempting to direct the panel's concerns rather
than let them have control of the direction. This case is especially interesting
42 The appellants here are accompanied by a legal representative, hence both
appellant and representative are available to the panel for further clarification
of the case and its documentation. This is not an uncommon occurrence, though
by no means does it occur in the majority of cases.
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because, it illustrates the three representations that the documents were seen to
provide for above. We can see, I suggest, that the main concern of the mother
and her view of what the texts represent is that of a past event, the failure to
statement her child, that is in need of legal adjudication as to its legality.
Although her concern is with obtaining a statement rather than the finer points
of education law. The tribunal panel are concerned with the current event,
whether the documents represent a case constituting a successful appeal against
the refusal of legal aid. And the lawyer seems to be concerned with a future
event that the documents represent, a case of sufficient evidence that will end
up being adjudicated in a court of law and showing that the Local Education
Authority in question has an unlawful education policy.
Of course, each of these three parties does not remain only with one
version of what the representation provided by the documents constitute. The
mother joins in the discussion of the tribunal in its discussion of the documents
as constituting a valid appeal. The tribunal panel show a genuine concern for
the situation of the child which the documents represent, as well as an interest
in the larger ramifications of an education policy that is illegal (although not as
much as the legal representative). And the legal representative, while displaying
a primary concern with obtaining a judicial review of education policy, does
display attention to the requirements of the tribunal panel in their view of the
case documents as an appeal - and to an extent, the concerns of the mother and
situation of the child.
It is my suggestion, that we can see some of the difficulties over the
interpretation of the documents as being due to the three representations that the
documents are used to provide for.
This case has illustrated the important role that the legal representative
can play in the tribunal process. It has shown that this revolves around
discussion of what the documentation is representing. The documents have
more than one possible interpretation, and much of the discussion revolves
around negotiation of what will be the salient one for consideration of the case.
However, it should not be assumed that the other interpretations have no
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influence on the fmal interpretation presented by the representative to the panel.
Instead this final interpretation can be seen to be incorporating the concerns of
all parties, but especially those of the panel. In doing this the representative
presents a self-reflexive account, that is aware of the situated activities that
preceded the delivery. This is a sophisticated activity in which the reading of
the texts is situationally oriented, and is displayed as such by the member
concerned. The texts, interpretations, and application of law does not follow a
positivist model, but is self-reflexively negotiated with reference to the ongoing
situated activity.
6.3 Chapter Discussion.
Looking at ethnomethodologically inspired research on texts in this area,
we noted Garfinkel's observation that sociologists can only describe the ways
competent members produce and use records as part of their work (Hak
1992: 142), and that this has been a difficult practice to adhere to for most
researchers. It was suggested that Smith, although heavily influenced by the
ethnomethodological critique of sociological method and adopting many of the
methodological criteria that ethnomethodology adopts, although appearing to
get her phenomena right ultimately fails to deploy a coherent set of methods
right in researching them. Our critique of McHoul was that he assumed prior
to his investigation what the phenomena he wished to investigate actually
consisted of, and that his 'ethnomethodology of reading', though aware of the
issues, largely fails to follow these them himself in his own empirical studies.
Specifically McHoul has problems finding texts in naturally occurring situated
action, and that to get over this he disingenuously claims that reading creates
a co-present participant.
Livingston's concerns are with descriptions of texts in the prescribed
readings by literary critics of literary texts, and this anthropological approach
does not claim to be an ethnomethodological study of situated activities.
However, Livingston's aim is to display how the literary community reads, and
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how it always locates a rationality in a text, yet instead of reporting the reading
activities of the literary community he deals with of their reported readings in
the form of 'instructed readings'. Livingston's text is problematic, not
anthropologically perhaps, but definitely if incorporated into the
ethnomethodological 'community'. What we have attempted to show in this
review is that investigationof situated activity in legal aid tribunals with a focus
on the role of textual documentation, is by no means a straightforward task.
These are complex activities and require sophisticated research strategies, and
that we have seen the difficulties previous researchers have had in adhering to
their strategies.
That the issue of ethnomethodology and textual analysis remains
problematic for researchers is evidenced by Watson (1997) whose discussion
of the area fails to provide an example of text use in interaction. Incredible
when we recognise that ethnomethodological studies are centrally concerned
with taking the interactional setting and intermediate local relevances of
particular actions into account. We have suggested that the research that comes
closest to addressing our research interests and methodological concerns is that
deployed by Lynch and Bogen (1996), a study which Watson (1997)
surprisingly neglects. Lynch and Bogen's study of the judicial proceedings of
the Iran-Contra Hearing, while not identical in its concerns of our study, seems
the most suitable from which to proceed further. However, the post-analytic
ethnomethodology that Lynch and Bogen advocate, is both relatively recent,
and I suggest, methodologically sophisticated. Ethnomethodology itself is, I
believe still a young and developing programme of studies, the post-analytic
positioning by a quite small number of researchers is both radical and
challenging.
This in a sense do not attend to implicit critique that has been made in
this chapter, that the research on document use seems to consistently fall wide
of the made. The 'fact' that documents are 'loose' descriptions, but they
become adequate and sufficient when their user has the members knowledge
for their practical use but that that use is not necessarily static across the
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members who might use those documents was noted by Garfinkel (1967) and
others in the early ethnomethodological studies. In this current study we have
seen the tribunal panel members ad hoc there decisions in a similar fashion to
Garfinkel's jurors, however in this chapter we have focused on the
documentation as constituting 'representation', in investigated what is the
textual phenomenon or phenomena end up being constituted as be the various
actors at a Legal Aid Tribunal panel. It was shown that the documents provide
for more than one representation or phenomenon and that many of the activities
of decision-making revolve around dealing with these multiple representations.,
a fact that has potential consequences for the resolution of ambiguities in
interpretation. It was seen that in the case we looked at in this chapter that the
documentation which is presented to the Legal Aid tribunal constituted at least
three individual, but connected phenomena:
a. A past event that it is claimed is in need of legal adjudication.
b. A current event, a case constituting an appeal against the refusal of legal aid.
c. A future event, a case that will potentially end up being adjudicated in a court
of law.
These multiple representations that make be invokable through
documents and their usage, I suggest only become fully evident in the temporal
present of their actual usage by members in their on-going activities. Research
which ignores this, which I have suggested much previous work on texts has
done, giving texts singular representational meaning, often decided upon
outside of any situated usage by members, read-off by an analyst outside the
context of their usage, may be ignoring the complexities of practices and
consequences of situated documentary usage. Rather, like Garfinkel (1967) we
have seen that documents cannot be seen as standing on behalf of something
which is independent of their organizational uses, and that usage is not singular
and neither are contents of the documents. The usage that documents will be
put, and the representations that they will be found to contain are not
necessarily decidable in advance, but only once use of them is being made.
Finally, I suggest that we recall Garfinkel's point, and it is beautifully
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simple, that a social science that describes the actions of members in terms of
a scientific rationality, a rationality that is not used in the 'everyday life-world'
of members, is trying to use two incompatible systems, and consequently
ironic ising common sense rationality (1967a:276). Hence, the troubles social
science has in describing social action and rationality are "due not to the
complexities of the subject matter, but to the insistence in conceiving actions in
accordance with scientific conceits instead of looking to the actual rationalities
that person's behaviours in fact exhibit in the course of their managing practical
affairs" (ibid:277). As a conclusion to 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' Garfinkel
states: "In a word, the rational properties of conduct may be removed by
sociologists from the domain of philosophical commentary and given over to
empirical research" (ibid:282).
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Chapter Seven - Concluding Comments.
"I've been trying to fit everything in, trying to get to the end
before its too late, but I see now how badly I've deceived myself, words
do not allow such things. The closer you come to the end, the more there
is to say. The end is only imaginary, a destination you invent to keep
yourself going, but a point comes when you realize you will never get
there. You might have to stop, but that is only because you have run out
of time. You stop but that does not mean that you have come to the end. "
Paul Auster 1987 - 'In the Country of Last Things'
London Faber and Faber
The aims of this research were stated at the beginning of this thesis, and
it is to these that we shall attend in concluding. The reader will have realised
that although phenomena of this study were descriptions of legal activity, there
has been little attempt to tie this thesis into the bodies of work that go under the
terms of Socio-Legal studies or the Sociology of Law. Instead, if this thesis has
to be described and placed with and body of work I would myself see it as a
'study' within a broadly ethnomethodological tradition. Personally, I see this
thesis as a 'study' with debts to work within the ethnomethodological tradition,
but also to areas outside it. The basic idea that one should look at the actual
practices of those you want to investigate has been expounded by others than
ethnomethodologists alone, and its simplicity is displayed by Geertz (1973:5)
in the following:
"If you want to understand what a science is, you should look in the first
instance not at its theories or its findings, and certainly not what its
apologists say about it; you should look at what the practitioners of it
do."
And in a sense, this is a conclusion which I believe this thesis not only comes
to, but also forcefully displays. This conclusion is not new, but it seems to be
one that has to be constantly repeated, and although there are fine exceptions
it is one which as Travers (1993) has noted those within socio-Iegal studies and
the sociology of law seem particularly deaf to. By having paid particular
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attention to the epistemological issues not only of my own methodology but to
those of positivism too, I hope I have displayed the importance that such issues
need to be accorded in research. However, this thesis was not intended to be a
solely programmatic argument for the study of legal phenomena and I will not
attempt to reinvent it as such now.
This thesis has attempt to achieve four objectives: a) to provide a
description of the activities that can occur in Legal Aid Tribunals, b) to explore
the use of documentation in the tribunal practices of tribunal panel members,
legal aid clerks, appellants and their representatives; c) to do so through the
adoption and adaption of a post-analytic ethnomethodology, and d) to apply this
to an epistopic discussion of legal positivism. We will now briefly look at these
and also comment of the social policy inplications of this thesis.
7.1 On the Description of Legal Aid Tribunals.
While no suggestion has been made for, or even the possibility
suggested, that the description of a number of unique cases can cover all
possible occurrences, I believe we have a good idea of what has occurred, and
in detail, 00 a few occasions. The aim has not been to develop a general model
to cover all occasions but to look at the complex local activities which constitute
individual occasions oflegal aid tribunal. However, while any generalizability
is on the whole disavowed, it would be disingenuous to suggest that such
practices to not occur on other occasions. Although these would be contextually
situated and organised.
With the above in mind we have seen cases which have been either
attended or unattended, either with legal representation or without, have been
granted or have been rejected, have been unanimously decided or not, that have
either followed a 'normal' four phase procedure or have not.
An aim of this thesis was to present to the reader a series of descriptions
of individual cases which adequately and accurately represent aspects of legal
aid tribunals. Although no abstraction of the individual and unique occurrences
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of the phenomenon described was attempted it was evident that on occasions the
tribunal members were orientating themselves, and orientating appellants to a
series of procedural phases. These were summarised as the following four
phases as: Discussing the Case and Deciding on what to ask the Appellant: the
panel discussed their prior readings of the case documents, to a greater or lesser
extent, and decided what issues to address to the appellant and/or their
representative. Discussing the Case with the Appellant: the appellant was given
a formal history of the case so far by the clerk, and introduced to the panel by
the chair. Then a discussion of the case ensued, initially based upon the issues
identified by the panel in 'phase one'. Considering the Case and Coming to a
Decision: in the absence of the appellant they came to a decision on the merits
of the case, based upon their initial perceptions of the case and the additional
information presented by the appellant. They also decided on the nature of their
decision, Le. what an award would consist of, and possibly how this
information was to be transmitted to the appellant and/or their representative.
Delivering the Decision of the Panel to the Appellant: the appellant returned
and was given the decision by the panel. The appellant was either congratulated
on the outcome of the tribunal prior to leaving.
Whilst admittedly these 'phases' cannot be claimed to not appear here
as analytic categories imposed on the data in any fashion, they are also clearly
attended to by the participants and evidence was shown for this. This was seen
as a potentiality only for the attended tribunals as the non-attended tribunals,
due to the absence of the appellant or their representative, did not allow for
such a possibility. These attended and non-attended dimension of the tribunals,
later described in terms of dialogical and monological assessments, were seen
as being of potential consequence for the evaluation of a case and on occasion
overtly referred to by the tribunal panel themselves.
However, we also saw instances in which the tribunal did not
necessarily always move through the 'four phases' in instances of attended legal
aid appeals tribunals in this thesis. That a foreshortening of the 'typical'
procedure was possible, and this was seen to display the not inconsiderable
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flexibility over process the panel members have. This flexibility appeared to
revolve around the specific requirements of individual cases and the approach
that the panel adopts towards their assessment which developed during the
interactions of the panel members, clerk and appellant/representative. As the
work necessary to assess a particular case is not fixed in advance, but is instead
a result of the developing interaction of those involved, it is evident that the
focus should not be on the phases but instead the 'constituting' activities
themselves - what it is that the activies that the four phases are percieved by the
members as 'meant' to achieve, for all practical purposes.
7.2 Document Usage in Lega Aid Tribunals.
It has been shown that a key aspect of the activities of the members of
the tribunal panel, clerk and appellants is the use of documentation.
Documentation was seen to be an almost all pervasive aspect in the activities of
the tribunal from initiating the case to its final closure, and as we have seen on
innumerable instances in-between it was constituted as a focal point for a
myriad of different activities. Notable was that the documentation was not taken
as being all of an equivalence, some documents being constituted as of greater
centrality and status to others, although this was locally negotiated by the
members themselves. Also, the panel members looked at the documents as
representing a legal case not just an originating phenomenon. Further, the
documentary representation of events was not expected to be a 'natural'
representation, but a representation orientated to legal practices, procedure and
statutes. This representation is constituted by a number of documents which
have a procedural way of being assessed, but that procedure does not
necessarily remain identical on each occasion. From we this saw that the
phenomenon that the documentary representations constitute is not
unambiguous, it appears entail a past phenomenon, a current one and a potential
future one. The current phenomenon that the documents are a representation of,
is also a phenomenon in its own right, not just in the sense that any
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representation is itself an object phenomenon, but that here that object
phenomenon is being assessed itself, not just what it represents. In light of this
it was suggested that the documentation which was presented to the legal aid
board could in the case we considered be seen to be a representation of three
individual, but connected phenomena:
a. A past event that it is claimed is in need of legal adjudication.
b. A current event, a case constituting an appeal against the refusal of legal aid.
c. A future event, a case that will potentially end up being adjudicated in a court
of law.
Considering that the case documents are representing all of these,
although it must be remembered that they are doing all these in the temporal
present of a legal aid tribunal, we can see that role that the documents have to
perform is a complicated one.
That the significance of the written documentation is situationally
organised and informed confirms some of the concerns that were raised about
the research into documentation in previous studies. We seem confirmed in our
suggestion that while Dorothy Smith's concern with the role of the written
document in local organization was correct, her concern to orientate this to
trans-situational issues impeded the adoption of a suitable research methodology
especially its design. We can also see our critique of McHoul confirmed as his
attempt to understand texts through and ethnomethodology of reading where he
is the reader, thus prevents any understanding of the use of texts in 'natural'
situated activity. As we have seen, the reading of texts in situated activity can
be partial and orientated to activity not contained within the texts themselves,
aspects that McHoul's methods do not have the opportunity of describing. This
same critique applies to Livingston to the extent that he provides a report on
reading activities of the literary community, instead of their reported reading
in the form of 'instructed readings' .
7.3 Post-Analytic Etnomethodology.
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The research perspective adopted and adapted here was of course that
of the ethnomethodology of Garfinkel in general, and in the work of Lynch and
Bogen specifically. This post-analytic ethnomethodological perspective is not
an easy option and while we did attempt some clarity, I believe in the end that
to do justice a separate thesis would be needed. Nevertheless, once it is clarified
that 'post' analysis is not 'anti' analysis it possible to use this methodology in
what I hope, and believe has been a fruitful manner. A key aspect of this work
revolved around the studies of science which, rather than separating specialised
activities from ordinary activity, it displays as constituted by such activities,
especially at the work site.
Post-analytic ethnomethodology and its practice of 'description', I have
suggested, is not the rejection of all methods or techniques of analysis, but the
claims of analysis to some epistemological justification which was then seen to
legitimise the adopted methods. The post-analytic ethnomethodological position,
as I understand it, is not that all methods or analysis are intrinsically
problematic, but rather that their validity is when claimed with reference to
some external point outside of the situated activity which they are investigating.
This is not to say that some sociological forms of analysis, if not most, are
inappropriate to ethnomethodology and cannot be used for the study of
ethnomethods. I, and neither do Lynch and Bogen as I understand it, claim that
this position has been fully worked-out, and it is not as simple as a single
paragraph would portray it to be, but its adoption here has been part of the
exploratory nature of this thesis. As such I believe it is worth giving a fuller
description of what I understand the post-analytic project to mean and the
practical applications of this.
7.3a An Understanding of Post-Analytic Ethnomethodology.
An aim of this thesis is to try and clarity on what Lynch (1993), and
Lynch and Bogen (1996), mean by post-analytic ethnomethodology. I believe
that as a methodological programme it has an almost 'in-built' opaqueness due
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to its anti-foundationalist stance and that what it is will be unique to each study.
This makes any description of it problematic, compounded by the rarity of post-
analytic studies to use as relevant examples, so it may better to first say what
post-analytic description is not: 'post' analysis is not 'anti' analysis. As Lynch
notes:
"Post- differs from anti- by suggesting a temporal (dis)placement 'after',
rather than an opposition to, the term that follows the prefix. Direct
opposition and inversion are replaced by a 'free play'. A post-modern-
architecture plays itself off in various ways against modernist styles while
retaining an ironic affiliation to an earlier genre." (1993: 312)
Post-modernism is thoroughly related to modernism for Lynch, its difference
being the rejection of the epistemological justification of modernist projects,
instead its 'validity' is perceived as being largely dependent on the situation of
its invocation. In terms of analysis, Lynch is not "repudiating analysis but
suggesting a retrospective relation to already accomplished analyses" (ibid).
Consequently post-analytic ethnomethodology does not deny the value of proto-
ethnomethodological studies, but believes that they must be viewed in the light
of post-analytic developments.' Developments which are reflected in his
suggestion to 'forget science', to "forget trying to act - or trying to convince
others that you are acting - in accordance with some general epistemological
! Lynch's critique of conversation analysis focuses on the claim to an
epistemological justification based upon that of the natural sciences. This is why
Lynch so much laments the development of conversation analysis away from
the 'primitive natural science' of the early Sacks. Significant though is that
Lynch does not deny the usefulness of the insights of conversation analytic
studies, but recommends that its insights should not be excluded from post-
analytic description. He believes, as noted above, that conversation analysis can
be reintegrated with the (post-analytic) etbnomethodological programme. If
conversation analysis drops its pretensions to an epistemological justification
and analysis based upon a vision of the natural sciences, then reunification with
its 'parent' should be relatively unproblematic.
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scheme." (ibid:311).2
An important question for us here is what is post-analytic description all
about? It is a mistake to struggle, as I initially attempted in this thesis, to try
and produce a form of description that did not involve some form of analysis.
This appears an almost impossible task, which in this research I initially
attributed to the use of transcript data that did not seem to provide for the forms
of demonstration associated with post-analytic ethnomethodology. However,
while the transcription system used in this thesis may seem to be designed for
conversation analytic use, this could not be the reason as it is only minimally
so and very similar to that also used by Lynch and Bogen (1996). The
production of description invariably invokes some analysis, and the result of my
attempts in Chapter Four and Appendix Three has been the adoption of a
description that is minimal in an attempt to avoid as much analysis as possible.
This is a useful exercise to keep unwarranted theorisation to a minimum.
The solution to the problem, as has been mentioned above, is not to
equate post-analysis with anti-analysis.' I suggest that the way that we can best
understand Lynch's focus on 'description', is not as 'anaemic' description
appearing to contain little in the way of content, even if that is not a possibility
in the first place." It appears to me that 'mere description', as Lynch ironically
2 This may explain to some extent Garfinkel's refusal to discuss the
philosophical background and justification for ethnomethodology, or any real
precursors to speak of. The possible reason being to prevent the outlining of
some epistemological framework to justify ethnomethodology, instead the
justification is meant to be the studies themselves.
3 I am grateful to David Greatbatch and Martyn Hudson for pointing-out my
use of analysis, and the pains that they both made in making me justify their
inclusions in the 'description'. Without their insistence I doubt I would have
managed to fully grasp what Lynch could mean by 'description'.
4 As James Boyd White (1984:6) notes in this regard: "Writing is never
merely the transfer of information, whether factual or conceptual, from one
mind to another, as much of our talk about it, but is always a way of acting
both upon the language, which the writer perpetually reconstitutes in his use of
it, and upon the reader. Action of this kind can never be wholly explained, and
our talk about these things should reflect that fact".
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refers to it, is not some reference to a form of representation that is devoid of
any 'analysis', but is instead a reference to a representation that does not claim
some epistemological justification or validity. The difference between the
former and latter possibilities of what 'mere description' constitutes being very
significant in the provision of such representations.
Lynch and Bogen (1996) note that their discussion of themes such as
ritual, spectacle, ceremony and the use of the work of Foucault to set the
agenda for aspects of their discussion does not mean that they have adopted a
semiotic, structural or post-structural anthropology or such like. They
acknowledge reference to the scholarship in these areas but that in doing so are
not referencing some form of abstract framework for their descriptive
interpretation. And to commentators who suggest they are, their response is:
"We are not denying that we must interpret the video tapes and written
texts that make up our materials; we are, instead, denying that it is
necessary to organize such an interpretation around a core theory or
cognitive model." (1986:266)
They state that although they may on occasion invoke terms from some theory
it is not to bring in a determinative theory, but to use them as figures of speech.
They realise they may be seen as empiricists, reductionists, naive realists, or
behaviourist, by refusing to assign priority to an abstract model, ignoring
context, and being apparently innocent of epistemological and moral
propositions inherent in the understanding of any text. But reply that they are
aware of these understandings of text and discourse, but equate their position
on these as being that where "Wittgenstein was aware of their precursors when
he divorced his conception of philosophy from the prevailing 'craving for
generality' of his day" (ibid:269).
The point of the reference to Wittgenstein is not to reference a value-
free form of description, but to note that Wittgenstein did not suggest this,
instead equating his description with no special epistemological privilege at all
(ibid:270). The difference between these two versions of description is that the
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latter, unlike the former, is not claiming a privileged position from which to
describe a 'generality'. The reason for avoiding this ascription being not that
it is impossible to provide such a description, but that it is too easy. The cause
of this being that "actual cases exhibit a surplus of detail that permits the
ascription of an open variety of sometimes incompatible analytical categories"
(ibid:171).5A further problem arising "when a simple structure is given priority
over the more complicated and seemingly amorphous relevancies of actual
usage" where members become seen as cultural dopes acting in terms of "a
theoretically specified arrangement of external forces and internal mechanisms"
(ibid).
This stance by Lynch and Bogen does not allow any compromise
between theory and practice to the extent that for them "even when they are
finite and formally encoded, systems of laws and rules are continually reworked
and inflected by reference to the occasions on which they are used. In effect,
they become open-ended constituentsof practice" (idid:271-272). However, the
aim is not to ignore such concepts as power, knowledge, meaning etc. but to
examine them in their vernacular usage, avoiding causal explanation and the
development of generalising explanatory schema. It may appear that my own
work has fallen prey to this form of explanation but, I suggest it is following
Lynch and Bogen (1996) who state:
"We are not proposing an inquiry free of propositions; instead, we are
disclaiming that our inquiry is theory-laden in the sense of being framed
by a professionally fashioned nexus of definitions, propositions, and a
priori expectancies." (ibid:273)
It is an approach that attempts to explain its data without granting a
single communicative theory foundational status, and is a post-analytic
ethnomethodology "in the sense that we presume that, and selectively describe
how, the sources of intelligible action and defensible judgement are not
S This relates to my assertion of the possibility of multiple epistopic within
occasions of phenomena.
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contained within even the most elaborate system of prescriptions and
specifications" (ibid:287). An approach which they doubt many social scientists
would wish to follow. The question is, how have we interpreted this in this
thesis.
I believe that what Lynch means by 'description' is something that might
quite legitimately include what in another context are understood to be forms
of analysis. At a simple level what I am suggesting is that post-analytic
ethnomethodology may in fact legitimately contain what appear to be proto-
ethnomethodological analysis, and yet still remain post-analytic. Post-analytic
ethnomethodology, as we have noted above is not anti-analysis but rather post-
analysis in that what it rejects are any foundational claims as epistemological
justifications, when this is translated into the use of forms of analysis, the
rejection is not necessarily the forms of analysis, but implicit foundational
claims by their users. This is not due to a claim to a superior epistemological
position, but reference to ethnomethodological studies of other disciplines, e.g.
natural science, which have shown that these disciplines are constituted not by
adherence to underlying epistemology (except when it comes to justification of
'findings'), but in the situated activities of the workplace, e.g. laboratory
practices. These practices involve "bricolage expertise, ad hoc practices,
improvisation, persuasion, persuasion, plausibility judgements, interfering with
equipment, and so forth" (Lynch 1993:317) . Post-analytic ethnomethodological
practices are themselves constituted in a similar fashion. As Lynch states:
"The lesson that observation, representation, replication, measurement,
and the like are 'locally organized' applies no less to the aims of social
scientific investigations than it does to the lay and professional activities
described and explained through such investigations." (Lynch 1993: 311)
Of course post-analytic ethnomethodology must be engaged in such activities,
but rather than being a problem, it is no more a problem than the equivalent
practices are for the validity of science (this is where the strong programme and
ethnomethodology differ). The only problem for science comes at the level of
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justifying its practices with regards to some epistemological position which it
adopts (or pays lip service to).
When it comes to post-analytic ethnomethodology, my understanding of
'description' and the one used in this thesis is not a the rejection of all methods
or techniques of analysis. But rather the rejection of such an analysis to some
epistemological justification which is claimed to legitimise the adopted methods.
The important point here is that the adoption of a methodology and form of
analysis has previously relied upon epistemological foundations for the validity
of those methods and analysis. The post-analytic ethnomethodological position,
as I understand it, is not that those methods or analysis are intrinsically
problematic, but rather that their validity is claimed with reference to some
external point outside of the situated activity which they are investigating is.
However, I am not suggesting all sociological forms of analysis once removed
of their foundational claims are suitable for use in ethnomethodological studies,
as this is clearly not the case. But neither is it the case that because forms of
analysis and description may be researchable epistopics themselves, that they
cannot be employed by ethnomethodology itself. Though in what form they are
employed will not be in relation to some foundational claim, hence although
some form of analysis such as 'comparison' may be used, it will not be tied into
some statistical justification for its validity. As Lynch notes, methods of
description and representation adopted in respecifications are less privileged
epistemic activities than those of science, but that they are also ones that
constitute science but have been "orphaned" by theory and "need to be
reclaimed if we are ever to make any sense of our scholarly endeavours"
(1994: 149).
Once deprived of any foundations and epistemological justifications it
may seem that post-analytic ethnomethodology can make no claims for its
descriptions. However, Lynch notes that this 'ascientific' approach of
ethnomethodology is an extension of the later work of Wittgenstein, and that:
"Wittgenstein conducted investigations that he claimed were neither
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explanatory nor grounded in a scientific method but that relied on the
intuitive familiarity of ordinary language to a community of users."
(ibid:313)
It would seem that this is where 'justification' must reside. But it must be said
that this does not clarify how, or why, a description to be accepted. I suggest
that answer is some form of intuitive appropriateness, though whatever it is it
must involve a reflexive awareness of the impossibility of a foundational
,scientism' .6
Finally. I wish to note: firstly, that just as Lynch recommends that
"Much of what goes under the heading of 'knowledge' in science studies can
be decomposed into embodied practices of handling instruments. making
experiments work, and presenting arguments in texts or demonstrations" (Lynch
1993:310). I suggest, that much the same argument can be applied to the
heading of 'knowledge' in law, and the exploration of legal positivism in this
thesis has been an attempt to describe it as such. Secondly, although Lynch's
programme has been adopted as guiding the methodology of the research in this
thesis, it has not, as described above. been followed to the letter. The 'spirit'
of what post-analytic ethnomethodology is all about is probably best
encapsulated in the follow quote from Lynch (Lynch 1988a:92):
"A truly radical break with traditional standards of scientific rationality
requires facing up to the existential absence of transcendental standards
for any claims that are made, and a willingness to 'fly by the seat of your
pants' - to defer all but the most provisional outline of 'programme' until
a body of investigative practices emerges in the social organization of the
discipline. Such a coherent body of practices may never come to pass,
and even if it does it will not offer any guarantees on the inherent
rationality of the constituent activities. In any case, there should be no
reason to fear falling into 'mere common sense' as a basis for inquiry,
since 'common sense' can no longer be defined as the reciprocal of
'scientific rationality'. What 'it' might be remains to be discovered."
6 Lynch and Bogen (1996:286) note: "Our treatment of the hearings as a
spectacle runs somewhat contrary to a research policy employed effectively in
conversation analysis, which is to decompose events endowed with spectacular
public significance into their mundane conversational constituents. "
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7.4 Legal Positivism as an Epistopic.
Part of the application of this research methodology of post-analytic
ethnomethodology, apart from the provision of the description of practices and
the view legal aid process that has resulted from this, was the investigation of
epistopics and related 'themes'. Using these methodological insights from
ethnomethodology we have been able to see that instances of decision-making
do not necessarily attend to the statutory rules explicitly, that' non-legal' forms
of 'subjective evaluation' are incorporated, but that this does not mean that
,objectivity' has been sacrificed on the alter of common-sense evaluation. The
adoption of the investigation of legal positivism as an 'epistopic', coupled with
the descriptions provided by the research, have allowed us to re-evaluate the
nature of objective legal decision making within the positivist/relativist debate.
Through the investigation of this 'epistopic' we have been able to re-specify
certain aspects of the notion of legal positivism, in particular the role that legal
positivism plays in the proof-giving aspects of legal practice. Notably though,
this did not indicate that such practices were any less legally adequate than
others, but that their 'legality' and validity as tribunal processes must be seen
as situatationally organised and agreed upon by the panel members concerned.
That the activities do not rule-follow in the classical sense but rather in terms
of what the rules are meant to achieve. This is an issue that can be further
developed not only in relation the theoretical jurisprudential debates about legal
positivism and legal realism, but about how policy debates need to
reconceptualise their understanding of the nature of legal practice.
At a very fundamental level this thesis has displayed how the actual
practices of legal practitioners revolve around the manipulation of their
documentation. These practices rather than being conceptualised in an abstract
fashion of a Iogico-linear positivism representative of a fictional ideal practice,
need to be seen as the reflexive construction of arguments towards locally
situated coherent interpretation of the documents, and what the consequences
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of various interpretations could be, and what the 'aim' of the tribunal system
is. In the practices of the legal representative we saw that documents were
utilised as support for a preferred 'goal', but that this goal was reflexive to the
situated activities of tribunal hearing. How the documents were to be used could
not have been stipulated in advance as the significance was only revealed and
constituted as the tribunal activities of which they were a part unfolded.
7.5 Policy Implications.
The practical significance of this respecification of legal positivism and
its rule-following approach to legal practice, can be seen in relation to the
current proposals to abolish attendance by appellants and their representatives
at Social Security Tribunals. This would transform the tribunals from their
current position as allowing the possibility of dialogical decision-making to that
of being purely monological and text-only based. This thesis has displayed the
potential merits of the dialogical assessment of tribunal cases over monological
assessment quite clearly. If this alone was considered it would seem proof
enough, but when combined with a respecification of the nature of the legal
positivist view of decision-making underlying these proposals it would suggest
serious reconsideration of the reform of tribunals in this fashion.
If we look again at the Genn and Genn Report (1989) entitled 'The
Effectiveness of Representation at Tribunals' commissioned by the Lord
Chancellor's Department were the questions underlying the research were: "are
represented cases more likely to succeed?; and, if so, what is it about
representation that causes cases to succeed, or what is it about tribunals that
renders representation necessary or desirable in producing successful outcomes"
(ibid:4). They found that in all the tribunals examined the presence of a
representative was found to significantly increase the probability of a successful
hearing and that:
"The experience of representatives is that unrepresented appellants and
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applicants are disadvantaged at tribunal hearings because there is an
imbalance of power between the parties, because appellants and applicants
do not understand the law, are unable to present their cases coherently
and are unaware of the need to furnish the tribunal with evidence of the
fact that they are asserting." (ibid:244)
What I suggest we can now see is that question of power imbalances,
legal understanding and the provision of suitable evidence can to a large extent
be seen as 'glosses' for situated activity as they manifest themselves in
tribunals. These glosses indicated that some sort of 'related' practices can occur
in attended and represented tribunals, but are unable to specify exactly what
these may consist of. This thesis, and the ethnomethodological research that it
has deployed, has been able to describe the actual practices which may have a
large part to play in explaining the nature of these glosses as inevitable
dependent upon situated activities in actual tribunals. Further, the
respecification of legal positivism would suggest that some reconceptualisation
of what the law is, and this does not necessarily mean legal relativism, needs
to be undertaken. Only then will the right type of issues be raised in relation to
the legal institutions and any policy developments for their reorganisation.
Finally, the complicated function of the documentary representations
would seem to explain why attended tribunal cases are preferred by the tribunal
panel over unattended case, that being for ease of understanding and
interpretation of the phenomena. Of course, the extent to which each appellant
can help in the interpretation of the documentation by the tribunal is not the
same in each instance. The more skilled the appellant at understanding the
needs and functions of the documentary representations the more likely, it can
be assumed, they will be in assisting the tribunal.
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Appendix One - Tribunal Venues
Venue One.
The location of this venue first case described here was a Legal Aid
Board Area office. The tribunal was heard in a conference room in which the
panel members and the Legal Aid Board clerk sat round a table facing each
other. A tape recorder had been placed in the centre of the table whilst I sat
back from the table at another table taking notes.
Venue Two.
This tribunal venue is a church hall in a moderately sized county town.
The Legal Aid Board area office has procured two rooms for the proceedings:
the first is used as a waiting room for attenders, the second as the room in
which the tribunal hearings actually occur. The two rooms are connected by a
short corridor. The tribunal room is set up so that the four panel members sit
behind a long table which the appellants face.' Next to the panel members sits
7 An interesting comment is made by Foucault on this form of spatial
positioning: "What is this arrangement? A table, and behind this table, which
distances them from the two litigants, the 'third party', that is, the judges. Their
position indicates firstly that they are neutral with respect to each litigant, and
secondly this implies that their decision is not already arrived at in advance,
that it will be made after and aural investigation of the two parties, on the basis
of a certain of truth and a certain number of ideas concerning what is just and
unjust, and thirdly that they have the authority to enforce the decision. This is
ultimately the meaning of this simple arrangement. Now this idea that there are
people who can be neutral in relation to the two parties, that they can make
judgements about them on the basis of ideas of justice which have absolute
validity, and that their decisions must be acted upon, I believe that all this is far
removed from and quite foreign to the very idea of popular justice." (p8)
However, we are dealing with civil justice rather than popular. Foucault,
Michel (1980), 'On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists' (Chapter 1 in
.. ), 'Power/Knowledge', Hemel Hempstead, Herts. Harvester Wheatsheaf.
(Originally published as 'Sur Ie justice populaire: debat avec les maos', in Les
Temps Modernes 310 bis, 1972)
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the Area Legal Aid Board clerk. I sat beside the attender.
Venue Three.
This tribunal venue is the conference room of a regional Law Society
offices in a city. The work is all done in the one room and the attenders wait
outside in the corridor to be called in. The door from the corridor leads straight
into the conference room. The tribunal room is set up so that the appellant faces
the panel behind a table, the panel being behind a row of such tables. The clerk
is at ninety degrees to the left of the appellant, whilst the researcher is in the
same position but to the right of the appellant but slightly set back.
Venue Four.
This tribunal venue was situated within the magistrates court of a
moderately sized town and was a room whose usual function was a family
court. When used by the tribunal none of the fixed furniture employed by the
court was used, instead the lose fittings of tables and chair were deployed to
form a bench behind which the panel sat and which the appellant faced. The
clerk sat alongside the bench at a ninety degree angle while the researcher sat
at a separate table off to the side. Appellants awaiting their case hearing
remained outside the room where sitting was provided.
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Appendix Two - Transcription Method and Abbreviations.
cl = Legal Aid Board Area Office Clerk
eh = Chair of Appeal Panel
pml , pm2 and pm3 = Panel Members




(0.6) = numbers in parentheses equate to the approximate lengh of pauses in
seconds
(.) = a micro-pause of less than two tenths of a second
[ = the start of overlapping talk
(words) = words or phrases in parentheses denote unclear recorded talk
Written transcripts are textual representations of natural language, while
written texts are influenced by natural language, the textual conventions
transform the natural language when it is represented in a textual format. This
is indeed also the case with transcripts presented here. Here the format, one
among many possible, is based upon that devised by Gail Jefferson for
conversation analysis and adopted by much of ethnomethodology, although in
a simplified form. Pace, pitch, pronunciation and stress have been omitted as
unnecessary to the descriptive needs of this thesis. As Watson (1997)8 has noted
there are conventions here which affect the presentation of natural language.
These include the larger cultural conventions of reading from left to right and
top to bottom, but also designation of the speaker in the left column. The
designation of speaker is an interesting point as that is designated by the
8 Observations on the effects of transcription on interpretation of data are
noted by Cicourel (1975) who also notes that the researcher with access to the
audio tapes is a more advantageous position than the reader of the transcript
only.
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researcher and as such instructs the reading of the transcript. There is no
guarantee that the designations used by the researcher are the ones seem as
appropriate by the members themselves, or that such designations are even
static throughout an encounter. Watson states:
"We might say that the very transcriptions they produce do persuasive
and predisposing work before the ethnographic analysis per se really
begins, and indeed, risks introducing an artificial element into that
ethnographic analysis. In a strong sense, the ethnography is done before
the transcribed data are analysed: once the categories are provided, a
predisposing interpretation is potentiated and it is 'all over bar the
shouting'." (ibid:84)
This, however, may be overstating the effects, which must also be
dependent on what the analysis is doing. I believe that the data itself should
provide some sort of corrective to the effects of these determinations. My
preference would be the provision of the tapes themselves to the reader,
however, the multimedia presentation that this would is beyond anything
feasible with this study and its inherent limitations.
The practice of law can be seen as disciplinary in the double sense as
both a body of knowledge and as a technology of control, and, as is illustrated
in Foucault's 'Discipline and Punish', this is not a power-neutral form of
control. The discourse of a positivist notion of law developed in the discipline
of law may be seen as an attempt to appear power-neutral, in borrowing the
visage of scientific neutrality and objectivity in its applications. Although this
thesis does not develop this issue, the question of the decline in the image of the
scientific view of the world, may be expected to affect any discipline which has
adopted the same discourse in its attempts at gaining and holding social
authority.
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Appendix Three - The Data Transcripts and Descriptions.
The following data transcripts and descriptions presented in numerical case
order as in the main body of the thesis. The first two cases that have their
descriptions presented in Chapter Four are presented here only in transcript
form. For the rest of the case their are full descriptions following each
transcript with summaries of the descriptions following each of them. Due to
the length of Case Five it is presented in three segments, the first segment
contrains phases one and two of the tribunal, the second contains phase three,
and the third that of phase four.
Case One9 - (Venue - One see Appendix One Venue Number One.
1 cl :Right we'll make a start (0.2) would you care to appoint a
2 chairman?-
3 ? : [we have done (0.4)
4 cl :and that is?
5 eh [I I got lumbered I'm afraid (.)
6 cl :(name) is the chairwoman (.) alright (.) okay (0.4) one (name of
7 appellant) (2.0) (cough)
8 eh :have we got a PI specialist amongst us? (.) you are aren't you?
9 pm2 [no
1 0 (.) well not really but 1
11 eh : [oh [I thought you did some
12 pm2 [ 1 thought erm
13 (0.2) 1 thought there was something quite (.) quite serious here (.)-
14 eh [yes
15 pm2 :-and that she ought to certainly have legal aid for (.) a medical
16 report and then counsels opinion (.)
17 eh :yes that was my my view as well (.)
18 pm3 :1 1 felt the same 1 thought primi facie there appeared to be a case
19 of negligence (0.4) and there ought to be (.) a grant (0.2) for a
20 medical report from doctor (name) and for counsel's opinion (0.8)
21 eh :1 mean 1 felt the quantum was (0.2) quite substantial (0.4)-
22 pm2 [might well
23 -be (.)
24 eh :-if they got home on liability (0.2) errm I felt (.) not able to (.)-











































































:-comment on the medical side because it does seem horrendously
complicated and there is all sorts of different medical conditions
(.)
:that's right (.) but we had no actual medical report before that-
[umm
[no
:-did we (0.2) so
[no I thought that errr that was unfortunate omission but
perhaps there isn't one (.)




:erm (.) there seemed prima facie there was a case (2.0)
:do you agree with this (name of)? (0.2)
:well speaking as the err divorce specialist it looked like a good
PI claim to me (.)
:(laugh) (0.8)
:yeah (.) I mean its if it is going to go home on liability it is
certainly going to go over a thousand in damages (unclear) (.) by-
[(unclear)
:-a street (.)
:1 think it's seven thousand for loss of life isn't it? (0.2) they (.)




[bereavement damages you mean (.)
:bereavement damages yes (.) plus the pain and suffering that the-
[ummm [ummm
:-child obviously experienced (0.2) throughout his life so I would-
[(unclear) .
:-think that it's a very substantial claim (.)
:yep (.) so Iwould say (.) we should grant it (.)
:can we give a limited certificate for medical reports counsel's
opinion on merits (.) please (clerk' forename) on that one (5.0)
:okay (.) err which takes us on to err six (4.0)
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Case TwolO - (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Two).
shuffling of paperwork as previous case vacates the room
1 cl :Neil you're ok for the next one too (0.4)
2 pml :is (unclear) around (.)
3 cl :yes (2.0)
4 pm3 :is this number two (0.2)
5 cl :(appellant's name) yes (5.0)
6 ch :now in the normal way we we (.) we look at this in case (.) we
7 have formed a view of reading (.) on this occasion we have got (.)
8 quite a lot of paperwork (2.0)
9 pm2 :counsel's er put a lot of doubt on it (unclear) unless he comes up
10 with that (.) gets us'him over that hurdle (0.4) he must fail (0.6)
11 ch :right (.) then I think we can do no better than have him in (.)
12 cl :okay (35.0)
13 Clerk leaves the room to get the attending appellant
14 ch :good opinion isn't it (0.4)
15 pm2 :yeah (20.0)
16 Clerk returns from waiting room with appellant
17 cl :(unclear) (.)
18 ap :okay (1.4)
19 cl :please sit down mister (name) (.)
20 ap :thankyou (5.0)
21 ch :mister (name of clerk) are you going to
22 cl :mister (name) you had (.) legal aid (.) err last year to enable you
23 to (.) be represented in the case involving (company name) (.)
24 ap :yes (.)
25 cl :err the legal aid certificate has been discharged by the (.) legal aid
26 board staff you are now (.) exercising your right of appeal to the
27 area committee this afternoon (.)
28 ap :urnhuh (.)
29 cl :err the members of the committee who are here this afternoon
30 who are all (.) quite independent of the legal aid board have had
31 a chance to consider the papers (.) they'll have some papers er
32 they'll have some questions for you and you can add what you
33 wish afterwards (.) the committee have had the counsel's opinion
34 of the 4th of november (.) err your notice of appeal (.) a letter ff
35 (.) from you dated the 9th of january (.) and various other papers
36 (0.4)
37 ch :mister (name) my name is (name) I'm sitting with mister (name)
38 on my right (.) mister (name) and mister (name) (.) erm as mister
39 (clerk's name) has said we've read errm (.) a statement (.) that you
40 gave (.) errm (.) which is (with us) (.) the helpful background you
















































(.) give the (0.2) reasons (.) (in this) the statement (.) that
accompanied your application 1 believe (.) you gave five reasons
why (.) you (.) felt that the err the (.) court judgement should be
set aside (.) you then got (.) mister (name) 1 think his name is his
opinion (.) errm which is (.) err though you describe it a interim
opinion it is (.) fairly (.) conclusive in my personal view but that
is dated the 4th of November 1994 (0.2) und then we have a
statement from you (.) erm regarding the notice of appeal (.) erm
and a further letter mister (clerks name) said (.) now as 1 say we
have read all that (.) perhaps (.) err the way we should handle the
appeal if for you to (.) add to those grounds if you want to (.)
we'II then ask you questions so perhaps you'd like to shoot away
(.)
:(cough) 1don't think 1have anything to add to the statement (.)
:nothing at all? (.)
:no (.) 1 mean it's it's all set out there (.) and and 1 don't think
there is any point in adding anything to that (0.2) 1 1 obviously
don't agree with you in in respect of the (.) of thee barrister's
opinion (.)
:in wha: have you got a copy of there (.)
:yes 1have (.)
:well sh.shall we refer to it because 1 think that it's quite important
that we don't get (.) at crossed purposes on this (.)
:okay
:cause after all it's on the basis of this appeal that urm (.) legal aid
is withdrawn (7.0)
:1:1thought I'd actually (referred to): in in the barrister's opinion
he asks for some further information (.) from thee (.) uh (.) two
directors of the company concerned (0.2)
:can (.) can you point to them now (33.0)
:I'm not sure I've found it (35.0) in twenty nine is it is he talks
(0.4) about thee err (0.4) assertions and (.) evidence before them
to support the third defendant's contentions (4.6)
:you being a second defendant (.) they're saying "those instructing
you should contact the person pertinent for (unclear) cite all the
evidence in the possession of the defendants" (0.2)
:and I'd I'd obtained that additional information which the barrister
hasn't seen (.)
:1see (0.4)
:and what 1 was asking was (.) that he could see the additional
information (.) that 1have obtained (.) since he he wrote his report
(.)
:so really (.) that (.) you're really hanging your appeal on that
point particularly? (0.4) is that right you're not challenging (.) the
other points (.) in thee eh
[well (.) the appeal to you as far as 1
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87 understand which is in in respect of (.) allowing me to go back to
88 the barrister so that he can complete his opinion (.)
89 ch [okay
90 ch :right (0.4)
91 ap :in terms of the appeal against the whole case th.that this is not up
92 to me to talk to you about today (.)
93 ch :quite (0.2)
94 ap :1mean if I'm wrong 1mean
95 ch :no no that's fine mister (name) that's that's actually quite helpful
96 (.) that we've narrowed (.) we've narrowed the issue down 1mean
97 (0.2) lets just deal with it on that level to start with (.) see if we
98 can not
99 ap : [and the other thing that 1 should say is the statement 1 have
100 made was actually drafted between my solicitor and I (.)
101 ch :yes sure (.) yes (0.2)
102 pm? :1have nothing else (.)
103 ch :okay (2.0)
104 pm2 :1 can anticipate what your answer will be but this additional
105 information that you've found is it encouraging (0.2) do you feel?
106 (1.4)
107 ap :yes a do (2.0)
108 pml :1notice (.) on the (.) statement in support the err notice of appeal
109 that a (.) bundle of additional evidence was submitted with that (.)
110 err we haven't seen it (l.0) including of course the comments from
111 the legal aid board (.) and er how extensive that (.) bundle is
112 which (unclear)
113 ap [well that's that's the bundle that was sent to the legal aid
114 board (1.5)
115 ch :hhhhh (0.4)
116 pml :donno what (.) what (.) we could consider today (1.0)
117 ch :that addresses the err point (unclear) that if we if we turn to
118 paragraph (.) paragraph thirty in (account) (.) the final closing
119 paragraph (.) he sez that "in my opinion unless the second
120 defendant is able to establish the plaintiff failed to mitigate its loss
121 or actively worsened it by failing to secure satisfactory (unclear)
122 was carried out or a fair price was obtained (0.6) err then no
123 prospects of setting aside the judgement" (unclear) (.) though 1
124 take it that the additional evidence you've been able to produce
125 addresses that particular flaw
126 ap [yes it does (.) the oth: the other two
127 defendants are (.) are directors company that actually borrowed the
128 money I'm not (0.2)
129 ch :fine (.)
130 pm2 :the there's also the question of contr: seeking contribution from
131 the other (.) two defendants (mumble) (0.2)
132 ch :good (.) okay (.) thank you very much (.) have you any other
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133 questions? (0.4) no (0.2) fine mister (name) if you'd like to (.)
134 (wait) out side (.) you can leave your papers here if you like (.)
135 leave your coat (.) sorry (0.2)
136 ap :thankyou (11.0)
137 pml :counsel's opinion (0.2)
138 pm2 :well I'd agree (mumble)
139 pml :counsel's opinion (.)
140 pm3 :that's me (.)
141 eh :well he's done it he's set aside thee eh (.) he's set aside (1.4) well
142 to his satisfaction anyway (laughs) err counsel's erm (1.0)
143 (unclear) (haven't they) (.)
144 pm2&3:yeah mmmm
145 pml [if he's got the other evidence (.)
146 ? :(mixed talk) counsel's opinion
147 pm3? [that was my initial reaction in this case
148 cl [okay right
149 I'll get him back in now (1.8)
150 eh :good good okay so now can we limit (.) the certificate here to
151 obtaining (.) counsel's further opinion (.)
152 pml [(unclear)
153 cl :yes certainly (.)
154 pm2 :oh yes I think that's (unclear) (2.0)
155 eh :okaayy (1.0)
156 cl :thankyou (34.0)
157 clerk leaves to get the attender and then returns
158 eh :thankyou for coming today mister (name) (.) it's always (.)
159 very good to see an appellant rather than do it on paper (.)
160 ap :well I'm sorry you didn't have all the papers I just
161 eh [no no no you
162 don't (.) no no (.) you've satisfied us (0.2) you should have another
163 opinion from (barrister's name) (.) therefore you certificate will be
164 (.) I don't know what the word is renewed here or or the appeal
165 granted (0.2)
166 cl: :discharge rescinded (.)
167 eh :discharge rescinded (.) I'm obliged to (name) I haven't got the-
168 pml [hohoha!
169 eh :-eh (.) the correct eh (.) discharge will be rescinded erm but
1 7 0 the certificate will be limited to obtaining (barrister's name)' s
171 further opinion (.)
172 ap :thankyou (.)
173 eh :thankyou very much goodluck (.)
174 ap :okay thankyou (0.2) that's a relief (1.8) happens to be my
175 birthday today sir it must be a good omen hhhuhhuh
1 7 6 eh [well there you
177 are (0.6) we couldn't say more than that (.) could we except















[you're in for the next one too neil (.)
:what is the next one? (.)
:the next one is (appellant's name) this is this erm (.) family
matter where they've (.) come down from (place) .
Case Three!! - (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Two).
1 ch :right (.)
2 cl :(reference by clerk to researcher access to case)
3 ch :the next one (.)
4 cl :the next one is (name of appellant) (.) this is this family matter
5 (.) they have come down from (town name) in (unclear) 22nd (.)
6 pm! :1 1 was minded to grant it (2.0) (any takers) (0.6)
7 pm2 :my comment about this 1 made uhh (.) a bit outside my field (.)
8 was about adoption (0.4)
9 pm! :there's a possibility that they'll go that route isn't there (.)
10 pm3 :very rarely now
11 all [(unclear as all talk at once)
12 pm3 :it's very rarely (.) they go through that route to be (unclear) (.)
13 chilren act would (.)
14 ? :mmmmh
15 ch :yes (.) children yep (.) that would be exceptional (.)
16 pm3 :if it's it' right that he can't (.) sort the (unclear) to qualify or
17 getting a grant or resposibilty order because he's erm (.)(remarried)
18 father of the child (.) errm (unclear)
19 pm! :what's (unclear) like (0.2)
20 ch :sorry (.)
21 pm! :what was your view of it (.)
22 ch :well my view was basically that 1 didn't think it was necessary
23 (0.2)
24 pm! :hummmh (0.2)
25 pm3 :my personal inclination would be to dismiss it (.)
26 ? :humh
27 pm2 :the problem is if he's he's looking to the future in a way 1 mean
28 if (.) if the mother dies (.) or if anything bappened (.) then (.) the
29 child may be wbisked or likely to be whisked away by her natural
30 father (be's) left (0.2)
31 cb :yes (.) unclear (0.4) I'm at a loss to understand (.) and I 1 I (.)
32 they are not represented are they (.)
33 cl :no (.)
11 Data session nine tape one case three.
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34 ch :I'm at a loss to understand why a second application's needed (.)
35 ? :(unclear) (0.4)
36 ch :welliet's have them in (unclear)
37 cl :okay (clerk leaves to get appellants) (10.0)
38 pm3 :(unclear) on that point (.) if she made the will (.)
39 pm! :appointing him as guardian (.)
40 ? :yeas (.)
41 ch :it's very simple (.)
42 pm3 :(unclear) worry about what happens (unclear) (.)
43 pm2 :that's his worry (.) he expresses it somewhere in the papers (35.0)
44 ch :would you also pay a (maintainance) order (0.2) if you knew
45 (someone) was married (1.0)
46 pm2 :(court could) technically (ingnore?) her (2.0)
47 pm3 :quite likely to (.)
48 ch :how how can we (hear) (.) I I I've touched on perhaps (.) I don't
49 know (.) she may reside with the mother and this chap (.)
50 ? :hmhuh (.)
51 ch :errm (.) another (unclear) and residence order (.)
52 pm2 :because she's not at home (.)
53 ch :she doesn't need it (.) then with him doesn't he need it «0.2) I
54 can't I can't see (.) I mean forgive me I can't (.)
55 pm3 :technically it would be the only way that you could get (.) some
56 sort of parental (.) right's for the future (0.2)
57 ch :(unclear) (0.2) I only (unclear) (.) a court which is not going
58 admit him (unclear) (.) is it going to give him (unclear) (0.8)
59 pm3 :well it depends on opinion at the end of the day (.) if if the
60 natural father turn up and objects and (unclear) (.) then they are
61 much more likely to
62 ch [yeas yes well (.)
63 pm! :hummh (0.8)
64 ch :I'm (.)
65 pm3 :she's trying to restrict contact isn't she (.)
66 pm! :she's trying to restrict contact (0.2)
67 ch :upon that (unclear) (.)
68 pm3 :no that's not not going to happen (unclear) no I mean his his
69 position from (unclear) both mother and father are battling
70 (unclear) (3.0)
71 Discussion stops as the clerk and attenders enter the room.
This case follows straight on from the attended case (case two) of the
previous chapter. The Chair using the term "right" signals that something is
about to happen (line l), and before continuing the clerk indicates to the
researcher that they have access to the case and do not have to tum the recorder
off and vacate the room (line 2). Then the chair continues indicating the start
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of the next case by asking for/about the case (line 3), to which the clerk
responds by giving the name and a brief description of the case (lines 4 and 5),
paraphrasing details from their documentation. At this point panel member one
gives their opinion of the course of action to be taken which they decided upon
on in their reading prior to the panel meeting (line 6), this too appears to be a
paraphrasing, this time from the notes made by the panel member in their
reading of the case notes. It seems, although it is not too clear, that the panel
member then offers this up for acceptance by the rest of the panel. Panel
member two (lines 7 and 8) does not take up the offer to comment on whether
the case should be granted legal aid, instead he directly refers to a comment
they have made about the case in their prior reading. Thus panel member two
moves the discussion away from the immediate decision on the case as whether
to accept or reject the appeal, raising the issue of adoption for discussion.
Following the comment about the issue of adoption, discussion takes
place between panel members one and three and the chair, in which panel
member three argues that adoption would not be the likely route to be taken by
the appellants (lines 9 to 20).12
Panel member one (line 9) in adding to panel member two's comment
(line 8) hypothesises about the next actions of the appellants, but is contradicted
by panel member three (lines 10, 12 and 13). The chair then agrees with panel
member three (line 15), who then goes on to also talk about possible actions
available and unavailable to the appellant (lines 16 to 18),'3 What is unclear
here is whether these details are in the documents or not, what is clear though
is that this information is not taken up for discussion by the panel. As panel
member three's talk tails off (line 18) the topic is not taken up by the other
12The move to the next 'phase' does not happens in this case, the possibility
of 'closure' is not taken up, rather a second line of discussion, the issue of
adoption, is raised.
13 Unfortunately some parts of the data are unclear, although this is not just
a problem with the recording as some it appears to be unclear to the
participants.
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panel members, instead panel member one (line 19) asks a direct question of the
chair who does not hear it clearly (line 20).
Panel member one repeats their question and asks the chair for their
view of the case (line 21), and the chair responds that their view of the case was
that the proposed action by the appellants was unnecessary (lines 22 and 23).
After a brief acknowledgement of this by panel member one (line 24), panel
member three then gives their opinion of the case as being to dismiss it (line 25)
- this too is acknowledged (line 26).
Once this split in the panel is made clear panel member two, who made
the initial suggestion of granting the appeal, gives an explanation derived from
their personal reading of the documents (lines 27 to 30). He does not appear to
directly quote the documents and his opinion, which can so far only have come
from their prior reading of documents for case facts, will be informed by
member'S knowledge, both lawyers and everyday, of the appellant's reason's
for seeking the action applied for. The extent to which this is supposition or
actually contained in the written documentation provided for the panel is not
made clear. The Chair responds to this, breaking the statement with a request
to the clerk as to whether or not the appellant is represented by a solicitor (line
32), that they still do not see why the action is necessary (lines 31 and 34). Why
the chair is interested at this point in whether the appellant has representation
is not explained, though in framing what to ask the appellant it is obviously
important for the chair to know whether they will be addressing another lawyer
or a lay person." Once this statement is not taken up in any clear fashion (line
35), the Chair then decides to have the appellant in and requests that they be
brought in (line 36), this is acknowledged by the clerk one of whose tasks is to
collect the appellants (line 37), thus bringing phase one to a close.
The talk continues after the clerk leaves with panel member three asking
about the point made by the chair about making a will (line 38). This statement
is finished by panel member one (line 39) and appears to be agreed with by the
14 This distinction can not be taken simplistically by the chair as occasionally
lay people are knowledgeable about the law relating to their own case.
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others (line 40 and 41). This is the chair's point that court action is not needed
as a will would suffice. Panel member two seems to raise some possible
worries, although it is not clear whether this is in general or for this particular
appellant (line 42). Panel member two states that this sentiment has been
expressed by the appellant in the documentation (line 43), although it does not
elicit any action by the panel to find the statement in their documents and is in
fact followed by a long pause. The chair continues after this to discuss some
technical points about maintenance orders (lines 44 and 45).
Summary.
From the written documentationthe clerk gives a brief description of the
case, the objects of work here being the documents that the panel members all
have, each having received identical bundles. These bundles do not remain
identical however in that each panel member tends to make notes which are
either added to their own bundle or written directly onto them. It is such a
comment that panel member two is directly referring to (lines 7 and 8 case 1)
when noting his opinion. So we can see that in this case it is via the
documentation and reference to it, that a start to this particular case hearing is
made. Not, of course, that this is achieved in the same fashion each time. In
this case we can see that such phrases as 'I was minded' and 'my comment
about this' (see lines 6 and 7) seem to indirectly refer to this process. However,
whereas in the introductory full transcript the offering of an opinion of the case
led to the early ending of the first phase and moving on the second phase, in
this instance discussion carries on."
Once the suggested option of granting the appeal by panel member two
15 From attended case (case two) chapter three, lines nine to eleven.
9 pm2 :counsel' s er put a lot of doubt on it (unclear) unless he comes up
10 with that (.) gets ushim over that hurdle (.) we must fail (0.6)
11 eh :right, then I think we can do no better than have him in (.)
12 cl :okay (35.0)
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(lines 7 and 8) is not taken up, the discussion moves to hypothesising about
future action, action not given in the documentation. This hypothesising was
met by rejection and eventually led the discussion to a halt and change of
direction." Whether it is unsuccessful because it has not remained grounded in
the documentation it is not possible to say.
It then becomes apparent why the suggestion by panel member two to
grant the case was not taken up, and why the case did not move on to phase two
immediately, as in Case Two. The reason being that the panel are split on their
opinions of the merits of the case and also, the chair, whom would 'usually'
make the suggestion of a move to the next phase is against granting the appeal
(line 22). Also, the clerk, who could move to the next phase by volunteering to
get the appellant, does not read the situation as being that the panel are ready
to move on to discussing the case with the appellant. A reason being that since
the panel have not agreed to grant the appeal they have not decided upon what
issues to discuss with the appellant as an alternative to granting immediately.
As soon as the panel have a question to ask the appellant they invite the
appellant in, though the question is not formulated as such, but rather a
response being required to the chair's twice made statement of being at "a loss
to understand" (lines 31 and 34).
We also see in this case the use of the transition period between phases
for discussion relating to the case. Much of the technical discussion is unclear
but it seems to be a period of clarification of aspects of the law which various
members are not familiar with. Panel members are often specialists in areas not
pertinent to a case and unfamiliar with the rules that are. The use of
hypothetical possibilities in the discussion are used to guess at possible
outcomes of various actions in court. This seems to be a move away from the
evaluation of the documentation contents in and of themselves and to display
their essential indexicality.
16 The way in which this was dealt with and produced had much in common
with what Kuhn (1981) describes as a thought experiment, although an
unsuccessful one.
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Case Four17 - (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Three).
1 eh :(unclear) been in prison now released and he would like (0.2) err
2 (.) he would like erm (.) access or whatever it is called nowadays
3 (.) to his (.) to his err two (0.2) natural children his own children
4 (4.0)
5 pml :we ought to have expert evidence (unclear) (1.0) reluctant to see
6 him embark upon (3.0) application until know what we've got
7 (unclear) (4.0)
8 pm3 :do we know how old theeeh (2.2) step daughters (.) were (.) or
9 are or (.)
10 cl :errrmh (8.0) I don't believe we have (.) if you will bear with me
11 (1.0)
12 eh :actually he wants to have (.) err (.) he doesn't just want to launch
13 one set of proceedings does he (.) he wants to have contact contact
14 with his sons (.) who live outside (city name) somewhere and he
15 also wants to have (.) supervised contact with his son (name) who
16 lives with his mother in (city name) (.) she too has denied him
17 contact (.)
18 pm3 :mmmmh (5.0)
19 eh :there are a lot of these cases going through (.) err the courts now
20 (.) one sees them (.) all the time in (place name) at any rate (.)
21 where fathers who have absolutely hopeless cases (.)
22 pm3 :ummm (.)
23 eh :eh pursue them with legal aid and the local authority (.) and the
24 guardian err defend at immense public expense (.)
25 all :ummmh (.)
26 eh :an the judges complain all the time that legal aid shouldn't be
27 granted (.)
28 pm3 :yep (0.4) yes and the problem is you you once you open the door
29 a lot of people are going to go through it all with legal aid
30 certificates
31 eh [yes
32 pm2 [but surely (unclear) on this to get psychiatric report and
33 opinion (.)
34 eh :he's been refused at the moment on the basis that he hasn't got
35 reasonable prospects of success (.) and (apart) from the fact that
36 the childs welfare is paramount (0.2)
37 pml :the trouble is (0.2) given (unclear) to get (unclear) is almost
38 certainly going to be favourable (0.2)
39 all :well
40 pm3 :[well well (name of solicitors) who are involved are very
41 experienced (.)
17 Data Session eight tape one case one.
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42 pml :(unclear) no we'll we'll give him some support then if he gets a
43 favourable (unclear) we're then allowed to erhem (.) extend (our
44 services) (.)
45 pm2 :but if there is (0.2) a reasonably respected psychiatrist who is
46 willing to put his name it (.) surely he's got a (eligible) case (0.2)
47 ch :how old are these boys do we know it isn't in the papers that
48 we've had (.)
49 cl :we (.) we (.)
50 ch :they presume we do know do they (.)
51 cl :yes (.)
52 ch :how old are they (0.2)
53 cl :the son (name) is (age) (0.2) (name) is (age) there is there is
54 another child (.)
55 all :(child's name) (.)
56 cl :(child's name) (.) who is (age) (0.2)
57 ch :yes (.)
58 all :(unclear) (name) and (name)
59 cl :1 don't have the inf (.) I don't have that information no (.)
60 ch :he actually want's to (make) two (.)
61 cl :yes (.)
62 ch :two claims doesn't he
63 cl [two applications yes
64 pm2 [when did he (see) do you know when he
65 last saw (name) and und (.)
66 ? :(unclear) (4.0)
67 pml :right I think (unclear) that he was seeing (name) then mother
68 turned him down
69 pm3 [yes it does rather suggest that doesn't it (.)
70 pml :when er er (.) the other problems arose (.)
71 ch :but he lives in (place) (1.0) what sort of contact can he have had
72 with his son in (place) (0.2)
73 pm2 :well we can ask him that couldn't we
74 ch [hmmm (0.2)
75 pm3 :he's now living in a probation hostel (4.0)
76 ? :what is (treatment)
77 pml [treated by a psychologist 1 mean how permanent is
78 such treatment likely to prove 1 mean (.) is he still is is it on going
79 I mean (.)
80 ch :well he hasn't done any naughties to any boys (0.2) heh heh he's
81 quite normal in that respect (.)
82 ? :hmmmh well (.)
83 ch :it's only with (names) that he's been errm (.) interfering (.)
84 pml :mmm (1.0) I'd love to know how old (names) are (.) and if they
85 are teenagers (0.4) it might influence one's decisions to the the risk
86 (0.2)
87 pm2 :well let's see what he has to say to me (.) 1 mean 1 must say 1
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88 don't have a lot of sympathy but (unclear)
89 pm! [I start from 1 start from the
90 same (.) ground but (.)
91 pm2 :the work here (.) justifies the investigation (3.0)
92 ch :seems to me its going to take awful lot more (.) a lot of legal aid
93 money (unclear) (.)
94 all :(unclear)
95 ch :and cause enormous pain and upset to the children and the
96 mothers (.)
97 pm! :and if the mothers absolutely determined that he won't have it
98 anyway (.) effectively she will stop him 1 mean she will just say
99 1 am not doing it and the court can do what it likes (.) the court
100 is not going to take the children away from her (.) because it
101 won't let her have contact with the step father (.) so eh
102 pm3 [couldn't
103 really blame the mother for taking that action either
104 pm! [no I beg your
105 pardon (.) father I'm sorry father (.) not step-father (.)
106 ch :children going to (.) horrible (that's right)
107 pml :and if the boys are living with the girls in question (.) which they
108 are according to that (.) going to upset the whole family unit
109 pml :(0.2) I'm very (.) very
110 pm2 [well well 1 (.) suppose we take all this
111 into account see what we act (unclear)
112 pm3 [see what he sez see what he sez (.)
113 pm2 :I'm not sure whether that' enough to deny him the question (.)
114 ? :hmmm
115 pml [that's the problem isn't we are in a sense putting ourselves
116 in the position of (.) errm
117 ? [judging
118 pm! [judging the case almost (2.0)
119 ch :1 suppose we have to do that to some extent
120 ? [hmmm (.)
121 pm3 :well when you are rationing money (.)
122 ch :yes (1.6)
123 cl :shall I ask (unclear) (.)
124 ch :yes please (.) thank you (name of clerk)
125 cl :(unclear)
126 ch :sorry about that (1.0) hello (name of appellant)
What we can see in the first instance (lines l to 4) is the chair
summarise what the appeal is about. After a four second pause panel member
one says rather tentatively that the panel ought to have some expert evidence
about the case (line 5), and that they are reluctant to see the appellant embark
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on the action until the panel have some further knowledge about the appellant
(lines 5 to 7). The first panel member has suggested that they require further
information, and after another four second pause (line 7) panel member three
asks if they have information as to the age of the two step daughters, either
their age at the time of the offence or (possibly) now (line 8 an 9). It seems that
the panel are not willing to give a decisive opinion and are trying to get further
information on the case. The clerk responds that they do not believe that the
requested information is available but asks the panel member to wait while he
looks through the documents (lines 10 and 11) - the clerk's having additional
documents to the ones the panel members have. At this point the chair makes
the observation that the appellant actually wants to "launch" two sets of
proceedings for two different sets of children with different mothers, and
indicates that both have denied the appellant access (lines 12 to 17). This is met
with neither definite confirmation or negation by panel member three (line 18).
After a five second pause (line 18) during which the clerk does not
respond to the request for information on the age of the step daughters, and no
one else offers any opinions, the chair then broadens the topic of discussion out
beyond the individual case a hand but in a way that is directly related to it. The
chair (lines 19 to 21) states that there are a lot of similar cases to this one going
through the courts, but qualifies this to courts in their area, where fathers have
"absolutely hopeless" cases. This is met with some form of token agreement
from panel member three (line 22), the chair goes on to state (lines 23 and 24)
that these are pursued with legal aid and defended at "immense public expense",
a statement agreed to by the rest of the panel (line 25). The chair carries on to
say that the judges themselves "complain" of these cases that legal aid should
not have been granted (lines 26 and 27). This stance is 'reinforced' by the
follow-on statement by panel member three (line 28 to 30), also at a general
level, who after agreeing with the chair states that once one person does this
with legal aid a precedent is made and others follow through "all" on legal aid.
The chair has adopted a very indirect move against the case, in many ways this
leaves him much room for manoeuvre but why he has adopted such a tactic is
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not clear.
However, just as this is being met with approval from the chair (line
31), panel member two brings the discussion directly back to the case by what
seems to be a suggestion that what is needed is a psychiatric report (lines 32 and
33). The chair then states, apparently reading from the documentation, that the
reason that the case was originally refused legal aid was due to lack of
reasonable prospects of success and the welfare of the children (lines 34 to 36).
Following this panel member one seems to express some concern over the
suggestion of obtaining a psychiatrists' report (line 37 and 38), apparently the
concern is due to a perception that it would be favourable to the appellant. It
seems that the rest of the panel do not quite agree with this position of panel
member one (line 39), but it is panel member three who gets to voice this in
stating the "experience" of the solicitors concerned (lines 40 and 41). Panel
member one, however, still continues to express concern, and seems to go
through what will occur but with a sense of doubt as to the desirability of such
an outcome (lines 42 to 44) - this is not too clear on the tape, though it is not
possible to gauge whether it has been designed as unclear or it has been due to
other reasons. This concern of panel member one is met by a statement from
panel member two (lines 45 and 46) that if the appellant can get a good
psychiatrist's report then the case of the appellant will have merit. This
discussion between panel members one and two seems to be between a concern
for the outcome of a psychiatrists report in giving the appellant access to the
children (panel member one), and a concern for the nature of due legal process
(panel member two).
This debate about the need for a psychiatrist's report, between the panel
members is brought to a halt by the chair who makes a request to the clerk for
the age of the boys concerned, stating that the information is not included in the
information which the panel members have been provided with (lines 47 and
48). There then follows a recognition of the question by the clerk (line 49)
which is added to by the chair that it is assumed that the panel does know this
information (line 50), this is confirmed by the clerk (line 51) and the question
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is restated by the chair (line 52). The clerk, reading from his documents, then
gives the names and age of two boys and states that there is a third (lines 53 and
54), the panel members then state together this child's name (line 55). The clerk
-then states that child's name and age (line 56). The chair acknowledges this
information (line 57) after which many of the panel member's talk at the same
time and two of the girls names are mentioned (line 58). This seems to have
been a request for the girls age or a reconfirmation of the lack of this
information, this references back to the earlier request and response (or lack of
it) (lines 8 to 11). This is met with a confirmation by the clerk that they do not
have this information (line 59).
Following this the chair makes a statement (lines 60 and 62) that the
appellant wants to make two claims for legal aid, this is actually the repeating
of an earlier statement by the chair to the same effect (lines 12 to 17) which was
not taken up for discussion by the panel at the time (line 18). It is the clerk who
is addressed and confirms the statement this time (lines 61 and 63), compared
to a panel member on the earlier occasion (line 18). However, again this not
taken up for further discussion, but is followed by a request by panel member
two as to when the appellant last saw one of the children (lines 64 and 65). This
request is not fully finished as it collides with some unclear talk from the panel
(line 66), but results in a suggestion by panel member one as to when this last
occasion was (lines 67, 68 and 70). That, panel member one is working from
the documents is displayed by the confirmation of this suggestion by panel
member three, who states that the documents suggest that to be the case (line
69). This is followed by the chair stating that due to the distance between the
two locations involved, where the child lives and where the appellant lives
"what sort of contact" could he have had with the son named (lines 71 and 72),
to which panel member two suggests that the panel could ask the appellant this
question (line 73) to which the chair concurs (line 74).
Having put aside the issue of how often the appellant has had contact
with the children, panel member three now introduces a new topic - that the
appellant is now living in a probation hostel (line 75). However, this topic is
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not taken up but rather, after a bit of unclear overlap (line 76), panel member
one again raises the issue of the appellants mental health this time by noting that
the appellant is having, or has had, treatment from a psychologist (line 77).
Panel member one is not just noting the fact though, rather their concern is
question to how permanent such treatment is and whether it is on-going (lines
77 to 79). To this the chair points out that the appellant has interfered with the
girls, but has not touched the boys, and in that respect he is "quite normal"
(lines 80 and 81), a fact said with some amusement by the chair. This is not met
with any great response from the panel (line 82), and the chair continues to state
which female child the appellant has "interfered" with (line 83). At this point
panel member one states that they would like to know how old the two girls are,
information which we have seen the clerk is unable to provide (line 84), as it
would influence the amount of risk that panel member might feel the girls to be
in if the appeal and court case were successful (lines 84 and 86). Panel member
two, as earlier with the question of contact (line 73), suggests that this is an
issue that can be directly asked of the appellant (line 87). Panel member two
continues further to state that personally they do not have a lot of sympathy for
the case (lines 87 and 88), to which panel member one states that they start
from the same position (lines 89 and 90), but panel member two continues and
states that the documentation before them does suggest further investigation
(line 91).
After this statement of opinion there is a three second pause before the
chair states their belief that if the case is successful it is going to use a lot of
legal aid money (lines 92 and 93). This, I suggest, can be seen as reiterating the
chairs earlier general comments about the cost of "hopeless" cases to the public
purse (lines 19 to 21, 23,24,26 and 27). This meets an unclear response from
the rest of the panel (line 94), but seemingly one of approval, and the chair
carries on to state that it will also cause distress to the mothers and children
(line 95 and 96). Panel member one adds to this that if the mother of the child
is determined to stop the step-father, although this is corrected to father (lines
104 and 105), having access to the children there is nothing the court can do as
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it is not going to order the children to be taken from the mother (97 to 101).
Panel member three adds to this statement that if it were the case, then one
could not blame the mother (lines 102 and 103), and the chair seems to add that
the scenario is a horrible one. Panel member one continues by stating that since
the boys who the appellant wants access to are living with the girls whom the
appellant "interfered" with, the whole family will be upset (lines 107 and 109).
Panel member one seems about to continue (line 109) but panel member
two interrupts to state that the panel takes these concerns into account (lines 110
and 111), but before the sentence is completed panel member three completes
it for them by adding that they will be taking this into account when they hear
what the appellant has to say (line 112) - two questions for the appellant have
previously been suggested. To this panel member two again states that they
believe that these worries of the panel are not enough to deny the merits of the
case (line 113). It is just after this that panel member one formulates the
problem as being that of "judging the case almost" (lines 115, 116 and 118), to
which after a slight pause the chair states that to an extent they do have to do
this (line 119), to which panel member three states the reason being that they
are "rationing money" (line 121) to which the chair concurs (line 122). This
issue of "rationing money" can be seen to be the panel attending to the fact that
they are dealing with monies from the public purse and, although not
technically limited, is an issue to be attended to as we can see the chair doing
earlier in the case (lines 23 and 24). The clerk asks what seems to be whether
the appellant should be brought in (line 123), the chair replies in the affirmative
and thanks the clerk (line 124) and with virtually no transition period or




The phase begins with hesitation by the panel members, although it is
not explicit here in the transcript, it is quite clear to the panel members what the
initial hesitation is about, and what the nature of the additional information is
to be about, because the panel can see from the documents in front of them that
the appellant has a previous conviction for child abuse. That this is evident to
them may be displayed in that the chair has not asked for, and no panel member
has offered, a definite clear cut opinion on the case. Further documentary
information is then requested from the clerk by panel member three (line 8 and
9). Then we see the attempted construction of the salient points of the case, the
mutual or joint recognition of what the phenomenon is, this construction of the
case is achieved from the documentation. It is the chair who is the person doing
this (lines 12 to 17), and it may be possible to see this as one of the tasks of the
chair, that the chair has perceived it to be so in this instance, although it does
not necessarily have to be so. However, this line of discussion comes to a halt
and there is move to 'other cases' which comes after a long pause (line 18). It
appears that the lack of development of the original line of discussion instigates
this. This broadening out of the discussion then facilitates a reorientation to the
case, a refocusing through 'provoking' panel member two (line 32)
The chair would seem to go on to labelling the current case also as
hopeless, and hence giving his opinion on the case, although it is a rather
indirect assessment (lines 19 to 21). The chair does this by including the case
with cases which it is claimed judges believe should not have legal aid due to
their lack of likelihood of success (lines 26 and 27). The unlikelihood of
success, a legitimate reason for its refusal of legal aid, is made without direct
reference to directly stated aspects of the case itself. This assessment of the case
by the chair is constructed with reference to criteria outside the direct content
of the case itself, but in the context of other cases going through the courts, this
assessment relies on personal experience. This displays the flexibility of the
members practices in allowing this sort of material to be introduced and
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possibly incorporated into their assessment.
The chair then states, apparently reading from the documentation, that
the reason that the case was originally refused legal aid was due to lack of
reasonable prospects of success and the welfare of the children (lines 34 to 36).
This brings the discussion back from a broader discussion to the specifics of the
case, and seems to be in response to the suggestion by panel member two that
a psychiatrist's report is needed (lines 32 to 33). This also appears to address
of the concerns of panel member one at the beginning of the case (lines 5 to 7),
as to the welfare of the children.
However, again the discussion of the case moves away from an
'objective' consideration of the case (lines 37 and 38), with panel member one
expressing an explicit concern that the appellant could be successful. This
seems to be met with some concern by the other panel members (line 39). Panel
member two attempts to allay panel member one's concerns by referring to the
experience of the solicitors involved in the case (lines 40 and 41). Panel
member one continues to express concern (lines 42 to 44), then panel member
two gets the discussion back to the panels 'official' remit of assessing the case
on its merits and not on their worries about the outcome (lines 45 and 46). Note
that this is done via reference to the production of a document to be then
assessed procedurally, at least that is the implication of the action of obtaining
a psychiatric report.
Throughout the phase the tribunal members attend together to the
documentation in front of them. This is especially evident when the whole panel
state the third child's name (line 55) in response to the clerk's failure to do so
(lines 53 and 54). This is also an illustration of documentation being used to
provide information for the situated activity of constructing the appellant's
'situation' as regards to the appeal.
The comment as to asking the appellant a question (line 73) is a clear
illustration of the panel members in phase one orientating to the future i.e. the
work of discussing the case with the appellant. It can also be seen as the line-up
of future activities, and the putting aside of unanswerable questions that could
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lead to supposition if followed up in the present. And has been shown in the
previous two cases (case two of chapter three and case one of this chapter), that
this locating of something to ask the appellant may lead to the termination of the
work of discussing the first phase of the case. However this does not happen
here, and thus illustrating some of the flexibility of the practices used by the
panel.
There appears to be a conflict between panel members one and two
(lines 84 to 91), over concerns of the former as to the consequences of allowing
access by the appellant to the children, and the latter as to the due legal process
warranted by the application. It can be seen as the resurfacing of earlier
concerns in the discussion of the case. Also, panel member two can be seen
here to be giving an assessment of the merits of the case (line 91) and possibly
suggesting it is worthy of legal aid. Here we can see a struggle between a
overtly 'moral' or 'concerned' approach to the assessment of the case, one
introducing an 'artifactual' (in the scientific sense) interpretation and one based
on 'legal procedure'. What is noteworthy is that this 'artifactual' interpretation
is not met with outright rejection by panel member one in their desire to assess
the case on its legal merits. This conflict is 'settled' with panel member one
(lines 97 to 101) saying that, even if the case was successful and the appellant
got access through the courts to the boys, if the mother ignored the courts then
the courts were virtually powerless to make their decision prevail. This being
because they would not take the children from a mother who refused to let a
father have access to a family whose one or more members he had interfered
with. Notably this seems to be the panel member not using the legal rules
rigidly but knowing the possible practical outcomes Le. lawyers common-sense
knowledge over legal statute.
Here we can see that the discussion of the case has moved away from
the assessment of the case in terms of strictly legal criteria, but in terms of the
outcome of the success of the case for which legal aid is being applied for.
When panel member three suggests that they will be taking this into account
when they hear what the appellant has to say (line 112), two questions for the
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appellant have previously been suggested, this appears as an attempt to move
the hearing on.
When the first phase of the case is brought to a close it is instigated not
by the panel but by the clerk, but not until after a 'pregnant' pause (line 122).
This is indicates that the clerk has been following the discussion and has
decided it has gone far enough to warrant a move to phase two - as we have
seen certain issues have been noted by the panel for inclusion in the following
phase.
Finally it is interesting that the chair believes that it is part of their job
to ration the monies of the Legal Aid Board as this is not in fact the case, and
no mention of rationing is made in the Legal Aid Handbook 1994. Rather, if the
case warrants it, it receives legal aid irrespective of issues of how much money
the Legal Aid Board's budget has.
Case Fivel8 - (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Two).
Due to the length of this cases, and that all of it has beeen transcribed
here, the case is presented in three segments. The first segment contrains phases
one and two of the tribunal, the second contains phase three, and the third phase
four.
1 pml :what did you say (.)
2 ch :1 said 1 said would a fee paying client be advised to take action
3 (.) no
4 all :(laughter)
5 ch :well a fee (.) you see a fee paying client who could afford this
6 type of work could send their child to a private school and
7 (unclear) (.)
8 ? :(unclear) (.)
9 ch :you would be going to (Sidford Mall?) or somewhere like that (.)
10 err and you would have the provision (.)
11 cl :that's not necessarily true though is it (.) 1 mean (.)
12 ? :(laughter)
18 Data session nine tape two case one.
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13 cl :they could (.) they have a very modest income and eight grand in
14 the bank and they wouldn't be eligible for legal aid (.)
15 eh :quite right (.) I mean one has a (.) one forgets how how restricted
16 the (.) legal aid is now (.) but on the other hand I believe these- cl
17 [umm oh yeah
18 eh :-are very serious matters actually (0.2) erm my own (0.2) I made
19 these reservations (.) to us here (.) my own reservations is that this
20 is again (.) a very poorly presented (.) application a very poorly
21 presented appeal I mean it is all very well to (.) err refer to the act
22 but act actually doesn't help you (0.2) you need to go a whole lot
23 further into it (.) Imean to point to section two six of the further
24 education act (.) made it plain (0.2) well it doesn't make it plain
25 at all actually but there we are (.) I mean (3.0)
26 pm? :he cites this other this case (.) december 7th (.)
27 eh :that's not a reported case (.) (unclear) reported in the times (.)
28 times report (0.2) is is mister (solicitors name) (.)
29 cl :yes yes mister (solicitor) and errm looks like mother and father
30 (.)
31 eh :right (0.2) okay (unclear)
32 cl [right (.)
33 ? :bring them in (5.0) [foot steps walking away]
34 eh :(anybody) got thee section two six err higher education act
35 nineteen
36 pml [I'll rely on you (.)
37 pm2 :oh and Ido (name of chair) (.)
38 eh :(oh) well I'm sorry about that (but depends what happens)
39 (unclear) (.)
40 pm3 :(well we started with Rutherford and Mill?) (unclear) (.)
41 ?? :(laughter) (unclear) (10.0) [appellants and solicitor return and get
42 seated]
43 cl :mister and misses (wrong name) is it (.)
44 s :(right name) (right name)
45 eh [right name
46 m [(unclear)
47 cl [I'm sorry (right name) and mister (solicitors
48 name) (.) right mister and misses (name) you've applied for legal
49 aid or rather (.) your son (name of son) has applied for legal aid
50 and you (.) that is his (unclear) (.) legal aid is sought to (.) seek
51 a judicial review of the decision made by (name) county council
52 as to the further education of (son's name) (.) erm legal aid has
53 been refused (.) errm it was felt on the information then available
54 er (.) a successful result seemed unlikely (.) you appealed to the
55 area committee against this decision (.) the area committee have
56 some papers (.) err you and or mister (solicitor) will have a chance
57 to address the committee and there will be some questions for you
58 (0.2)
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59 eh :err (.) mister and mrs (name) my name is (name) I'm
60 accompanied by mister (name) (name) and mister (name) (.) if I
61 may tell you what we have read so far in detail (.) we've a
62 statement which I think is by you misses (name) (.) dated thee err
63 (.) its I think the sixth of the ninth I think september last year (.)
64 err we've got a statement here which is undated (.) it starts off
65 "this case raise important complex issues of law" (0.2) errm we
66 have a letter from mister (solicitor) errm (.) asking for the matter
67 to be relisted (.) errm (.) er another letter saying that a (.) written
68 statement in relation to the appeal against the appeal for legal aid
69 (0.4) errm (0.2) another letter (.) err about mention a case
70 (unclear) dorset county council (0.2) and err another letter also on
71 that (1.0) errm (2.0) referring to thee (.) err fact that the board
72 had refused the application on the basis of no reasonable prospects
73 of success (.) which of course isn't quite right (0.2) its a refusal
74 (.) on the grounds of (unclear) that's part of it no reasonable
75 grounds for (taking?) (0.2) errm then we have that decision (1.4)
76 now (1.0) perhaps you could (.) (tie that on to?) your case you
77 could tie it up (unclear) perhaps you could take us through it (.)
78 s :err well perhaps a chronology would help (.) beginning with the
7 9 interests of er the child (.) who's now sixteen (.) (child's name)- eh
80 ~e~
81 s :-born (date) er when he was very young he was assessed as being
82 a child with (.) special educational needs (.) and the local edram
83 authority this was (place name) count county council (.) wentthrough the
84 statutory statement proc er processes under the educationact (.) and the
85 statement was in force (.) until the child was (.) sixteen years of age (.)
8 6 there are also statutory
87 requirements which require that there be a transition plan for
88 children from the age of fourteen (.) taking them through to adult
89 (.) life (.)
90 eh :right can you point to that what whats the statutory reference for
91 that (.)
92 s :errm well I don't have the statutory references here but I do have
93 a (.) guide book (.) erm issued by the (.) department of education
94 (.) relating to special educational needs (.) and there is reference
95 in there (.)
96 eh :perhaps you would find that and read us the bit saying there is a
97 duty to (.) to provide the statement (5.0)
98 s :ermm well I'll read the relevant passage here (.) "education for
99 young people with special education needs does not stop at sixteen
100 C.) depending on the child's interests and abilities (.) he or she can
101 stay on at an ordinary or special school (.) or can move to a
102 college of further education (.) erh many schools have developed
103 link courses with colleges so that so that pupils in their last year
104 at the school C.) can go on to a college C.) on a part-time basis C.)
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105 erm further education is available for young people over the age
106 of sixteen (.) if your child has a statement of special educational
107 needs (.) further education will be considered (.) when the
108 transition plan is drawn up when he or she is fourteen" (.) and
109 then there is reference there to an earlier section (.) on page thirty
110 one (.) I really didn't want to dwell on this point too long (.)
111 ch :so are you saying that no transition plan was drawn up (.)
112 s :well as far as I can ascertain no transition plan has been drawn up
113 and I have discussed this with mister and misses (name) (.) and eh
114 [they would surely
115 know
116 s :-and the latest official document was the (.) latest form of the
117 statement (.) which (.) was dated the 14th of august ninety-two (.)
118 and I have a copy of that and that actually recommended that the
119 child remain (.) at the school where he then was which was the (.)
120 (name) special school in (place name) (.) and that always remained
121 (.) err the wish (.) of the parents (.) now its part of our case (.)
122 ch :er could you just pause a moment (.) was that's that's erm (.)
123 certificate given (.) for (.) thee (.) for (child's name) fourteenth
124 birthday (.)
125 m :that was the (.) that is the plan (.) that was the last statement (.)
126 he would get (.) to to provide
127 ch [was it was it given before he was fourteen (3.0)
128 s :he was just he was gone fourteen (.)
129 ch :he was gone fourteen so that that that then (.) but I mean that
130 surely (.) erm as things stand covers him till sixteen doesn't it (.)
131 m :yeah (.)
132 ch :so (.) you're saying the transition plan from fourteen to eighteen
133 hasn't been drawn up (0.4)
134 s :that's right (.) but the main thrust of my argument is really based
135 upon (.) that judgement that was made in december (.) erm and
136 (0.2) the fact of the matter here (.) is that (name of child) was
137 destatemented (.) there was never a considered reason why the
138 statementing process (.) should stop when he reached the age of
139 sixteen (.) the local education authority simply did that (.) they
140 shouldn't have done that (.)
141 ch :well hang on (.) they did it you say (.) how did they do it (.)
142 s :they purported to d well they did it by (.) virtue of the fact that
143 they no longer are continuing with the statement (.) there was
144 never any consultation process (.) leading to a reasoned decision
145 for the statement in (unclear)
146 m [they did actually write to me to say that
147 they were going to err (.) cease his statement (.) as from (.) a date
148 in august (.) and then I wrote back asking them (.) that I
149 ch [you
150 haven't got have you got the letter showing (.) that they are (.)
314
151 they in fact (.) cause what they are doing in fact surely is saying
152 (.) that they no longer propose to continue with the arrangements
153 special arrangements (.) set out in the err certificate which was
154 given just after his fourteenth birthday (.)
155 s :yes the thrust of there approach is that they're saying that (child)
156 m : [yeas
157 ch [ yeah
158 but I understand that but have you got the letter there (.)
159 m :1didn't bring it with me no (.)
160 s :but there's there's a bundle of correspondence here (.) passing
161 between (county name) (.) and the clients that I can produce (.)
162 dealing with these issues (.) but the fact of the matter is that there
163 was no consultation process (.) (child's name) was (.) told that he
164 could not continue staying at the school that he was at (.) and he
165 was told that the provision that would be made for him (.) would
166 be (.) under the financing of the further further education funding
167 council (.) and that he could go to the (name) college (.) and that
168 remains the position at the moment (0.2) now (.) if we refer to the
169 judgement (.) err in the case decided in december (.) it is clear I
170 submit (.) that the local authority will be acting outside their
171 powers (.) if they either frame their statement craftily (.) so as to
172 (.) take it outside the scope of their continuing obligations as the
173 local education authority (.) or if they simply stop statementing the
174 child when he reaches sixteen (.) without making a reasoned
175 decision as to whether that is the appropriate thing to do (.) as 1
176 say that is precisely what has happened in this case (0.6)
177 ch :I'm not very sure I fffollow you mister (solicitor) (.)
178 s :well (.)
179 ch :hang on a minute (.) lets just take this step (0.6) what you're
180 doing you you start you go off (.) (child's name) situation you go
181 straight into the situation of this (.) child who was in Dorset (0.2)
182 dorsetshire county council (0.6) your what you're saying really is
183 this (.) looking down half way down the page of that report (.) his
184 lordships view once the child was statemented (.) the duty to
185 maintain the statement (.) under the under section seven two of the
186 nineteen eighty one act (.) now section one eight one six five (a)
187 of the nineteen sixty three act (.) continued after the child reached
188 sixteen (0.2) now surely your
189 s [unless and until amended or ceased to be-
190 ch [yep
191 maintained on a proper proposal
192 ch [yep I didn't read on because I was
193 going to say (.) your best point surely (.) is that (.) the authority
194 has done nothing (.) this point (.) save to refer (child's name) to
195 the F.E.F.e. (0.2) is that right (.)
















































:yes but that that could be alright isn't it if they've reached that of
a result of proper proposal (.) now if you're saying you're saying-
(unclear)
:-they've not done that (.)
:elsewhere in the judgement it totally clear crystal clear (.) that the
local authority cannot rely on the regime of the further education
funding council (.) to absolve themselves from their own
responsibilities that's clearly written into the judgement here (.)
:yes but 1 have to say this is a times report mister (solicitor's
name) (.) those two paragraphs don't actually lie easily side by
side do they (.) because they say here one six one eight six five (a)
(.) errm statutory duty continuing after the child has reached
sixteen "unless and until amended or ceased to be maintained (.)
on a proper proposal by the local education authority" (.) then he
goes on to say the report would have it (.) and its contradictory (.)
"made it plain that the FEPC's duty to sixteen to eighteen year
olds was secondary to that of local education authority where the
latter was responsible and maintained or should maintain a
statement"(.)
:"for a pupil with (unclear) education (unclear)"
[yeah [so what (.) surely your
best point is this (.) that the the local the education authority have
not got to grips with need (.) to (.) take and make a proper
proposal (.) for this for (child's name) (0.2) am I right (0.2)
:well what I'm saying is that they are no longer maintaining a
statement (.) und that they are (.) unlawfully failing to maintain a
statement (0.2) that they've adopted a policy (.) that where
children have special educational needs and are statemented (.)
they will automatically cease to statement them at sixteen (.)
without considering whether it's appropriate (.) those are the facts
of the case (.)
:well you don't do you have any evidence of the policy (.) 1mean-
[basically-
:-I'm just trying to
:- I've I've I've great
[I'm only trying to make it easier for you you
understand mister (name of solicitor) I'm trying to make it easier
for you (.) because surely what here you're seeking to (.) judicially
review (0.2) a decision of this authority or its failure to make a
decision (.) am 1right (.)
:well if we look at the history of the matter (.)
:no sorry hang on (.) just a moment lets lets just I'm not cross-
examining you but are you am 1 right there you are seeking to
review (.) the failure to (.) do something (.) in this case (.) and-
[yes [yes
:-what they-failed to do (.) is to make a proposal (0.2) or to
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243 continue with a proposal (.)
244 s :they failed to maintain a statement (0.2)
245 ch :well I'm I'm worrying about that (.) I'm worrying about the
246 failure to maintain a statement but maybe I'm being too particular
247 (.) I mean I've seen I've (.) read (.) the statutory references (.)
248 and I I take the point that thee erh (.) further and higher education
249 act does require them to C.) secure provision for sixteen to eighteen
250 year olds C.) yuh C.) yes okay C.) right I I've been talking too much
251 s [umm
252 ch :(.) (unclear) (.)
253 pm? :yes I wonder how (.) how do you (.) do we define a proper
254 proposal (.) what constitutes a proper proposal (.)
255 s :well C.) if if a child with special needs has had those needs met
256 for some reason as a result of the way he has developed (.) err it
257 turns out (.) that there's no longer any particular need for him to
258 remain under the regime C.) of the local education authority
259 because his needs have been met (.) he's developed in such a way
260 that that regime is not necessary that would be a proper proposal
261 (.) that that somebody would propose that certain things are no
262 longer necessary (.)
263 pm :ah yes but how does this proper proposal manifest itself C.)
264 s :well the obligation to maintain the statement (.) persists (.) until
265 there is a proposal (.) that it shouldn't (.) if
266 pm [who makes this
267 proposal (.)
268 s :the local education authority (.)
269 pm :how do they err (2.0) how does this this published (unclear) what
270 do they do do they have a meeting and they all draw up proposals
271 that this child should no longer be statemented and that the end of
272 it (.) or do they have to enter into a proper procedure (.)
273 s :no its its an ongoing process C.) und err (.) the local authority the
274 education authority (.) the county council has the statutory
275 obligation (.) to arrange for the statementing in the first place if
276 the child with special educational needs is identified C.) now the
277 way that it carries out its obligations (.) is (.) to C.) err usually err
278 (.) contact the school where the child is if it is at a school (.) and
279 arrange with the school (.) for preparation of reports on the child's
280 progress (.) and also various other agencies are called in (.) err
281 health officials (.) speech is considered (.) so it it's a multi-
282 disciplinary (.) err matter (.)
283 pm :you say this hasn't been done C.)
284 s :I'm not saying it hasn't been done it was clearly done until the
285 child was of a certain age C.)
286 ch :six hundred and sixty seven of the nineteen ninety three act
287 (seems to say its the provision of the state?) (.)
















































here (.) and what we are saying is that there's a a policy (.) that
in all cases of children with special educational needs (.) they will
cease to cease to statement them (.) those individuals without
considering whether that is appropriate or
[what is your evidence
what is your evidence for that (.)
:well my evidence for that (.) is misses (child's mother name)'s
case (.) discussions that I had with misses (name) of the education
authority (.) erm discussions by telephone with the local education
authority (.) when they cease err they seek to deny that there is a
particular policy but where (.) the evidence is that there manifestly
is such a policy (.) over a period of several years in (name of
county) children children approaching the age of sixteen who have
(.) for example (.) er remained at special schools (.) erm w i I I
cease to be statemented (.) no specific official provision is made (.)
children (.) have in the past been placed with the (name of college)
which does not have the appropriate facilities (.) the college has
found that it could not cater and then on an unofficial unfunded
basis (.) the children have tended (.) in certain cases to be referred
back to the school that they were attending for example at the
(name of school) this has happened in the past (.) now in the last (.)
year to two years (.) the local education authority have actually
specified (.) that they're not going to continue doing that on this
unofficial basis (.) in practice that will (.) what was happening to
the children of ages between sixteen to nineteen (.) und er (.)
statements were not being maintained for those children (0.6) now
this practice (.) is widespread (.) it is a policy we say in (county
name) (.) clearly the evidence is that other education authorities (.)
err do the same sort of thing and there is the evidence of the err (.)
dorset county council case (.) I don't know what the picture is
nationally (0.2) but we're talking about (.) a small number of
children who have very significant needs (.) the judgement here (.)
if read carefully (.) and I know it it is not a full judgement but the
substance (.) of the judgement is there and it it is an important
judgement (.) is (.) that thee (.) regime of the further education
council is not adequate (.) that the statutory regime under the
education acts (.) for children with special needs (.) err is an
important right (.) they must not loose that right (1.2) the reason
that I have referred to this case is that I consider that it is (.) really
on all (fours?) with my clients case (.) originally when we lodged
our application for legal aid it was more broadly based (.) and err
it was my contention (.) that what the education authority was doing
was discriminating against a particular section of the children (.)
namely children with special educational needs (.) but I don't need
to continue with that (.) broad point because (.) we have this case
here (.) and I think that really supports us very strongly
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335 indeed (.) I really cannot distinguish (.) (child's name)'s case with
336 the dorset case (0.4)
337 ch :can I ask mister and misses (child's parents name) I mean (.) what
338 has happened so far as (.) (child's name)' s education is concerned
339 at the moment (.)
340 m :he's at (name) college errm (unclear) but (.) he's there (.) he was
341 very borderline as to whether or not they could take him or not (.)
342 and he's he does have (.) very difficult problems (unclear) with
343 behaviour so if therefore they decided to (.) errm (.) to (dis ... ?)
344 (child's name) from college (.) which they are perfectly entitled to
345 they don't have to keep him there (.)
346 pm? :but at the moment he is there (.)
347 m :he is there (.) I mean it is errm (.) I do have a letter here that (.)
348 came (.) back from college which does sort tend to indicate (.) the
349 problems that they're having with him (.)
350 pm? :1 mean your original statement you say that it it you have got
351 a unit within the north (county) college (.)
352 m :yes he's in a special unit (.) but errm they tend to build on more
353 mild cases (of erm) (.) mental handicap than rather than the severe
354 case that my son's got (.) my big problem that I worry about if if
355 he (.) is excluded from college because of his behaviour (.) and
356 they've got to (.) erm the education department don't make a new
357 statement (.) they won't restatement him (.) so he will not there
358 will be no where for him to go there'll be no education for him (.)
359 whereas if he continues to be statemented even if they say (.) that
360 at the moment that he should stay at the college (0.2) if the college
361 don't want him then then it's (.) the education department (.) s
362 responsibility to find him somewhere else (0.2) whereas at the
363 moment he is not statemented that's only (unclear) (.) so don't
364 have anything to fall back on (.)
365 pm? :so there's no problem at the moment but your concern is what
366 would (.) what might (.)
367 m :I'm not happy with him at the college I didn't want him to go to
368 the college and 1 pleaded with them to stop at school but 1 didn't
369 (unclear) (.) 1 mean (.) my son has ran out into the road the other
370 day (.) he could have been run over and killed and I wouldn't have
371 a son (.) that's never happened while he was at school (.) I don't
372 know but they really are (.) qualified enough to be looking after
373 him (.) und
374 pm? [and how far is the north (county name) college from where
375 you live (0.2)
376 m :mmm (.) two miles (.)
377 pm? :so it's within easy reach (.)
378 m :it within the town (0.2) 1 mean it's just a hundred yards from the
379 school that he was attending (.)
















































:any more questions (4.0) (name of school) school does provide




:so where're where (.)
:(county) county council have no schools in their (.) in the county
at all that provides education for sixteen to nineteen (.) they don't
have schools for (.)
:there's no schools for (.)
:no (0.2)
:fine (.)
:there's no designated schools for
[you're absolutely sure about that (.)
:yes (.) (unclear)
:they make no provision at all (.)
:only only with the colleges
: [there is a there is a provision if I could just make this point (.)
that erm there are (.) two basic categories of children with special
educational needs (.) those that are statemented and those that are
not statemented (.) non-statemented er (.) children with special
needs may simply be slow learners and can be dealt with on a
remedial basis in main stream schools and they will usually go on
to (.) sixteen to eighteen in normal schools (.) so it is not quite
accurate to say that normal (.) er main stream schools do not make
provision for children with special educational needs (.) but
statemented children (.) tend to have needs (.) that main stream
schools are (.) incapable of coping with (.) with because they don't
have the physical facilities or the staff to cope (0.2)
:and the money (.)
:and the money (.) and what has happened in the past is (.) that
schools such as the (name of school) special schools (.) have (.)
plugged the gap filled in the gap for those sixteen to nineteen (.)
er in the past (.) but now (.) as the result of the local education
authority saying no they're not plugging that gap any longer (.)
and there is a a lacuna here (1.0)
:right [hushed voice] (0.6) I may read (.) in (.) this is merely your
saying here have (.) section two of the (.) erm further and higher
education act nineteen ninety two (.) "it shall be the duty of each
council" (.) that the the education authority (.) "to secure the
provision for the population of their area of sufficient facilities for
education to which the subsection applies (.) that is full-time
education (.) suitable to the requirement of the persons over
compulsory school age who have not (.) attained the age of
nineteen years" (.) so really you're you are saying that (county
name) are failing (.) to fulfil that duty in respect of (child's name)
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427 (0.2)
428 s :I'm saying that but that's a broadly based proposition that could-
429 c [no no
430 s :-apply to other children as well (.)
431 c :oh I mean hah
432 s [my my case is
433 c [mister (solicitor's name) we got to you
434 mustn't (0.4) may I remind you you're seeking legal aid for
435 (child's name) (.) now it really is (child's name)'s needs and
436 (child's name)' s concern we're dealing with today and not (.) the
437 general picture of education in (county name) (.) I mean it's (.)
438 they have not (.) I mean (0.4) mister and misses (name) you have
439 told us they have not provided you with full-time education (0.2)
440 m :(unclear) (0.4)
441 c :although he is at this this college (0.2)
442 m :errm (.) although he did (.) but then (.) (county name)
443 (education?) himself (.) and they (.) on his statement it doesn't say
444 anything about (.) him going to the college (.) after he was sixteen
445 (.) so if (.)
446 c :your concerned that they could whip him out any time (.)
447 m :if the college declined to keep him then he's got nothing (.)
448 c :because that place is funded by the HEPC (0.2) right okay (.) I
449 I I think I've got that (4.0) have you anything else to add at all (.)
450 s :well (.) only one point which is that this is a public law matter in
451 the sense that we are dealing with statutory obligations and
452 although (.) (child's name) was an interested party (.) there is (.)
453 the point that if we are challenging what we say is there policy that
454 does have a knock on effect for other children (.) but of course if
455 we are seeking judicial review we're saying (.) that they are failing
456 in their specific duties towards (child's name) because he' s-
457 c [mmmh
458 s (unclear) entitled to that provision (.) and so that it maybe not-
459 c [mmm [yeah
460 s : simply a declaratory (.) application (.) but an application for
461 (mandamus?) directed to make special (.)
462 c [mmmm yeah no doubt about
463 that no doubt about that (.) that all (.)
464 s :errmm (0.6) I come back to this that what we really seek is for
465 implementation (.) of the regulations that pertain to children with
466 special needs that are statemented (.) and not err directed to
467 (child's name) as a general member of the population (.) which
468 would apply whether he was a child with special needs or not (.)
469 c :yes I can see that that's an added factor here (.) okay (.) anything
470 else (0.2)
471 s :errm is there anything else that we've (0.8) it's a matter of


















out on the basis (0.2) that we didn't have a case (0.2) I (.) think that
one (.) has got to take (.) a view of the way that proceedingscan
be dealt with in this sort of tribunal which is an appeal tribunal
(.) this isn't a review of a judicial review application (0.2) and I
have not prepared it on the basis that we're going before the court
on a (.) a full hearing (.) this is a hearing to establish whether we
should have legal aid (.) there may be (.) deficiencies in my
arguments today through lack of preparation because (.) of
the nature of today's proceedings is with regard to whether
we should get legal aid (.) I would say that on the basis of what
we have put before the tribunal today (.) I think that we've
established that we've got something substantial to argue about (.)
and I think at the very least (.) it merits a decision (.) to obtain
counsel's opinion (.) at the very least (0.2)
:okay (.) fine (.) thankyou (3.0) if you would like to wait outside
(23.0)
The transcript starts with panel member one asking the chair what their
comments from their reading of the case documentation prior to the tribunal
hearing were (line I). The chair responds by stating that they had raised the
question as to whether a fee paying client would be advised to embark on the
legal action for which legal aid has been applied for, and states that their
opinion was that they would not (lines 2 and 3). This being a legitimate reason
for refusing legal aid and as such is a reference to the regulations guiding the
panel. This is responded to with laughter by the other panel members (line 4),
and although it is not evident in the transcript the general tone of the language
of the first four lines has been one of underlying mirth.
The chair goes on to explicate their reasoning behind their opinion,
stating that a fee paying client who could embark upon such an expensive
course of action would, in fact, avoid the problem by sending their child to a
private school (lines 5 to 7). There is an unclear comment (line 8), before the
chair goes on to elaborate further by naming an example of such a school which
provides such facilities (lines 9 and 10). However, at this point the clerk
challenges the chair's assessment of likely courses of action by stating that
someone on a modest income with a moderate amount of money in the bank
would not be eligible for legal aid (lines 11, 13 and 14). It is notable that the
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clerk has interjected on the deliberation of the panel, and that this contradiction
of the chair is taken with good humour by the panel and with some laughter
(line 12). The clerk is saying that someone ineligible for legal aid for financial
reasons would not necessarily have the money to send their child to a private
school due to the eligibility levels for legal aid. Now this contradicts the latter
part of the chair's statement (line 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10), but not the earlier part
which is whether a fee paying client would be advised to embark upon such a
course of action (lines 2 and 3). Rather it contradicts the reason given for such
a decision.
The chair then responds to this by agreeing with the clerk's assessment
and comments upon how eligibility for legal aid has dropped to such an extent
that individuals of moderate means are not eligible any more for legal aid (line
15 and 16). The chair at this point takes action to lower the levity which has so
far accompanied the case. The chair states that these are serious matters, a
comment that evokes agreement from the clerk (line 17), and goes on to
comment further on the case (lines 16, 18 and onwards). The chair goes on to
state that the case has been poorly presented (as he believes were earlier cases
in the session), specifying the inadequacy of a reference in the documentation
to a specific act of parliament on education. That reference to section two six
does not clarify matters at all, although the chair seems to get a bit muddled in
saying this (lines 18 to 25).
Following this one of the other panel members, it is unclear which,
notes that the solicitor has cited a case (line 26), the date of which is then given
(line 26). However, the chair goes some way to dismissing the status of this
case by stating that it is not a 'reported case', but the report of a case in The
Times newspaper (lines 27 and 28). The chair appears to be stating that the
newspaper report does not have sufficient status to qualify the reported case as
being able to be used as having set a precedent. The chair follows this statement
with a topic change by asking if the solicitor for the appellant will be present
(line 28). This is responded to by the clerk who affirms the question and adds
the information of the presence of the two parents (lines 29 and 30). The clerk
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has obtained this information not from the documents, but from checking the
arrival of appellant as the tribunal session is in progress. Neither the question
by the chair, or the answer from the chair, appear in the transcript as fully
formed, but this is not problematic for the members themselves. The clerk's
answer is acknowledged as having satisfied the request by the chair (line 31),
thus confirming the clerk understanding of the question initially.
The chair gives a slightly drawn out "okay" and appears to make a
request of the clerk which is unclear on the tape (line 31). This seems to be a
request for the clerk to bring in the appellants, at least it is attended to as such
by the clerk. The clerk responds with a repeat of the chair's "right", and seems
to take this as concluding the first phase of the tribunal (line 32). One of the
tribunal members then says to "bring them in", and the clerk leaves to bring in
the appellants and their legal representative (line 33). The panel then orientates
to the next phase, discussing the case with the appellant (and their
representative) .
In the transition period between the clerk leaving and his return with the
attenders, the chair asks the other panel members if any of them have the
relevant section of the education act for this case (line 34 and 35). Panel
member one responds by saying that they, panel member one, will rely on the
chair (line 36). Panel member two then does the same (line 37). The chair then
responds to this by saying that he is "sorry about that" (line 38), and seems to
mean that he is sorry they have not managed to be able to get round to reading
the relevant Act. This is not an item which would have been included in the
documents supplied by the legal aid board, but would have to have been done
independently by the panel members. The chair seems to indicate that it might
not be consequential (lines 38 and 39). Panel member three responds to this by
stating, somewhat unclearly, that they started the hearing with some other case
(line 40). This seems to be offered as some sort of reason or excuse for not
having read the relevant act and evokes laughter from the other members (lines
41 and 42). Following this there is a long pause with the sound of returning
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footsteps as the clerk and the attenders return.
Once the appellant and their solicitor are seated the clerk then checks
that he has the name of the appellants correct (line 43), as it happens he does
not use the correct name and is then corrected by their solicitor (line 44), the
chair (line 45), and also unclearly by the mother (line 46).
Once the clerk has apologised for his mistake (lines 47 and 48), the
clerk goes on to give a summary of their application for legal aid so far (lines
48 to 58). This is similar to the second case (case two) in Chapter Three. The
first thing that we note of difference here is that the appeal is being brought on
behalf of their son, and not on behalf of themselves (lines 48 to 50); this is
allowable when the appellant is a child. The clerk then states what legal aid has
been sought for, a judicial review of a decision of a local education authority
(lines 50 to 52). Following this the clerk notes that legal aid was refused and
that this was due to success being deemed unlikely, although specific reference
is given here to "information then available" (line 53). Referencing that
appellants are allowed to introduce new information and evidence during the
tribunal hearing, new information that could lead to a decision differing from
the initial assessment both in phase one and the original assessment. The clerk
then notes that the appellants have appealed against this decision to the area
committee, i.e. legal aid tribunal (lines 52 to 55). Then he notes specific
documents centrality to the work of the tribunal that the committee has (line 55
and 56). Finally, the clerk states that the appellants and/or their solicitor will
have a chance to address the committee and the committee will do likewise to
them (lines 56 to 58).19
Following this the chair then addresses the appellants, the parents rather
than the solicitor, introducing himself and the three other panel members by
19Of note here is Pomerantz's observation of a similar event that: "This is
the first occasion in which the 'basic facts' of the case are described: what
happened, when it happened, who is named as defendant, and the extent of the
alleged damage. In describing them, the adjudicator introduces them into the
record and gives both plaintiff and defendant access to a version of the facts that
the court provisionally accepts" (Pomerantz 1987:229).
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name (lines 59 and 60). The chair then goes on to detail the documents that the
panel have read (line 60 onwards). The chair refers to one of these by its author
and date (lines 61 to 63), a second by reading the first line (lines 64 and 65),
a third by stating who it is from and what action it was intended to perform
(lines 65 to 62), a fourth letter which the chair seems to be going to quote from
but then only states its main theme (lines 67 and 68), a fifth letter about a case
concerning Dorset County Council (lines 69 and 70) and a sixth letter
concerning the refusal of legal aid (lines 70 to 73). The chair states that that this
letter is incorrect in its statement of the reasons why legal aid was refused. This
seems to be a letter from the solicitor and the chair states why it is only
partially correct (line 63 to 75), although the exact reason is not clear on the
tape. The chair then lists a final document which is the one containing the
decision of the legal aid board to refuse the case initially (line 75). The chair
having finished listing the documents then suggests that the appellant/solicitor
could tie these documents together by taking the panel through the case (lines
76 to 77). What is not clear here is whether this final statement/request has been
directed at the appellants or their representative. This is one of the potential
limitations of purely audio data.
Whether or not the question has been asked of the appellants or their
solicitor it is the solicitor who speaks (line 78), and this is not in over-lap with
the appellants or 'challenged' by them or the panel. When the solicitor begins
he does so by suggesting a format by which the case can be related to the panel
Le. a chronology of events (line 78). The solicitor also informs the panel that
the focus will be on the interests of the child - or at least "beginning with"
(lines 78 and 79). This flagging of "beginning with" may be seen as an early
notification that there is more to the case than just the interests of the child. The
chronology of the child's problems starts with a statement of the child's current
age, sixteen (line 79), thus indicating the length in years of the chronology,
before working through the events relating to the problem in a chronological
order beginning with the child's date of birth (lines 79 and 81). The solicitor
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then states that "when he was very young" he was diagnosed as having special
educational needs by his local education authority, which is named, in
compliance with the education act (lines 81 to 85). The solicitor does not deem
it necessary to give the date of this assessment, nor is it requested, thus
indicating that such a fact may not be important in terms of its exact temporal
location in the chronology, just that it occurred. The solicitor then goes on to
note that the statement was in force until the child was sixteen (lines 85 and 86).
There is a shift here from a chronology of the child's life events in relation to
its educational needs, to a rendering of the history of the application of relevant
legal requirements to him. This move is subtle and becomes clear as the
solicitor then goes on to note the legal requirements for a 'transitionary plan' ,
for all children covering them from fourteen to adult life (lines 86 to 89). The
shift is attended to unproblematically by the chair who asks the solicitor if they
could provide the statutory references for the legal requirements for the
transition plan (lines 90 and 91).
The fact that the solicitor can not provide the statutory references (line
92), does not seem overly problematic to the chair and the panel. The solicitor
instead offers a guide book containing a relevant reference from the Department
of Education (lines 92 to 95). The chair then asks the solicitor if they would
read to the panel the relevant information on the duty of the local education
authority to provide a statement (lines 96 and 97).
It takes a short time for the solicitor to locate the relevant passage of the
guide book, but when this is achieved the solicitor overtly informs the panel
that he is going to read the relevant passage (line 98). This is interesting in that
the chair has asked for a quote in the first place, but also because members can
'usually' hear a quote as a quote due to the intonation of the reading. So the
prefix mayor may not be doing the work of something else apart from
introducing the quote, possibly regaining some control of the direction of the
interaction. Certainly, after reading the quote" stating that a transition plan
20 The quote seems to be able to be heard to end here due to both the nature
of the talk that follows and the intonation change.
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should be drawn up at the age of fourteen for a statemented child (lines 98 to
108), the solicitor retains the speaking turn. The solicitor draws attention to a
reference made in the text to an earlier section of the text quoted, a page
number is actually given, but the solicitor does not choose to go back and read
it (lines 108 to 110). Rather the solicitor states that they "didn't want to dwell
on this point too long" (line 110).
However, the solicitor does not get far in controlling the direction of the
tribunal in this instance as the chair tries to surmise what it is the solicitor is
trying to get at. The chair asks if the solicitor is saying that no transition plan
was drawn up for the child (line 111). The solicitor responds to the chair by
saying that as far as he can "ascertain" that that is the case (line 112). The
solicitor then goes on to invoke his discussions with the parents of the child to
back this statement up (line 113), but before he can finish the chair interrupts
the solicitor stating that the parents would surely know (lines 114 and 115). The
solicitor though, does not stop to answer this assertion/question but carries on
with his reply to the previous question focusing on the latest statement of the
child, and he gives the date of this document (line 117), and that he also has a
copy off the document with him (line 118). The reference to the date (line 117)
appears to be invoked as a validity criterion of the document. The solicitor
asserts that this statement recommended that the child remain at the school
where he was when the statement was made, noting the school name and
location (lines 118 to 120). He then carries on to say that that was also the wish
of the parents (120 and 121), and is in the process of outlining how this fits into
the case (line 121).
At this point the chair asks the solicitor to "pause" a moment (line 122),
and then asks if that "certificate" is the one drawn up on the child's fourteenth
birthday (line 122 to 124). It is the mother that responds to this not the
solicitor, this might be due to the chair having stated previously (lines 114 and
115) that the parents would know, possibly being interpreted as indicating that
the parents could give some input and not rely only on their representative as
in more 'formal' legal procedures. The mother starts to talk of the "plan" and
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then corrects this to statement," that the child gets (lines 125 and 126), but is
cut short by the chair who asks if he was given this before he was fourteen (line
127). It is the solicitor, however, who responds to this question saying that the
child had just gone fourteen (line 128).
The chair continues after the solicitor by stating as a question, that this
meant that the child was covered until he was sixteen (lines 129 and 130). To
this the mother replies with a simple affirmative (line 131). After this the chair
again tries to summarise what it is the appellant and their solicitor are trying to
say, that a transition plan document has not been drawn up for the child (lines
132 and 133). This is the same question that was put at the beginning of this
segment of talk (line 111), except that the second formulation has an age group
category attached (lines 132 and 133).
The solicitor agrees (line 134) with the chair's statement that what the
appellant and their solicitor are doing is saying that a transition plan for the
child has not been drawn up. But goes on to state that his (line 134), the
solicitors (notably not the clients) case is that the child was destatemented by
the local education authority at the age of sixteen and that they should not have
done so (lines 134 to 140). At this point though the chair again halts the
solicitor to ask how the local education authority apparently achieved this,
wanting to know what constitutes destatementing in this particular instance (line
141). In reply to this, after making a false start (line 142), the solicitor states
that it was achieved by not continuing with statementing, and no consultation
"leading to a reasoned decision" (lines 142 to 145) - legally consultation with
the parents should take place. The solicitor is set to continue but is interrupted
21 A statement is "a legal document which states the child's special needs
and which binds the [local education] authority to providing for these needs"
(McCracken and Sutherland 1991). This is required under the 1981 Education
Act for all children assessed as having learning difficulties. Mehan (1983) has
looked at language and role in the American procedure for the assessment of
children for special education programmes. He notes the significance of the use
of written documents in the production of authorative accounts by professionals,
it is likely that the parents here are not therefore unfamiliar with text based
assessment procedures such as this tribunal.
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by the mother who states that they were informed about the destatementing and
the date at which this was to commence (lines 146 to 148), it is notable that the
mother has 'stayed' in the discussion after being brought in by the chair. The
mother is about to embark upon a description of a letter that she wrote to the
local education authority (line 148), but is interrupted by the chair asking if she
has a copy of it (lines 149 and 150). This request for the document can be seen
as a request for proof in the form of textual evidence, however the request is
not attended to. The chair continues by describing what he expects the letter to
contain with reference to the last statement (lines 150 to 154). The chair seems
to position an argument that is counter to that of the solicitor.
The solicitor does not reply as to whether they have a copy of the letter
and he again attempts to talk 'beyond' the question (see line 110 above), this
time by attempting to agree with the chair's description of the contents of the
letter and to add more (line 155). This is at the same time as the mother starts
to speak (line 156) but the solicitor talks over the start of the mothers talk (lines
155 and 157). However, the chair interrupts the solicitor to return to whether
or not the mother has the letter with them (lines 154 and 158).
When the mother answers the chair that she does not have the letter (line
159), although she does not attempt to add any further information to the
response or try and develop the discussion in a more positive direction, her
solicitor does. In response to his clients admission of lack of documentation the
solicitor immediately responds, taking charge for the reply, that "there's
bundles of correspondence here" dealing with the same issue (lines 160 to 162).
The solicitor suggests that proof of its existence can be made with reference to
correspondence that is available referencing the document. It is notable that the
solicitor tries to substitute another set of documents as equivalent for the one
that is missing. The solicitor then attempts another topic change by suggesting
that "the fact of the matter" (line 162) is that there was no consultation process,
and enters into - returns to the original strategy of giving - a brief chronological
list of events to the present situation (lines 162 to 168). After this the solicitor
then moves the topic to a similar case - this is the case discussed by the panel
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before the solicitor and appellants entered (lines 26 to 28) - where the
judgement was that an education authority would be acting outside its powers
if it stopped statementing a child without reasoned decision making (lines 168
to 175). The solicitor then concludes that this is what has happened in this case
(lines 175 and 176).
Although the solicitor has finally manage to present what he believes to
be the case of the appellant, he has not managed to convince the chair who
declares that he does not follow what the solicitor is attempting to explain (line
177). The solicitor attempts to explain (line 178), but is halted by the chair (line
179). The chair then goes on to attempt to clarify what the solicitor has been
saying. The chair does this by stating that the solicitor is attempting to equate
the child in the current case with the case of the child of the case in Dorset -
this is a reference to the newspaper article (line 179 to 182). The chair then
summarises some of the report of this case and quotes references to acts of
Parliament, invoking written texts, in an attempt to get at what the solicitor is
saying (lines 182 to 188). The chair is about to make a suggestion (line 188),
but is interrupted by the solicitor who carries on with the quote the chair has
been reading to include a part which the solicitor believes supports his point
(lines 189 and 191). This seems to be a verbatim quote from the earlier text
read out by the solicitor, but may be from one of the acts, either way it is not
prefaced with an introduction but just stated and seems to be taken in an
unproblematic fashion by the tribunal members.
The chair, sensitive to this comment by the solicitor, explains their
reason omitting the last part of the quoted text stating that it was because they
were going to make a suggestion as to how the case could proceed, and asks the
solicitor if they are right (lines 192 to 195). It does seem as if the chair has
managed to state what they were going to say at the end of their previous tum.
The solicitor does not go along with the chair but rather reiterates the earlier
argued 'fact' of the authority's failure to maintain a statement (line 196). The
chair responds to this by saying that this may not be problematic if they have
done this as a result of a proper proposal (line 197 and 198), and 'asks' if that
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is what they are saying is, that they have not done that (lines 198 and 200).
However, the solicitor does not respond directly to this question, but rather
returns to the report of the judgement on the Dorset case and to it's clarity on
that point (lines 201 to 204). The solicitor invokes the text to substantiate the
claim here.
The chair responds to this by addressing the solicitor by name and
stating that the letter is only a newspaper report (lines 205 and 206), and then
notes that the report is problematic (lines 206 to 211), is contradictory (line
211), and goes on to quote a second part of the report (lines 211 to 215).
Seemingly calling this evidence, and any argument based on it into doubt. Here
again the solicitor carries on where the chair left off the quote (line 216), the
reason being that the further extract supports their argument. This mutual
attendance to separate copies of the same text is on obvious display here with
one member able to follow the other seamlessly.
Whilst the chair acknowledges the solicitors continuation of the quote
(line 217), he then goes on to reformulate his, the chairs, earlier statement of
what the problem is, that a proper proposal has not been made for the child
(lines 217 to 220). It is notable that the chair again asks the solicitor whether
he is right or not (line 220). However, the solicitor does not offer agreement
with the chair but rather reformulates what their position is, that the local
education authority is not maintaining a statement of the child (lines 221 to
223). But the solicitor goes on, widening their position, to further state that the
local education authority have adopted a policy of doing this to children of
special educational needs (lines 223 to 226). The solicitor attempts to support
this statement, and possibly close the discussion down to the point, by stating
that "those are the facts of the case" (lines 216 and 227).
The chair, however, challenges these "facts" by noting that the solicitor
has no evidence of such a policy, and attempts to continue (lines 228 and 230),
but is interrupted by the solicitor (lines 229 and 231). Nevertheless the chair
manages to continue and states that they are only trying to help the solicitor,
and states what it is he believes the solicitor is attempting to do (lines 232 to
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236), and asks the solicitor if he is right (line 236). The solicitor does not
answer this question but makes an attempt to restate the position he is taking
towards the case (line 237), but the chair stops him, explains that he is not
"cross-examining" him and asks again whether or not the solicitor is after a
judicial review because the local education authority has failed to maintain a
proposal (lines 238 to 240, 242 and 243). The solicitor agrees with the chair
that they want a review because of a failure to do something in this case (line
241), but states that it is a failure to maintain a statement (line 244). The chair
believes it is a failure to maintain a proposal and much of the disagreement can
be seen to emanate from these two positions.
The chair states that it is this difference over what the local education
authority has failed to do that is worrying him, but cedes that he may be "being
too particular" (lines 245 and 246). The chair goes on to state that he has read
the relevant statutory references, and hence agrees with part of what the
solicitor is saying (lines 247 to 250) - seemingly to qualify his position. This
receives an acknowledgement token from the solicitor (line 251), the chair then
continues by winding-up their talk by saying that they have been talking too
much, hence opening the floor to the other panel members (lines 250 and 252).
The panel member who takes up the talk after the chair asks the solicitor
if they could give a definition of a proposal and how it is constituted (lines 253
and 254). This can be seen as keeping with the topic that the chairman was
discussing, in that rather than talk about statements the panel member wants to
clarify proposals. The way that the solicitor responds to this is by stating what
would constitute grounds for a child with special needs to be given a proposal,
that they had successfully developed beyond special needs, but this itself would
need to be proposed (lines 255 to 262). The panel member then repeats the
second part of their question by asking how such a proposal "manifests" itself
(line 263). The solicitor replies that a statement has to be maintained until a
proposal is made stating it should not be maintained (lines 264 and 265). The
panel member, overlapping and interrupting, asks whom makes such a proposal
(lines 266 and 267), and is told by the solicitor that it is the local education
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authority (line 268). The panel member then asks if this is done by the local
education authority at meeting or by a "proper procedure" (line 269 to 272).
The solicitor, replying to the question describes the process of statementing
rather than proposal construction (lines 273 to 282). To which the panel
member inquires if the solicitor is saying that this has not been done (line 283).
The talk has gone from talk of the proposal to talk of the statement, what the
solicitor has been attempting to do all along. Previously the chair was not
moving from his focus on the proposal but the panel member has proven to be
not so intransigent. The solicitor replies to this question as to what they are
trying to say by stating that the statementing has been done but only up to a
certain age (lines 284 and 285).
At this point the chair re-enters the discussion by quoting a reference to
an act of parliament for the provision of statementing (lines 286 and 287). The
solicitor begins to re-iterate their position, a position gradually being built-up
through the discourse. The solicitor states that it is the ceasing to provide a
statement that is the issue here - rather than a non-provision from the start - and
that this is a policy towards children with special educational needs (lines 288
to 292). The chair interrupts the solicitor to ask what evidence they have for
this claim (lines 293 to 294).
In response to the chair's request for evidence, the solicitor enters into
a list of 'facts' of various types, which are intended to prove the truth of the
claim about a policy of not providing statements for children between the age
of sixteen and nineteen. This information is initially about their local education
authority for which he offers no documentary evidence (lines 295 to 314), then
he refers back to the Dorset case, referring to the documentary evidence of The
Times report of a case there - evidence which has already been criticised by the
chair (lines 315 to 336). The solicitors seems to challenge the chair and states
"if read carefully" (line 321).
Instead of responding directly to the solicitors re-statement of his
position towards the current case and the salience of the 'Dorset Case', the
chair asks the parents of the child what is the current state of the child's
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education (lines 337 to 339). The mother responds that their child was a
borderline case for entry into the college and that he has "very difficult"
behavioural problems, and that the college does not have to keep him as a
student (lines 340 to 345). One of the panel members at this point asks if he is
still there though (line 346), to which the mother replies in the affirmative but
goes on to offer a letter as evidence that his presence there is problematic (lines
347 to 349). The ability here to provide documentary evidence by the mother
to show how tenuous the child's continued stay at the college does, in light of
other documents that they have not provided, seem to show that the mother was
anticipating its use. This is interesting in that the child's problems at the school
and the consequences of such a state of affairs, has not been part of the
solicitor's argument.
None of the panel members asks to see this document offered by the
mother, its physical presence is taken to be enough, rather the panel member
goes on to 'clarify' that there is a special unit within the college. In making this
request the panel member refers to the original statement for legal aid where a
statement to this effect is made (lines 350 and 360), this is a reference to the
application for legal aid that was refused and presumably not the appeal,
although it is not too clear here. It is noticeable here that the panel members are
going back to the original application documents in their attempts to clarify the
current state of the child's education, they are not referring to the particulars
of the solicitor's summary of the case. In fact this line of questioning excludes
the solicitor from representing the parent in that it is directed at the parents, and
is the type of question that only they are likely to know the answer to.
The mother replies that there is a special unit within the college but they
do not usually deal with cases as severe as her son's (line 352 to 354). She then
goes on to formulate what she means by this to say that if the child is not
restatemented, and then asked to leave college for behavioural reasons, then he
has lost his 'right' to education until he is nineteen. Whereas if he is
statemented, and then asked to leave college, then the local education authority
has a duty to provide him with education (lines 352 to 354). She then
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reformulates this to say that without a statement he has nothing to "fall back on"
(lines 363 and 364). This is then reformulated by the panel member in terms of
her saying there being no problem at present but that there may be in the future
(lines 365 to 366).
However, the mother picks up on "there's no problem at the moment"
(line 364), to say that she is not happy with him at the college and gives an
example of a recent near accident, before questioning the college's ability, via
a contrast, to look after him (lines 367 to 373). The panel member does not
attend to this accusation of inability on behalf of the school, but instead asks
how far the college is from where the child lives (lines 374 and 375), this would
seem to be a minor topic change. The mother gives the distance (line 376) to
which the panel member replies that is not far for them (line 377), which the
mother then contextualizes in relation to the closeness of the child's previous
school to the college (lines 378 and 379). The panel member acknowledges this
statement (line 380) but does not follow that line of questioning any further and
there is a long pause, eight seconds, before the chair asks the panel if there are
any further questions (line 381). It appear this line of questioning by the panel
members has come to a halt.
When this offer of further questions is not taken up, after another long
pause, four seconds, the chair asks if the child's previous school had provision
for boys between sixteen and eighteen years old (line 381 and 382). The mother
answers "no" to this (line 383), which the chair questions in some surprise (line
384), to which the mother repeats her negative answer (line 385). The chair
begins to ask a question (line 386) which is anticipated by the mother who states
that the county council has no provision for that age group (lines 387 to 389).
To this the chair repeats in question that there is no provision (line 390), to
which the mother confirms in the negative before the chair finishes (line 391),
which the chair appears to accept (line 392). The mother continues to stress that
there are no designated schools (line 393) but is interrupted by the chair who
asks if she is "absolutely sure" (line 394). The mother confirms that she is (line
395) to which the chair questions again in the form of a question as to there
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being "no provision at all" (line 396), to which the mother gives the proviso
that this is only within the colleges (line 397). What we see here is that the
chair finds it difficult to believe what the mother is saying, the reason being that
there is a statutory duty on the part of the local education authority to provide
such schools.
It is at this point that the solicitor reenters the discussion, and does so
initially on behalf of the mother to clarify what she is saying to the chair, and
which the chair has difficulty in believing. The solicitor's talk overlaps that of
the mother when she is saying that there is provision in the colleges, and his
initial comment is in partial contradiction with his client as he says there is
provision (line 398). He goes on to elaborate that there are two types of special
needs, statemented and non-statemented, that provision is made for non-
statemented children with learning difficulties in normal schools but that they
cannot provide for statemented children (lines 399 to 409). Helped by the chair
(line 410), the solicitor then gives some of the historical trends in the past as to
how the system was managed (lines 411 to 414), but that this has changed due
to the local authority no longer allowing special schools to plug the gap for
sixteen to nineteen year-old's (lines 414 and 415). A fact that the solicitor
believes has caused there to be a "lacuna", or gap, in the provision of education
for statemented children with special needs (line 416).
After the solicitor has cleared up the difference between statemented and
unstatemented children with special needs and reformulated his argument again,
the chair tries to apply this to statutory law. The chair states that as he
understands it the solicitor is saying, and he quotes from the Further and Higher
Education Act 1992, that a local education authority has to provide education
for persons of the sixteen to nineteen age group (lines 416 to 425). And that the
local education authority in question is failing to do that in respect of this
particular child (lines 425 to 427). In response to this the solicitor initially
agrees with the chair, but goes on to say that that formulation is a broadly based
proposition "that could apply to other children as well" (lines 428 and 430).
While the solicitor is saying this the chair tries to show disagreement with this
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version but the solicitor continues (lines 429 and 431). It is when the solicitor
again tries to re-present his version of the case (line 432), that the chair
succeeds in halting the solicitor. At this point the chair reminds the solicitor that
the application for legal aid has been made on behalf of a specific child, and
that it is that child's concerns that they are here to deal with, not the education
policy of the county (lines 433 to 438). The chair then goes on to address the
parents saying that they, the parents, are claiming that their child has not been
provided with full-time education (lines 438 and 439). The mother makes an
unclear remark at this point (line 440), while the chair finishes his sentence
noting that the child is still at a college (line 441). The mother, a bit
'incoherent' at first, then goes on to qualify this provision of education at
college by saying that this provision is not down on the child's statement (lines
442 to 445).
The chair then goes on to spell out what he believes is the mother's
worry, that her child could be removed from school at any time (line 446). The
mother then reformulates this as being that if he was removed he has no
education provision described on a statement, hence "he's got nothing" (line
447). The chair then gives the reason why the child would have nothing, due
to their place at college being funded not by the local education authority but
by a 'training council' (line 448). The chair then goes on to say that he believes
he thinks he now understands the case and after a pause asks the 'appellants' if
they have anything else to add to the case (lines 448 and 449).
The solicitor takes up this offer and states, contrary to the position taken
by the chair (lines 432 to 437), that the case is "public law matter", and
although the child on whose behalf the case is being brought is an interested
party, other children may be affected (lines 450 to 454). The solicitor carries
on to say that if they are seeking a judicial review, it may not be merely a
"declaratory application" but an "application for mandamus ,,22 (lines 454 to
22 Mandamus: "A high prerogative writ which is issued in the King's name
from the High Court of Justice on application to the King's Bench Division to
some person or body to compel the performance of a public duty. It was
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456, 458, 460, and 461). The last part of this has been met by token agreement
by the chair (lines 457 and 459), the chair then slightly overlaps with the
solicitor with more agreement before asking again if that is all (line 462 and
463). There is a sense in which these token agreements and the final agreement
given before asking if "that all" (line 463), are done not necessarily in full
agreement but rather as a way of drawing this phase of the tribunal to a close.
However, it is not a 'definite' closure and the solicitor takes the opportunity to
carry on.
The solicitor uses this opportunity to stress that they, "we", are seeking
the implementation of the regulations not just for the child in question here but
for all such children (lines 464 to 468). The chair acknowledges this as a factor
here and asks if there is "anything else" (lines 469 and 470). It seems that the
solicitor is determined not let these opportunities to speak offered by the chair
to go amiss. Following this opportunity the solicitor asks the parents if there is
"anything else" (line 471), and after a short pause starts to discuss why the
original application was refused monies (lines 471 to 473). The solicitor then
goes on to talk about what the tribunal's function is, and what it is not. He
states that this is not a review of "a judicial review application" but an appeal
tribunal (lines 473 to 477). That the case was prepared for this tribunal with the
aim of being given legal aid monies, and to allow the case to be presented in
court. Hence any weakness (with regards the judicial review) in the case is due
to this reason (lines 477 to 482). Then the solicitor goes on to say that on the
basis of what they have presented to the tribunal today, they think it has been
"established" that they have something "substantial", and at very least should
be awarded monies for a counsel's opinion (lines 482 to 486).23 To which the
chair offers recognition of what the solicitor has said and asks them if they
would care to wait outside, thus bringing this phase of the tribunal to a close
replaced by an order of Mandamus which is now comprised in the procedure
known as Judicial Review. Applications for judicial review are made to the
Divisional Court" (Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary 1983:213).
23Note how this differs from a case without a solicitor.
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(lines 487 and 488).
Summary.
This is a long transcript and much that occurs is of interest, however we
can briefly state the interaction as consisting of: A first 'phase' of a tribunal in
which the panel discuss the case and find questions to ask the appellant, and
noting that there will be a legal representative present. In 'phase two', the
attenders are orientated to the case and introduced to the panel by the clerk and
the chair of the panel. The solicitor who is the appellant's legal representative
attempts to orientate the panel via the use of a chronology of the case, though
he is not allowed an uninterrupted rendition due to questioning from the chair.
The representative and the chair enter a series of discussions each attempting
to give, and have accepted, their version of the issues involved, resulting in a
number of reformulations in the face of opposition from other parties. The chair
drops out of the discussion for a while which is taken up by one of the panel
members, though the chair soon re-enters the debate. The chair then asks
questions of the parents which are responded to by the mother, though their
legal representative rejoins the discussion when his client makes an erroneous
point. The discussion between the chair and the legal representative continues
with some increased 'control' by the chair as to the nature of what the case is
about, though the representative uses the closing comments of the chair to
restate his version of the case and what it should be awarded by the panel. The
phase then closes and the appellants and their representative leave the room. We
can explore this data further if we look at the work the solicitor does as a legal
representative.
We may assume the legal representative for the appellant performs some
work of representation in its broadest sense prior to their attendance at the
tribunal session. Though we cannot say from the present research what that
might consist of, we can probably safely assume the appellant is given some
sort of outline of the nature of the upcoming tribunal.
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The first activity described in the data constituting the work of the legal
representative began almost immediately on starting 'phase two', when the
solicitor corrects the clerk as to the respective names of the appellants (line
44).24 The clerk when introducing the case also describes what is going to
happen in the tribunal and in so doing indicates what the possibilities and
likelihood of actions to be taken are, thus laying out and giving directives for
the following interaction, and indicating the role of the representative. The
chair runs through a list of the case documents the panel have seen and this
listing of the documentation draws attention to the centrality and importance
that it is accorded, and that it will be the focus of ensuing discussion." The
chair also takes this listing as an opportunity to 'repairing' an 'erroneous text'
by correcting it.
Following the chair's introduction and request to be 'taken through' the
case (lines 59 to 77), it is the appellant's representative who literally speaks on
behalf of his clients and their case. This literal representation is done to produce
a presentation of the case through a re-presentation of the "facts" contained in
the documentation (textual representations) through a chronology (line 78). This
is a very controlled form of story-telling in which the solicitor informs the panel
that the focus will be on the interests of the child - or at least "beginning with"
(lines 78 and 79). This flagging of "beginning with" may be seen as an early
notification that there is more to the case than just the interests of the child. It
24 What has happened here is that the clerk has confused the appellants name
with their solicitor's. This displays the usefulness of this procedure of a
summary of the case by the clerk in that it clarifies who is who, and that the
correct documentation has been looked at. This is similar to the second case
(case two) in Chapter Three.
25 Komter (1995: 126) gives us some insight into what is occurring here
when she states:
"The presentation of 'the facts' by judges may seem a straightforward
matter as long as they are undisputed. 'The facts' as they are known by the
judges from the dossier are brought forward for the defendant's confirmation,
disconfirmation, or amendation. In this way a body of knowledge is built up
that everyone can agree on. "
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is interesting that the chronology of the child's problems starts with a statement
of the child's current age, sixteen (line 79), thus indicating the length in years
of the chronology, before working through the events relating to the problem
in a chronological order beginning with the child's date of birth (lines 79 and
81). Although the mother's concerns transpire as being beyond the sixteen year
chronology.
This chronology is interrupted by the chair who requests 'statutory
references' which the representative does not have available, however the
representative suggests an alternative source of information and introduces this
as a substitute to the initially requested documents (lines 92 to 95). This would
seem to display more work of the representative, the ability to manipulate the
use of documents so as to retain some control over the direction of the
discussion of documents i.e. representations in textual form. What this request
for statutory references is actually doing is not so clear, as at first it seems to
be a substantiation of the legal requirements noted by the solicitor. It also
appears to direct the solicitor to make the chronology text based. However, it
may also be seen as a mechanism by which the chair keeps some control over
the direction of the interaction and flow of information. The reasons for this
control may be as simple as to have the facts not come so fast at the panel that
they can not form a stable picture of the case. When the chair asks the
representative to read the 'substitute' (lines 96 and 97),26 the request for a
quotation possibly does more than inform the chair and the panel of the exact
wording of the guide book, it may, as the previous request for statutory
references was doing, also be controlling the solicitors monologue.
However, when the solicitor states that they "didn't want to dwell on
this point too long" (line 110), this seem to their attempt to gain control of the
direction of the interaction from the interruptions and questions of the chair.
26 What we have here is a description of reading located in situated and
ongoing activities. What this illustrates is that the context of the reading is
extremely significant in the understanding of the text and the practices
displayed.
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This is arguably another aspect of the work of the solicitor as representative,
trying to control the direction of the interaction of the tribunal rather than just
responding to the questions given by the panel members. That these practices
are engaged in is supported in that the solicitor's chronology did not proceed
far before clarification of it was requested, thus breaking the flow of the
chronology.
This attempting to retain control over the discussion and interpretation
of documentary representations is displayed on a number of occasions, and the
ways in which this is attempted are never exactly the same. For example when
the chair again asks for a document that is not available, though of course the
chair can request in equally numerous ways (line 111), the representative states
that one was not "as far as I can ascertain" drawn up (lines 112 and 113),
ignores an interjection by the chair and moves onto another document (lines 116
to 121). What is noticeable here is that the solicitor has not directly, or at least
conclusively, answered the question of the chair as to whether a transition plan
has been drawn up. The solicitor has tried to move on beyond that question to
talk about the last statement of needs for the child, and how this further
information relates to the case for which legal aid is applied for. Possibly
ignoring the question so as to remain in control of the direction of the
discourse.
We see the solicitor responding to questions directed at the mother for
example in response to a request for the child's age (line 128). It is the solicitor
who replies here in reaction to the mother's answer to the previous question it
in which she appeared to get a little confused over the 'statement' of needs for
the child, and the transitionary plan (lines 125 and 126). By the solicitor taking
over the answering, he is able to keep the direction of the questioning clear of
confusion which may be a prospect if the appellant is allowed to continue. Also,
unlike the solicitor the mother does not attempt to use her turn to do anything
other than confirm the question, she does not try to lead in any direction of her
own design, in contrast to the 'technique' of the solicitor. Doing this the
solicitor may have to resort to cutting in on, and cutting off, their own client.
343
Unlike a court where the appellant will speak through their legal representative
except when in the dock, in the legal aid tribunal the appellant does not have to
rely on their representative, and may speak at times and about topics that appear
inopportune for their solicitor's strategy with the panel. This may be seen to be
the case here when the mother mentions a letter sent by the local education
authority, but then cannot provide the letter, its mere existence has distracted
the chair from the route that the solicitor was trying to take the panel down. At
first the representative tries to divert the chair's attention away from the letter
and to regain control of the direction of interpretation (line 155), but when this
fails offers to produce "a bundle" of documents dealing with these issues. This
management of the documents and discussion consists of situated actions that
are context dependent. For example when the chair is attempting to strengthen
their position by quoting from a document (lines 205 to 215), the representative
displays active management of the documentation representations via a
continuation of the quote which lessens its impact (line 216). This also
illustrates that the chair has to monitor the conversation and make sure that the
solicitor does not take control, thus managing to avoid 'tricky' areas that may
be of concern to the panel. An example of this is when we see the chair
summarizing the information that the panel have been presented with, and
formulating this as a case which has been offered to the appellants for
confirmation. The chair legalises this version of the case by framing it with
direct reference to an Act of Parliament, reads out loud what he considers to be
the relevant section of the Act (lines 417 to 427).27 The solicitor attempts to add
his own angle to this version (line 428, 430 and 432) but is rebuffed by the
27 Quoting from the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, that a local
education authority has to provide education for persons of the sixteen to
nineteen age group (lines 416 to 425). The chair can be seen here as narrowing
the discourse to the specifics of a documentary text, i.e. focusing the
interaction. And that the local education authority in question is failing to do
that in respect of this particular child (lines 425 to 427) the chair is attempting
to focus the case down specifically to the child in question. The reason for this
may be that when presented in this form it becomes amenable to the decision
making of the tribunal panel in a form which the chair would prefer.
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chair who then addresses the appellants directly (lines 433 to 439).
This work of presenting the case has involved addressing the questions
of the chair and his attempts to take the discourse in a different direction to that
deemed most profitable by the solicitor. It has also included the management
of the utterances of the solicitors client when they have threatened to take the
discourse away from that planned by him, and dealing with any information
released inadvertently by the client.
Much of the work of the representative seems to consist of spotting,
selecting, and using occasions with which to press their version of the
documentary representations and the talk that has built up around them in the
tribunal. This is displayed when the chair drops out of the discussion and a
panel member takes over, the panel member asking a question relating to how
a 'proposal' is produced asks if this is done by the local education authority at
meeting or by a "proper procedure" (line 270 to 273). The solicitor, replying
to the question describes the process of statementing rather than proposal
construction (lines 274 to 283). To which the panel member inquires if the
solicitor is saying that this has not been done (line 284). What is noteworthy
here is that the talk has gone from talk of the proposal to talk of the statement,
what the solicitor has been attempting to do all along. Previously the chair was
not moving from his focus on the proposal but the panel member has proven to
be not so intransigent. The solicitor has again got round to stressing the nature
of their case, successfully moving from proposals to statementing, and also to
reintroducing the court case from Dorset and stressing its similarities with the
current case.
It is interesting that the talk of statements and proposals is actually
referencing documents, but these documents are not offered to, or request by,
the panel. The documents remain in abstract. It is here we see that the
documentary representations, texts, are not separate from the verbal
interpretations that are built up around them in the situation of their use. The
clearest example of the representative using the opportunities available to press
their version of the documents and case on behalf of their clients, is when
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taking the opportunity to sum up their case," the representative goes so far as
to recommend the minimum award they should be given (line 484 to 486). I
suggest that in these last few turns we have seen the work of the solicitor in its
most obvious form. As the representative of his clients the solicitor has taken
the opportunities offered to him by the chair, and used them to restate what the
solicitor wants the case to consist of. The solicitor firstly restates that this is a
case for judicial review, not a declaratory application but a one for mandamus
(lines 454 to 456, 458, 460 and 461). Secondly, that the case is for the
implementation of the regulations to all children not just this one child (lines
464 to 468). Thirdly, stating what it is that they are all doing here today, so
informing the panel of their task. Fourthly, that there may appear some
weakness in the case as presented, but that this hearing is just to obtain legal aid
monies and is not the full case. The solicitor then goes on to make suggestions
as to what the outcome of the panel's decision making should be. After having
'fought' to get his version of the case over to the panel, the solicitor has taken
the opportunities offer him here at the end to reiterate and expand upon his and
his clients version.
Finally, we can see that the legal representative represents the clients
and the 'case' in interaction with the tribunal panel, and actively re-presents the
documentary representations. Although this representation of the client differs
from an artifactual representation of an object, in the sense that the client of a
representative can usually speak 'orally' on their own behalf, where as this is
not so with an artifactual representation. This speaking 'on their own behalf'
by clients can be problematic for a representative who may have spent a large
amount of effort in building a version of the documentary representations and
their surrounding talk, only to have it 'undermined' by their client.
28 This asking if an appellant has anything further to say, allowing them to
sum up their case, is a common feature of the drawing to a close the work of
hearing the appellant. Though few unrepresented appellants proceed with the
ability of the solicitor.
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Case Five Phase Three.
This case follows on from phase one and two described above.
1 eh :okay (.) fine (.) thankyou (3.0) would you like to wait outside
2 (23.0)
3 pml :how (did you claim for the) (unclear) (1.0)
4 pm2 :1 understand the point about the fourteen point (.) 1 eh (.)
5 (unclear)
6 pml [I think 1got to grips with it eventually but (.)
7 eh :what they are supposed to for a for a (.) 1 can't give you a
8 statutory reference for it (.) what they are supposed to do for a (.)
9 a fourteen year old who's (.) statemented (.) but it's eh (.)
10 pm2 :but but it's done before or after birthday it seems here that they -
11 eh [no
12 pm2 :-haven't done it? (.)
13 ch :what 1 was asking (0.2) really was (.) this (.) what what their last
14 statement statement which was supposed to carry him through (.)
15 fourteen to nineteen (1.0) and the answer was well we don't know
16 do we (0.2)
17 pml :fourteen to sixteen (.) (unclear) (0.6)
18 eh :yess 1mean (.) if if (.) 1mean there is that (procedure?)
19 pm3 [the
2 0 (budget?) account's a basic transitional document isn't it (.)
21 pml :what she's concerned about is that if he is (.) removed from this
22 present school he's got nowhere to go (.)
23 eh :ummh (.)
24 pm2 :well I can understand that (0.6)
25 eh :and he's (.) I mean this is a common concern with many children
2 6 who are perfectly normal who in the maintained sector if they are
27 chucked out of (.) sufficient schools and (unclear) (0.8) the statute
2 8 sez that where you have a child of special educational needs (.) the
2 9 council has a duty to provide for those needs and then (.) and that
3 0 that's their best point which (.) they're not
31 pml [he seemed to gloss over
32 didn't he
33 pm3 [well (0.2)
34 pm2 :1 think (0.4)
35 pml :1 would still grant it (0.4)
36 pm2 :the big point he made at the end was fair this wasn't it in the
3 7 sense that he he this wasn't the full hearing (.) therefore we
38 perhaps shouldn't be too (.) judgemental on the actual (0.2)
39 pml :(wuarrr?) (0.2) I don't know about you but 1 was coming round
40 to the
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41 ch [if you all to the library and get the book (.) you can all read
42 it and come to some decisions on it [tapping a large volume of
43 apparent statutes] (.) can't we (.) I mean I did that (0.2) (inhale)
44 okay (.) how about you (.)
45 pm3 :well my my initial (.) my initial view I think (.) allow limited to
46 counsel's opinion (.) then merits for proceeding (.)
47 ch :yeah (.) I mean fortunately fortunately here (.) it is an ongoing
48 it's an ongoing refusal so it's no decision which I mean we're not
49 in the time limit situation (.) I mean I'm slightly aghast at the fact
50 that (.) the fourteenth birthday was so long ago (.) it should really
51 sorry sixteenth birthday was so long ago they should really have
52 got on with it before now (.) but it doesn't really matter because
53 it's it's an ongoing refusal so (.) we're not we have no problem
54 with errmm (.) the three month limitation (.) so err counsel's
55 opinion (.) err yeah okay-
56 cl [right
57 ch :can we have them back (.)
58 cl :right thank you (36.0)
Initially we have the concluding of the previous phase where the chair
has asked the appellants and their representative to wait outside the tribunal
room (line 1). Although the chair gives no explanation of the reason for this it
is implicit in this statement that the panel will now consider the case and the
statements made by the appellants and their representative and come to a
decision." The appellants take a while to vacate the room (line 2) though while
this occurs no discourse is engaged in by the tribunal panel, either relating to
the case or otherwise.
Once the appellants and their representative have vacated the room the
third 'phase' of the tribunal commences with an unclear comment by panel
member 1 (line 3), though it seems to be a question to a panel member or
all/any panel members. This is followed by what appears to be a response by
panel member two (lines 4 and 5), that they, panel member two, understand the
point that was made by the solicitor in the previous phase about the
29 Fuller descriptions are often provided by the chair, though when a legal
representative is present, as in this case, the chair may be assuming that they
are aware of the process of the tribunal. Certainly this instruction is not taken
to be problematic by the appellants.
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requirements of statementing of the child at the age of fourteen. At this point
panel member one rejoins with a similar confirmation on this point but this is
prefixed conditionally with the term "I think" (line 6). It is also emphasized that
they did not do so immediately, they then start to continue but leave a micro
pause which is taken by the chair as space in which to interject. The chair
begins by attempting to clarify what the local education authority are supposed
to do for a child with special educational needs at the age of fourteen (lines 7
to 9). He breaks his description though to state that he can not provide them
with the statutory reference for this though (lines 7 and 8). Panel member two
then states that the local education authority have not done this in this case
(lines 10 and 12).
While panel member two is illustrating his understanding of the issue
(lines 10 and 12), the chair, in overlapping speech (line 11), though not causing
panel member two to stop in mid-sentence, begins what seems to be a repair of
the inference he has made of the two panel members' understanding of the
issues. It is this which panel member two is in the process of at least partially
correcting by displaying his understanding of the case. The chair does this with
use of "no", which seems to indicate that he was not indicating that his
colleagues did not understand the issue. The chair manages the repair by
referring to what he "was asking" (line 13) the appellant and their
representative. This was, what are the details of the child's last statement, the
one which should have "carried" the child's education from fourteen to eighteen
years of age contained (lines 13 to 15). He adds that they, the panel, were not
able to obtain this information (lines 15 and 16). Panel member one then
corrects, and also displays his grasp of the issue which the chair had 'doubted',
stating that the child's statement would cover him from fourteen to sixteen not
fourteen to eighteen, and says something which is unclear and after which there
is a slight pause (line 17). The chair acknowledges the correction and after a
micro pause seems to be about to say something further, "(.) if if (.)", but then
seems to take a different direction to note that there is a procedure to be
followed (line 18). At the end of which panel member three, who has remained
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silent so far states that the "budget" -this is unclear - is a "basic" transitional
document i.e. one that may perform some of the roles of a statement (lines 19
and 20). Unfortunately this point is not too clear. However, panel member one
follows on from this by stating the practical concerns of the mother, her child
having a guaranteed education, and moves away from direct discussion of
documentation and process (lines 21 and 22). This issue is acknowledged by the
chair (line 23), and then the mother's concern itself acknowledged as
understandable by panel member two (line 24).
The chair then takes up this point and addresses it as being the concern
also of people outside of special education if their child is removed from
enough schools (lines 25 to 27). After a short pause, the chair continues and
brings the issue back to the case by paraphrasing the statute relating to the
concerns of the mother, and stating that that aspect of the statute is "their best
point" (lines 27 to 30). He seems to be continuing to say that they are not
following this (line 30) when panel member three 'interrupts' by saying that the
solicitor representing the appellants seemed to "gloss over" that point (lines 31
and 32). Panel member three seems to be making a hesitantly negative response
to this (line 33) which is not continued, after a short pause panel member two
seems to be about to add their opinion but then stops (line 34). After another
short pause panel member one continues stating that he would still grant the
appeal nevertheless (line 35).
Following panel member three's statement that they would allow the
appeal (line 35), panel member two refers to the point made by the solicitor at
the end of the previous phase when summing up his case that this appeal was
not a full hearing of the case but and appeal against the refusal of legal aid
(lines 36 and 37), Panel member two continues, in seeming agreement with
panel member one's previous opinion of granting the case, to say that the panel
should not be too judgemental - about the case presentation presumably (lines
36 and 37). Panel member does not finish their statement but leaves the end
'hanging', which, after a short pause, is followed by panel member one making
a 'noise' and starting to state the position which they were "coming round to"
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(lines 39 and 40). However, panel member one is cut off by the chair chastising
the panel members for not having read the relevant statues," as he did, which
would have allowed them to make a decision (lines 41 to 43). The chair then
asks panel member three what their opinion was (line 44).
Following the chairs request for their opinion panel member three offers
their opinion, which they frame as their initial opinion, that the panel allow the
case legal aid but restrict it to counsel's opinion to see what merits the case has
for proceeding (lines 45 and 46). It is worth noting here that panel member
three frames their answer as being their considered opinion before the case
hearing, rather than a decision based upon the presentation by the appellant and
their legal representative Le. not based upon the non-statutory evidence that the
chair has just criticised the other two panel members of basing their opinions
upon. Although panel member three does not make any direct reference to the
legal statutes.
The chair then rejoins with an agreement (line 47) and continues with
a discussion of the specifics of the case regarding the eligibility of the case for
legal aid (lines 47 to 53). This discussion relates to the time passed since the
problem arose, and that if it had not been an ongoing problem it would have
been ineligible due to the lateness of the application in relation to the "three
month limitation'?' (line 54). The chair then repeats, in agreement, panel
member three's opinion (lines 54 and 55), which is acknowledged by the clerk
as being their decision on the case (line 56), and then asks the clerk to bring the
appellants and their legal representative back (line 57), the clerk then
acknowledges the request and thanks the panel (line 58).32
30 This is a book of statutes which the chair has read from in the second
phase of this case.
31 This reference to limitation refers to the prescribed periods within which
proceedings to enforce a right must be taken, the reference by the chair here is
in relation to the Education Act limitations.
32 Note that there is no talking in the transition period here.
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Summary of Case Five Phase Three.
The third phase of this case begins with panel member two, after an
unclear question by panel member one, picking up on one of the issues that was
central to the appellants case in the previous 'phase', and stating that they
understood that point. This initial point is taken up by panel member one who
hesitantly confirms that they too understood this point. The chair seems to take
this hesitancy, which seems to be evident in both the statements of the two
panel members, as a lack of clarity on the issue and an attempt at clarification
of the point. Two things occur here: Firstly, the raising of an issue for
discussion and a clarification of what that issue initially is. Secondly, the chair
beginning to describe what the issue is, and noting his inability to give a
statutory reference for the point, although in a manner which suggests that he
could eventually provide one. It is notable that the lack of statutory reference
is not taken by himself, or the others, as problematic. This appears to indicate
that reference to documentation does not have to be in an 'exact' form for the
other panel members to accept considering its reported content in this instance.
Similarly, an absence of a full and technical understanding of the relevant law
does not prevent consideration and decision-making by the panel members.
Issues for discussion are raised, but those that refer to relevant statutes are
discussed in general terms and are not attended to as being of singular
importance. The discussion of the case allows various aspects to be raised and
for these to be corrected where some confusion exists, but there is no real focus
on the exact details of the case.
What we can see in this part of the transcript is significant in that it
begins with a move away from an initial discussion of the panel members'
understanding of a specific issue of the statementing process, to what that
statement should contain and the procedure which it was embedded in. It then
moves rapidly away from the legal responsibilities of the Local Education
Authority to the practical concerns of the mother. These concerns are then
embedded by the chair back into the statutory responsibilities of Local
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Education Authority, this being done by the paraphrasing of the relevant statute
- the statute is not named but its existence is not questioned - and that this is the
appellants best point. The actions of the legal representative in relation to this
point, his glossing over it and lack of focus on it, are then pointed out. But the
same panel member then states that he would still grant them the appeal.
What we see is a rapid move through some of the issues to a volunteered
course of action which is based upon an identification with the parental
concerns of the mother, and framed within the general duties of the Local
Health Authority. The argument of the solicitor which referenced the specifics
of the statementing process is virtually ignored after the initial orientation of the
panel to the decision making process, in favour of an identification with the
concerns of the mother and the stance of the chair. Panel member two refers to
the appellant's legal representatives point that, the representation that the panel
are considering is not the ability of the case documents to win the case in court
about the legal responsibility of the local education authority, but the
representation as constituting a successful appeal against the refusal of legal aid.
Something that the appellant's representative had requested them to do in the
previous phase (see Chapter Five). After a small tirade by the chair about the
need to read the legal statutes, the panel grant the award at the level suggest by
the appellant's legal representative. The case is interesting in that the chair
shows concern that the panel are making decisions without using the statutory
references. The chair seems to indicate that this is not sufficient in his opinion
and that they should have read the relevant legal statutory background material
which would have allowed them to come to a judgement on legal principles
rather than 'common sense" reasoning. The chair, however, does not take this
criticism further, or decide to act upon the criticism, for example by suggesting
the adjourn the case until they have read the relevant legal texts, rather he
continues the discussion from where it left off, i.e. the opinions of the panel
members. So although they seem to be consciously aware that their decision
33 By 'common sense' I do not mean reasoning devoid of any legal
understanding, but the members' common sense of lawyers.
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making is not based upon legal 'positivism', it does not prohibit the
continuation of the decision making process - nor does it make it less legal.
Hence we see that the legal statutes are not necessarily central for practical legal
decision-making in this instance.
It is worth noting that the clerk has been monitoring the discussion and
speaks initially when a recognisable decision has been made. Although the clerk
has to write the formal decision down, the clerk does not ask for a finalised
version, nor does the chair offer one, it seems mutually acknowledged that the
clerk has followed their discussion and recognised their decision and will
transfer this in an adequate format into the relevant documents. Thus we see
that the textual product which the clerk records is not in the words of the panel,
but in this instance formulated by the clerk themselve - no doubt in accordance
with his perception of the future and potential uses and needs of such
documentation.
A point that is illustrated by this case is that even after the presentation
by the appellant and their representative, there is still some confusion as to the
exact nature of the case to be decided upon.
Case Five Phase Four.
The following transcript is of 'phase four' Case Five, the three prior













:right thank you (36.0)
:thankyou (.) [clerk returns with the appellants] (7.0)
:thankyou very much for coming today mister and misses
(surname) it's always (.) very (.) useful if we can see (.) err
applicants in this case (child's name)' s parents (.) thank you very
much mister (solicitor's name) for coming and trying to explain (.)
the background to this matter it is very difficult (0.2) I think you
have a very considerable problem here (0.6) on the other hand we
do think that it's a problem that does need to be redressed
therefore we are granting you a legal aid certificate limited to
taking counsel's opinion (0.2) on the issues (0.2) this will take a
lot of preparation and I'm sure in mister (counsel's name) you've
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13 pick one of the few specialist counsel who know about these
14 matters who can (.) give a useful opinion which can be relied upon
15 (.) thankyou very much for coming (.) I wish you good fortune (.)
16 m,f&s :thank you very much (6.0)
17 cl :next one is (surname of appellant)
At the start of this segment of transcript we have the end of 'phase three'
where the clerk thanks the panel for their decision on the case (line 1). There
follows a long transition period while the clerk goes out to bring back the
appellants, in this period the panel do not talk further of the case or any other
topic. The silence is broken by one of the returning appellants, either the
husband, wife or solicitor thanking someone while retaking a seat (line 2).
There is another silence while they get seated before the chair begins.
The chair begins by thanking the parents for attending and that it is
helpful when appellants do attend (lines 3 to 5). The chair then thanks the
solicitor for coming and trying to explain the case background (lines 5 to 7).
The chair then goes on to state that he considers it a difficult matter (line 7), but
that he and the panel, "we", think that the case addresses a problem and it is a
matter that needs to be "redressed" (line 7 to 9). The chair then announces that
they are granting the appeal but that it is "limited" to taking a counsel's opinion
(lines 10 and 11). The chair continues by stating that an opinion on this case
will take a lot of preparation but that in the counsel the appellants have
indicated they wish to give an opinion, they have chosen a specialist whose
opinion can be "relied upon" (lines 11 to 14). The chair then thanks them for
coming and wishes them "good fortune" with the case (line 15). The appellants
in unison thank the chair and panel (line 16). There is a period of silence while
the appellants leave, and then the clerk introduces the next case.
Summary.
The whole delivery of this decision is carried off smoothly by the parties
concerned, very much in contrast to the earlier phases of this case which
involved a lot of debate - especially phase two. If one was to speculate as to the
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reasons for this, one reason may be that, due to the work of their legal
representative, the appellants managed to put forward a case which addressed
all their concerns. In doing so this forestalled the raising of issues at this later
period in the hearing. Some evidence towards such an interpretation is given
when the chair thanks the parents for coming to the tribunal stating that it is
useful when they do so (lines 3 to 5). Although the chair does not directly note
the role of their legal representative it seems that this to can be inferred to be
a useful occurrence.
We have seen from the previous phases that the panel have discussed the
case in some length with the appellants and that the chair does not fully agree
with the approach to the case by the appellant's solicitor. This is reflected for
example in the chair adding his opinion of their having "a very considerable
problem here" (line 8). He expresses this as his own opinion with the use of "I"
(line 7), whereas when he says that the problem nevertheless needs to be
redressed, he expresses this as the opinion of the panel as a whole with the use
of "we" (line 8). However, as noted above none of the protracted discussion of
the previous phases gets referred to in depth and the delivery of the decision is
given as a representing united position taken by the panel.
That the decision of the panel is of a legal aid certificate limited to a
counsel's opinion, is also interesting in that this was what the appellant's
solicitor suggested as the minimum that their appeal warranted while summing
up in 'phase two' of the appeal. Though it is not easy to show the influence that
this has exerted on the panel's decision.
The chair does not really offer the appellants or their solicitor any
chance to comment on the decision, and he seems to achieve this by finishing
his turn by thanking them all for coming and wishing them good luck (line 15).
This does not prevent further discussion or questions, but does result in eliciting
thanking acknowledgements from the appellants and solicitor (line 16). The
appellant's do not ask any further questions, as unrepresented appellants
occasionally do as to the future actions of the Legal Aid Board with regard to
their case, possibly as their solicitor can be expected to inform them - possibly
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why the chair does not offer such information either.
Case Six34 - (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Four).
One of the panel is the appellant's solicitor for this case and as their
representative has presented an interpretation of the case documents for the
panel. Thus providing representation for the appellant while the appellant is a
non-attender. The representative though does not play any part in the decision
making which is performed by the three remaining panel members. The case is
a claim for damages against a police surgeon. The third 'phase' is quite short
in this case and can be presented in one segment.
1 pml :well I'd be inclined to grant it to close of pleadings and (.) let it
2 be reviewed at that stage at that stage they'll know what ehh (.)
3 what the other (parties) are gonna do (0.4)
4 pm2 :no 1 would refuse it because 1don't think that a fee paying client
5 of moderate means bearing in mind the quantum of the claim
6 would would proceed with it (0.4) unless of course an offer was-
7 ? [mmh
8 pm2 :-forthcoming yuh err mister (solicitor's name) there indicates that
9 he had a letter inviting him to consider quantum all he has to do
10 now is contact them and consider quantum (0.2) and if an offer is-?
11 [mmmmmm
12 pm2 :-forthcoming that is satisfactory he can settle it without (.) legal
13 aid (.) 1 don't think a fee paying client of moderate means would
14 embark upon (.) this sort of expensive litigation (.) just for the
15 sake of ff a few hundred pounds (0.6)
16 ch :okay (.)
17 pml :1agree with that (.)
18 pm2 :it doesn't stop (solicitors first name) from reapplying at a later
19 date does it (unclear) (.)
20 ch :no (2.0) nyeh okay fine then (.)
21 cl :so you're refusing him
22 ch [yes we are (.)
23 cl :okay (13.0)
This 'phase' of the case starts after a transition period between 'phases'
34 Data session 10 tape 1 case 1.
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two and three of the case hearing, in which no oral interaction between the
panel occurred. It starts with panel member one giving their opinion on the
case, that they would grant the appeal to close of pleadings." Panel member
one suggests that the merits of the case can then be reviewed at that stage in
light of what the other parties to the case will do (lines 1 to 3). Panel member
two disagrees with this saying that they would refuse it due to the size of
quantum, and that no fee paying client would undertake such legal action (lines
4 to 6). At this point there is a murmur of approval from one of the other panel
members (line 7). Panel member two then continues by expanding upon his
opinion by noting this would be unless an offer was made for an out-of-court
settlement (lines 6 and 8). He continues stating that the appellant's legal
representative indicated that a letter containing such an offer was made, and that
a response to this should be made by the solicitor on behalf of the appellant
(lines 8 to 10). This again elicits an approving response from one of the other
panel members (line 11). Panel member two continues by stating that if the
offer of quantum was satisfactory then the case could be settled without the
need for legal aid (lines 10, 12 and 13). Panel member two then repeats his
original reason as to why he believes that the case should not be granted legal
aid, noting that the sum involved is not large (lines 13 to 15).
The chair acknowledges panel member two's opinion (line 16). Panel
member, one who initially believed the case should be granted legal aid,
indicates a change in his opinion and concurs with panel member two (line 17).
Panel member two then inquires, using the representatives first name, to check
that this does not disallow the appellant's legal representative from reapplying
for legal aid at a later stage if this should be necessary (lines 18 and 19). The
chair replies that it does not and, after a short pause, indicates that they have
35 Pleadings are: "Written or printed statements delivered alternatively by
the parties to one another, until the questions of fact and law to be decided in
an action have been ascertained, i.e. until issue is joined. The pleadings
delivered (a) by the plaintiff, (b) by the defendant, are as follows: (1)(i)
statement of claim; (ii) defence, (2) (i) reply" (Osborn's Concise Law
Dictionary 1983:254). There are variations on this but they are seldom used.
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reached a decision (line 20). The clerk then asks the chair if they are refusing
the appeal, though uses the term "him" referring to the appellant's
representative who panel member two had referenced using their Christian
name (line 21). The chair confirms this (line 22), the clerk acknowledges the
confirmation and a silent transition period ensues while the clerk retrieves the
legal representative (line 23) from the waiting area.
Summary.
This case is interesting in that it is so neat and tidy in the way it occurs
and is dealt with. A opinion in favour of granting the appeal and detailing the
extent of the award is made but is responded to with a disagreement, and a
reason for the refusal made. This refusal is expanded to describe a situation
where the case could still proceed but without legal aid. A repeat of the reason
for a refusal is made, a reason that is stated in the Legal Aid Handbook. This
argument then wins round the panel member who originally held a different
position and the panel come to a unanimous decision.
What this also illustrates is that, even after the appellant or their
representative has discussed the case with the panel members, this does not
mean that the panel members have all come to a similar understanding about the
documents and the case. Instead, we can see that the panel members have
interpreted the case differently. It takes further discussion between them to
agree upon an interpretation in terms of the 'correct' award.
Case Seven36 - (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Four).
This case is a female appellant who is not represented by a legal
practitioner. She has a claim against a council for personal injury caused by an
alleged defective paving which resulted in her breaking her leg. Initially in
36 Data Session 5 tape 1 case 1.
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phase one the panel have thought that the case was at least worth counsel's
opinion, but had raised some issues which they wished to ask the appellant. In
the second phase of the tribunal the panel discuss with the appellant details of
the accident and the medical implications of the injuries. They discuss with the
appellant photographs of the alleged offending paving stones and related issues.
The appellant has tended to supply unextrapolated answers to questions in a
quiet voice.
1 ch :right thankyou very much (.)
2 cl :okay (.)
3 ch :would you like to like to wait outside (.) erm while we consider-
4 ap [yes
5 ch :-our decision (.) and when we've made our decision we'll call you
6 back in and we will let you know what (.) the decision is (.)-
7 ap [right
8 ch :-(cough) (.)
9 ap :thankyou (.)
10 cl :would you like to wait just outside (.)
11 ap :right thankyou (4.0)
12 pml :grant limited to the close of (proceedings?) (.)
13 pm? [ummm
14 ch :yeah weell I'd grant to close of pleadings (2.0)
15 pm2 :1 would say counsel's opinion (.)
16 pm3 :no I think counsel's opinion as well (.)
17 pm2 [mmm yeah (0.4)
18 ? :errm (6.0)
19 ch :seems to me that (.) erh (.) its a (.) fairly good (0.2) good claim
20 that she's got (.) and I (0.2) you won't get an opinion better than
21 (barrister's?) letter will you (.)
22 ? :(unclear)
23 pml : [there has been some more recent cases hasn'there
24 pm3 [well there's (.)
25 nineteen seventy one (.)
26 ch :there are a lot of cases (.) err
27 pml [yes there are (6.0)
28 pm2 :it's obviously not a very big case anyway and it may be th that if
29 if it (.) it might even be a case of (0.2) the insurance company
30 could be persuaded to settle before er (.) proceedings have
31 started
32 ch [ummh (4.0)
33 cl :right I'll bring her back then (.)
34 ch :mmm (16.0)
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The first eleven lines of this transcript are the end of the second 'phase' of a
tribunal case hearing, in which they inform the appellant as to their next course
of action and those of the tribunal panel. In doing so the chair can be seen to
displaying an orientation to the phases of the tribunal described in this thesis,
although he does not name them.
Initially we have the chair closing the second 'phase' discussion of the
case with the appellant (line 1), this is acknowledged and 'supported' by the
clerk (line 2). The chair then requests the appellant outside (line 3), which is
affirmatively answered by the appellant (line 4), but the chair continues their
instructions by informing the appellant of the reasons for this and outlining the
course of actions that will be taken by the panel, and how this relates to the
appellant (lines 3, 5, 6, and 8). The appellant acknowledges what the chair is
saying while they are still talking (line 7), thus displaying that they are
following the instructions, and thanks the chair when he has finished (line 9).
The clerk then repeats the instructions to leave the room with the added
direction of "just" in the request to wait outside (line 10). This request seems
to occur while the appellant is already leaving the room and seems to be a piece
of direction-giving rather than a request. The appellant acknowledges these
instructions and then thanks the clerk (line 11). There then follows a short
transition period of four seconds in which the appellant leaves but which
contains no oral interaction between the panel.
Following the short transition period the third 'phase', the decision
making, begins with statement/suggestion by panel member one that the appeal
be granted and what the award should be (line 12), initially eliciting an
indecisive response from one of the other panel members (line 13). This
suggestion is taken up by the chair and repeated as their position also (line 14).
However, after a short pause panel member two states that they would "say"
counsel's opinion (line 15). This is not a suggestion that the case should not be
granted, but a suggestion of a lesser award than that suggested by chair and
panel member one. This disagreement to the initially suggested award is taken
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up and supported by panel member three (line 16). This support by panel
member three is responded to with an agreement by the panel member two
which seems to be an agreement that they have chosen the right award (line 17).
It seems that another panel member is about to speak, but then cuts off after just
a murmuring which is followed by a long-ish silence (line 18).
The silence is broken by the chair, who had agreed with the initial
suggestion of a higher award, stating that they thought the claim was a good
one, and that a better opinion than the one presented in a letter submitted to the
panel in the previous 'phase' could not be obtained (lines 19 to 21). This is
followed by an unclear comment (line 22), which is immediately overlapped by
the comment that there have been "some more recent cases" (line 23). In
overlap with this, panel member three gives the date of a 'specific case' - this
would appear to be the initial precedent case - (lines 24 and 25). The chair then
responds that "there are a lot of cases" (line 26), which is agreed to by panel
member one (line 27). Following this there is a longish pause before panel
member two who had suggested the lesser award which the chair does not seem
to agree with, although not directly arguing against, states that the case is "not
very big" and that it is quite possible that the insurance company "could be
persuaded" to settle before proceedings get underway (lines 28 to 31). This
receives a token agreement from the chair (line 32). After a short silence the
clerk states/suggests that he will bring the appellant back in (line 33) and
receives a token agreement from the chair (line 34).
Summary.
The data displays instructions being given to the appellant at the end of
the second 'phase' of the tribunal, describing the processes that the panel will
be engaged in and what action the appellant will be expected to perform. This
not only provides a coherent link between phases two and three, but also set up
in advance the possibility of a smooth transition between the following phases.
The third 'phase' begins with a suggestion that the case be granted and
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what it should be awarded, this is then agreed by the chair. From then onwards
the question of the case being granted is not at issue, rather the issue becomes
what it is to the nature of the award. Panel member two suggests, and is
supported by panel member three, an award different to that proposed by panel
member one and agreed upon by the chair, thus making a split of opinions
within the panel as to the nature of the award. We see that the first two phases
have not resulted in a uniform interpretation by the panel of the case
documentation and newly introduced discourse from the appellant.
What is interesting here is that there is a split, not in the success of the
case but in the nature of that success. Once the split becomes evident there is
a pause before the chair makes a case with reference to the documentary
evidence of the barrister's opinion, though not forceful for his position of a
higher award. This is met with some agreement by two of the other panel
members, one of whom cites a specific case, seemingly as evidence of
precedence. Panel member two does not respond to this line of discussion but
rather suggests that the case will probably be settled by the insurance company
out-of-court. This line is not particularly responded to except by a token
agreement from the chair. There is a short silence of four seconds before the
clerk offers to bring the appellant back in and receives agreement on this course
of action. What stands out here is that, though there does appear to be
unanimous agreement as to the success of the appeal, no firm decision as to the
nature of the award seems to be overtly agreed upon and yet the clerk perceives
this 'phase' of the case to be finished and is not argued against or contradicted.
In the transition period of sixteen seconds that follows no reference to their
decision is made by any of the panel members, only once the appellant arrives
is it disclosed that the award is the lower rather than the higher level. This
would appear to be an incomplete decision making process in an explicit sense,
yet it succeeds unproblematically for the participants as a completed 'phase'.
Any implicit agreement would seem to be located in the agreement of three of
the members that documentary evidence of precedent did exist, and an
uncontested letter from a barrister. The letter from the barrister is not directly
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referred to as counsel's opinion.
Case Eighe7 - (Venue - See Appendix One Venue Number Two).
The transcript starts at the beginning of the case recording.
1 ch :is she coming? (.)
2 cl :she's here (.)
3 ch :is is she coming in? (.)
4 cl :err yeah well yeah 1 1 are you happy to (0.2)
5 pm? [are we
6 ch :no (.) no no no no hang on a minute (.)
7 pm? [unclear
8 cl :no she's not much (unclear) you know
9 ch [okay (unclear) well (0.2)
10 fine (unclear) (.)
11 pm1 :1 think we all have the view that if (.) if the other side's got
12 ch [have (name) [have
13 (name) got legal aid? (.)
14 cl :let me just check (0.2)
15 pm2 :she sez so
16 pm1 [she sez he has (11.0)
17 cl :yep he has (0.4) area six (0.2)
18 ch :then arguably then she must have it (.) because (.) ermm it its-
19 pm? [mmm
20 ch :-quite unfair but (.) but 1 mean we must be even handed (0.6) 1-
21 pm? [mmm
22 ch :-mean (.) you know (.) its
23 pm2 [can we discharge his (.)
24 ch :no (.)
25 ? :yeah (laugh)
26 cl :well you we we could certainly be putting her under (.) future
27 legal aid for the two of then could be considered (0.2) errm (0.2)
28 pm3 :if he's got it she that's fine (.) but if (unclear) (0.2)
29 ? [ummm
30 cl :mind sometimes it works out that they both have it for a short
31 time then you knock them both on the head (.)
32 ? :humm (.)
33 cl :cause err its (.) you just simply can just get into a lawyers benefit
34 and that (.)
35 ch :well 1 think so (.) 1 think so (.) 1 mean (1.0) arguing about the-
37 Data session nine tape two case 2 (5).
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36 ? [mmm
37 ch :(.) mahogany box room fitting (.) clearly the pull string handle (.)
38 pml [ssssuh
39 pm3 :it'll be subject to statutory charge (0.4)
40 ? :(unclear) the toilet seat
41 pml [(laughs)
42 ch [(laughs) (0.4) righto (.) well I'm (.)
43 what's the situation then in this case (.)
44 cl :right well have ermm
45 ch [no hang on (mrs name of appellant miss
46 name of appellant) she's here? (.)
47 cl :she's here (.)
48 ch :she's er he
49 pm2 [he has legal aid (.)
50 cl :he has legal aid (.)
51 ch :well I think we will forward her and advance her (.) her appeal- cl
52 [right
53 ch :(.) err on the basis of our (unclear)
54 cl [yep (.) these are the other
55 attenders (.)
56 ch :right (unclear) (15.0)
57 clerk leaves to get appellant, some unclear talk in the transition
58 period then the appellant arrives.
59 ch :(name of attender) I won't bother (name) our clerk should read
60 any of the notes (.) I would just say and I won't even introduce us
61 (.) ermm we have read these papers (.) over the last few days (.)
62 we have observed in your comments that (name of opposite party
63 in case) has legal aid (.) we have cofirmed with (name) our clerk
64 he does have legal aid and in those circumstances we will grant
65 your appeal so that you may have legal aid (.) 1 have to say
66 though that that is no guarantee that you will get legal aid
67 throughout the proceedings (.)
68 ap :1realise that (.)
69 ch :right (.) good (.) okay (.) so there we are thank you for coming
70 (.)
71 ap :well thank you very much for (unclear)
72 ch [no my pleasure (.)
73 ap :thankyou (0.2) bye bye (.)
74 cl :bye
75 ch [goodbye (5.6)
76 Appellant leaves
77 ch :that was good and quick (1.6) now (name of next case)
This case starts with the chair asking if the appellant is coming to the
appeal (line 1) to which the clerk replies that she is here (line 2), the chair asks
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if she is coming in (line 3) to which the clerk stumbles a bit before replying if
the chair/panel are "happy to" (line 4). The reason for this hesitation is possibly
because the clerk realises the panel have not yet discussed the case ('phase one')
as is 'normal' procedure, this concern is shared by one of the panel members
(line 5) who speaking at the same time as the clerk starts to say "are we",
presumably ready, but stops as the clerk continues to say a similar thing. The
chair realises this confusion and requests the clerk to wait (line 6), there is an
unclear overlap with the chair. The clerk then makes some reference to the
appellant which is unclear (line 8), but this does not seem to be related to the
unclear talk of the panel member but a continuation of the talk with the chair,
possibly a clarification of the mix up - but this is somewhat speculative. The
chair then dismisses this line of talk (lines 9 and 10).
At this point panel member one moves the talk on by suggesting that the
panel all have the same view, and goes on to start explaining this (line 11).
However, the chair on his second attempt interrupts panel member one to ask,
using the name of the person the appellant is going to court against, if the other
party to the dispute has legal aid (line 12 and 13). This appears to be along the
same line of discussion that panel member one was developing (line 11), so the
reason for the interruption is not clear, unless the it was due to the chair
believing it was his own 'role' to lead the discussion. The clerk asks the chair
to let him check this information (line 14), this is done with reference to
documents the panel do not have. While the clerk is doing so panel member
two, with reference to the documents that the panel do have, notes that the
appellant says that they do (line 15). There is a long pause after this as the clerk
checks his documents and eventually confirms this and adds which Legal Aid
Area Committee has awarded it (line 17). It is notable that the confirmation via
the appellant's documents is not taken to be sufficiently reliable, and notable
that the clerk when he confirms this adds information i.e. the awarding area,
that had not been requested. It is plausible that this information may have been
added to either justify the time spent checking the documents when confirmation
was available from the appellants documents the panel had at hand or, to justify
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why the clerk did not know already due to the award being made by another
area office.
Following on from the clerk's confirmation the chair then goes on to say
that the appellant must then be awarded it also if the panel are to be "even-
handed" (lines 18, 20 and 22). While the chair said this, one of the panel
members was giving token agreements (lines 19 and 21). Before the chair can
continue panel member two inquires as to whether the panel can "discharge
this" (line 23), by which they mean can they annul the award to the other party,
to which the chair responds in the negative (line 24). This request by panel
member two seems to indicate that they do not want to make an award to the
appellant but recognise they have to if the other party in the case has legal aid,
therefore if they can revoke the other award they do not have to give it to this
appellant. This line of reasoning raises a laugh from some of the other panel
members (line 25). The clerk responds to this line of reasoning by noting that
they could nevertheless have the legal aid awards to both of them reconsidered
at a future date (lines 26 and 26). Panel member three then attempts what is a
reformulation or addition to this statement by the clerk, gaining some initial
agreement/encouragement from another panel member (line 29), but this is not
too clear (line 28).
It is the clerk who continues after this saying that it is possible for both
cases to have their legal aid withdrawn (lines 30 an 31), adding that to continue
is often just a benefit to their lawyers (lines 33 and 34). The panel members,
themselves practising lawyers, do not appear to take the comment as relating
to them and in fact the chair infers agreement by giving the example appellants
arguing of small household items (lines 35 and 37). A lightheartedness prevails
as panel member three states that the room fittings used in the example by the
chair would be subject to statutory charge (line 39). Another panel member
continues this line of humour by reference to the toilet seat (line 40). This raises
a laugh from panel member one (line 41) and the chair (line 42), however, the
chair continues adopting a more serious line and addressing the clerk as to the
situation in this case (lines 42 and 43). The clerk begins to start, and as if to ask
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a question (line 44), but is halted by the chair who asks if the appellant is here
(line 45 and 46). The clerk confirms this (line 47) and the chair references the
appellant but changes this to her ex-partner (line 48), but before the chair can
continue panel member two seems to anticipate the chair noting that he has legal
aid (line 49). The clerk repeats this in confirmation (line 50), and the chair then
suggests the action and the decision the panel will take, this being that the case
will be forwarded to phase four the decision delivery 'phase' (lines 51 and 53).
The clerk acknowledges this (lines 52 and 54), and gives the chair a list of the
other attending appellants for that day (lines 54 and 55). The chair
acknowledges this (line 56) and the clerk goes out of the room to fetch the
appellant (lines 57 and 58). There is some talk in the transition period but this
is unclear and does not seem to relate to the case.
The appellant arrives and the chair addresses her by name and tells her
that he will not bother to introduce himself or the panel, that they have
considered the appeal documents and the fact that her ex-partner has legal aid
(lines 59 to 63). The chair then states that this has been confirmed by the clerk
and hence they will grant the appeal (lines 63 to 65), adding the caution that this
is not a guarantee of continued legal aid support (lines 65 to 67). Here we see
the chair divert from the 'normal' tendency to introduce themselves, the clerk
and the panel at 'phase two'. The reference to the documents and the actions of
the panel so far are features of 'phase two' but this is transformed into a
decision via reference to confirmation of details by the clerk, which is a
reference to their discussion in the previous 'phase', and the delivery of a
'granting the appeal' with reference to its possibly being temporary.
The appellant acknowledges the possible temporality of the award (line
68), and the chair then acknowledges this and thanks her for attending (lines 69
and 70). The appellant thanks the chair (line 71), this is acknowledge by the
chair (line 72) and the thanks are repeated with a goodbye by the appellant (line
72). The clerk and chair both respond to the farewell (line 74 and 75) as the
appellant leaves. Once the appellant has left the chair comments positively to
the handling of that case and moves onto the next (line 77).
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Summary.
Here we see early agreement that the case should be awarded legal aid,
although there is some preference shown for both appellant and plaintiff to have
their legal aid revoked. This is not a current option though, and some talk about
when this may be an option is undertaken. The notable point in this case is that
the decision to tell the appellant that they have decided to allow the appeal is
taken in 'phase one'. Also noticeable is that the chair started off by attempting
to move 'phase two' of the appeal before completing a 'phase one' (line 3). This
caused the clerk to question this action, causing him to become a bit flustered
(line 4), and illustrates that the clerk is attending to the 'normal' 'phases' of the
tribunal. It seems likely that one of the panel members has also noticed this
'deviation from the norm' (lines 5 and 7). This concern for the deviation from
the 'norm' at the beginning of 'phase one', and the lack of concern for the
suggested 'deviation' at the end of 'phase one', would seem to be due to the fact
that the work necessary for the move had not been done in the first instance,
whereas it had in the second.
In this case we see the panel come to a decision the initial phase of the
tribunal which they consider satisfactory, although a final decision is not
usually an outcome of phase one but phase three, they then carry the 'logic' of
this through by suggesting they inform the appellant of their decision. The
second phase begins with references to the 'normal' practices of phase two,
giving proof of the 'normative' way in which they are adhered to - at least in
this case, with an explanation of why the are being deviated from. This
explanation then develops into a delivery of a decision which would have
'normally' occurred in phase four.
What we can also see from this case is that the work that is normally
performed across four phases is achieved in two. Though it must be noted that
these two phases cannot therefore be seen as examples of any of the phases
noted in the description of other cases in this thesis. Nevertheless, we can note
the overt references by the clerk and the panel members to 'normal' practices
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and deviation occurring, though it must be remembered that this is itself a
situated construction of normative procedure.
Finally we have seen that it is possible to forward the tribunal 'phases',
but that this can meet with resistance if the work which the panel is meant to do
has not been achieved, or is no longer necessary. The panel were aware in this
case when the chair asked initially if the appellant was coming in, that the work
of the panel had not been done for them to satisfactorily move to the next
'phase'. This attention to the work that needs to be done before 'moving on' is
displayed both by the clerk and one of the panel members. When the chair
suggests forwarding the case to phase four there are no objections, this would
seem to be because the clerk and the panel members realised that they have
done the work which would allow this to be possible.








































:right contract (.) well this is contest isn't it (.)
[contract
:well (.) yes ummm (0.2) that's right umm (.)
:but Ihad a copy of thee eh of that law report
[the recent one you
mean




:that's in Scotland (.)
:it's newcastle on tyne now
[newcastle on tyne yeah (.)
:with the social worker (.)
:mmmm (.)
:is that scottish authority (though) (.)
:yeah no but the one he refers to is the johnson one (0.4) the- pm2
[(bloomsbury)
:-johnson and bloomsbury doesnt help him because johnson and
bloomsbury it's the junior hospital doctor where (.) there were-
[umm
38 Data session four tape two case 2 (2).
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22 eh :excessive hours of work (.)
23 pm2 [ummm that's right (.)
24 pm3 :yeah not quite the (same is it)
25 eh [(unclear) in the contract that requires them to
26 work under twenty hours a week then it's a slightly different-
27 pm2 [that's right
28 eh :-thing you see (.) I mean here (1.2) errm it seems to be just
29 general stress at work (.) well I mean general stress arising out of-
30 pm2 [umm
31 eh :-his job (.) It's a little bit thin on sort of (.) specific (.)
32 pm2 :but he he can obviously (.) to some extent rely upon the (.) erm
33 (.) success in the industrial tribunal although it wasn't contested -
34 ch [ummm
35 pm2 :-the fact that he had an award (0.2) and that (.) is is something- eh
36 [ummm
37 pm2 :-he err (.)
38 pm3 :well what's he (going to court) for (.)
39 pm2 :errrm (.) unfair dismissal
40 pm1 [well well erm yes that award that award but it that would be
41 based upon fact that they failed to implement proper procedures-
42 pm2 [umm
43 pm1 :-(.) I mean I think based upon that newcastle social workers case
44 he might (.) and it's very much a might and I do accept that (.)
45 have grounds for an argument but I would certainly limit it (.)-pm2
46 [umm
47 pm1 :-very strongly (.) I would limit it to a very low (.) financial
48 amount and I would say counsel's opinion only (.) plus (.)
49 counsel's opinion and and a and a Iowa low financial (.) yes yes-
50 pm2 :[umm
51 eh [around five hundred
52 pm1 :-five hundred costs yes (.) perhaps seven fifty (.)
53 pm3 [I I I uh
54 eh :seven fifty including costs (.)
55 pm1 :including costs yes (.)
56 pm3 :that' what I
57 pm2 [ I I agree I think it's going to be difficult but I think
58 it's not by no by no means hopeless (.)
59 pm1 :yeah (0.1)
60 pm3 :that's my view (.)
61 pm2 :it's new territory as well
62 pm1 [yes a new territory interesting (.)
63 ? :yeah (0.2)
64 cl :right (.) I'll bring him in then (0.1)
65 Clerk leaves to get attender
6 6 eh :so we're just going to tell him (.)
67 pm2 :mmmm (.)
371
68 pm1 :if you're happy to (laugh) (0.4)
69 pm2 :what the upshot (unclear) try and persuade us that he he's
70 (unclear) but I don't suppose for a minute will (.) do anything
71 other than the great (unclear)
72 ? [(laugh)
73 Some unclear talk ensures at a rapid pace then a pause (2.0)
74 pm1 :wh wh what financial limits are we going to set (.) what do you
75 think seven fifty (.)
76 ? :okay (.)
77 pm3 :yeah inclusive oh inclusive oh yeas (.)
78 eh :ahem (.)
79 [unclear comment made as clerk returns with the appellant]
The case starts with a lot of flicking through of documents and with the
chair stating the character of the case as being about contract (line 1), with
panel member one giving a heavily overlapping repetition and confirmation of
this characterization of the case (line 2), and the chair continuing by
categorizing the case also as "contest" and seeking agreement on this (line 1).
This is somewhat hesitatingly confirmed by panel member one (line 3). The
chair then goes on to state that they had a copy of "that law report" (line 4), the
panel then enters into a discussion to clarify exactly which report he chair is
talking about. Panel member two asks if the chair means "the recent one" (line
5 and 6), panel member three asks if the chair means the "Newcastle one" (line
7). The chair adds that he means the "Scottish one" (line 8 and 10), to which
in overlap panel member suggests the chair means "social services" (lines 7 and
9) to which panel member two states "that's in Scotland" (line 11). Panel
member three corrects panel member two by stating that is Newcastle (line 12)
to which panel member one adds their agreement with panel member three (line
13). Panel member two clarifies that the report they are talking about is the one
concerning a social worker (line 14) which panel member one confirms (line
15). The clerk queries if the case in the report from Newcastle was under
Scottish authority (line 16). The chair initially responding to the clerk but then
correcting himself states that the case that the report he has referred to (back at
line 4) and that the appellant's documents refer to is the Johnson and, as he is
informed by panel member two (line 18), Bloomsbury case, about the junior
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hospital doctor. This report he informs the panel is the case of excessive hours
of work and does not help the appellants case here (lines 17, 19,20 and 22),
which panel member two acknowledges (lines 21 and 23) and panel member
three acknowledges that the case report and the case the tribunal are "not quite
the same" (line 24).
The chair then goes on to report what he sees as the difference between
the appeal case they are reviewing and the case report produced in its support
as providing a precedence for it. Firstly he states the nature of the reported case
(lines 25 and 26), receiving an agreement token from panel member two (line
27), then contrasts this with the case the tribunal is sitting on (lines 26, 28, 29
and 31). The chair also then adds that he thinks that the case documentation for
the case they have to decide upon is a bit weak on "specifics" (line 31).
As noted above, the chair, after the panel has managed to focus on the
case and organized what the relevance of the case report referenced by the
appellant is, has moved to making an assessment of the case in hand noting he
thought it was a "little thin on sort of C.) specifics" (lines 29 and 30). Following
this panel member two notes that the appellant can "to some extent rely" on
their success in a industrial tribunal that the case had previously been to before
(lines 32, 33, 35 and 37). After this panel member three seeks to clarify why
the appellant is taking the case to court (line 38), to which panel member two
replies "unfair dismissal" (line 39). At the same time Le. slightly overlapping
the previous utterance, panel member one outlines the specific claim of the
case, "a failure to implement proper procedures". Then invokes the Newcastle
case involving the social worker which was the source of some earlier
confusion, to note that the case they are assessing "might" have an "argument",
adding that they would limit the monies "very strongly" and only for counsel's
opinion (lines 43 to 45 and 47 to 49). This talk of the limitations of the award
of legal aid implies the decision that the case should be granted its appeal, this
aspect of the statement is not contested and the deliberations of the award
amount by the panel begin.
The chair suggests the sum of five hundred pounds (line 51), to which
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panel member one seems to initially agree to but suggests seven hundred and
fifty pounds (lines 49 and 52), which the chair then modifies to "seven fifty
including costs" (line 54) to which panel member one agrees (line 55). Panel
member two then agrees with the assessment so far, reiterating that it may be
difficult but the case is not a hopeless one (lines 57 and 58). It is worth noting
that it was perhaps panel member three who was attempting to take a tum twice
earlier, but did not continue and rather let the chair and panel member two
continue (lines 53 and 56). Panel member one adds their agreement to panel
member two's assessment (line 59), to which panel member three states that this
is their view too (line 60). Although that is all the panel members agreed, panel
member two adds further support for the case by stating that the case will be
covering new territory (line 61), to which two of the other panel members voice
their assent (lines 62 and 63). At this point the clerk who has been monitoring
the panel members assess the panel as having decided upon a course of action
and indicates that they shall bring in the appellant, and goes out to do so (line
64).
When the clerk leaves to get the appellant (line 65) the chair then
proffers the notion that they are just going to tell the appellant their decision
(line 66), to which panel member two agrees (line 67) and panel member one
by stating explicitly if the chair is "happy to" (line 68). Following this panel
member two starts talking and although it is not quite clear what he is saying
all the time, it appears to be what he suspects the appellant will say to the panel
if they start asking questions to the appellant about the case (lines 69 to 71). It
seems that panel member two's utterance elicits a laugh from one of the panel
members (line 72), however it would seem to be giving support to the decision
of the chair as to how to continue the case hearing. Following this there is a
piece of unclear talk (line 73), and then panel member one asks the chair about
what financial limits to the award they are going to set suggesting "seven fifty"
(line 74 and 75) and a panel member agrees (line 76). Panel member three adds
that this should be inclusive (line 77). Following this the chair clears his throat
(line 78) as the clerk returns with the appellant (line 79).
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Summary.
What we can see occurring in the initial phase of this case is the panel
discussing whether a case cited and report referenced by the appellant on behalf
of their case as being applicable or not. However, some confusion has arisen
due to some of the panel members believing the report the chair is referring to
is actually another case, a case from a Newcastle court involving a social
worker, rather than a Scottish case involving a junior doctor. Some of the
confusion seems to be due to a belief by some of the panel that the Newcastle
case will support the appellant's case, but this only becomes fully clear later.
The initial activity of the case so far has been on the panel members all
orientating to the same document, the case report involving a junior doctor in
Scotland, as referenced by the appellant. From the initial confusion the turn-
taking involving all the panel members including the clerk, each putting in their
own observations, eventually results in the recognition of the cause of confusion
and the chair being able to dismiss the report cited. It is worth noting that once
the two cases are identified as being separate, the confusion is lifted instantly
without any need for clarification of the Newcastle case or reference to the case
itself.
The chair then contrasts the report on the Scottish case with the current
case and notes their differences, he then states that he finds the current case a
bit weak on specifics. Having sorted the documentation out initially this seems
and having focused their attention this appears as a move to a preliminary
agreement on the merits of the case (lines 28, 29 and 31).
Following this we see that from a criticism by the chair as to the lack of
specifics in the appeal document, first panel member two and then panel
member one support the appeal although with the latter especially noting the
possibility of difficulties for the case in court. Of interest though is how panel
member two's suggestion for a course of action is taken up, with only slight
amendment by the chair, as non-problematically the decision of the tribunal on
the case. The worthiness of the case and its attendant documentation is not
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discussed as being problematic, even though it initially seemed as though the
chair believed the documentation to be a "bit thin on .. specifics" earlier on
(line 31). Rather, panel member two's suggested course of action is followed
by agreement and consensus building to the extent that the clerk believes the
panels deliberations to be suitably complete. However, the panel had not
decided on any questions to ask the appellant whom the clerk has gone out to
collect, nor have they decided on any other course of action.
We see here the transition period being used to perform work that was
not finished before the clerk went to fetch the appellant. That work being what
the panel are going to say to the appellant. Although the panel has not discussed
the next piece of work the chair suggests that they inform the appellant of their
decision, this can be seen as a deviation from the 'normal' pattern of work
when an appellant is in attendance, in that they would 'normally' talk the case
over with the appellant then discuss again their decision on the case and then
inform the appellant (see previous sections of this chapter). However, in such
a 'normal' case they would have decided on some issue which they wished to
discuss with the appellant which they have not done in this case, rather they
have already come to a unanimous decision in favour of the appellants claim.
The chair seems to acknowledge this deviation from the 'norm' in the
suggestion that they just "tell him" (line 66), and seems to be recognised as
such by panel member one when they respond with "if you're happy to" (line
68). The rest of the panel also give assent to this proposed course of action.
Although direct reference is made to the change in practice from
'normal' procedure does make reference to this deviation in the transition
period, the four phases do not adequately describe this adaptation of the
transition period into the final decision-making occasion.
Case Ten39 - (Venue - Appendix One Venue Number Three).
39 Data session four tape two case 4 (5).
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The panel have moved onto phase two without having decided to inform
the that they are refusing the case, in this they seem to be following the
'normal' four phase route. Phase two does allow the presentation of new
evidence, so the panel are unlikely to have decided to definitely to refuse the
case, but to do so if the appellant can not provide evidence to overturn the
decision by the area office. After introducing the appellant to the panel they
inform the appellant of the current situation. The appellant believes that he and
his solicitor, while in conference with the barrister, were told by the barrister
that it had a greater than fifty percent chance of success, which would make it
eligible for legal aid. The appellant does not produce any new documentation
and as the tribunal panel have the document giving the barrister's opinion they
can not grant legal aid. In this case such evidence would probably have to be
a second barrister's opinion assessing the chance of the case's success in court
as being fifty per cent or higher. The appellant is challenging the original
document but this is not accepted by the panel. 40
Phase two is quite long in this case, the appellant goes into a detailed
description of the events that have ended up in the current appeal against the
refusal of legal aid. The panel however, will not move beyond the document
provided by the barrister. The appellant believes that there has been a mistake,
especially as he believes he was told in conference to put the case down for
court, and that the panel, presented with his appeal, can overturn the barrister's
written opinion of the case. The chair has informed the appellant that panel do





ch [well it does sound strange but there's no
there's no letter from mister (solicitor's name) err (.) suggesting
that (.) the opinion given is different to the one given in
conference (.) and I'm afraid given the err the opinion we have
40 What is interesting here is that the appellant's solicitor who was
supposedly present at the alleged original verbal assessment of success at fifty
percent or more is not present. If the solicitor had been present it would have
been interesting to see what the outcome would have been if they had


















































now (.) that we have no alternative (.) mister (appellants name) but
to say that we must dismiss your appeal (0.2) if you want to go
back and talk to mister (solicitor's name) about it he will advise
you as to what you might be able to do next (.) errah but given the
(0.2) the advice (.) in writing from mister (name) of counsel (0.2)
which puts your chances at under fifty per cent (.) errm (0.4) then
we have ab (.) no alternative in the present circumstances I'm
affraid but to dismiss that appeal (0.6)
:so (0.2) don't a (0.2) so (1.2)
:what happens now well you go back and discuss with mister
(solictor's name) what happens now I think is the answer (1.0)
:yeah but (.) like a say I mean you're dismissing it on the (0.8)
grounds of what the barrister said (0.4) and a've come to appeal -
[ummm a p
:-so (2.0) that's not much of appeal (0.6) because like (0.4) you- ch
[umm
:-know what he sez in the first place Iknow what he sez
[no (.)
we only know that he said forty per cent to you in conference and
fifty in his written und erh less than fifty per cent in his written
advice that's all we know on that (0.4) you're telling us he said
fifty per cent in conference (.)
:quoted fifty per cent und then he said forty
[well (0.2) we can't go behind that (.)
you go back and discuss it with mister (solicitor's name) mister
(solicitor's name) may advise you as to what might be able
to do (.) in terms of perhaps getting another opinion from a
different barrister (.) which might leave you in a position to make
a fresh application for legal aid (.) but (0.2) that would have to be
a very strong opinion I think to get over (slight laugh) this one
(0.2) but we are left with this opinion now (1.6) what we are
saying is as I said to you at the beginning of this hearing we are
not here to try the case we are not the judge (.) I know you say "I
don't agree with it" but we cannot we have to accept the advice
that you have been given by your barrister (.) he's acting on your
side (.) and the advice he's given is that it's less than fifty per cent
(.) and we are not here on this appeal to say well let's make our
own minds up on what your chances are (3.0) we're here to say
(.) we've seen the facts there is no evidence the barrister was (.)
totally misdirected himself (.) and therefore we must we must
accept his assessment (3.0) right (.) so that's it I'm afraid the
appeal is dismissed and I suggest you go back to you solicitor














51 ap [okay then cheers (.)
52 ch :bye bye
53 cl [thanks bye (6.0)
54 ch .pffhhhh (.)
55 cl :next one is mister (appellants name)
At the point we take up the transcript we have the chair acknowledging
the concerns of the appellant as to the report contradicting their understanding
of the opinion of the barrister. The chair notes however, that there is no letter
from the appellants solicitor to support this report of contradictory opinions by
the barrister, and that the panel therefore have no option but to dismiss the
appellants appeal (lines 1 to 6). The chair suggests that the appellant may wish
to go back to their solicitor to be advised what to do next (lines 6 to 8), but
repeats, noting the fifty percent chance of success rule and the barrister's
document which puts the case's chances of success at less than that, that they
have no option but to dismiss the appeal (lines 8 to 12). The appellant hesitantly
starts to ask a question but halts leaving a longish pause (line 13) before the
chair informs the appellant that what happens next is that appellant talks to their
solicitor (lines 14 and 15). The chair displays (line 15) that this information is
an answer to what he believes the appellant was about to ask (line 13).
The appellant then states that the panel is dismissing the case in light of
the report from the barrister (lines 16 and 17), the chair gives a token
acknowledgement to this (line 18), and that he has come to appeal (lines 17 and
19), this also gets a token acknowledgement from the chair (line 20). The
appellant continues by saying that it is not much of an appeal (the appellant
means that he has not been given much of an appeal) since they both know
already what the barrister said in the first place (lines 19 and 21). The chair
responds quickly contradicting the appellant and the stating that all the panel
knows is that the barrister said forty percent to the appellant in conference and
fifty in the written document (lines 22 to 24). This is the wrong way round and
the chair immediately corrects himself and adds that they only have the
appellant saying that the barrister said fifty percent chance in conference (24 to
26). The appellant then makes what seems to be a late correction to the earlier
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mistake of the chair, putting the percentage chances in a correct temporal order
(line 27). The chair, overlapping the end of the appellants correction, states that
the panel can not "go behind" the barristers statement, and repeats his
suggestion that the appellant see his solicitor as a next course of action (lines
28 to 31). The chair adds to this a suggestion as to what the solicitor may then
advise, that he may suggest another barrister's opinion and a re-application for
legal aid, but adds, with a slight laugh in his voice, that it would have to be a
strong new opinion (lines 31 to 34). The chair then states, noting that he told
the appellant this when he first came in at the beginning of phase two, what the
role of the tribunal is and that they have to accept the advice the appellant has
been given by their own barrister, and not make their own decision (lines 35 to
42). There is a pause then the chair continues to spell out the panels role, that
they have seen the barristers decision, that is does not look problematic and that
they therefore must accept it (lines 42 to 45). There is another pause then the
chair continues again telling the appellant that the appeal is dismissed and
suggesting that they go back to their solicitor to see what happens next (lines
42 to 47).
The appellant, in not attempting to prolong and extend the discussion,
appears to accept this as the fmal decision of the panel (line 48). The chair then
thanks the appellant (line 49), as does the clerk (line 50), and the appellant
acknowledges these and says goodbye (line 51). The chair and clerk reciprocate
this goodbye (lines 52 and 53) and there is a pause as the appellant leaves. After
the appellant leaves the chair give an audible exhale at the ending of the appeal
(line 54) and the clerk introduces the next case (line 55).
Summary.
This case is an appeal which in 'phase one' the panel are agreed upon
the interpretation of the case documents which they had received prior to the
tribunal. That they indicated that the case should be refused legal aid and that
this opinion meant the appeal should be refused as it stood at that point in time.
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However, since the appellant can introduce new material at the tribunal, and
they can not refuse the appeal without checking this, they move on to 'phase
two' to discuss the case with the appellant. However, in 'phase two' it becomes
evident to the panel that the appellant does not have any new material to present
before the tribunal. Once the chair has established this he can be seen to
develop the discussion with the appellant, informing the appellant that the panel
are not able to grant the appeal against the refusal of legal aid and in so doing
delivers the decision of the panel as being such. The chair does this without
moving the tribunal to 'phase three', the reason that the chair can do this is
because it was established that the case warranted a refusal unless new material
was made available, and since it has not been the chair can presumably assume
the panel's opinion on the case. The appellant has raised some issues about the
case with the panel but these have not affected the key point of the appellants
own barrister's opinion which is unfavourable towards the appellant. As none
of the panel has taken the appellant's information to override their initial view,
by raising this in the discussion with the appellant, the chair assumes previous
position of the panel and informs the appellant of the refusal without proceeding
to 'phase three'. The chair does this, and in doing so differs from the two
previous examples of foreshortening, without conferring with the other panel
members. This case also differs in that not overt reference is made to the 'four
phase' 'norm', by the panel members or the clerk. Even if the panel get through
the work that is associated with the four phases that have been described
throughout this thesis as evident in other cases, this does not mean that the
panel have been attending to the four phases in a way that describing their
activities with reference to such a model would not be a distortion.
It is notable that in this case the panel are not allowing any testimony of
the appellant to allow an amendment to the situation depicted in the
documentation. The barrister's report as a document is being accorded a status
that is not necessarily accorded to other documentation, in that its content is
being taken as unambiguous. This would seem to indicate that all documents are
not accorded the same status as representations of external situations, this does
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not necessary mean that they are better representations, but that they are
accorded institutionalised legitimcy, that causes their contents to be accorded
a much narrower negotiable meaning. A meaning that is designed to be referred
to in specific bureaucratic processes and practices. Although the relevance of
the document and its content still require situated negotiation and application.
This case displays what appears as a phase two initially to be transformed due
to situational circumstance to be transformed, not into a phase four, but into
something that is neither.
382
Bibliography.
Anderson, Digby C. (1978)
Some Organizational Features in the Local Production of a Plausible Text
Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol 8: 113-135
Ashmore, Malcolm (1989)
The Reflexivity Thesis
Chicago University of Chicago Press
Atkinson, J. Maxwell (1979)
Sequencing and Shared Attentiveness to Court Proceedings (in ...)
G. Psathas (ed)
Everyday Language: Studies in Ethnomethodology
New York Irvington
Atkinson, J. Maxwell (1981)
Ethnomethodological Approaches to Socio-Legal Studies (in)
Podgorecki, A. and C.J. Whelan (eds)
Sociological Approaches to Law (reproduced as Chapter 17 in ..)
Jeff Coulter (ed) (1990)
Ethnomethodological Sociology
Aldershot Edward Elgar Pub.
Atkinson, J. Maxwell (1982)
Understanding Formality: The Categorization and Production of 'Formal'
Interaction
British Journal of Sociology Vol33 Nol:86-117
Atkinson, J. Maxwell (1983)
Two Devices for Generating Audience Approval: A Comparative Study of
Public Discourse and Texts
Tilburg Studies in Language and Literature. Tilburg Katholieke Hogeschool
Atkinson, J. M., (1984)
Our Masters' Voices: The Language and Body Language of Politics
London Methuen
Atkinson, J. M. and Paul Drew (1979)
Order in Court: The Organisation of Verbal Interaction in Judicial Settings
London MacMillan
Beach, Wayne (1985)
Temporal Density in Courtroom Interaction: Constraints on the Recovery of
Past Events in Legal Discourse
Communication Monographs Vol 52:1-18
383
Bakhtin, M. M. (1986)
The Problem of Speech Genres (in ..)
M. M. Bakhtin
Speech Genres and Other Late Essays
Austin University of Texas Press
Baldwin, J. and M. McConville (1979)
Jury Trials
Oxford Clarendon Press
Benson, D. and P. Drew (1978)
"Was there Firing in Sandy Row that Night?": Some Features of the
Organisation of Disputes about Recorded Facts.
Sociological Inquiry Vol48 No 2:89-100
Benson, Douglas and John A. Hughes (1991)
Method: Evidence and Inference - Evidence and Inference for
Ethnomethodology
Graham Button (ed)
Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences
Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Blimes, Jack (1981)
Proposition and Confrontation in a Legal Discussion
Semiotica Vol34 No 3/4:251-275
Blum, Alan F. and Peter McHugh (1971)
The Social Ascription of Motives
American Sociological Review Vol 36:98-109
Boden, Deirdre (1990)
The World as it Happens: Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis
(Chapter 7 in..)
G.Ritzer (Ed.)
Frontiers of Social Theory: The New Synthesis
New York Columbia University Press
Bogen, David (1989)
A Reappraisal of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action in Light of
Detailed Investigations of Social Praxis
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour Vol19 No 1:47-77
Bogoch, Bryna (1994)
Power, Distance and Solidarity: Models of Professional-Client Interaction in
an Israeli Legal Aid Setting




Annual Review of Anthropology Vol 17:221-237
Burrows, David (1989)
Civil Legal Aid: A Practical Guide
Bristol Bristol Classical Press
Bush, Robert A. Baruch (1989)
Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of
Quality Arguments
Denver University Law Review Vol 66:335-380
Button, Graham (1991)
Logic: Ethnomethodology and the Logic of Language (Chapter 3 in ...)
Graham Button (ed)
Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences
Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991
Button, Graham (1991)
Introduction: Ethnomethodology and the Foundational Respecification of the
Human Sciences
Graham Button (ed)
Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences
Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991
Caesar-Wolf, Beatrice (1984)
The Construction of 'adjuicable' evidence in a West German Civil Hearing
Text Vol4 No1-3:192-224
Carroll, John S. and Eric J. Johnson (1990)
Decision Research: A Field Guide
London Sage
Carter, Martin and David Forest (1992)
The Reform of Civil Legal Aid: An Economic Perspective
Salford Papers in Economics 92 - 2
Salford Dept. of Economics University of Salford
Chau, Beng-Haut (1979)
Democracy as a Textual Accomplishment
Sociological Quarterly VoI20:541-549
Cicourel, Aaron V. (1964)
Method and Measurement in Sociology
New York Free Press
385
Cicourel, Aaron V. (1968)
The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice
New York John Wiley & Sons
Cicourel, Aaron V. (1973)
Cognitive Sociology: Language and Meaning in Social Interaction
Harrnondsworth Penguin
Cicourel, Aaron V. (1975)
Discourse and Text: Cognitive and Linguistic Processes in Studies of Social
Structure
Versus Vol. 12:33-88
Clark, Robert E. and Emily E. LaBeff (1982)
Death Telling: Managing the Delivery of Bad News
J. of Health and Social Behaviour Vol 23:366-380
Cobb, Sara and Janet Rifkin (1991)
Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation
Law and Social Inquiry Vol 16:35-62
Collins, Patricia Hill (1991-92)
Review of The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of
Knowledge'
American Sociological Review Vol 97:270-272
Conley, J. M., W. M. O'Barr and E.A. Lind (1978)
The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom
Duke Law Journal Vol 1353:1375-1399
Conley, J. M. and W. M. O'Barr (1990)
Rules Versus Relationships: The Ethnography of Legal Discourse
Chicago Chicago University Press.
Cotterrell, R. (1992)
The Sociology of Law (2nd Edition)
London Butterworths
Danet, Brenda (1980)
Language in the Legal Process
Law and Society Review Vol14 No 3:445-564
Danet, Brenda (ed.) (1984)
Language and Law - Special Issue
Text Vol 14 No 1-3
386
Davies, Howard and David Holdcroft (1991)
Jurisprudence: Texts and Commentaries
London Butterworths
Denzin, Norman K. (1987)
Under the Influence of Time: Reading the Interactional Text
Sociological Quarterly Vol28 No 3:327-341
Dingwall, Robert (1992)
'Don't Mind Him - He's From Barcelona' (Chapter 9 in ..)
Daly, Jeanee et. al (eds)
Researching Health Care: Designs, Dilemmas, Disciplines
London Routledge
Douzinas, Costas and Ronnie Warrington, with Shaun McVeigh (1991)
Post Modem Jurisprudence - The Law of Text in the Texts of Law
London Routledge
Drew, Paul and John Heritage (1992)
Analysing talk at work: an introduction (Chapter 1 in ..)
Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings
Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Edelman, Lauren B., Steven E. Abraham and Howard S. Erlanger (1992)
Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge
Law and Society Review Vol26 No 1:47-83
Edelman, Lauren B., Howard S. Erlanger and John Lande (1993)
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the
Workplace
Law and Society Review Vol27 No 3:497-534
Elgin, Peter (1975)
What Should Sociology Explain - Regularities, Rules or Explanations?
Philosophy of the Social Sciences VoI5:377-391
Eglin, Peter (1979)
Resolving Reality Disjunctures on Telegraph Avenue: a Study of Practical
Reasoning
Canadian Journal of Sociology Vol. 4 No 4:359-377
Felstinger, Abel and Sarat (1980-81)
The Emergence and Transformations of disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.
Law and Society Review Vol 15 No 3-4:631-654
387
Feyerabend, Paul (1993)
Against Method (3rd edition)
London Verso
Finnis, John (1995a)
History of the Philosophy of Law (in)
Ted Honderich (ed)
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
Oxford Oxford University Press
Finnis, John (1995b)
Problems of the Philosophy of Law (in)
Ted Honderich (ed)
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
Oxford Oxford University Press
Fish, Stanley (1989a)
Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature (Chapter 4 in
...)
Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in
Literary and Legal Studies
Oxford Clarendon Press
Fish, Stanley (1989b)
Wrong Again (Chapter 5 in ...)
Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in
Literary and Legal Studies
Oxford Clarendon Press
Fish, Stanley (1989c)
Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road (Chapter 1 in ...)
Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in
Literary and Legal Studies
Oxford Clarendon Press
Fitzgerald, Jeffery and Richard Dickens (1980-81)
Disputing in Legal and Nonlegal Contexts: Some Questions for Sociologists of
Law
Law and Society Vol15 No 3-4:681-707
Flood, John (1991)
Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyers Work
Law and Society Review Vol25 No 1
Fuller, Steve (1989)
Beyond the Rhetoric of Antitheory: Towards a Revisionist Interpretation of
Critical Legal Studies (Chapter 8 in ...)
388
Herbert W. Simons (ed)




Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall
Garfinkel, Harold (1967b)
Practical Sociological Reasoning: Some Features in the Work of the Los
Angeles Suicide Prevention Center (Chapter 8 in ..)
Schneidan, Edwin S. (ed.)
Essays in Self Destruction
New York Jason Aaronson
Garfinkel, Harold (1974)





Respecification: evidence for locally produced naturally accountable
phenomena of order, logic, reason, meaning, method, etc. in and as of the
essential haecceity of immortal ordinary society, - an announcement of studies.
Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences
Ed. By Graham Button
Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991
Garfinkel, Harold (1996)
Etnomethodology's Programme
Social Psychology Quarterly Vol. 59 No.5:5-21
Garfinkel, Harold and Harvey Sacks (1969)
On Formal Structures of Practical Actions (Chapter Six in ..)
Garfinkel, Harold (1986)
Ethnomethodological Studies of Work
London Routledge and Kegan Paul
Garfinkel and Sacks' (1970)
On the Formal Structures of Practical Action (in ..)
McKinney, J. C. and E. A. Tiryakian (eds.)
Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments
New York Appleton-Century-Crofts
389
Garfinkel, H, and D. Lawrence Wieder (1992)
Two Incommensurable, Asymmetrically Alternate Technologies of Social
Analysis
Watson, G. and R.M. Seiler (eds)
Texts in Context: Contributions to Ethnomethodology
Newbury Park, CA. Sage
Geertz, Clifford (1973)
The Interpretation of Cultures
New York Harper Collins
Gellner, Ernest (1975)
Ethnomethodology: The Re-Enchantment Industry or The Californian Way of
Subjectivity
Philosophy of the Social Sciences VoI5:431-450
Genn, Hazel and Yevette Genn (1989)
The Effectiveness of Representation at Tribunals
London The Lord Chancellor's Department
Gilboy, Janet A. (1991)
Deciding Who Gets In: Decision Making By Immigration Inspectors
Law and Society Review Vol25 No 3
Glenn, Philip J. (1995)
Laughing at and Laughing with: Negotiation of Participant Alignments
Through Conversational Laughter (in ...)
Paul ten Have and George Psathas (eds)
Situated Order: Studies in the Social Organization of Talk and Embodied
Activities
Washington International Institute for Ethnomethodology and Conversation
Analysis and University Press of America
Goffman, Irving (1963)
Behaviour in Public Places
New York Free Press
Goodrich, Peter (1984)
Law and Language: An historical and Critical Introduction
Journal of Law and Society Vol 11 No 2: 173-206
Goodrich, Peter (1995)
Scepticism about Law (in)
Ted Honderich (ed)
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy




American Anthropologist Vol. 96 No.3:606-633
Goodwin, Marjorie Harness (1990)
He-Said-She-Said
Bloomingdale Uni. of Indianapolis Press
Green, Bryan S. (1983)
Knowing the Poor: A Case-study in Textual Reality Construction.
London Routledge and Keegan Paul
Hacking, Ian (1981 )
Lakatos's Philosophy of Science (Chapter 6 in ...)
Ian Hacking (ed)
Scientific Revolutions
Oxford Oxford University Press
Hak, Tony (1992)
Psychiatric Records as Transformations of Other Texts (Chapter 8 in ..)
O. Watson and R. Seiler (eds)
Text in Context: Contributions to Ethnomethodology
London Sage
Hansen, Ole (1992)
A Future for Legal Aid
Journal of Law and Society Vol. 19 No 1:85-100
Hansen, Ole (1993)
Legal Aid in Practice
London Legal Action Group
Harding, Sandra (1991)
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking From Women's Lives
Milton Keynes England Open University Press
Hart, H. L. A. (1961)
The Concept of Law
Oxford Oxford University Press
Hartland, Nick (1989)
Texts and Social Organization: An Ethnomethodology of State Documents





Hasenfeld, Yeheskel., Jane A. Rafferty and Mayer N. Zald (1987)
The Welfare State, Citizenship, and Bureaucratic Encounters
Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 13:387-415
Hawkins, Keith (1983)
Thinking about Legal Decision Making
Issues in Criminology and Legal Psychology Vol 5:7-24
Heap, James (1990)
Applied ethnomethodology: Looking for the Local Rationality of Reading
Activities
Human Studies Vol. 13:39-72
Heath, C. C., P. Luff, and G. M. Nichols (1995)
The Collaborative Production of the Document: Context, Genre and the
Borderline in Design
Proceedings of COOP'95, 25-27 Jan. 1995:203-218
Heath, Christian and Paul Luff (1996)
Documents and Professional Practice: 'bad' organisational reasons for 'good'
clinical records
CSCW96 Proceedings of the ACM 1996 Conference on Computer Supported
Co-operative Work.
New York ACM Press
Heath, C. C. and G. M. Nichols (forthcoming)
Animating Texts: Selective Readings of News Stories (in)
Resnick, L. B. and Saljo, R. (eds)






A Change-of-State Token and Aspects of its Sequential Placement (Chapter 3
in ..)
J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds)
Structures of Social Action:Studies in Conversation Analysis
Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Heritage, John (1989)
Current Developments in Conversation Analysis (Chapter 2 in ..)
Derek Roger and Peter Bull (eds)
Conversation
Cleavdon Philidephia Multilingual Matters Ltd
392
Holt, Elizabeth (1993)
The Structure of Death announcements: Looking on the Bright Side of Death
Text Vol13 No 2:189-212
Hurst, James Willard (1980-81)
Functions of Courts in the United States - 1950-1980
Law and Society Review Vol 15 No 3-4 P
Irvine, Judith T. (1979)
Formality and Informality in Communicative Events
American Anthropologist Vol 81 :773-790
Jackson, Bernard S. (1988)
Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence
Merseyside Debora Charles
Jefferson, Gail (1988)
'On the Sequential Organization of Troubles-Talk in Ordinary Conversation'
Social Problems Vol35 No 4 :418-441
Jenkings, K. Neil (1995a)
The Role of the Text: The Spoken and Written Word In Tribunal Decision
Making
Unpublished Conference Paper Socio-Legal Studies Association Annual
Conference Leeds 1995
Jenkings, K. Neil (1995b)
Re-Covering Dorothy E. Smith for Etnomethodology
Conference Paper for the American Sociological Association Annual
Conference Washington D. C. 1995 (see Sociological Abstracts Aug 1995)
Johnson Jr., Earl (1980-81)
Lawyers' Choice: A theoretical appraisal of Litigation Investment decisions
Law and Society Review Vol15 No 3-4 p
Keller-Cohen, Deborah (1987)
Organizational Contexts and Texts:The Redesign of the Midwest Telephone
Bill
Discourse Processes Vol 10:417-428
Kidder, Robert L. (1980-81)
The End of the Road? Problems in the Analysis of Disputes
Law and Society Review Vol15 No 3-4 p
393
Komter, Matha L. (1995)
The Distribution of Knowledge in Courtroom Interaction (Chapter 7 in ...)
Paul ten Have and George Psthas (eds)
Situated Order: Studies in the Social Organization of Talk and Embodied
Activities
Washington University Press of America
Kritzer, Herbert M. (1980-81)
Studying Disputes: Learning from the CLRP Experience
Law and Society Review Vol 15 No 3-4 P
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970)
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd edition)
Chicago Chicago University Press
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1981)
A Function for Thought Experiments (Chapter 1 in ..)
Ian Hacking (Ed.)
Scientific Revolutions




The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
Oxford Oxford University Press
Latour, Bruno and Steve Woolgar (1979)
Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts
London Sage
Lee, J. R. E. (1987)
Prologue: Talk Organisation (Chapter 1 in ..)
Graham Button and J. R. E. Lee (eds)
Talk and Organisation
Avon Multilingual Matters Ltd
Lempert, Richard O. (1980-81)
Grievances and Legitimacy: The Beginnings and End of Dispute Settlement
Law and Society Review Vol 15 No 3-4:707-715
Levi, Judith N. (1990)
The Study of Language in the Judicial Process (Chapter 1 in ..)
Judith N. Levi and Anne Graffam Walker (Eds.)
Language in the Judicial Process
New York Plenum Press
394
Levi, Judith N. (1994)
Language and Law: A Bibliographic Guide to Social Science Research in the
U.S.A.
American Bar Association
Lewis, Roy and Jon Clark (1993)
Employment Rights, Industrial Tribunals and Arbitration: The case for
Alternative Dispute Resolution.
London The Institute of Employment Rights
Livingston, Eric (1987)
Making Sense of Ethnomethodology
London Routeledge and Kegan Paul
Livingston, Eric (1993)
The Disciplinarity of Knowledge at the Mathematics-Physics Interface (in ..)
Messer-Davidow, Ellen.,Shumway, David R., and David J. Sylvan (eds)
Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity
University Press of Virginia Charlottesville
Livingston, Eric (1995)
An Anthropology of Reading
Bloomington Indiana University Press
Lloyd, Denis (1964)
The Idea of Law
Harmondsworth Penguin
Luhmann, Niklas (1985)
A Sociological Theory of Law
London Routledge and Kegan Paul
Luff,P., M. Jarotka, C. Heath and D. Greatbatch (1993)
Tasks and Social Interaction: the Relevance of Naturalistic Analyses of
Conduct for Requirements Engineering
RE'93 IEEE International Symposium on Requirements Engineering
Los Alimitos, California IEEE Computer Society Press
Lynch, Michael (1982)
Technical Work and Critical Inquiry: Investigations in a Scientific Laboratory
Social Studies of Science Vol. 12:499-533
Lynch, Michael (1985)
Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop Talk
in a Research Laboratory
London Routledge and Kegan Paul
395
Lynch, Michael (1988)
The externalized Retina: Selection and Mathematization in the Visual
Documentation of Objects in the Life Sciences
Human Studies Vol. 11:201-234.
Lynch, Michael (1988a)
Alfred Schutz and the Sociology of Science (Chapter 4 in ..)
Lester Embree (ed.)
Worldly Phenomenology: The Continuing Influence of Alfred Schutz on North
American Human Science.
Washington D.C. Centre for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and
University Press of America
Lynch, Michael (1991)
Method: Measurement - Ordinary and Scientific Measurement as
Ethnomethodological Phenomena.
Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences
Graham Button (ed)
Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991
Lynch, Michael (1993)
Scientific Practice and Ordinary Interaction
Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Lynch, Michael (1994)
Representation is Overrated: Some Critical Remarks about the Use of the
Concept of Representation in Science Studies.
Configurations Vol I :137-149
Lynch, Michael and Steve Woo Igar (1988)
Introduction: Sociological Orientations to Representational Practice in Science
Human Studies Volll :99-116
Lynch, Michael and David Bogen (1994)
Harvey Sack's Primitive Natural Science
Theory, Culture and Society Vol. 11 :65-104
Lynch, Michael and David Bogen (1996)
The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text, and Memory at the Iran-Contra
Hearings
Durham Duke University Press
Lynch, Michael and David Bogen (1997)
Sociology's Asociological "Core": An Examination of Textbook Sociology in
Light of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
American Sociological Review Vol. 62 :481-493
396
MacCormick, Neil (1995)
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory
Oxford Oxford University
Mather, Lynn and Barbara Yngvesson (1980-81)
Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes
Law and Society Review Vol 15 No 3-4 p
Maynard, Douglas (1982)
Aspects of Sequential Organization in Plea Bargaining
Human Studies Vol. 5 :319-344)
Maynard, Douglas (1983a)
Language in Court
American Bar Foundation Research Journal Vol. 1:211-222
Maynard, Douglas (1983b)
Social Order and Plea Bargaining in the Courtroom
Sociological Quarterly Vol. 24:233-215
Maynard, Douglas (1984a)
The Structure of Discourse in Misdemeanour Plea Bargaining
Law and Society Review Vo. 18 No.1 :75-104
Maynard, Douglas W. (1984b)
Inside Plea Bargaining: the language of negotiation
New York Plenum
Maynard, Douglas (1985)
The Problem of Justice in Courts Approached by the Analysis of Plea
Bargaining Discourse (Chapter 9 in ..)
Teun van Dijk (ed)
Handbook of Discourse Analysis
London Academic Press
Maynard, Douglas (1988)
Narratives and Narrative Structure in Plea Bargaining
Law and Society Review Vo.22 No.3:449-481
Maynard, Douglas (1989a)
On the Ethnography and Analysis of Discourse in Institutional Settings
Perspecti ves on Social Problems Vol. 1:127-146
Maynard, Douglas W. (1989b)
Notes on the Delivery and Reception of Diagnostic News Regarding Mental
Disabilities (In) The Interactional Order: New Directions in the Study of Social
Order, New York, Irvington.
397
Maynard, Douglas W. (1996)
On "Realization" in Everyday Life: The Forecasting of Bad News as a Social
Relation
American Sociological Review Vol 61:I09-131
Maynard, Douglas W. and John F. Manzo (1993)
On the Sociology of Justice: Theoretical Notes From an Actual Jury
Deliberation
Sociological Theory VollI No 2:171-193
McCracken, Wand H. Sutherland (1991)
Deaf-Ability not Disability
Clevedon, England Multilingual Matters
McHoul, Alexander (1978a)
Ethnomethodology and Literature: Preliminaries to a Sociology of Reading
Poetics Vol 7: 113-120
McHoul. A.W. (1978b)
Wittgenstein and Criticism: Towards a Praxiological View of the Text
New Literary Review Vol. 3:49-57
McHoul, A.W. (1980)
The Practical Methodology of Reading in Science and Everyday Life: Reading
Althusser Reading Marx
Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol 10: 129-150
McHoul. A.W. (1982a)
Hermenuetic and ethnomethodological formulations of conversational and
textual talk
Semiotica Vol38 No 1/2:91-126
McHoul, A.W. (1982b)
Telling How Texts Talk: Essays on Reading and Ethnomethodology
London Routledge and Kegan Paul
McIntosh, Wayne (1980-81)
150 Years of litigation and dispute Settlment: A Court Tale
Law and Society Review Vol15 No 3-4 p
Mehan, Hugh (1983)
The Role of Language and the Language of Role in Institutional Decision
Making
Language and Society Vol 12:187-211
398
Mehan, Hugh and Houston Wood (1975)
An Image of Man for Ethnomethodology
Philosophy of the Social Sciences VoI5:365-376
Mertz, Elizabeth (1992)
Language, Law, and Social Meanings: Linguistic/Anthropological
Contributions to the Study of Law
Law and Society Review Vol26 No 2
Metzger, Terri R. and Wayne A. Beach (1996)
Preserving Alternative Versions: Interactional Techniques for Organizing
Courtroom Cross-Examinations
Communication Research Vol23 No 6:749-765
Miller, Gale and James A. Holstein (1995)
Dipute Domains: Organizational Contexts and Dispute Processing
Sociological Quarterly Vol. 36 No 1:37-59
Miller, Richard E. and Austin Sarat (1980-81)
Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture
Law and Society Review Vol IS No 3-4 P
Milton, Richard (1994)
Forbidden Science:Exposing the Secrets of Suppressed Research
London Fourth Estate
Moerman, Michael (1973)




Talking Culture: Ethnography and Conversation Analysis
Philadelphia Uni. of Philadelphia Press
Moore, Sally Falk (1992)
Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers What To Say To
Africans About Running "Their Own" Native Courts
Law and Society Review Vol26 No 1
Morrison, Kenneth L. (1981)
Some Properties of 'Telling-Order Design' in Didactic Enquiry
Philosopy of the Social Sciences Vol 11
399
Morrison, Ken (1989)
Some Researchable Recurrences in Disciplinary-Specific Enquiry (Chapter 8
in ...)




Agreement and Disagreement in Conversations and letters
Text Vol5 No 2:201-227
Mulkay, Michael (1985b)
The Word and the World
London George Allen and Unwin
Murray, Denise E. (1988)
The Context of Oral and Written Language: A Framework for Mode and
Medium Switching
Language and Society Vol 17:351-357
O'Keefe, D. (1980)
Ethnomethodology
J. of Social Behaviour Vol9 No 2:187-219
Ong, Walter J. (1982)




New York Free Press
Peay, Jill (1989)
Tribunals on Trial: A Study of Decision-Making Under the Mental Health Act
1983
Oxford Oxford University Press
Perakyla, Anssi (1997)
Reliability and Validity in Research Based on Tapes and Transcripts (Chapter
13 in ...)
David Silvennan (ed)
Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice.
London Sage
Peyrot, M. (1982)
Understanding Ethnomethodology: A Remedy for some Misconceptions
Human Studies Vol. 5:261-283
400
Pollner, M. (1975)
"The Very Coinage of your Brain": The Anatomy of reality Disjunctures
Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol 5:411-430
Polner, Melvin (1979)
Explicative Transactions: Making and Managing Meaning in a Traffic Court
(in ..)
Psathas, George (ed)
Everyday Language: Studies in Ethnomethodology
New York Irvington Pub.
Pomerantz, Anita M. (1978)
Compliment Responses: Notes on the Co-operation of Multiple Constraints
(p79-112 in ...)
Jim Schenkein (ed)
Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction
New York: Academic Press.
Pomerantz, Anita (1984)
Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some Features of Prefered and
Disprefered Tum Shapes. (Chapter 4 in ...)
J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage
Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis
Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Pomerantz, Anita (1987)
Descriptions in Legal Settings (Chapter 9 in ...)
Button, Graham and John R. E. Lee (eds)
Talk and Social Organisation
Clevedon Philidelphia Multilingual Matters Ltd
Pomerantz, Anita and J. Maxwell Atkinson (1984a)
Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis, and the Study of Courtroom
Interaction (Chapter 21 in ..)
Muller, DJ., D.E. Blackman, and A.J. Chapman (eds)
Psychology and Law
Chicester John Wiley and Sons
Pomerantz, Anita (1984b)
Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some Features of
PreferredlDispreferred Tum Shapes (in ...)
J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds)
Structures of Social Action
Cambridge Cambridge University Press.
401
Popper, Karl (1959)
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
La Salle, Illanois Open Court
Raffel, Stanley (1979)
Matters of Fact: A Sociological Inquiry
London Routledge & Kegan Paul
Ralphs, Enid and Geoffrey Norman (1992)
The Magistrate as Chairman
London Butterworths
Richards, Stewart (1987)
Philosophy and Sociology of Science (2nd Edition)
Oxford Blackwell
Rogers, Mary (1984)




Rosen, Sidney and Abraham Tesser (1970)




Civil Justice Research and Civil Justice Reform
Law nd Society Review Vol IS No 3-4 P
Sacks, Harvey (1984)
Notes on Methodology (Chapter 2 in ..)
J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds)
Structures of Social Action:Studies in Conversation Analysis
Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Sacks, Harvey (1992)
Lectures on Conversation (Two volumes)
Oxford Basil Blackwell
Sacks, Harvey., E. Schegloff and G. Jefferson (1974)




Why do Public Bureaucracies Follow Legal Rules
International Journal of the Sociology of Law Vol. 9:69-84
Schegloff, Emanuel (1982b)
Discourse as an Interactional Achievement: Some uses of "uh huh" and Things
that Come Between Sentences (In ...)
D. Tannen (ed)
Analysing Discourse:Text and Talk
Washington D. C. Georgetown University Press:71-93.
Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1987)
Between Micro and Macro: Contexts and Other Connections (Chapter 9 ..)
Jeffrey C. Alexander et al (eds)
The Micro-Macro Link







On Talk and its Institutional Occasions (Chapter 3 in ...)
P. Drew and J. Heritage (eds)
Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings
Cambridge Cambridge University Press
Schwartz, Howard and Jerry Jacobs (1979)
Qualitative Sociology: A Method to the Madness
New York, Free Press.
Sharrock, Wes and Bob Anderson (1987)
Epilogue: The definition of alternatives: Some Sources of Confusion in
Interdisciplinary Discussion (Chapter 12 in ...)
Graham Button and John R. E. Lee (eds)
Talk and Social Organisation
Clevedon Philidelphia Multilingual Matters Ltd
Silbey, Susan S. (1980-81)
Case Processing: Consumer protection in an Attorney General's Office
Law and Society Review Vol15 No 3-4 P
Smith, Dorothy E. (1987)
The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology
Boston Northeastern University Press
403
Smith, Dorothy E. (1990a)
The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge
Boston Northeastern University Press
Smith, Dorothy E. (1990b)
Texts, Facts, and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling
London Routledge
Smith, Roger (ed) (1992)
A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990's'
London Legal Action Group
Smith, Roger (ed) (1995)
Shaping the Future: New Directions in Legal Services
London Legal Action Group
Smith, Roger (ed) (1996)
Achieving Justice: Appropriate Dispute Resolution for the 1990's'.
London Legal Action Group
ten Have, Paul (1990)
Methodological issues in conversation analysis
Bulletin de methodologie sociologique Vol 27:23-51
Travers, Max (1994)
The Phenomenon of the 'Radical Lawyer'
Sociology Vol28 Nol:245-258
Travers, Max (1993)
Putting the Sociology Back into the Sociology of Law
Journal of Law and Society Vol 20 N04:438-451
Travers, Max (1996)
Studying Law-in-Action: The Case of British Immigration Courts
Conference Paper delivered at Law and Society Association, University of
Strathclyde, 10-13 July, 1996.
Travers, Max (1997)
Preaching to the Converted? Improving the Persuasiveness of Criminal Justice
Reaseach
British Journal of Criminology Vol 37:359-377
Trubek, David M. (1980-8Ia)
Studying Courts in Context
Law and Society Review Vol15 No 3-4 P
404
Trubek, David M. (1980-81 b)
The Construction and deconstruction of a Disputes Focussed Approach: An
Afterword
Law and Society Review Vol 15 No 3-4 P
Vidmar, Neil (1984)
The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical
Investigation'
Law and Society Review Vol 18 No 4:515-550
Wall, D, and Adrian Wood (1994)
The Administration of Criminal Legal Aid in the Magistrates' Courts of
England and Wales
Centre For Criminal Justice Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Leeds,
England
Walker, Anne Griffam (1986)
The Verbatim Record: The Myth and the Reality (Chapter 10 in ...)
S. Fisher and A.D. Todd (eds)
Discourse and Institutional Authority: Medicine, Education and Law
Advances in Discourse Processes Vol. XIX
Norwood, New Jersey Ablex
Watson, Rodney (1992)
The Understanding of Language Use in Everyday life: Is There a Common
Ground (Chapter 1 in ..)
Edited by Graham Watson and Robert M. Seiler
Text in Context: Contributions to Ethnomethodology
London Sage
Watson, Rod (1997)
Ethnomethodology and Textual Analysis (Chapter 6 in ..)
David Silverman (ed)
Qualitative Research: Theory Method and Practice
London Sage
Weissbourd, Bernard and Elizabeth Mertz (1985)
Rule Centrism Versus Legal Creativity: The Skewing of Legal Ideology
Through Language
Law and Society Review Vol19 No 4:623-659
West, Candace and Don H. Zimmerman (1982)
Conversation Analysis (Chapter 9 in)
Klaus R. Scherer and Paul Ekman (eds)
Handbook of Methods in Nonverbal Behaviour Research
Cambridge Cambridge University Press
405
West, Candace and Don H. Zimmerman (1983)
Small Insults: A Study of Interruptions in Cross-Sex Conversations with
Unacquainted Persons (pl02-117 in ...)
B. Thome, C. Kramarea, and N. Henley (eds)
Language, Gender and Society
Rowley, MA, Newbury House,.
Westman, Margareta (1984)
On Strategy in Swedish Legal Texts
Text Vol4 Nol-3:57-70
Wheeler, Stanton (1969)
Problems and Issues in Record Keeping (Chapter 1 in ..)
Stanton Wheeler (ed)
On Record: Files and Dossiers in American Life
New York Russell Sage Foundation
White, James Boyd (1984)
When Words Lose their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of
Language, Character, and Community
Chicago Chicago University Press
Wieder, Lawrence D. (1971)
On Meaning by Rule (Chapter 5 in ..)
Jack D. Douglas (ed)
Understanding Everyday life
London Routledge Kegan Paul
Wiessbourd, Bernard and Elizabeth Mertz (1985)
Rule-Centrism Versus Legal Creativity: The Skewing of Legal Ideology
Through Language
Law and Society Review Vol. 19 No. 4:623-659
Wilson, Thomas P. and Don H. Zimmerman (1979-80)
Ethnomethodology, Sociology and Theory
Humboult Journal of Social Relations Vol. 7 No 1:52-88
Winch, Peter (1958)
The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy
London Routledge & Kegan Paul
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958)




Administrative Justice within the Legal Aid Board: Reviews by Caseworkers
and Area Committees of Refusals of Criminal Legal Aid Applications.
(Chapter 8 in ...)
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty
Young, Richard and David Wall (1996)
London Blackstone Press
Wooffitt, Robin (1992)
Telling Tales of the Unexpected: The organization of Factual Discourse
Hemel Hempstead Harvester Wheatsheaf
Wraith, R. E. & P. G. Hutchinson (1973)
Administrative Tribunals
London George Allen & Unwin Ltd
Wootton, A.J. (1989)
Remarks on the methodology of conversation analysis (Chapter 11 in..)
Conversation
Edited by Derek Roger and Peter Bull
Clevedon Philidelphia Multilingual Matters Ltd
Young, Richard and David Wall (eds) (1996)
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty
London Blackstone Press
Young, Richard (1996)
Will Widgery Do?: Court Clerks, Discretion, and the Determination of Legal
Aid Applications (Chapter 7 in ...)
Young, Richard and David Wall (eds)
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty
London Blackstone Press
Zimmerman, Don H. (1969)
Record-Keeping and the Intake Process in a Public Welfare Agency (Chapter
11 in ..)
Stanton Wheeler (ed)
On Record: Files and Dossiers in American Life
New York Russell Sage Foundation
Zimmerman, Don H. (1971)
The Practicalities of Rule Use (Chapter 9 in ..)
Jack Douglas (1971)
Undersatnding Everyday Life
London Routledge Kegan Paul
407
